Submitted by Ashok Kumar Chakma Development worker Rangamati

An assessment of the UNDP-CHTDF project on Promotion of Development and Confidence Building in the Chittagong Hill Tracts relating to implementation of the CHT Accord 1997 Submitted by Ashok Kumar Chakma Development worker Rangamati 1 P a g e

Sl Table of Contents Page Executive Summary 1 Introduction 1.1 Background of the study 1.2 Objectives of the study 1.3 Specific objectives 1.4 Methodology of the study 1.5 Limitations of the study 1.6 Definition of the terms 2 Contexts of Conflict, Development and Peacebuilding in CHT 2.1 The CHT Conflict: Causes and dynamics 2.2. Peace Process and the CHT Accord of 1997 2.3 Development in Chittagong Hill Tracts 2.4 Priorities for development and peace-building in the post-accord period 3 Key findings of the UNDP-CHTDF Project 3.1 Background of the UNDP-CHTDF project in CHT 3.2 UNDP-CHTDF s Project: Problem analysis, development goal and strategies 3.3 Key areas of the CHTDF activities and outputs 3.3.1 Economic Development 3.3.2 Education 3.3.3 Health Program 3.3.4 Community empowerment 3.3.5 Confidence building 3.3.6 Capacity development 3.3.7 Gender mainstreaming 4 Assessment of the Impacts of the CHTDF project 4.1 Impacts of the region-wide initiatives on education, health, economic development and gender equity 4.2 Impacts of the core components of the CHTDF project 4.2.1 Impacts of community empowerment 4.2.2 Impacts of Capacity Development 4.2.3 Impacts of Confidence Building 5 Gaps between the people s priorities and CHTDF s intervention in the post-accord period 6 Exit/future plan of the CHTDF project 7 Conclusions and recommendations Bibliography Annexure 2 P a g e

Acronyms ADB Asian Development Bank ADP Annual Development Plan AFG Adivasi Facilitator s Group AL Awami League ARI Acute respiratory infections BNP Bangladesh National Party CB Confidence Building CD Capacity Development CDP Capacity Development Plan CEP Community Empowerment Project CF Community Facilitator CHSW Community Health Services Worker CHT Chittagong Hill Tracts CHTC Chittagong Hill Tracts Commission CHTDB Chittagong Hill Tracts Development Board CHTDF Chittagong Hill Tracts Development Facility CHTRC Chittagong Hill Tracts Regional Council CHTRDP CHT Rural Development Project CHTWoN Chittagong Hill Tracts Women s Network CIDA Canadian International Development Agency CIPD Centre for Integrated Program and Development DC Deputy Commissioner EC European Commission ED Economic Development EU European Union FFS Farmer field Schools GoB Government of Bangladesh GoC General Officer Commanding HDC Hill District Council ICDP Integrated Community Development Project IDP Internally Displaced People IGA Income Generating Activities ILO International Labour Organization IWGIA International Work Group for Indigenous Affairs LoA Letter of Agreement M&E Monitoring and Evaluation MG Mothers Group MLE Multi-lingual Education MoCHTA Ministry of Chittagong Hill Tracts Affairs MoPME Ministry of Primary and Mass Education NCCHT National Committee on Chittagong Hill Tracts 3 P a g e

NGO NSC PCJSS PDC PNDG ProDoc QIF SMC TAC UN UNDP UNDRIP UnFC UNICEF UP UzAC VAW WFP Non Governmental Organization National Steering Committee Parbattya Chattagram Jana Sanghati Samiti Para Development Community Para Nari Development Group Project Document Quick Impact Fund School Management Committees Technical Advisory Committee United Nations United Nations Development Programme United Nations Declaration on Right of Indigenous Peoples Union Facilitation Committee United nations Children Fund Union Parishad Upazila Advisory Committees Violence Against Women World Food Programme 4 P a g e

Acknowledgements This study has been carried out with support from the Centre for Integrated Program and Development (CIPD) with an objective to provide the community leaders and civil society organisations including the development agencies with the first hand information of UNDP- CHTDF s project on Promotion of Development and Confidence Building in Chittagong Hill Tracts, which had been the largest project in terms of budget allocation in the post-accord period. This project is going on for about 10 years since 2003. This study makes an attempt to assess how far the CHTDF s project has contributed to overall implementation of the CHT Accord. For this study, the data were collected both from the primary and secondary sources. During the field work, the study team received cordial support from para development committees (PDCs), partner NGOs workers, traditional and elected leaders. Thanks go to them for their kind support. I would also like to express thanks and appreciation to Nyo Hla Mong Marma, who gladly took the responsibility to conduct the field works and interviews with PDCs in Khagrachari and Bandarban. I owe much to him for his kind support and valuable inputs into this report. Thanks also go to the CEP partner NGOs colleagues and the Adivasi Facilitator s Group (AFG) members for their support during the field work. Special thanks go to Nae Prue Merry for her support to connect me with UP Chairmen and members. Finally, I would like to accord thanks to all those who provided valuable comments and inputs to finalise this report. Ashok Kumar Chakma Development Worker Rangamati November 2013 E: ashok.chakma@gmail.com 5 P a g e

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Following the CHT Accord in 1997, new hopes and aspirations have emerged among the people in CHT for peace and development. In the post-accord situation, many international development agencies have come forward to support development interventions in CHT. In terms of budget allocations and long-term presence, UNDP-CHTDF was the largest development partner in CHT in the post-accord period. The CHTDF s project of Promotion of development and confidence building in the Chittagong Hill Tracts was set out to achieve accelerated and sustainable socio-economic development, with a particular focus on confidence building among the people and CHT institutions to promote long term peace in the CHT region. Since 2003 until today, UNDP-CHTDF has implemented various activities covering a wide range of issues such as community empowerment, local economic development, basic services (health and education) and confidence building. Now the CHTDF project is about to phase out. On this backdrop, this study, by looking at the ground reality of the CHTDF project, aims to provide an account of what have been done and achieved so far by the UNDP-CHTDF s project towards promotion of development and peace-building vis-a-vis implementation of the CHT Accord. It is also expected that based on the assessment of the study, CHT people, especially civil society members and development organisations will make advocacy and lobby with UNDP as other international development partners to address the critical issues of the CHT Accord in the future course of development intervention in CHT. To carry out the study, data were collected both from the primary and secondary sources. The key grassroots stakeholders Union Councils chairmen and members, traditional leaders and PDCs (village development committees) officials, local partner NGOs executives and frontline workers, relevant CHTDF officials and CHTRC Councilors were interviewed to gather data from the primary source. Apart from interviews with the key grassroots stakeholders, project documents, evaluation reports and annual reports of UNDP-CHTDF were reviewed. Academic journal articles and daily news paper reports were also consulted to understand the core issues of CHT. The study shows that the major causes of the CHT conflict resulted from the continuous denial of identity, self-rule system and development aggression by successive regimes from the British period to the present Bangladesh times. In the post-independence of Bangladesh, the struggle of indigenous peoples got a momentum when their identities and cultures have been denied by the newly emerged state. To protect their own distinct national and cultural identities, indigenous peoples of CHT led by PCJSS waged guerilla warfare against the government of Bangladesh. In response to the guerilla warfare, the government of Bangladesh (GoB) conceived an economic solution. To bring the CHT into development, the GoB, since the mid 70s through establishing the Chittagong Hill Tracts Development Board (CHTDB), has implemented various development projects on social, economic and infrastructural development. These economic development projects could not bring to an end to the guerilla warfare rather served the purpose of counter-insurgency operations, by facilitating military mobility across the whole CHT. Later the GoB was seen to implement the two radical measures military intervention and transfer of Bengali settlers from the plain region to the hills. Apart from militarisation of the whole CHT region, some 400,000 Bengali settlers from the plain region were transferred into CHT under the aegis of the government. To resist these ill moves of the government, PCJSS took up arms. The armed conflict between the GoB forces and PCJSS continued until 2 December 1997 when the CHT Accord was signed. 6 P a g e

In the post-accord period, UNDP-CHTDF has come up with the package of promotion of development and confidence building in CHT financed by the European Union and other donors. This project had been designed under the five key strategic areas: Capacity building of CHT institution; Service delivery (on education, health and economic development); Community empowerment (CE); Confidence building (CB) and Enhancing the UNDP-CHTDFs operational and infrastructural capacity. Of these components, the capacity building of CHT institutions and CB were the core components which were expected to directly support implementation of the CHT Accord vis-a-vis political empowerment, while the rest components were expected to do with economic and social development in the post-conflict situation. The findings of the study suggest that the components on basic services (health and education) and economic development are quite visible and the achievements seem to be fairly on track as per the project plan. Through these components, CHTDF provided development services to some 3257 remote village communities across the whole CHT. On any aspect, this coverage should be treated a grand success. However, the sustainability of these components after the CHTDF s withdrawal remains a big concern. The core components such as the capacity development (CD) and confidence building (CB) were expected to deal with the critical issues of the CHT Accord implementation, e.g. resolution of land disputes, rehabilitation of internally displaced persona (IDPs), returnee refugees and ex-combatants, devolution of authority to CHTRC and HDCs, election of HDCs, demilitarization of CHT, and formation of mixed police force etc. But UNDP-CHTDF could not touch on any of these critical issues due to a host of reasons, such as lack of political will of the government, and lack of capacities of the CHT institutions (MoCHTA, CHTRC, and HDCs). On the other hand, UNDP was allegedly remained too lenient to surrendering to the government policy on the question of implementing these critical issues of the CHT Accord. As such, the CHTDF project could not bring in tangible results in peace building vis-à-vis implementation of the CHT Accord. The study suggests that for peace building or implementation of the critical issues of CHT Accord, it needs structural changes to the state policies. To bring in such changes depends on the political will of the government. Given the present complex political situation in Bangladesh, this study gives an emphasis on drawing political support from different stakeholders like political parties, members of parliament, civil society, and academics including civil and military bureaucrats. Taking all these factors into account, the following recommendations are made to support the confidence building measures vis-a-vis implementation of the CHT Accord: To the CHT institutions (MoCHTA, CHTRC and HDCs) Work together to reach a common understanding on the recognition of indigenous peoples in the constitution of Bangladesh; To draw a common vision, political consensus and guidance on development and implementation of the CHT Accord; High level policy advocacy led by MoCHTA and CHTRC to influence decision-making at the national level with regards to CHT affairs. Continuous goal oriented policy dialogues with the key stakeholders on CHT affairs, particularly on the critical issues such as resolution of land disputes, devolution of authority to CHTRC and HDCs, demilitarization of CHT, and formation of mixed police force etc. Strengthening the MoCHTA including appointment of officers who are sensitized with indigenous issues. In case of appointment, indigenous persons should be given preference. 7 P a g e

Sensitization of the civil and military bureaucrats on CHT issues. To UNDP and donor community All development programs/projects must support implementation of the CHT Accord. Before designing the projects/programs, a proper analysis of conflict should be carried out. To support implementation of the CHT Accord, specific projects should be designed to work on the critical issues that include land dispute resolution, rehabilitation of IDPs, returnee refugees and ex-combatants, preparation of electoral roll for HDCs, and formation of mixed police force in CHT. To involve civil society organisations and local NGOs in implementation of all development programs in CHT. To explore the opportunities to work in partnership with other national bodies such as Bangladesh National Human Rights Commission to protect human rights violations in CHT. To explore the opportunities to work with the members of parliaments, who might uphold the interest of indigenous peoples and give political support for peace building in CHT. For instance, the Parliamentary Caucus on indigenous peoples headed by the Worker s Party chief Mr. Rashed Khan Menon, worked on constitutional recognition of indigenous peoples during the constitutional amendment by the current grand alliance government. This experience of the Parliamentary Caucus might be replicated in the future work. Support media campaign on specific issues to remove people s misconceptions or ramifications on implementation of the Accord. For example, mass people in plain region do have a general misconception that Bengalis cannot buy land in CHT or adivasi identity will tell upon the state s sovereignty etc. Media campaign should be launched to remove such misconceptions about specific issues related to implementation of the CHT Accord. To Civil society and local development organisations Civil society organisations (CSO) and NGOs can play a watchdog role. They can monitor the development activities including the UNDP-CHTDF program in CHT; CSOs and NGOs can publish annual status report on the development and peace building activities in CHT. Organise community based organisations (CBOs) to articulate people s perspectives on development and peacebuilding in CHT. 8 P a g e

SECTION 1: INTRODUCTION 1.1 Background of the study The Chittagong Hill Tracts (CHT) is situated in the south-eastern part of Bangladesh. It is geographically, politically, socially and culturally different from other parts of the country. CHT, a home to 11 indigenous communities, is the only region in Bangladesh, where the majority of the indigenous peoples is found. Since the mid 1970s, the indigenous peoples of the CHT under the leadership of PCJSS, the indigenous political party, have waged an armed struggle for the right of self-determination. This armed struggle continued until 2 December 1997, when an accord, popularly known as the CHT Peace Accord was signed between the government of Bangladesh and PCJSS. The CHT Accord ended the decade-long armed conflict in the region by recognizing the special governance systems under the indigenous leadership such as CHT Regional Council, and 3 Hill Districts Councils alongside the traditional administrative systems. The CHT Accord lays down a framework for overall development in the CHT. As the CHT Accord created an enabling environment for peace and development, many international development agencies have come forward to support development interventions in the post-accord period. Of them UNDP-CHTDF has come up with the first ever largest development package of USD 160.5 million to implement a project titled Promotion of Development and Confidence Building in the Chittagong Hill Tracts. This is a multi-sectoral project focused on a wide range of development issues such as capacity building of CHT institutions, local economic development, community empowerment, region-wide development initiatives (health and education), and confidence building for sustainable development and peace in the CHT region. Since 2005 until now, the project covered 3257 para communities (villages) across the CHT. Now this project is at the phasing out stage. Unofficial sources indicate that the CHTDF project will be wrapped up by 2013 followed by a new phase in 2014. The National Steering Committee of the project in its last meeting held in March 2012 approved an extension to the project until September 2015. However, there is no clear information about the phase out plan of the UNDP- CHTDF program; whereas from the CHTDF-UNDP s side, as of now, no initiative has been seen to consult with the indigenous peoples, civil society members and CHT institutions. As such, the civil society, development organisations and CHT institutions are in the dark about the future CHTDF program. On this backdrop, CIPD (Centre for Integrated Program and Development), a non-government development organization, has supported this study with an objective to provide better understanding of what have been done and achieved so far by the UNDP-CHTDF s project on promotion of development and confidence-building in the post-accord period. Within this objective the study also makes an attempt to assess whether the CHTDF s development interventions were supportive to implementing the CHT Accord, and whether it promoted the local people s perspective on self-determined development in accordance with the principles of the CHT Accord and international laws and policies related to indigenous peoples. The final output of this study is also expected to be used for lobby and advocacy with donors and development agencies on the future work of UNDP in CHT region. 1.2 Objectives of the study The overall objective of the study is to assess how far the UNDP s program of promotion of development and confidence-building has contributed to implementation of the CHT Accord. In particular, the study will assess whether the UNDP s intervention has contributed to addressing 9 P a g e

the core issues of development and special governance systems vis-à-vis peacebuilding as envisioned in the CHT Accord. 1.3 Specific Objectives: The specific objectives of the study are: 1. To assess the CHTDF s intervention what have been done and achieved so far for development and confidence building in the post-accord situation; 2. To assess the UNDP s program whether it has been relevant and effective to addressing the fundamental issues of self-determined development and special governance system in the CHT in line with the CHT Accord; 3. To assess the impacts of the UNDP s program activities on the overall situation of indigenous peoples, with a particular focus on economic, social, political, ethnic and gender relations. 1.4 Methodology of the study This study is largely drawn on the qualitative methods for collecting data to assess the CHTDF project. These include the review of literature, key informant interviews, field visits to PDCs, and focus group discussions with PDC officials. The documents of the CHTDF projects, annual progress reports (2006 to 2011), project evaluation reports, survey reports, project completion reports and briefing papers produced by the CHTDF were reviewed to get the whole picture of the project s achievements. To gather information about the issues of conflict, and development priorities for the CHT in the post- Accord period, the documents published from various sources e.g. articles, research reports and journals, the CHT Accord, the Rangamati Declaration, UNDRIP etc. were consulted. To gather data from the primary sources and also to verify the information gathered from the literature review, the researcher supported by two research assistants visited 30 para communities (Para Development Committees PDCs) in three hill districts (see Annex A: the list of PDCs). During the community visits, PDC officials were interviewed. Focus group discussions were held with key PDC executives (e.g. president, general secretary and treasurer and PDC members). To gain an in-depth understanding of the impacts of the CHTDF program, particularly CEP component, a few cases were also recorded. Apart from visits to communities, key informants who include Union Council Chairmen and members, CHTDF officials, NGO Executive Directors, Community Facilitators (CF), Project Coordinators and social leaders were interviewed to understand their views and perception about the overall achievements and impacts of the CHTDF program at the community level. To understand the policy issues and strategic guidance of the project, CHTDF high officials, and CHTRC councilor and HDC councilors were interviewed (see Annex B: the list of persons interviewed). While collecting data, the lead researcher was supported by the Adivasi Facilitation Group (AFG), and the NGO staff. Data also were collected from the M&E data on CEP activities prepared by the partner NGOs in three hill districts. On the preliminary findings of the study, a briefing session was organised in Dhaka attended by civil society members from CHT. 10 P a g e

1.5 Limitations of the study The CHTDF intervention is a multi-sectoral program, of which each component may need indepth investigation to assess the impacts at community and policy levels. Given the time constraints and objective of the study, it was not possible to do in-depth assessment of each component. Political instability such as frequent hartals interrupted the field work and interview schedules with many of the key informants. As a result, the study team could not talk to the Councilors of three HDCs and MoCHTA as per the study plan. As such, their views and perceptions about the CHTDF s project on development and peace-building are still missing. Randomly 30 PDCs were visited in the three hill districts, but it was not possible to cover all indigenous communities. Therefore, views and perceptions from different ethnic groups as to the CHTDF s project are also missing. 1.6 Definition of the terms used in the study In this study a few terms such as confidence building, self-determined development and special governance system have been used. These are blanket terms, which have elastic meanings. Therefore, it is necessary to define some of the terms used in this study in order to avoid conceptual ambiguity. Confidence building 1 is a fluid concept equated with peace-building in the post-conflict situation, whereas academics and practitioners do not have consensus on the concept of peace-building as well. For working definition, the then UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali puts postconflict peace-building as to identify and support structures which will tend to strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid a relapse into conflict (An Agenda for Peace, 1992: para 21). According to GTZ (2001) peace-building refers to medium- and long-term measures aimed at setting up mechanisms of peaceful conflict management, overcoming the structural causes of violent conflicts and thereby creating the general conditions in which peaceful and just development can take place. These definitions suggest that peacebuilding measures aim at preventing recurrence of violent conflict once the existing violence has been halted. In this study, confidence-building or peacebuilding is interchangeably used to refer to the CHT Accord implementation. The concept of self-determined development 2 is very broad but must be elaborated and operationalised in the spirit of the right to self-determination as recognized by the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP). By virtue of this right, indigenous peoples have the right to determine their own social, economic and political status. 1 Interviewed G. K. Chakma, who stated that peacebuilding has a political connotation, which might be sensitive to the government in any ways, while the term confidence-building has a positive meaning. It was stated that due to the conflict situation over the past decades, real development could not take place in CHT. As such, confidence-building measures should be there to boost mutual trust and confidence of the CHT people and CHT institutions by creating socio-economic development opportunities at grassroots levels. 2 See Tauli-Corpuz, Victoria (2008). the Concept of indigenous peoples self-determined development or development with identity and culture: challenges and trajectories, Tebtebba Foundation Inc. and UNESCO, available at http://portal.unesco.org/culture/en/files/37745/12197591975concept_paper_indigenous_peoples D evelopment_with_identity.pdf/concept%2bpaper%2bindigenous%2bpeoples%2b%2bdevelopment%2b with%2bidentity.pdf 11 P a g e

To operationalise this right, ILO Convention 169 underscores the right to decide priorities for development (Article 7). This study refers the self-determined development to the principle of the right to self-determination, by which indigenous peoples have the right to decide own development priorities through their representative institutions, for instance, in case of CHT, they are the three Hill District Councils (HDC), CHT Regional Council (CHTRC) and MoCHTA alongside the traditional institutions - Karbaris, Headmen, and Circle chiefs. Special governance system 3 refers to the decentralized institutions established under the CHT Accord, such as the three Hill District Council (HDCs), CHTRC and traditional governance structures. 3 Unlike other parts of Bangladesh, the CHT Accord 1997 provides decentralized District Councils for the three hill districts Rangamati, Khagrachari and Bandarban with delegated authority over 33 subjects such as health, education, agriculture, land and land management etc. For details, see the 1st Schedule of the HDC Acts (amendment), 1998. 12 P a g e

SECTION 2: THE CONTEXTS OF CONFLICT, DEVELOPMENT AND PEACEBUILDING IN CHT To understand the CHTDF s project of development and confidence-building in the post-conflict situation, first it is necessary to have a look at the contexts of conflicts and development in the CHT region. This section briefly touches on: the causes of conflicts and dynamics; development paradigms in CHT; and the concept of development and confidence building as conceived by UNDP-CHTDF in the post-accord situation. 2.1 The CHT Conflict: causes and dynamics Indigenous peoples of CHT led by PCJSS started movement for autonomy to protect the distinct national and cultural identities, and protect themselves from the perceived exploitation and misery that they had been subjected during various regimes from the British colony to Bangladesh period (Jamil and Panday: 2009; Uttaran, 1985). Later this struggle took the violent form. The roots of the CHT conflict could be traced back into its political history. Before colonization the CHT region was administered through the traditional rajas (chiefs) without external interference (Larma, 2003; Roy, 2004a). With colonization by the British, the freedom of the traditional rajas had been curtailed, although the colonial rulers maintained autonomous administrative status of CHT through legislative measures 4. Then the Pakistani regimes undertook different destructive policies for CHT. Firstly, the Excluded Area status of CHT was diluted into the Tribal Inhabited Area in 1962, and then in 1964 it was completely scrapped off from the constitution of Pakistan to open CHT for outsider settlers. Secondly, in 1960s the Kaptai Hydro-electric dam was constructed in the name of development in the national interest. The dam led to massive natural resource appropriation and destruction on one hand, and human sufferings knew no bounds on the other. The cumulative effects of the hydroelectric dam were very colossal on the lives of indigenous peoples in CHT. In the newly independent Bangladesh, the state-building process took a different turn as Bangladesh was declared a mono-national and mono-cultural state based on Bengali nationalism by denying ethnic identities, religion and cultures of others (Chakma, 2010a). Equally the constitution made Bangladesh a unitary republic, leaving no room for autonomy in CHT. This denial of the newly independent state contributed to the creation of a sense of otherness politically, culturally and socially. Consequently indigenous peoples in CHT resorted to armed resistance for autonomy in CHT. In response to the demand for autonomy, the successive regimes of Bangladesh undertook various radical measures that included military intervention and transfer of Bengali settlers into CHT in 1980s under the state s sponsorship. These two measures took the structural root of the violent conflict in the CHT. As means of military solution to the CHT issue, the government of Bangladesh increased military camps across the CHT. Although no actual official figure was available, some sources estimated that 1 soldier for every 5-6 indigenous persons (Levene, 1999 cited in Chakma, 2010 b: 289), and 1 security force for every 10 indigenous persons had been deployed during the period from 1982 to 1990 (CHT Commission, 1991:35). Apart from military authority, the army was also given power to have control over civil affairs in CHT through the military order like Operation Uttoron (IWGIA, 2012). 4 The Chittagong Hill Tracts Regulation I of 1900 was enacted by the British for administration of CHT. By this regulation, the CHT was given an Excluded Area status, barring outsiders from buying land and settling down permanently in CHT.. 13 P a g e

In aid of the military forces, the government brought more than 400,000 Bengali settlers in three phases the 1 st phase (1978 81), the 2 nd phase (1981 1982) and the 3 rd phase (1982 1984) from plain districts into CHT (CHT Commission, 1994: 26; Chakma, 2010b). This population transfer program has drastically changed the demographic composition between the Bengali settlers and indigenous peoples. Over the past decades, the joint forces of the Bengali settlers and the military served the purpose of ethnic cleansing in two ways: eviction and land grabbing; and total extermination e.g. massacres jointly perpetrated by the army and settlers (Chakma, 2010a and 2010b). Backed by the military and civil administration, the Bengali settlers forcefully occupied lands from indigenous villagers. On the other hand, the Bengali settlers and the military forces jointly carried out more than one dozen systematic massacres 5 and communal attacks on indigenous people from 1971 to 1993 (PCJSS, 2005; Chakma, 2010b). As a result, thousands of people, mostly indigenous, got killed and displaced from their lands. Violent conflicts between the Bengalis and indigenous people continued until signing the CHT Accord in 1997. 2.2 Peace process and the CHT Accord of 1997 To find out solution to the CHT problem, dialogues between PCJSS and the government of Bangladesh took place in two phases: first, with military-backed autocratic regimes from 1976 to 1990, and then with democratically elected governments from 1991 to 1997. First, militarybacked Ershad government (1981 to 1990) recognized the need for solution to the CHT problem through a political means (Larma, 2003). To communicate with the guerillas, the government formed a 3-member CHT Liaison Committee with Upendra Lal Chakma, MP in 1984. Subsequently 6 rounds of talks were held between PCJSS and the Ershad government, but ended in without any tangible results. In 1990 through a mass upsurge the country saw a democratic transition from military rules. Through national election in 1991, Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) came to power. As a good gesture to the BNP government, PCJSS declared a unilateral ceasefire on 10 August 1992. In response to it, the BNP government formed a Parliamentary Committee on the CHT issue with Col. (Rtd.) Oli Ahmed, Minisiter for Transport and Communication. The Parliamentary Committee held 13 rounds of talks with PCJSS from 1992 to 1995, but no substantial progress could be achieved due to lack of strong political commitment of the BNP government (CHTC, 1997; Larma, 2003). In 1996 Awami League (AL) came to power. To draw the attention to the AL government, PCJSS extended ceasefire unilaterally. Accordingly, the AL government responded to this call positively. Through a National Committee on Chittagong Hill Tracts (NCCHT) 6, the AL government held six rounds of talks with PCJSS and finally both parties agreed to a peace agreement popularly known as the CHT Peace Accord, which was signed on 2 December 1997 in Dhaka by ending the long-standing armed conflict in the region. 5 To name a few of the massacres on indigenous peoples in CHT were the Kaukhali-Kalampati massacre on 25 March 1980, the Barkal massacre on 31 May 1984, the Panchari massacre on 1 May 1986, the Matiranga massacre in May 1986, the Commilla tilla/taindong massacre on 18-19 May 1986, the Hirachar, Sarbotoli, Khagrachari, Pablakhali massacres on 8-10 August 1988, the Longadu massacre on 4 May 1989, the Malya massacre on 2 February 1992, the Logang massacre on 10 April 1992 and the Naniarchar massacre on 17 November 1993 etc. 6 An 11 member NCCHT was formed on 1 October 1996 taking members of parliament headed by Abul Hasnat Abdullah, Chief Whip. To assist NCCHT, a 10-member Advisory Committee was also formed with co-opt members from among former army officials and civil society members. 14 P a g e

The CHT Accord includes some basic features that recognises political, social, cultural, educational and economic rights of CHT people, while paving the way for peace-building and socio-economic development in the region. The main features of the Accord are: Recognition of the CHT as tribal inhabited region ; Strengthening self-government system through establishing three Hill District Councils (HDCs), CHT Regional Council (CHTRC) and Ministry of CHT Affairs (MoCHTA) under indigenous leadership; Dismantling military camps except six cantonments 7 ; Resolution of land-related problems through: a) establishment of a Land Commission on resolution of land disputes, b) establishment of a Task Force for rehabilitation of the refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs); c) Land administration authority of three HDCs; d) recognition of customary laws of indigenous peoples; Socio-economic development by under guidance of HDCs and the CHT Development Board (CHTDB) under the supervisory authority of the CHT Regional Council. The CHT Accord ended the long-standing armed conflict between guerillas and government forces, but real peace-building is very much contingent upon implementation of the CHT Accord in letter and spirit. 2.3 Development in CHT The development history of CHT can be divided into two periods: before and after the Accord of 1997. Development experience of the CHT people before the Accord period was very painful. A classic example of such painful case was the Kaptai Hydroelectric dam, which inundated 40% of the best arable land and resources, apart from triggering off adverse social, economic, political and ecological impacts on the lives of the people in the region. In fact, this dam sowed the seed of conflict. Behind the idea of such development program was economic growth through industrialization for national interest of the state (Pakistan). Then next spate of development in CHT was initiated by the CHT Development Board (CHTDB) since mid 1970s onwards. The key focus of the CHTDB development programs was on social, economic and infrastructural development. In the beginning, the Asian Development Bank (ADB) 8 and UNICEF 9 financed CHTDB to implement various development projects. CHTDB was headed by the General Officer Commanding (GOC) of Chittagong until the CHT Accord in 1997. As such, indigenous people hardly had opportunity to decide on development priorities. The key areas of the CHTDB s intervention were road construction, telecommunication and resettlement of population along with provisions of social services like education, and water and sanitation. In fact, all these development projects had been instruments of the government and military to serve the purpose of counter insurgency operations in the CHT (CHT Commission, 2000) 7 These are the three district headquarters in the three hill districts and three cantonments in Alikadam, Ruma and Dighinala. 8 In 1979 ADB financed the CHTDB to implement a project titled The Chittagong Hill Tracts Multi-sectoral Development Project comprising eleven components, one of them was the Upland Settlement Project to settle 2000 landless tribal families by providing 6.25 acres of hilly land to each family for horticultural and rubber gardens. 9 UNICEF started financing CHTDB since 1980 for the project of Integrated Community Development Project (ICDP) on reduction of child and maternal mortality, elimination of malnutrition, reduction of water borne diseases, expansion of basic and primary education. As of 2011, ICDP II was completed under the GoB-UNICEF collaboration. 15 P a g e

After signing the CHT Accord, new prospects have emerged for social and economic development with people s participation through the decentralized institutions like HDCs and CHTRC. In the post-accord period, international development agencies like European Union, UNDP, UNICEF, and ADB, among others, have come ahead to support development and peace-building in CHT. Supported by EU and other development partners, UNDP-CHTDF initiated a project on promotion of development and confidence building with an investment of US$ 160.00 million, while ADB financed US$ 60.00 million for Chittagong Hill Tracts Rural Development project (CHTRDP). In terms of budget allocation, they were the largest development partners in CHT in the post-accord period. Apart from international development agencies, local NGOs and national NGOs have come forward for social and economic development in CHT in the post-accord period. 2.4 Priorities for development and peace-building in the post-accord period What are the priorities for development and peace-building in the post-accord period in CHT? In response to this question, different views and perceptions came out from the respondents interviewed. However, a common answer came out from almost all of them was: full implementation of the CHT Accord. They generally view full implementation of the CHT Accord as the pre-condition for all development and peace-building activities in the post-accord period. In concrete terms, their views and perceptions of full implementation could be explained in two ways: as principles and priority areas for action: a) As principles of development: any development program should follow these principles all development programs must support implementation of the CHT Accord; full and effective participation of the people and CHT representative institutions e.g. HDCs, and traditional institutions at all levels of development; free, prior and informed consent of the concerned people to development programs that may have impact on their lives; beneficiary selection: indigenous peoples and non-tribal permanent residents 10 of CHT as defined in the CHT Accord, with a particular attention to internally displaced persons (IDPs), returnee refugees, ex-combatant families, forest villagers, jumia families, the families affected by the Kaptai Dam, the most disadvantaged and the small indigenous communities 11, and landless and marginal families below the poverty line. b) Following priority areas 12 have been identified by the respondents for development and peace-building/confidence-building in the post-accord period: strengthening the self-rule government system (CHTRC and three HDCs) as per the CHT Accord; 10 To be eligible as non-tribal permanent resident, i) s/he is not a tribal ; ii) must have legal lands and generally live in hill districts at specific addresses. 11 These groups include Bawm, Chak, Khumi, Lushai, Pangkhua and Mro, who are the more marginalized, should get preferential treatment for development programs. 12 See the Rangamati Declaration 1998 adopted by CHT local NGOs including women s rights activists, community leaders and ethnic Bengali people. Also see Chakma, M. K. (2003) The UNDP s Development Program in the Chittagong Hill Tracts and relevant issues, The Keokradong (a Bengali news bulletin), Bulletin 3, 30 June, Hill Students Council, Dhaka: Pp 2-2; and PCJSS Follow-up Report on the UNDP s Project (2004). 16 P a g e

resolution of land disputes through the Land Commission; rehabilitation of IDPs, returnee refugees and ex-combatants through a Task Force; demilitarisation/dismantling of military camps as per the Accord; constitutional recognition of indigenous peoples and the CHT Accord. 17 P a g e

SECTION 3: KEY FINDINGS OF THE UNDP-CHTDF PROJECT This section looks at the CHTDF s project on promotion of development and confidencebuilding activities and outcomes achieved so far. 3.1 Background of the UNDP-CHTDF project in CHT Immediately after signing the CHT Accord, UNDP fielded a three member Need Assessment Team in 1998 to have a preliminary idea of the development needs of the CHT people. In 2002 a Joint GoB/UNDP Risk Assessment Mission was assigned to assess overall security situation for donor-funded development intervention in the region. As the said Risk Assessment Mission reported positively on overall security situation, UNDP started the pilot phase of the project styled as Promotion of Development and Confidence Building in the Chittagong Hill Tracts in 2003 and continued until 2005. By drawing on the experience from the pilot-phase, the fullfledged project was launched from 2005 to 2009 followed by an extension for four years from 2010 to September 2013. In its 7 th meeting held in March 2012 the National Steering Committee (NSC) approved no-cost extension until September 2015. In the post-accord period in CHT, the CHTDF s project was the largest development project in terms of budget allocation with an amount of US$ 160.5 million. The European Union is the highest contributor (59%) to this fund followed by CIDA, DANIDA, AusAID, and UNDP (see the table 1 below). Table 1: Funding from development partners Development Partners USD (in million) Percentage OVERALL BUDGET 160.5 EU 94.8 59.07% CIDA 14 8.72% DANIDA 3.7 2.31% UNDP 13 8.10% Other sources 35.2 21.93% Source: CHTDF Project Factsheet, 2012 Other donors include Japan, NORAD, and USAID which supported the CHTDF project in the pilot phase. UNDP-CHTDF has been working in 20 Upazilas (subdistricts) out of 25 in the three hill districts (see the map). Of them 8 are from Rangamati and 6 respectively from Khagrachari and Bandarban districts. Some 3257 para (village) communities have been brought under the project coverage. The direct beneficiaries of the project are twofold: peoples of CHT; and the CHT institutions concerned with or mandated for development (Prodoc, 2005, Annual Report, 2011). The indirect beneficiaries include NGOs, private sector, line department officials and technical staff. UNDP has been implementing this project through the 18 P a g e

Direct Execution (DEX) mode, while MoCHTA is the lead national agency. To implement the project, different committees have been set up at national, regional, district, upazila, union and para levels involving different stakeholders. At the national level, the National Steering Committee headed by the State Minister of the MoCHTA is the apex body for overall policy guidance to the project. To advise NSC, Technical Advisory Committees (TACs) on specific issues such as health, and education have been set up. Memberships to both committees have been drawn from CHT institutions CHTRC, HDCs and the Offices of the Circle Chiefs, and relevant government line ministries and other agencies, while the regional, district, upazila and union level committees have been headed by respective chairs, and members are taken from the cross sections of society and departments. 3.2 UNDP-CHTDF s project: problem analysis, development goal and strategies To intervene for development, UNDP has identified the profound and pervasive poverty as the major development challenge in CHT. Several factors such as the scarcity of cultivable land; low levels of education and health; weak development institutions; high under-and unemployment; and low incomes have been identified as the contributing factors that deepen and make worse poverty situation in the region (ProDoc, 2005: 5). In the post-accord period, UNDP also observed that the people and CHT institutions had a strong commitment to resumption of development assistance and their willingness to participate in the development efforts. With regards to development goal, as stated by UNDP in its project document, the people and CHT institutions had a consensus on: a) poverty reduction should be an overarching goal of development; and b) development should be based on a model of small scale and community-initiated development activities supported by effective development institutions. Following the CHT Accord, the three Hill District Councils (HDCs), the CHT Regional Council (CHTRC), and the Ministry of Chittagong Hill Tracts Affairs (MoCHTA), the offices of traditional Circle Chiefs and the CHT Development Board (CHTDB) have turned out to be the most relevant development institutions in CHT. However, these institutions are beset with low development capacities and with a considerable degree of ambiguity as to their respective authorities and mandates. For instance, the government did not devolve power to the HDCs over the 33 transferrable subjects as per the provision of the CHT Accord. Moreover, due to lack of subsidiary legislations, CHTRC and HDCs cannot exercise their authority to coordinate and supervise the development programs in CHT. Hence, these hill councils are yet to be capable of delivering desired development results to the people. Keeping these issues into account UNDP-CHTDF its started project of promotion of development and confidence building with a goal of accelerated and sustainable socioeconomic development based on the principles of self-reliance and decentralized development initiative. However, its main focus was on poverty reduction in CHT through resumption of a significant scale of international development assistance, and confidence-building measures among the people and CHT institutions that promote long-term peace. To achieve the above-stated project s goal, the CHTDF sets project operational strategy that focuses on the five key outputs (for details, please see Annex C) capacity building of CHT institutions; region wide initiatives (on health, education and economic development); community empowerment; confidence-building; and UNDP-CHTDF s operational and infrastructural capacity to support CHT development 19 P a g e

In the end of the project, following qualitative results were expected: enhanced development capacities; improved socio-economic development; improved capacity of the CHT institutions; grassroots communities in charge of own development; improved environment and long-term peace attract further donor s support for development; Finally, the CHTDF project expected to create a new sense of optimism and hope for the future development to all communities, with practical opportunities for individual economic and social gain. This new optimism and opportunity will lead to a more stable and prosperous Hill Tracts. 3.3 Key Areas of CHTDF activities and outcomes As part of development and peace-building activities, the CHTDF project focused on the following components: 3.3.1 Economic Development (ED): With an objective of creating alternative source of income for PDCs and PNDGs, this ED component since 2008 onwards supported various income generating activities e.g. mushroom cultivation, honey production, bio-briquette production, ginger processing and medicinal plant cultivation. Other activities were: training conducted for 18 weavers groups on marketing, costing and value addition; and 2 CHT Awards of Excellence (in 2009 and 2011) were organised. In collaboration with HDCs, youth skills development training course were offered to the youth, and market sheds (total 5) and collection points (total 4) were renovated and constructed. In 2010, through the Agriculture and Food Security component, Field Farmers Schools (FFS) were introduced to train farmers on improved crop farming, fisheries and livestock etc. Towards ensuring food security Rice Banks were supported under this component. 3.3.2 Education: Since 2008 this component supported construction of 300 primary schools in 12 Upazilas, covering 4 Upazilas in each district. Of these schools, 72 were renovated, while the rest were completely new schools set up by this project. Some 20,000 children have enrolled in these project schools thus it has improved access to education in remote areas both at preprimary and primary levels. The project also introduced pre-primary mother tongue education (in 8 indigenous languages) in 131 project schools. This component focused on improved school facilities, improved teaching quality, relevant learning materials (including MLE materials) and strengthened school management systems through mobilizing the school management committees (SMCs) and mothers groups (MGs). With continued advocacy with the high level policy makers, already some tangible success achieved, especially in terms of relaxation of criteria for setting up primary schools in CHT. For example, the Prime Minister already approved de-reservation 13 of land for 44 non-government primary schools, 30 decimal for each, in the Reserved Forest areas in CHT. 3.3.3 Health Program: This component aims to increase people s access to quality health care through sustaining and expanding the provision of medical services to the communities and 13 See the Daily Prothom Alo, dated 07 May 2013. 20 P a g e

enhancing the capacity of health workers and institutions of CHT. This component is being implemented through the concerned HDC under the LoAs between the CHTDF and HDCs. This intervention spreads over 15 Upazilas across CHT focusing on i) Network of Community Health Services Workers (CHSWs) across the region. The project supported approximately 1000 CHSWs, who provide basic health care and advice to the communities; ii) provision of mobile medical clinics consisting of 16 mobile medical teams operating in 80 weekly satellite clinics; and c) referral systems emergency cases were referred to the Upazila and district level government hospitals. The services include free/highly subsidized ambulance service to the emergency patients. So far, about 1.8 million patients received health care service through the CHSWs, and a total of 1300 cases were referred to Upazila and/or district health complexes from the remotest areas. 3.3.4 Community empowerment: Based on the idea of small scale self-reliant development at community level, CHTDF in partnership with local NGOs has been working on community empowerment with para (village) communities across the three hill districts. So far, a total of 3,257 para communities from all ethnic groups, in addition to 1492 Para Nari Development Groups 14 (PNDGs), have been brought under community empowerment activities (please see the figure 1). To implement CE activities, each para community is organised through a Para Development Committee (PDC) 15. Each para community was provided with Quick Impact Fund (QIF) of Tk. 400,000 to plan and implement community-managed small projects by the villagers. The major components of CE activities were: livestock followed by agriculture, horticulture, fisheries, small enterprise etc. In addition to QIF amount, the best performing PDCs were awarded with an extra amount of Tk. 200,000 which was exclusively managed by female groups through PNDGs. Later selectively some paras were provided with other grants 16 for implementation of non-ffs ADP, FFS-ADP and rice bank activities. It was estimated that on an average each PDC was allocated a sum of money with Tk. 550,000 thus the total disbursed amount of money to PDCs and PNDGs accounts for Tk. 1792 million. On any accounts this was the first ever largest cash transfer to the remote communities in the CHT. 14 Para Nari Development Group (village women s development group) is formed exclusively with female members with an objective of mainstreaming gender issues into development programs in selected paras. 15 Para Development Committee (village development committee) constitutes with 9-11 members, taking members from cross-sections of the people in the village, of them one-third is women s representatives. 16 Under LoAs with the three HDCs, CHTDF channeled funds to each HDC to assist implementation of its agricultural development plan (ADP). One of ADP activities was Field Farmer s Schools (FFS). The communities not covered by FFS were also allocated funds. These activities are commonly known as Non-FFS ADP. Selected para communities are allowed to implement projects according to their needs, such as cow rearing, vegetable gardening etc with the Non-FFS ADP funds. 21 P a g e

Apart from QIF, PDCs and PNDGs were offered capacity building training on different subjects such as PDC management, financial management and basic book-keeping, organizational development, participatory monitoring and evaluation; gender and entrepreneurship skills development. Government line departments such as agriculture, livestock and fishery also provided technical support and training to the para communities for CE activities. To raise awareness on basic services and rights, information dissemination workshops were organised at upazila and union levels. National and international days e.g. national Independence Day, national victory day, international mother language day, and the international day of the World s indigenous peoples etc. were celebrated to enhance awareness of basic rights. 3.3.5 Confidence building program: The confidence building component was a core component of the CHTDF project to assist implementation of the CHT Accord. The overall objective of this component is to facilitate a process for building mutual trust and confidence among the communities and the CHT institutions. The purpose of this initiative is to provide the CHT communities with an opportunity for socio-economic development in an environment of peace and stability. In the initial project plan following activities were proposed for confidence building in CHT (ProDoc, 2005, p.15 17). Box 1: Confidence building activities in the initial project plan Facilitation of dialogue and partnership among (the relevant stakeholders) for joint actions Study tours on innovative development and confidence building experiences Exchange visits (of the grassroots communities and other stakeholders) across the CHT Support to the GOB initiatives for land dispute resolution through the Land Commission Piloting community managed forestry Support to the Police Force working in the CHT Advice and support to the GOB electoral initiatives Promotion to minority Interests and cultural diversity Support to incentive programmes Support to GOB initiatives for returned refugees, internally displaced peoples and ex-combatants The most important and urgent activities related to the CHT Accord implementation e.g. support to Land Commission, Police Force and rehabilitation of IDPs and ex-combatants have remained untouched upon. So far, the key confidence building activities implemented by CHTDF were: cultural festival, exchange visits (domestic), international study tours, small grant support to local partners (e.g. observation of BOISABI, international day of the world s indigenous peoples etc), policy dialogue on CHT development, support to local crisis (e.g. rodent crisis in 2008), local level workshops on peace and development, sports for peace (through the CHT Regional Council and Regional Sport Association), meetings of local consultative groups (LCG), scholarships (AusAID) and logistic support to CHT institutions. From 2007 to 2012, national cultural diversity festivals were organised in Dhaka with a view to drawing a broad based support and understanding among the mainstream people about the cultural diversity of the CHT people. Several international study tours to the Philippines, Australia, New Zealand, Malaysia, Indonesia and Guatemala were organised for the policymakers and senior officials from MoCHTA, CHTRC, HDCs, traditional administration and civil society members. This component also supported exchange visits across the CHT and plain regions with representatives from PDCs, traditional leaders, union councils chairmen and 22 P a g e

members, teachers and line department officials and staff of partner NGOs. These exchange visits aimed at sharing development experiences and appreciation of cultural diversity of different communities. To promote human development, exclusive scholarships were provided to indigenous students to study in Australia along with short courses for leadership development. Under this component, MoCHTA, CHTRC and HDCs were supported to organise several dialogues on policy issues concerning development priorities for CHT. At local level only 3 workshops were held on peace and development in 2009 respectively at Thanchi (in Bandarban) Panchari (in Khagrachari) and Bagahaichari (in Rangamati) in order to identify the common understanding of the CHT Accord. These workshops were attended by the government officials, Upazila and Union leaders, NGO workers and local community representatives. 3.3.6 Capacity Development: The Capacity Development component provides support to CHT institutions - CHT Regional Council (CHTRC), the three Hill District Councils (HDCs) and the three traditional Circles offices in order to strengthen the decentralized governance system and enhance their management and operational capabilities. Under the Letters of Agreements (LoAs), CHTDF provided CHTRC, the three HDCs and the three traditional Circle Offices with logistical support that included vehicles, motorbikes, IT equipments (computers, printers, digital camera, scanner, UPS, and photocopier) and furniture etc. This support was also extended to the CHT Land Commission and the Task Force on rehabilitation of the IDPs and returnee refugees. Apart from logistical support, CHTDF provided capacity development training to CHTRC and HDCs staff on specific subjects such as financial management, basic office management, project management, advanced and basic English, human rights and gender development etc. In collaboration with the Bangladesh Public Administration Training Centre (BPATC) a CHT specific public administration module was developed (CHTDF Annual Report, 2011, 2010). 3.3.7 Gender mainstreaming Gender had not been included as a separate component in the initial project document. Later as part of gender mainstreaming, this component had been included as cross-cutting issue among all component. To mainstream gender issues into development programs and policies, several activities were carried out under this component: 1492 PNDGs (exclusive female groups) had been formed across CHT. In every PDC, one-third seat has been reserved for women. Grassroots women s organisations were organised through a network called Chittagong Hill Tracts Women s Organisation Network (CHTWoN). CHTWoN is registered with the joint stock company. Staff members of the key CHT institutions, PDCs and NGOs were given basic awareness training on gender. 23 P a g e

SECTION 4: ASSESSMENT OF THE IMPACTS OF THE CHTDF PROJECT This is a multi-sectoral project, which included 33 intervention areas under the five key objectives (please refer to Annex C). These intervention areas could be categorized into two: the core and cross-cutting and the region-wide initiative (RWI). Community empowerment (CE), capacity development (CD), and confidence building (CB) fall under the first category, the latter two components are directly related to implementation of the CHT Accord. The RWI includes the components: health, education, economic development and gender mainstreaming - the first two components are linked with the mandated subjects of the three HDCs. Being a multi-sectoral project, the results of the CHTDF project could be shown in huge quantitative figures in addition to descriptive language. However, this section, within the scope of the study, makes a general assessment of the CHTDF project, with a particular focus on the core components as they are relevant to implementation of the CHT Accord. 4.1 General impacts of the region wide initiatives on education, health, economic development, and gender equity As stated in section 3.2, the CHTDF project diagnosed profound and pervasive poverty as the key development challenge in CHT in the post-accord period. Hence, as part of the solution to this problem, the project included provision of basic services of health and education, which were termed as peace dividends by the CHTDF officials interviewed. The CHTDF project conceived confidence building through connecting the rural communities with extended peace dividends on health, education and economic opportunities coupled with technical support from the government line agencies for agriculture, horticulture, livestock, fisheries, civil works etc. The key general impacts of the RWI were: a) The education component improved access to education for some 20,000 children in rural areas through supporting 300 primary schools in the remote areas, where either there were no schools or virtually non-functional, if any. It means that the largest majority of these children would not have got the opportunity of education if these project schools were not established. To contribute to quality education, and decentralized governance at local level, the project provided training to teachers, and mother groups (MGs) and the school managing committees (SMCs). As per the CHT Accord, education in mother tongue at primary level was one of the key development priorities for indigenous children. The CHTDF project worked to this end by introducing multi-lingual education (MLE) in 8 languages in 131 project schools. Despite these successes in education, sustainability of many of these schools is a big concern. Many of these project schools cannot fulfill the criteria 17 to be eligible for government registration. Until and unless these schools are not registered and taken over by the government, their sustainability after the project is a very less possibility. The largest number of communities cannot pay teachers salaries if the CHTDF s funds is stopped. b) The health component made health care facilities medicines and prescription services available to rural communities in selected Upazilas through: i) provision medical services; ii) 17 There are common criteria which stand as barrier to registration of a non-government primary school in CHT. These include population size 2000, and number of students (150) in the catchment area, and conditions for land registration etc. Given the villages in CHT are scattered here and there, it is difficult to meet all these criteria to set up a primary school. To relax these criteria, three HDCs sent letters to the Ministry of Primary and Mass Education (MoPME), such as reduction of population size (from 200 to 700) and number of students (from 150 to 50) for CHT. 24 P a g e

capacity enhancement of community health workers and CHT institutions; and iii) referral system. In terms of patients turnover (over 1.8 million), this component had brought in substantial success by treating the major diseases like malaria, diarrhea and acute respiratory infections (ARI) (UNDP, 2011). However, continuation of this success is very much pending on availability of funds either from the government or development partners. The project also trained more than 1000 community health service works (CHSWs), who provide basic health care and advice to the communities across CHT. As these CHSWs will stay in hills, they are the great asset and may bring in long-term positive impacts to communities, if at all, after the CHTDF project has been wrapped up. c) Economic development (ED) component, parallel to community empowerment (CE), was initiative to create alternative sources of income through various income generating activities (IGAs) like mushroom cultivation, beekeeping, ginger processing and medicinal plant cultivation. Although CHTDF claims success of this component in terms of increased income and market linkages, the respondents of local NGOs and PDCs confirmed that the impacts of these IGAs are very limited or hardly visible. The factors behind the failures of this component were that they were introduced on a pilot basis in a small scale. Secondly, these products could not be linked with markets properly. d) Gender was a cross-cutting issue in the CHTDF s program; hence the impacts of this component should be assessed across all components. However, a few key results of this component, as stated by the respondents are: women s participation in different stages of the project, and increased awareness on gender issues among different stakeholders. Through establishing exclusive platform PNDGs for women, they had opportunity to decide on the project activities at the community level. At the same time, the provision of one-third seats for women in PDCs created space for them to participate in development activities. These measures contributed to raising women s voices at community level. CHTDF assisted to set up a network of women s organisations (more than 50), known as the CHT Women s Network (CHTWoN) at CHT level to make advocacy on women s issues at the policy level. Issue-based campaigns e.g. violence against women (VAW) were carried out across CHT. However, some of the respondents questioned the effectiveness of CHTWoN on certain grounds: first, it was rather an imposed body created by CHTDF, and as such, it was dependent on CHTDF s funding for its activities. Second, CHTWoN so far could not work on the tough issues vis-à-vis rape and killing of indigenous women across CHT. 4.2 Impacts of the Core components of the CHTDF project In this category, the major components were: community empowerment, capacity development and confidence building. 4.2.1 Impacts of community empowerment The CHTDF s idea of empowering communities was based on the vision of small scale selfreliant development at community level. To this end, the CHTDF project provided supports to communities: seed money, known as quick impact funds (QIF), capacity building training for PDCs, PNDGs and partner NGOs; technical support from the upazila line departments, and awareness raising on basic rights. From investigation into the PDCs/PNDGs activities, the following impacts were observed: Increased income and social well-being from QIF investment: Each para community was provided with a cash grant of Tk. 400,000 to implement community-demand driven small scale projects. From visits to the communities it was found that the largest numbers of 25 P a g e

schemes implemented were on livestock (37.9%) followed by horticulture, fishery, agriculture, well-being services (water and sanitation, solar panel, rice-bank etc) and small enterprises etc. However, the schemes vary from one place to another, given the geographical locations of the communities. As per the respondents of PDCs/PNDGs, the livestock schemes were most successful than other projects. This is confirmed by Arun Chakma, Moghban Union Council chairman cow rearing projects are still visible, but other components such as ginger, turmeric, and fishery had already gone without success. The reason behind the success of cow rearing schemes was that they gave the project beneficiaries more individual benefits than the schemes implemented on other components 18. Although it is difficult to generalise, it was found that many para communities have been able to amplify and diversify their income sources through recycling or reinvestment of the QIF funds. At the same time, they have developed their savings habit. The increased income and savings ensured a small financial safety-net at community level. Because of such social safety-net, in many villages, PDCs have been able to ensure social well-being e.g. access to safe drinking water and sanitation, and medical treatment. Increased community capital assets: Out of QIF, para communities purchased different assets like cattle, agricultural equipments, solar panels, horticultural crops, nurseries and fruits gardens etc. Due to the increased return from this investment, many of the PDCs were able to re-invest more capital, which ultimately led to the increasing community capital assets in the villages. Coverage of remote communities: CHTDF project organised 3,257 para communities through PDCs and some 1492 PDCs, with priorities to the most remote communities in 20 Upazilas (out of 25 Upazilas) across the CHT. The largest portion of these remote communities has first ever received development support from CHTDF. Through QIF and other grants they have been planning and implementing project for economic development at community level. Enhanced capacity of PDCs and PNDGs: Because of the training on various subjects, PDCs were able to enhance their capacities, especially for keeping the meeting minutes, book keeping, dealing with the banks, and contacting the service agencies. The technical training has created pools of community technicians, who are now capable to give solutions to many problems related to livestock management, agriculture and fish culture. Equally the level of awareness about basic rights and social services has increased among community people. Linkages established with the service agencies: As claimed by the PDCs, CHTDF officials and Union council chairmen that through CE activities, PDCs have been able to establish 18 CHTDF encouraged PDCs to implement the schemes through collective efforts; a sort of commune system was tested in the name of promoting collective values of indigenous peoples. Cattle purchased with the QIF money were kept in long sheds, and by rotation every household was to share labour for grazing the cattle. After some time, it was found difficult to manage the cattle in one shed. Even many of the households lost interest to contribute labour. Later cattle were left at the personal disposal of individual households under a profit sharing contract agreement between the PDC and the individual household. Cattle were raised easily by the households, as they possessed indigenous knowledge of cow rearing; whereas other projects such as on ginger and turmeric could not be successful for a variety of reasons: price manipulation of produces by the intermediaries, and many households were reluctant to participate in collective farming. 26 P a g e

linkages with the service delivery agencies. As such, PDCs/PNDGs are now aware of and can access the services provided by the GoB line departments and NGOs. Multi-stakeholders involvement in development: One of the remarkable aspects of the CEP project was involvement of various stakeholders like PDCs, NGOs, GoB line departments, and local government institutions. In contrast to the positive results as stated above, a good numbers of divider impacts were observed during the field investigation, such as: Drop-out of households from PDCs: UNDP-CHTDF claimed that it reached to as many as 3,257 para communities across CHT, but in practice, this success was questioned due to high drop-out rate from PDC activities. The field data show that 34% - 40% HHs were excluded from PDC interventions (see the figure 2). It was found that two categories of people faced off from PDC activities: most marginalized people, who were wage labourers, widow, and old-aged persons; and village elite or well-off families, e.g. solvent farmers or headmen, who either did not need support from PDC or were not interested in giving collective labour contribution to PDC activities. A long list of reasons behind their exclusion from PDCs have been identified, such as: idea of collective action 19 not properly understood and applied (see box 2); non-refunding of money to the PDC after selling out a cow or asset received from QIF funds; disagreement over the selection of project components. Village elites dominated over project selection, for which more marginalized people s (e.g. wage labourers) aspirations were not reflected in project activities; frustration or distrust in PDC activities following either a failure in certain components or misuse of funds by the key officials of PDCs; monthly savings some could not pay monthly savings, for which they withdrew themselves from the PDC activity; old age old people could not contribute labour to PDC s collective initiatives; lack of proper monitoring. 19 PDCs were encouraged to implement projects through collective efforts, where every household had to contribute either labour or money as trade-off. If any household fails to attend the PDC work, he or she has to pay money equal to the amount of wage per day for his/her absence. For wage labourers and unit family, it was difficult to contribute labour to the collective work. Consequently, they lost their interest in PDC s collective works, and they dropped out. 27 P a g e