Carl Shusterman, CA Bar # Amy Prokop, CA Bar #1 The Law Offices of Carl Shusterman 00 Wilshire Blvd., Suite 10 Los Angeles, CA 001 Telephone: (1 - Facsimile: (1-0 E-mail: aprokop@shusterman.com Attorneys for Plaintiffs UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 ROSALINA CUELLAR DE OSORIO, ET AL v. Plaintiffs, JONATHAN SCHARFEN, ET AL Defendants. Case No. SACV 0-0-JVS(SHx PLAINTIFFS MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT Date: September, 00 Time: :00 p.m. Courtroom: C Hon. James V. Selna TO THE COURT, ALL PARTIES AND THEIR ATTORNEYS OF RECORD HEREIN: 1
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 Plaintiffs hereby submit their Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Opposition Defendants Motion to for Summary Judgment. I. INA 0(H( IS UNAMBIGUOUS The issue presented in this case is whether aged-out derivative beneficiaries of third and fourth family-sponsored preference categories may utilize the automatic conversion and priority date retention provisions of INA 0(h(. 1 Under the plain and unambiguous language of the act, the answer must be yes. The first step in any statutory interpretation is whether "Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at issue." Chevron USA, Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., U.S.,, 1 L. Ed. d, S. Ct. (1; See also, Consumer Product Safety Commission v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., U.S., (10 ("The starting point for interpreting a statute is the language of the statute itself. Absent a clearly expressed legislative intention to the contrary, that language must ordinarily be regarded as conclusive". If the statute is clear, courts as well as the agency "must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress." Chevron, U.S. at at. Section 0(h( of the INA explicitly includes derivative beneficiaries 1 The facts in this matter are not disputed, and a full discussion of the relevant statutory framework was set forth in Plaintiffs Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, p. 1. Docket No. - (August 1, 00.
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 under INA 0(d the section covering derivatives in all family and employment-based visa categories, as well as the diversity visa category. Indeed, the phrase, for purposes of subsections (a((a and (d is repeated in both 0(h(1 and 0(h(. By the consistent and repeated reference to sections (a((a and (d, it is plain that each provision of section 0(h applies to derivative beneficiaries in the family, employment and diversity preference categories. Had Congress meant to limit 0(h( to derivatives of the secondpreference category only, it would have eliminated 0(h( s reference to derivatives under 0(d. The Defendants recognize that [t]he language in each subsection of [ 0(h] is identical, implying that all derivative beneficiaries of petitions filed under section [0] may be eligible to benefit from the provision. Def. s Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment (hereinafter Def. s Memo. of Points and Auth., p. - (Aug. 1, 00. Nevertheless, Defendants contend that the operative language of [ 0(h(] only makes sense in reference to petitions originally filed to classify an alien as the primary or derivative beneficiary of an FA petition. Def. s Memo. of Points and Auth., p.. The Defendants find an ambiguity in the statute by focusing on the wrong familial relationship as well as the wrong point in time. First, the Defendants erroneously focus on the relationship between the original petitioner and the now
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 aged-out derivative beneficiary. The original petitioners could not have filed visa petitions directly on behalf of the derivative beneficiaries. Def s Memo. of Points and Auth. p. 1. Thus, Defendants contend, when the derivatives reached the age of twenty-one, there is no preference category to which they may convert. Id. It is clear that a derivative s interest in a visa petition comes from his or her relationship with the principal beneficiary. Under 0(h(, the focus should remain on the relationship between the principal beneficiary and the aged-out derivative. As stated in Matter of Garcia, where an alien was classified as a derivative beneficiary of the original petition, the appropriate category for purposes of section 0(h( is that which applies to the aged-out derivative visà-vis the principal beneficiary of the original petition. Matter of Maria T. Garcia, 00 WL 1 at p. (BIA June 1, 00 (emphasis in original. When one focuses on the appropriate familial relationship, the operation of 0(h( becomes clear. The Plaintiffs aged-out children are unmarried sons and daughters of lawful permanent residents. Thus the appropriate category is the second family preference category. The Defendants also find an ambiguity in 0(h( by focusing their analysis on the wrong point in time specifically the date a derivative beneficiary turns twenty-one. Defendants contend that, when the Plaintiffs children turned twenty-one there was no appropriate category to convert to. They state that, when Plaintiffs children aged-out, their petitions automatically converted to the only
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 appropriate category: termination. Def s Memo. of Points and Auth. p. 1. Thus they conclude that 0(h( cannot possibly apply to the case at hand. Contrary to this analysis, the determination of benefits under the CSPA is not made upon the derivative turning twenty-one. Section 0(h(1 establishes a formula to determine whether a derivative beneficiary may still be considered a child notwithstanding the fact that he has reached the age of twenty-one. This formula starts with the age of the alien on the date on which an immigrant visa number becomes available for such alien (or, in the case of subsection (d, the date on which an immigrant visa number became available for the alien's parent. The alien may reduce his age on this date by the number of days in the period during which the applicable petition was pending, only if the alien has sought to acquire the status of an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence within one year of such availability. INA 0(h(1 (emphasis added. The language of the statute plainly demonstrates that the required CSPA calculation cannot be completed upon a derivative beneficiary turning twenty-one. At that point in time a visa number may not be available, and it may also be unclear whether the beneficiary will seek permanent residence within one year. Thus a final determination of whether a derivative remains a child under In Wang, the BIA makes the same mistake by focusing on the moment the derivative aged out. They conclude that there was no preference category for an adult niece of a United States citizen, and thus there was no category for the beneficiary to convert to. Matter of Wang, I&N Dec., (BIA 00.
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0(h(1 may very well take place well after he or she turns twenty-one. For example, Joe is the derivative beneficiary of a family-based third preference visa petition filed on behalf of his mother on May, 000. Joe was born on April 0, 1, and thus at the time the petition is filed he is fourteen (1 years old. The visa petition is pending for days before it is approved by the USCIS. However, visa numbers are not immediately available. In fact, it is over seven ( years before the 000 priority date becomes current on January 1, 00. Joe turned twenty-one on April 0, 00. Nevertheless, Joe s interest in the petition filed on behalf of his mother clearly did not terminate on this date. His interest in the petition continued because in order to determine what benefit Joe derives under 0(h(1, one must start with Joe s age on January 1, 00 the date a visa number becomes available to his mother. The CSPA states that Joe may subtract the number of days the petition was pending ( from his age of January 1, 00. This subtraction would bring Joe back under the age of twentyone for immigration purposes. But even at the date a visa becomes available, the CSPA s calculation may not necessarily be complete. There is one final requirement under 0(h(1. Joe must seek to acquire permanent residence within one year of visa availability. Thus, he must take steps to acquire permanent residence prior to January 1, 00 in order to satisfy 0(h(1. Provided that he meets this final requirement, Joe will still be considered a child and may be granted permanent residence as his
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 mother s derivative. Just like the calculation under 0(h(1, a determination of benefits under 0(h( does not take place immediately when the derivative turns twenty-one. Section 0(h( section provides: ( Retention of priority date.-- If the age of an alien is determined under paragraph (1 to be 1 years of age or older for the purposes of subsections (a((a and (d, the alien's petition shall automatically be converted to the appropriate category and the alien shall retain the original priority date issued upon receipt of the original petition." INA 0(h( (emphasis added. One must first perform the calculation under 0(h(1 before one may turn to an analysis of benefits under 0(h(. Again using the example of Joe, when he turns twenty-one in 00 a visa number is not yet available. It thus remains to be seen whether he may be considered a child under 0(h(1. Assume that a visa number did not become available until January 1, 00 (rather than 00 as stated above. On that date, Joe s age was twenty-two years, eight months, and one day. Although he can subtract the days the visa petition was pending with USCIS, this subtraction is not enough to bring him under the age of twenty-one. Nevertheless, Joe benefits from the 0(h( s automatic conversion and priority date retention provisions. Although his age is determined to be over twenty-one, he automatically converts to the appropriate category (as determined by his relationship to the direct beneficiary, his mother, and he retains a priority
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 date of May 1, 1. If that priority date is current, Joe is eligible to apply for lawful permanent residence. The same analysis applies to the Plaintiffs in the instant case. For example, Plaintiff Ruth Uy was the derivative beneficiary of a fourth-preference petition filed on behalf of her mother on February, 11 (when Ruth was two ( years old. The petition was approved on February, 11. Ruth Uy turned twenty-one on April, 000. As discussed above, her interest in the visa petition did not immediately terminate on that date. Because the priority date was not yet current, it was still unclear whether she could benefit from the CSPA calculations in 0(h(1. Unfortunately, an immigrant visa did not become available to the Uy family until July 00. Subtracting days the visa petition was pending, Ms. Uy was still over twenty-one. However, she benefits from 0(h(, and thus she attempted to apply for lawful permanent residence in July 00. She was and is eligible for such status as the unmarried daughter of a lawful permanent resident with a current priority date under 0(h(. The USCIS rejection of her application was in error. II. THE AGENCY S INTERPRETATION IS UNREASONABLE AND IS ENTITLED TO NO DEFERENCE The Ninth Circuit has recognized that, when the legislature enacts an Her mother, Norma Uy, also filed an I-10 petition on her behalf and included her arguments for priority date retention under the CSPA.
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 ameliorative rule designed to forestall harsh results, the rule will be interpreted and applied in an ameliorative fashion. This rule applies with additional force in the immigration context, where doubts are to be resolved in favor of the alien. Akhtar v. Burzynski, F.d, 100 (th Cir. 00; see also Padash v. INS, F.d 1, (th Cir. 00; Matter of Vizcaino, 1 I&N Dec., (BIA 1 (noting that the expansion of relief clearly was intended as a generous provisions, and it should therefore be generously interpreted. In contrast to these recognized principles of statutory interpretation, the BIA s decision in Matter of Wang is restrictive and contrary to the plain language of the law. A detailed discussion of the many errors made in Matter of Wang is presented in Plaintiffs Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, p. 1 0, and will not be repeated here. (Docket No. (August 1, 00. The BIA erroneously concludes that the statute is ambiguous; it uses a selective and incomplete analysis of the terms automatic conversion and priority date retention; and it relies on legislative history that is irrelevant to the particular section at hand. Most importantly, the agency s interpretation set forth in Matter of Wang essentially deletes 0(h( s inclusion of derivatives as defined in 0(d, and re-writes the statute as follows: If the age of an alien is determined under paragraph (1 to be 1 years of age or older for the purposes of subsections (a((a and (d, the alien's petition shall automatically be converted to the appropriate category and the alien shall retain the
1 original priority date issued upon receipt of the original petition. The agency cannot interpret the CSPA to eliminate benefits for a category of aliens when Congress did not exclude them from eligibility. See e.g., Succar v. Ashcroft, F.d, (1st Cir. 00 (The agency cannot promulgate a regulation that categorically excludes from application for adjustment of status a category of otherwise eligible aliens. III. CONCLUSION The Plaintiffs request this Court deny the Defendants motion and enter judgment for the Plaintiffs. 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 Dated: September, 00 Respectfully submitted, Carl Shusterman s/ Amy Prokop Amy Prokop Attorneys for Plaintiffs Law Offices of Carl Shusterman 00 Wilshire Blvd, Suite 10 Los Angeles, CA 001
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I hereby certify that on September, 00, a copy of the foregoing Plaintiffs Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Opposition to Defendants Motion for Summary Judgment was filed electronically using the Court s electronic filing system. I understand that notice of this filing will be sent to all parties by operation of the Court s electronic filing system. Parties may access this filing through the Court s system. 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 Dated: September, 00 Respectfully submitted, s/ Amy Prokop Amy Prokop Attorney for Plaintiffs Law Offices of Carl Shusterman 00 Wilshire Blvd, Suite 10 Los Angeles, CA 001