Warm-up Day 3 Given these preference schedules, identify the Plurality, Borda, Runoff, Sequential Runoff, and Condorcet winners.

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Warm-up Day 3 Given these preference schedules, identify the Plurality, Borda, Runoff, Sequential Runoff, and Condorcet winners. Plurality: Borda: Runoff: Seq. Runoff: Condorcet: Warm-Up Continues ->

Warm-up Day 3 If each voter approves of only the top three in his ranking, which is the Approval Voting winner? Approval:

Warm-up Day 3 ANSWERS Given these preference schedules, identify the Plurality, Borda, Runoff, Sequential Runoff, and Condorcet winners. Plurality: C Borda: A Runoff: B Seq. Runoff: A Condorcet: None

Warm-up Day 3 ANSWERS If each voter approves of only the top three in his ranking, which is the Approval Voting winner? Approval: A

HW Questions? Tonight s HW Packet p. 7-8 = Quiz Review

Weighted Voting and Voting Power Section 1.5

WEIGHTED VOTING Definition: Method of voting when some members of a voting body have more votes than others. Why might it be fair for some members or groups to have more weight than others? Examples: Electoral College, Corporate stockholder meetings, Mom, etc.

the # of votes is based on population in each state http://www.uselectionatlas.org/uspresident/national.php?f=0

Example: A student council has 1 representative per class, but there are 500 sophomores, 300 juniors, and 300 seniors. How could votes be weighted to represent everyone fairly? Every 100 students = 1 representative How many votes would be needed to pass an issue? If not given, go for majority.

WINNING COALITIONS: Each collection is known as a Coalition. {So;5}, {Jr;3}, {So,Jr;8}, {Jr,Sr;6} Those with enough votes to pass an issue are known as Winning Coalitions. (A winning coalition is like an alliance in Survivor. ) A voter is essential when their vote is NECESSARY to win. (i.e. if you remove it, the winning coalition becomes a losing coalition.)

COALITIONS: Sophomores get 5 votes Juniors get 3 votes Seniors get 3 votes Notation: {So;5}, {Jr;3}, {Sr;3} There are a total of 11 votes and they need 6 votes to win. Could any group win by themselves? NO!! So, join forces!

Sophomores get 5 votes. Juniors get 3 votes. Seniors get 3 votes. You need 6 votes to WIN so a winning coalition must have 6 votes. Of these coalitions which ones are winners? WINNING COALITIONS: (like an alliance on Survivor) What are all the possible coalitions? none; 0 So; 5 Jr; 3 Sr; 3 So,Jr;8 So,Sr;8 Jr,Sr;6 So,Jr,Sr;11 So,Jr;8 So,Sr;8 Jr,Sr;6 So,Jr,Sr;11

WINNING COALITIONS: (like an alliance on Survivor) So,Jr;8 So,Sr;8 Jr,Sr;6 So,Jr,Sr;11 Notice that the sophomore, junior, and senior representatives are each essential to 2 of the coalitions. This is a PARADOX: Although the votes have been distributed to give more power to the sophomores, the outcome is that all members have the same amount of power.

Banzhaf Power Index: determines the power of a member of a voting body Step 1. Make a list of all possible coalitions Step 2. Determine which of them are winning coalitions Step 3. In each winning coalition, determine which of the players are essential players Step 4. Count the total number of times each player is essential You just found the Banzhaf Power Index of each player!

Consider the weighted voting situation: Voter A 15 votes; Voter C 6 votes; Another Example Voter B 12 votes Voter D 3 votes 20 votes are needed to pass List all of the possible coalitions: List all of the winning coalitions: none; 0 A; 15 B; 12 C; 6 D; 3 A,B; 27 A,C;21 A,D; 18 B,C; 18 B,D; 15 C,D; 9 A, B,C; 33 A, B, D; 30 A, C, D; 24 B, C, D; 21 A, B, C, D; 36 A,B; 27 A,C;21 A, B,C; 33 A, B, D; 30 A, C, D; 24 B, C, D; 21 A, B, C, D; 36

SO. A 15 votes; B 12 votes; C 6 votes; D 3 votes 20 votes are needed to pass Winning coalitions: A,B; 27 A,C;21 A, B,C; 33 A, B, D; 30 A, C, D; 24 B, C, D; 21 A, B, C, D; 36 Determine the POWER INDEX for each voter: 5 3 3 1 A is NEEDED for coalitions B is NEEDED for coalitions C is NEEDED for coalitions D is NEEDED for coalitions Power Index: Number of winning coalitions to which the voter is essential.

One More Example Consider the weighted voting situation: Voter A 7 votes; Voter B 3 votes Voter C 3 votes; 7 votes are needed to pass List all of the possible coalitions: none ; 0 A; 7 B; 3 C; 3 A,B; 10 A,C;10 B,C; 6 A, B,C; 13 List all of the winning coalitions: A; 7 A,B; 10 A,C;10 A, B,C; 13 Power Indices: A 4 B 0 C 0

Dummies and Dictators A Dictator has all the power in a voting body. He is essential to EVERY winning coalition. A Dummy has no power in a voting body. He is not essential to ANY winning coalitions.

You Try Consider a situation in which voters A, B, C, and D have 4, 3, 3, and 2 votes, respectively, and 7 votes are needed to pass an issue. a. Identify all winning coalitions and their vote totals. b. Find the power index for each voter. c. Do the power indices reflect the distribution of votes? d. Suppose the number of votes necessary to pass an issue is increased from 7 to 8. How does this change the power indices of the voters?

You Try Consider a situation in which voters A, B, C, and D have 4, 3, 3, and 2 votes, respectively, and 7 votes are needed to pass an issue. a. Identify all winning coalitions and their vote totals. A, B; 7 A, C;7 A, B, C; 10 A, B, D; 9 A, C, D; 9 B, C, D; 8 A, B, C, D; 12 b. Find the power index for each voter. A:5, B:3, C:3, D:1 c. Do the power indices reflect the distribution of votes? No, A s power is disproportionately high, while D s is low. d. Suppose the number of votes necessary to pass an issue is increased from 7 to 8. How does this change the power indices of the voters? All voters now have equal power.

Classwork Packet p. 5 #1 and #2 Packet p. 6

Classwork 1.4-1.5 Practice: Approval Voting and Weighted Voting