Reality Math Sam Kaplan, The University of North Carolina at Asheville Dot Sulock, The University of North Carolina at Asheville

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Reality Math Sam Kaplan, The University of North Carolina at Asheville Dot Sulock, The University of North Carolina at Asheville Purpose: Show that the method of voting used can determine the winner. Voting Voting is a method of group decision-making. In the United States we use voting to choose representatives for cities, counties and states in local, state and federal government. Voting is also used to make decisions on committees, rank basketball and football teams, to pick members of the Rock and Roll Hall of Fame and make tens of thousands of choices, large and small, every year. Even though voting is used in so many ways, it's only recently that the effectiveness of voting has been studied. In this module we will look at several methods of voting and their ability to extract a group s opinions. 1. Majority Winner or Plurality Winner? For example, consider a committee of seven high schools students is putting together a dance party. They have to choose the dance music. Three students want techno-rock, two students want hip-hop and the last two students want country music. All three students who want techno-rock would be willing to have hip-hop and would hate country music. The two students who wanted hip-hop would be okay with techno-rock but would loathe country music. The two who want country music are willing to tolerate hip-hop but detest techno-rock. One way to express this information is with a voter preference schedule: 1 st choice TR HH C 2 nd choice HH TR HH 3 rd choice C C TR number of voters 3 2 2 A majority winner has more than half of the first choice votes. The plurality winner has the most first choice votes. 1. If the seven students voted for their first choice, (a) Would any music option have a majority? (b) Which music option would win (have the most votes, be the plurality winner)? 1

2. Pair-wise Voting and Condorcet Winners If techno rock were not an option, what would the group prefer? Who would win a hip-hop vs. country music pair-wise competition? 2 voters would chose HH and 2 voters would chose C, but the three who like TR the most would vote for HH and HH would win 5-2. 2. If country music weren t an option, what would the group prefer? Who would win a hip-hop vs. techno-rock pair-wise competition? We see that even though techno rock is the plurality winner, the whole group prefers hip-hop to techno-rock and hip-hop to country music. Against either other choice, hip-hop is the winner. Thus, hip-hop better represents the group s favorite music than techno-rock. What we see in this simple example is that plurality voting does not always identify a group's real preference. If one choice can win pair-wise against each of the other choices, that candidate is called a Condorcet winner. The mathematician and social philosopher, Marie Jean Antoine Nicolas Caritat, marquis de Condorcet (1743-1794) was the first to apply mathematics to the social sciences. He asserted that any fair voting system should pick a Condorcet winner, when there is one, as the winning candidate. He also noted that with some sets of voting preferences, a group might prefer candidate C to B and prefer candidate B to A and prefer candidate A to C! This situation is called by the fancy title, intransitivity of the majority paradox. This is something like a tournament of three chess players where player C always wins against player B, player B always wins against player A, but player A always wins against player C. In that setting, you cannot decide who is the best player. In our example of the music preferences of the seven students, hip-hop (HH) is a Condorcet winner because HH beats TR and HH beats C in pair-wise competitions. A candidate who wins one-on-one against all other candidates is a Condorcet winner. 3. If the three techno rock fans changed their preference to TR > C > HH, who wins the pair-wise matches (a) TR vs. HH? (b) TR vs. C? (c) HH vs. C? (d) Is there now a Condorcet winner? (e) Since HH > TR and TR > C, does HH > C? (f) If not, what is the name of this paradox? 2

3. Another Example: Freshman Parking Consider a college parking committee of 11 deciding Freshmen parking rules. There is limited space for parking but a growing student population. The committee has three options, no Freshman parking on campus (N), restricted Freshman parking in a distant lot (R), or a lottery where only a few Freshmen get spaces on campus (L). Below is a chart of the preferences of the 11 members. Notice the left column when reading the chart. There is one voter who prefers N to R to L and three voters who prefer N to L to R. Number of voters Preferences 1 N > R > L 3 N > L > R 1 R > N > L 3 R > L > N 3 L > N > R total = 11 4. (a) Does any option have a majority? (b) Does any option have a plurality? (c) Who wins N vs. R? (d) Who wins L vs. R? (e) Who wins L vs. N? (f) Is there a Condorcet winner? (g) Who should win? 4. Borda Counts Jean-Charles Chevalier de Borda (1733-1799) was a contemporary of the Marquis de Condorcet. Also French, Borda was a mathematician, scientist, engineer and sailor. He fought for the Americans in the American Revolutionary War. In his study of voting, he invented the Borda count. This voting method is currently used to ranking college and professional teams and to elect members to various Halls of Fame. The Borda count assigns 0 points to the lowest preference, 1 to the next lowest, 2 to the next and so on. The candidate with the most points wins the election. For example, the preference A > B > C gives 2 points to A, 1 point to B and none to C. Let s do a Borda count for the dance music choice. Number of voters Preferences 3 TR > HH > C 2 HH > TR > C 2 C > HH > TR total = 7 TR will get 3 first-place 2 points, 2 second-place 1 points, and 2 last-place 0 points. TR: 3(2 points) + 2(1 points) + 2(0 points) = 8 points 3

We can do a Borda Count Check on our Borda count. 7 voters have 3 points to give so the Borda counts should total 7 x 3 = 21. 5. Find the Borda count for (a) hip-hop (b) country music (c) Do our counts add up to 7 x 3? 6. Find the Borda count for (a) N (no Freshman parking) (b) L (lottery) (c) R (freshman parking in a restricted, distant lot) (d) Show the check. (e) which parking option wins? 5. Instant Runoff Although we know that a Condorcet winner should win an election, actual voting methods make it difficult to know if there would be a Condorcet winner. We have seen two voting methods that are sometimes used in reality, plurality and the Borda count. With plurality, only the voters first choices matter. The Borda count incorporates more information about the voters total preferences. Some countries, such as France, use two elections to elect their president if there is no majority winner in the first election. In France s multi-party political system, it is unlikely that a majority winner will emerge in the first election. 7. Does having only two candidates in a presidential election pretty much assure a majority winner? In the United State, some states and local elections use a third voting method called instant runoff. Instant runoff is a little different from place to place. Typically, voters list their top three choices in order. The election only counts the first preferences for everyone. If none of the candidates has majority, more than half the votes, then the top two vote getters have a run-off using everyone's extended preferences. The motivation behind the growing popularity of instant runoff is money. Holding a second election between the runoff candidates costs extra to the candidates and to the city, county or state holding the election. With instant runoff, a second election is avoided. 8. Using the instant runoff method, (a) Which dance option wins? (b) Which parking option wins? 9. Do the instant runoff and Borda count always produce the same outcome? 4

10. Reflect. Will a majority winner always be a Condorcet winner? Why or why not? 5