The police service 1

The police service 1

12 The Police Service Michael Hirst The general consensus of opinion within the police service and amongst informed commentators is that 1989 has seen an increase in the pressure currently being generated for a change in the nature, style and organisation of the police in England and Wales. Whether at the end of the debate the police service remains in its present form, is adjusted to accommodate a changing environment, or is radically and fundamentally altered, will depend, amongst other things, on views of the existing tripartite control of policing. The question of police performance What has brought about this increasing demand to change what is regarded by many countries as one of Britain s most commendable institutions? One answer might be that, in a culture increasingly concerned with measuring performance and cost-effectiveness, the service has failed to deliver the goods. Put simply, spending on the police has risen since 1979 by 52 per cent (Economist,10 December 1988), whilst crime detection rates, that most imprecise of efficiency indicators, have fallen nationally from 37 per cent in 1983 to 33 per cent in 1987. There is an increasing fear of crime and violence in our streets, fuelled by the media, and gratuitous violence and disorder, often stimulated by drink, appear to be beyond police control. Whilst juvenile crime is decreasing at a more rapid rate than can be explained by demographic change, juvenile crimes of violence are increasing in severity and in numbers. Confidence in the way the police service is run has fallen from 77 per cent in 1983 to 66 per cent in 1987 according to the British Social Attitudes survey. The argument follows, therefore, that if real violence and the public perception of crime and disorder are increasing at a time when government 82

The police service has taken the necessary steps to increase available resources, then the police service or, more importantly, its senior management has failed in its primary function of preventing crime and detecting offenders. This loss of confidence is reflected in the government s changing attitude to the service. Even a cursory examination of recent Home Office circulars and national seminars, to which Chief Officers are invited, indicates a much more positive central direction of police senior managers than hitherto. Typical of this closer scrutiny is the Home Affairs Select Committee s current examination of training and preparation of the service s senior managers at the Police Staff College, Bramshill: direct entry into senior management of the service is not inconceivable in this atmosphere. Even the Police Federation and the Past-President of the Association of Chief Police Officers have asked for a Royal Commission to examine the role, function and organisation of the police. In addition, Christine Horton, the author of the recent Policy Studies Institute report on evaluating police work, has argued that Police Authorities have added to the problem by failing to make full use of their powers. Any organisation spending annually 3.7 billion of public money with in excess of 124,500 uniformed employees and 42,000 non-uniformed staff, which has some difficulty in determining its own key performance indicators or (according to Dr Young of the Criminology Centre of the Middlesex Polytechnic) the cost effectiveness of many of its primary functions must give some cause for public concern. First, however, let us set the record straight. In 1987 591,000 individuals were arrested by the police for criminal offences and appeared before the courts, an increase of 31,700 (5.36 per cent) on 1986; a further 150,000 were cautioned in accordance with Home Office guidelines, an increase of 8.7 per cent. This might well be claimed as a 14 per cent increase in productivity without a commensurate increase in resources. There was indeed an increase of 13 per cent (17,600) in crimes of violence on the previous year, but the clear-up rate was an amazing 79 per cent. Organisational change and civilianisation, managed by senior officers, have increased the numbers of officers available for patrol by 800 in a short period of time. Less ambiguous questions arise, however, when some forces appear to perform more effectively or more or less expensively than others: the burglary detection rate in the West Midlands is 54 per cent, in the Metropolitan Police area, 8 per cent. A system in which fifty forces carry out similar tasks but need a government Audit Commission to point up the possible cost benefits and operational advantages of reviewing the way they gather and check fingerprints, or which are unable to agree on a standard national uniform or a standardisation of transport with the ensuing cost benefits, leaves something to be desired. Is the service giving value for money, or is there scope for the 83

New directions in public services privatisation of some areas of activity? Is the existing national structure, fragmented into its individual and so-called independent force elements of varying size and levels of efficiency, the best way to co-ordinate the national response to crime, disorder and the myriad other tasks performed by the police? The tripartite system of control While the nature and extent of public concern is plain enough and is easily understood, it does not follow that the responsibility lies squarely with the service itself. Before coming to a view it is necessary to recall that the system of control of the police, outside the Metropolitan areas, is based on a tripartite arrangement. Local councils through Police Authorities were, in the words of the 1964 Police Act, given the task of securing the maintenance of an adequate and efficient police force for the area. The Chief Constable, on the other hand, is responsible only for the direction and control of those resources made available to him. This is a fine point when it comes to assessing blame. Moreover, every force in the country is subjected annually to a vigorous inspection by Her Majesty s Inspectors of Constabulary, on behalf of the third element of the triple alliance, the Home Secretary. The present system which allows both Home Office and local politicians to bring considerable pressure to bear on the Chief Officer s ability to command and control his resources but leaves him with sole responsibility for the results, is only one of the current anomalies. I cannot recall a chairman of a police authority being pilloried for the rise in local crime and disorder, or the Home Office responding to criticisms with other than a recital of additional resources granted to the service and the addendum that police operational deployment is a matter for the Chief Constable. To understand why even the service itself is demanding changes requires a close examination of developments over the past 25 years. A useful starting point in any discussion of contemporary UK policing has to be the final report of the 1962 Royal Commission. The report s recommendations were designed to secure a system of control to bring about the maximum efficiency and the best use of manpower, greater accountability and proper arrangements for dealing with complaints. Whilst the latter two objectives have been achieved, the first is an area which more than 25 years later still causes great concern. What was envisaged in 1962 was a system of policing based on a partnership of local and central government, managed by a Chief Constable, independent of national or local political ties or pressures and free to exercise his professional judgement and his discretion to enforce the law. Local criminality and disorder would be controlled by the sensitive and independent administration of the law in which the Chief Constable had absolute discretion 84

The police service to prosecute. Local politicians exercising civic responsibility on behalf of the community would keep a watchful eye on force efficiency and control spending. The magistracy would provide the non-political element of the Police Authority, thus reducing the influence of party politics. And this concept of policing would flourish under the benign eye of central government, which was keen not to interfere but at the same time anxious to monitor and ensure the uniform application of best practice and efficiency through the Inspectorate. So much for the Willink vision, but the world has since changed. Several notable developments have undermined the Royal Commission vision of policing and the ability of Chief Officers to direct and control their resources to maximise efficiency. A quarter of a century after the Police Act of 1964, which enshrined the Willink vision, we have in the present police service of the UK some of the best policing principles alongside some of the worst management practices. The changing environment of policing The reorganisation of local government boundaries in 1974 created the first serious problem. Some forces grew in size with the concept of the Metropolitan Authorities; others were left with relatively small establishments but were nevertheless required to provide similar, albeit smaller, support functions. These changes forced on the service, regardless of the cost benefits or efficiency, were destined to create anomalies for the future. If Greater Manchester Police, with 6,966 officers, is judged cost-effective, it is hard to see how another force, with 981 officers, is to be judged. But who was talking cost-effective policing in 1974? During the late 1960s and early 1970s the Home Office unit beat policing system, introduced as an expedient to cover the shortfall in recruitment resulting from the poor salary structure, changed the nature of policing in the UK. The mobile police officer lost contact with the community in which he worked and gradually, with the demise of his credibility, his influence over it. At the same time, his continuous radio contact with his base deprived him of his independence, and he assumed a reactive stance in the community. Social control through contact with the community was undermined at a time when crime and social disorder were on the increase. The alienation of the police came to a head with the riots of the early 1980s. The response to the subsequent report by Lord Scarman again changed the nature of policing with the reinforcement of the concept of policing by consent, never previously applied in any literal sense, and the introduction of community consultative committees. Unfortunately Lord Scarman not only advocated such committees in London, Liverpool and Birmingham -- where 85

New directions in public services rioting had been at its fiercest -- but also in the rural areas where relationships had always been good and where parish council contacts more than sufficed. Police forces were statutorily involved in such systems of consultation by Section 106 of the Police Act of 1984. Local consultation introduced a new level of accountability, raised public expectations, and involved the commitment of a policing resource to activities whose benefits have been difficult to establish in many areas. The concept further undermined the ability of a chief officer to command and control resources in the way he believed to be professionally most effective and cost-efficient. In the absence of identified policing objectives, increasing political and, in some areas, public pressure resulted in the service becoming consumer-led. There is little reference in the Scarman report to cost-effectiveness. Last but by no means least, the issue of Home Office Circular 114/83, which placed constraints on the acquisition of additional resources and required Chief Constables to consider greater cost efficiency and more effective methods of policing at a time when the workload was increasing, probably made the greatest impact on the service. Cost-cutting exercises influenced by otherwise spendthrift local authorities actually reduced force strengths in some areas, while in others chief officers were obliged to restructure their forces to contain increasing demands in an attempt to maximise the effectiveness of scarce resources. Again this created anomalies and inequities in the national organisation and even in the service-delivery of policing in different areas. Nevertheless, despite the varying size of the forces, the diversity of local political pressures, and the tardiness or otherwise of the local paymasters, each force s efficiency was measured against standard CIPFA statistics in terms of cost-efficiency and by Home Office returns in terms of effectiveness. Recently, the auditors have added their own particular form of mayhem to the system. They have identified individual cost-effective systems and indirectly advocated their national application irrespective of the infrastructure and evolution of individual forces. Finally, the Chief Constables independent discretion in prosecution disappeared in 1986 with the introduction of the Crown Prosecution Service; that tool of social control is now a thing of the past. Central government, either directly or through the Inspectorate, brings pressure to bear on local forces regardless in some instances of cost-effectiveness, providing only that the proposed initiative is in keeping with government strategy. Has anyone, for example, measured the cost effectiveness of neighbourhood watch, the linchpin of central government s active citizen strategy? Or the long-term cost implications of the diversion of juvenile offenders from the criminal justice system which appears in some 86

The police service areas to give the persistent offender licence to commit considerable amounts of crime at the public expense? Local party politics play an increasing part in local policing systems and judgements do not necessarily use cost-effective criteria. Policing strategies which attract costs will often be determined along party lines. The Chief Constable has, on the one hand, to appease his local political mentors who control his spending in line with party policy and, on the other, to conform to pressure applied through Home Office circulars and enforced by Home Office statistics, national and regional comparison tables and the Audit Commission. Progress under these circumstances can sometimes be achieved only by playing the conflicting parties off against each other, whilst at the same time endeavouring to maintain the morale of the force which is expected to face the pressures of street policing but is on occasion denied the wherewithal to do the job as a result of political intervention. Alternatively, the Chief Constable can insist on his independence, but this simply increases the demands for greater accountability from bodies as diverse as the Police Complaints Authority and local political activists. If he says that the street situation is getting beyond his control, he is accused of exploiting public alarm to bolster his case for more resources. If he says he has it under control, he can be accused of complacency in the face of rising social disorder. The police service at the crossroads Whilst some might see the fragmentation of the service into 50 separate elements as one of its strengths, many would argue that this is now one of its greatest weaknesses. The national co-ordinating element is no longer the ACPO which has neither the resources nor the authority to create a single national voice, but the Home Office which has neither the political independence and experience, nor the desire to take responsibility for crime and social disorder. Such a fragmented service seems ill-equipped to cope with the increased pressures which 1992 and the removal of some international frontier controls will inevitably create. Forces have assumed disparate sizes which means that some communities benefit from economies of scale, whilst others have to pay for expensive duplication of services at a non-cost-effective rate. Thus we have a fragmented national resource dependent on local financing but advised by central government and accountable to both central and local government as well as the local community, and increasingly the Police Complaints Authority, which is even now advocating the involvement of a Home Affairs Committee to review force policy, following serious complaints. So much for the Chief Constable s independence to direct and control the operational resources at his disposal. 87

New directions in public services On the credit side the present tripartite system, for all its faults, has prevented the creation of a single police supremo in either the service or the government, or any single body with total control. Despite increasing demands for national motorway and drugs squads and other forms of national response, we have not as yet assumed a national dimension in other than highly specialised areas, such as the National Drugs Intelligence Unit, the Police National Computer, and the Police Requirement Support Unit. This is mainly due to the strength of local police chief officers and police committees jealously guarding their local force identities, often for all the wrong reasons. The links with the local community have been retained and in many areas strengthened as a result of consultative groups, crime prevention panels and the reorganisation of police forces emphasising sub-divisional primacy and relative autonomy. Forces are still locally funded in the first instance. The Police Authorities still retain a non-party political element in the one-third magistrate membership. None of these advantages should be lightly dispensed with as they are the integral elements which give the UK system its uniqueness. For the future we must endeavour to create a model of policing which will retain these features but at the same time obviate the disadvantages and ineffectiveness of the present system which has outlived its usefulness. The new model must accept that resources are finite, and should therefore maximise economies of scale. Modern technology can reduce lines of communication and allow the greater centralisation and co-ordination of support functions, such as training, financial administration, personnel, crime task force, supplies, etc. There is no longer need for 50 individual Chief Constables with individual police headquarters and administrations. If a force and a community the size of the West Midlands or Greater Manchester can be administered cost-effectively and efficiently as a single organisational unit, we no longer need smaller forces so long as local identity is maintained through sub-divisional interfaces and community links. The model for the future requires an organisational definition of a police force. Crime patterns, motorway complexes, urban and rural environments, local authority boundaries and other geographical factors provide no such key. The answer must lie in the creation of an organisational model of the most efficient and cost-effective size duplicated as many times as necessary throughout the country. Each force would comprise a number of principal policing units of divisional or sub-divisional size, ideally town orientated and including the surrounding rural area. This would provide the link with the local community, consultative groups, local elected members and crime prevention panels, and be seen as both a cost centre and a service delivery point. Superintendent heads of such units would have the discretion to temper local policing to meet local 88

The police service demands while acting within force policy and working to national key performance indicators, thus facilitating national comparison and evaluation. A cost-effective number of these units would be drawn together within the concept of the super-force of perhaps 10,000 officers. Policy would be force-determined and sub-divisionally implemented. Support services would be force-administered and sub-divisionally deployed. Local co-ordination would be the responsibility of the force inspectorate and administered by district assistant chief constables. The Police Authorities, who would have the same role as at present, would include one-third magistrate members and be an amalgam of members of the local authorities served by the force on a proportional basis. Each authority would in turn be a financial precepting committee and costs would be allocated to the parent local authority on the same proportional basis. The Home Office would provide the 51 per cent support as at present. Such a model is simply an evolution of what has gone before but more cost-efficient and operationally effective than the present system. In addition, it would create better career opportunities for both police and civilian personnel. A system with less than 10 independent Chief Constables would enable the ACPO to determine national key performance indicators, and respond more quickly and in a more easily co-ordinated fashion than at present to both national and international pressure when the need arises, whilst retaining the Chief Constables independence of central government. The cost of policing could be offset to some extent by charging realistically for non-public policing responsibilities and offering the private sector a security service, such as cash movement, etc., at true cost. At present private profit-making bodies can organise functions which net enormous profits and cost police forces tens of thousands of pounds of policing resources, and yet result in minimal income to the force. Organisations, including football clubs, should pay the true cost to the community of their operations rather than benefiting from the public subsidy which they enjoy at present. Over the past two decades the country has seen the rise of the private security industry, much of which the police service could undertake with little additional cost in terms of training, transport, control systems etc. The profit from this could help to finance its primary functions and reduce the burden on the chargepayer. This is surely a better option than seeing the profitable and more easily managed aspects of the police role privatised. Unfortunately a more simple model than the super-force concept of policing is the national Police Force, with a Minister in charge, administered by a Home Office Department and centrally funded. There is already growing pressure for this. Such a force would obviate the local involvement and local funding which provide the barrier against central control. Anyone advocating such an 89

New directions in public services approach should look towards the Prison Service or the Crown Prosecution Service as examples of such methods. Policing is too important to be left to one single government department or individual. But equally it is too expensive and complex to be fragmented into 50 separate units as at present. If, as demands for change increase, the police service and local government do not get together to determine a model for the future based on cost-efficiency and maximum effectiveness, while safeguarding the tested principles of the UK system, then a model will be determined elsewhere. There will, however, have to be compromises. Some Chief Constables posts will go. Direct local authority control will be reduced. But it is important that we recognise those elements in the existing system which are worth preserving and ensure that they are retained in the new model. The alternative is for local government to lose all involvement in local policing. 90