Reform or Referendum The UK, Ireland and the Future of Europe I would like to begin by thanking Noelle O Connell and Maurice Pratt (on behalf of the European Movement Ireland) for inviting me to speak today. It is an honour to be asked to speak on the panel and whilst I certainly do not profess to speak for everyone in Northern Ireland, I am delighted that a Northern Ireland speaker has the opportunity to give a view on this issue. It s also serendipitous that I am, to some degree, picking up the question where Ken left off, looking at the background to Northern Ireland s relationship with the EU through the lens of identity, which remains a sensitive and contested issue. In Northern Ireland, what was a historic conflict between Britain and Ireland and one which continued to fester post-partition, was resolved at least from a GB and Irish perspective with the Good Friday Agreement. Even prior to the Good Friday Agreement, whilst Ireland may have continued to exert a constitutional claim on Northern Ireland, politics and society here moved on and forged out a new form of Irish society from which those on the other side of the border were, by and large, at a remove. Equally, whilst Britain may have stated that Northern Ireland was an integral part of the UK, its priority in UK terms was largely dictated by the demands it made on the security and financial resources of the state and the risk that it posed to the wider security of Great Britain. As a result of the continuing tensions in Northern Ireland, there has developed a kind of uber-unionism and a form of frontier nationalism much more excessively and aggressively displayed than in the South or in GB. At times, taken to its extremes, it feels almost like a parody of national identity and I can only imagine would feel quite alien to those who share that nationality but reside outside Northern Ireland. The truth is that both Britain and Ireland saw the Good Friday Agreement as the end of their territorial dispute. They have been able to agree self-determination for the people of Northern Ireland and, in doing so, have largely freed themselves to move beyond the territorial struggle which defined their relationship for so long. 1 P a g e
They are now nation states in Europe with a common interest in many things banking and the economy, cooperation on organised crime, as island nations with a shared interest in agriculture and fishing and, the risk is that the identity crisis in Northern Ireland makes it increasingly something of an anomaly in that positive relationship. NI itself is a distinct region within these islands and within Europe. Borders and nationhood have become less defined and differentiated with the EU as the emphasis has been on regions and interconnectedness. It is one of the reasons why as a Party, our emphasis is so strongly on resolving those internal relationships, rather than on the constitutional question which remains the main cleavage in NI politics despite having been settled in the Good Friday Agreement. As an island off an island off a continent that is no longer the centre of the universe, Ireland has used its membership of the EU to powerful effect in positioning itself as a European hub, as a nation at the centre of Europe despite its physical peripherality and it was highly apparent during the recent Scottish independence campaign that the SNP had noted Ireland s example and endeavoured to do the same. With the rise of countries like Brazil, China, India as economic powerhouses, the need to be part of something bigger to attract that attention is more and more compelling and is being driven home by global investors, including the US, in their warnings to the UK about the impact of any split from the EU on future inward investment. For Northern Ireland, membership of the EU is essential to our future economic growth because it allows us to access these emerging markets; in addition to this, around 40% of Northern Ireland s exports are to the rest of the EU and the free movement of goods and labour make it massively easier for Northern Ireland businesses to sell their products. Further, the EU has funded PEACE programmes in Northern Ireland, which have sought to forge and protect a Shared Future through peace and reconciliation work, developing shared spaces and promoting integrated education. 2 P a g e
However, we in Northern Ireland also need to think about what we can contribute to the EU and to the construction of democratic institutions and good governance particularly in divided societies elsewhere in the Continent. We should know, from conflicts right on our boundaries, most obviously recently in Ukraine, that peace-building is far from a luxury option it is an absolute necessity for our and our neighbours security. The EU can cooperate better than it currently does on these matters, and we can be at the forefront. A more enthusiastic membership of the EU also has the potential to alter our wee country attitude and turn Northern Ireland into an outward and open-minded place, ready to play a bigger role in world affairs. However, our attitude to the EU cannot usually be described as enthusiastic, and I believe this stems from UK-wide euroscepticism too often fuelled by fearmongering, populist headlines and political discourse. It is notable that the push to leave the EU is driven largely by a form of English nationalism which is in many ways a more traditional style of nationalism than we see in the rest of these islands today. It is interesting that outside of England the main support for that position comes from NI Unionist politicians, and I suspect that the reasons are similar. It is also more marked by a desire for independence from rather than interdependence with surrounding nations. Whilst some of that can be explained by the psychology of being an island nation, Ireland has, by contrast, much more readily embraced its European identity. I suspect that some of that discomfort with having to partner and negotiate a future with others stems, at least in part, from being for a long time the lynch-pin nation of the largest Empire and effectively masters of their own destiny, and for that matter the destinies of many others. Now to have to deal with people and nations from a position not of weakness but of equality is a difficult transition to make for some. That largely English-driven isolationism feeds into the push we are seeing now to address that West Lothian question, and address the matter of NI, Welsh and Scottish MPs having a say on English only matters. However, rather than doing so by creating devolved institutions for England (or indeed for regions within England as the Cornish and others would wish to see), the suggestion is to resolve the anomaly by excluding non-english MPs from votes in Westminster. This poses a real challenge to UK Parliament as, particularly for the smaller constituent nations, even on issues which are entirely devolved, such as welfare, health and pensions, decisions taken at Westminster still have impact in NI, for example, through budgets and systems which we are reliant upon for the delivery of local service. 3 P a g e
Whilst you would assume that influence within the as powerful an institution as the EU would be an attractive prospect to those who are frustrated by devolution and its impact on England, the complete converse is true. This view is not only utterly perplexing to people like me who can see the obvious benefits of the EU, but is also dangerous for the UK s overall stability. Setting aside the economic and philosophical arguments for membership of the EU, at the most basic level, after the UK s exit, the EU will still exist. It will still take decisions which will have political, environmental and social implications for the UK and its citizens. The UK will still have to engage with the EU as our nearest neighbours and significant trading partners. However, by giving up its seat at the table where decisions are made, the UK will weaken its ability to shape the EU and to guide those decisions to the benefit of its people. An added complication to the UK s relationship with the EU is the threat or potential of a referendum on UK membership. At best, a referendum would be costly, would discourage potential investors and would distract political parties at a time when constructive engagement with the EU is most essential; at worst, it would be hugely destabilising to the economy and society and divisive, both in the UK as a whole and specifically in NI, where the debate will be overlain with the sectarian political weave of local politics. The so-called rise of UKIP has sought to push calls for an in/out referendum up the political agenda, as well as the public consciousness. UKIP have succeeded in marrying the issue of EU membership with that of immigration: a dangerous mix. I am deeply concerned at the rise of xenophobia and the deep mistrust of immigrants, which has been seen in my own constituency of Belfast East only too recently, in the form of physical assaults, intimidation and damage to the property of immigrants living locally. It is not merely a local issue, however, as the narrative which underpins it is propagated more widely and perhaps more easily in the difficult economic times in which we live. I am often baffled by the willingness of some politicians and commentators to continue to peddle the contradiction that immigrants are coming over here, taking our jobs whilst simultaneously scrounging from our benefits system and their ability to do so without serious challenge. Immigrants are type-cast only as the consumers of public services, but 4 P a g e
never as the contributor or provider, despite the huge evidence to the contrary. In my own constituency, when faced with complaints about Polish workers being contracted in Harland & Wolff as an example of the dangers of immigration, I did point out that Gustav Wolff was not a particularly local name so some immigration had driven our economy for a long time. If we tie in the added sectarian element in NI arguably anti-eu campaigners will be seen as pro-british and pro-eu campaigners as anti-british or even pro-irish this is a truly alarming prospect for a still-fragile peace process in Northern Ireland. In conclusion, to counter this, I believe we should have open and honest public discourse about the future of the EU. The EU in its current form is not perfect: we do not have to pretend it is to be pro-european. Rather, I would prefer to fully explore options for reform, such as strengthening Human Rights framework, changes to the Common Agricultural Policy, a review of the bureaucracy associated with the EU and more accessible voting records and expenses claims for MEPs, ensuring they are held to account. We also need to acknowledge that if we want to be in a position to influence reform, the best place is at the centre rather than hanging around the door straining to leave. We must also seek to emphasise the benefits of EU membership in a way which translates to the general public, the grass roots. The potential implications for businesses are wellknown, and the previous speakers have illustrated these very well; however, my own constituents are unlikely to be moved by arguments around the financial services industry or the City of London: it simply does not appear relevant to them. Only when we make clear that it is not just our economy and our trading relationships which are on the line here, but also our security and our role and influence in the world, can we have a proper debate about the EU and about the vast, if often unspoken, benefits that it brings to each and every one of us. Thank you. 5 P a g e