GUIDE 1: WOMEN AS POLICYMAKERS

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GUIDE 1: WOMEN AS POLICYMAKERS Thinking about measurement and outcomes This case study is based on Women as Policy Makers: Evidence from a Randomized Policy Experiment in India, by Raghabendra Chattopadhyay and Esther Duflo (2004a), Econometrica 72(5), 1409-1443. J-PAL thanks the authors for allowing us to use their paper.

DESCRIPTION India amended its federal constitution in 1992, devolving power to plan and implement development programs from the states to rural councils, or Gram Panchayats (Panchayats). The Panchayats now choose what development programs to undertake and how much of the budget to invest in them. The states are also required to reserve a third of Panchayat seats and Panchayat chairperson positions for women. In most states, the schedule on which reserved seats (quotas) and positions cycle among the Panchayats is determined randomly. This creates the opportunity to rigorously assess the impact of quotas on politics and government: Do the policies differ when there are more women in government? Do the policies chosen by women in power reflect the policy priorities of women? Since randomization was part of the Indian government program itself, the evaluation planning centered on collecting the data needed to measure impact. The researchers questions were what data to collect, what data collection instruments to use, and what sample size to plan for. (DT2). In this case, you should make suggestions, but be sure not to do the work for them. LEARNING OBJECTIVE To explore the issues that have to be resolved when deciding what questions to ask and what data to collect. Consider the need and purpose of a policy. Use that discussion to drive the evaluation (rather than the reverse). Subjects covered: Measuring a program or policy, logical framework, defining a hypothesis, selecting indicators, GENERAL GUIDANCE The context of the evaluation being used in this case study is somewhat complicated. Nonetheless, the details are not as relevant for the case. The main point is that quotas for women were instituted in a random fashion at the Village Council level (also, see spotlight below). Participants may also have difficulty coming up with all of the outcomes and their corresponding indicators

RANDOMIZED QUOTAS IN INDIA: WHAT CAN THEY TEACH US? You may need to explain what quotas are. Here is a primer: Spotlight on Political Quotas for Women Political quotas are voluntary or legally mandated gender quotas in politics and government. With voluntary quotas a political party decides on its own to impose a quota for women. Voluntary quotas often target the nominating stage. The (internal) rule ensures that, say, 20 or 30 percent of the party s candidates are women. The quotas are legally mandated, often by the country s constitution or the electoral law, and so regulate the activities of all political parties. Legal quotas often target the electoral stage. The law ensures that, say, 20 or 30 percent of seats in the assembly are reserved for women. This may mean, for example, that parties in the reserved constituencies, the parties can field only women candidates. Most countries that adopt gender quotas do so on the understanding that the quotas are temporary, to be remove just as soon as barriers to women s participation in politics are removed. Gender quotas, whether legally mandated or voluntary, have usually been followed by dramatic increases in the political representation of women. Rwanda, for example, jumped from 24th place in the women in parliament rankings to first place (49%) after the introduction of quotas in 1996; Costa Rica jumped from 25th place in 1994 to third place (39%) in 2006. Similar changes have been seen in Argentina, Burundi, Iraq, Mozambique, and South Africa. Seventeen of the top 20 countries have some form of quota. The trend holds at sub-national levels. India, for example, has 10% women at the national level, but 33% at the local level where there are quotas. One thing people might be stuck on is the term panchayat meaning assembly of five. Most gram panchayats are not comprised of only five people. They range from 5-15 depending on the state, size of the panchayat, and number of villages (hamlets) [we probably need to check this this corresponds to the number of villages found in a panchayat in these areas]. If people are confused by how the quota system works within a GP, you can ask them to assume there are 9 leaders in the GP. There is a slate of candidates. Without quotas, the top 9 vote-takers would make up the council. With quotas, if the top 9 do not include at least 3 females, then they will substitute lower-vote-taking males with the top female vote-takers until there are 3 female representatives. Allow participants to read for 10 minutes before Discussion Topic 1. Discussion Topic 1 Gender quotas in the village councils (20 minutes) This DT aims to get participants to delve into the debate around the quota system. To do so, it asks that they first consider the context of the system the institution it is trying to change, the need for change, and how this policy attempts to bring about that change. The topics here may overlap with DT2. However, we want this part of the discussion to remain at a higher level. To do so, assume there is no evaluation. Simply carry on a discussion, then debate, on the justification for and the merits of this policy. If people are tempted to start identifying indicators in the discussion, pull them back. We ll get to indicators in DT2. That said, when discussing DT1 it is useful to nominate someone to take notes since the same topics should be revisited in DT2. DT1.1 and DT1.2 should be discussed separately. In DT1.1 you should think about your destination or goal first. We don t want people to jump into thinking about the quota system before understanding the purpose of the panchayati raj. The order of the questions is designed to get participants to think of the goal / destination (responsive policymakers) or the need (failure to respond to the preferences of certain constituencies) before jumping to the input (quotas for women).

If you start this exercise by thinking of the road (or policy) first, and then define your destination (or goal) by where road happens to go you ll naturally conclude that your road is successful in reaching your destination. If you start with the goal or destination first, you allow yourself more room to consider other alternatives and realize that your input may not necessarily be the most direct path of achieving your goal. In the context of the course, and the different types of evaluation (needs assessment, theory of change, process evaluation, and impact evaluation), DT1 is supposed to mimic a needs assessment : give a strong idea of the issues at hand and the possible effects. This assessment is particularly important since it is the starting point of the logical framework in the next section. 1. What were the main goals of the Village Councils? Answer: Decentralized government, in particular to improve the delivery of public goods and service in the rural areas. Discussion primer: Ask participants why such a system is necessary. Is it purely practical? Is it based on some philosophy? Ask which specific public goods the GP is responsible for overseeing. Are there any moral, political or philosophical reasons why local governance is good? 2. Women are underrepresented in politics and government. Only 10% of India s national assembly members are women, compared to 17% worldwide. Does it matter that women are underrepresented? Why and why not? Answer: Yes (see #3 below) No, if: Men and women have the same preferences This question attempts to draw out the need for the panchayat system. What are the assumptions that go into why a quota system would be socially beneficial? (Only) if people have trouble understanding what this is getting at, ask them what the purpose of representation is. Allow them to discuss this. Then ask how the representatives are chosen. They should respond with by popular vote. Ask whether women vote in these elections. Ask whether women want to vote for female candidates. Can women and their interests be represented effectively by male leaders? Then ask them to consider it from the perspective of a very cynical villager. Participants may reply that a villager would say women don t know anything. Ask them whether they think the male leaders know anything. Note that in India, more than in most countries, incumbents are frequently voted out of office. Incumbents are in fact at a large disadvantage. We want them to question whether the panchayati raj matters at all. 3. What were the framers of the 73rd amendment trying to achieve when they introduced quotas for women? Answer: They were worried that the newly empowered Panchayats would marginalize traditionally disadvantaged groups, such as women. Participants may answer with the same reasons mentioned in DT1.2 if they argued that representation of women matters. WHAT DATA TO COLLECT Discussion Topic 2 Using a logical framework to delineate your intermediate and final outcomes of interest Panchayats exercise no power Perfect democracy (leaders decisions reflect will of entire community) (30 minutes) For this section, review the notes from DT1 and circle specific outcomes that you think are worth measuring.

There may be some overlap, but what we re trying to do is take abstract ideas and turn them into tangible building blocks, outcomes. If people identify certain outcomes in this DT that look like final outcomes, ask them to explain how that will happen. For example, if they say, better health and education for the children, ask them to identify what assumptions they are making there. In this example, you want to draw out from the discussion that better health as an outcome assumes that women inherently care more about health as a policy topic. Play Devil s Advocate: how do you know women care more about health? Can you measure that? You may want to save this Devil s Advocate role until DT2.6, when you draft your logical model. 1. Brainstorm the possible effects of quotas: positive, negative, and no effects. Sample answers: Positive effects: A wider array of issues and needs (particularly those important to women) are addressed by the Village Council, more women become involved in politics and community leadership, community perceptions of women improve, women achieve higher status and better treatment Negative effects: Qualified men are denied positions or no longer participate in politics; there may be community backlash against the quotas No effects: though women are elected, the men in the household (fathers, husbands) still dictate the women s preferences. If they have covered this in question DT1.5, you can skip the next question. 2. What evidence would you collect to strengthen the case of those who are for or against quotas? For each potential effect on your list, list also the indicator(s) you would use for that effect. For example, if you say that quotas will affect political participation of women, the indicator could be number of women attending the General Assembly. Sample answers: A wider array of issues and needs are addressed by the Panchayat: Percentage of budget spent on education and health concerns More women become involved in politics and community leadership: Number of women attending the General Assembly Number of women running for office Number of women winning elections Number of women in nonpolitical community leadership roles Community perceptions of women improve: Number of community members satisfied with female leadership Number of community members willing to vote for a woman Qualified men are denied positions or no longer participate in politics: Number of men who state they will no longer participate in politics due to quota system Community backlash against the quotas: Number of community members dissatisfied with the quota system

MULTIPLE OUTCOMES ARE DIFFICULT TO INTERPRET, SO DEFINE A HYPOTHESIS Discussion Topic 2, continued (15 minutes) 3. What might be some examples of key hypotheses you would test? Pick one. Answer: You want to guide them toward something general such as Quotas will change the types of goods invested in to reflect the preferences of women 6. Which indicators should you try to measure at each step in your logical framework? Answer: See Figures 1 and 2 7. Using the outcomes and conditions, draw a possible logical framework, linking the intervention and the final outcomes. Sample answer: See Figure 1 4. Which indicators or combinations of indicators would you use to test your key hypothesis? Sample answer: GP investments; preferences by gender USE A LOGICAL FRAMEWORK TO DELINEATE INTERMEDIATE AND FINAL OUTCOMES For this section, COMBINE questions 5-7. Revisit the outcomes discussed and try to figure out which are intermediate outcomes and which are final outcomes. Some outcomes may be prerequisites for others, and for other pairs of outcomes, causation could go in both directions. Identify those. Try to draw a flow chart that places these outcomes in the right place. You should also revisit the assumptions discussed in DT1.1 and DT1.2. If people reject those assumptions, what evidence would you want to collect to show that those assumptions in fact hold? Discussion Topic 2, continued (30 minutes) 5. What are the steps or conditions that link quotas (the intervention) to the final outcomes? Answer: See Figures 1 and 2

FIGURE 1 A Possible Logical Framework Reservations Imperfect Democracy + Some Democracy + Pradhan s preferences matter More women pradhans Women are empowered Women have different preferences + Investments reflect women s preferences Different (and specific) public goods Different health, education outcomes? FIGURE 2 Model with Indicators