A. Growing dissatisfaction with hyperglobalization

Contents A. Growing dissatisfaction with hyperglobalization B. The region s vulnerable participation in global trade C. A political scenario with new uncertainties

A. Growing dissatisfaction with hyperglobalization

Globalization questioned in the North Tensions Low dynamism of the global economy High unemployment (Europe) Wage stagnation Increasing inequality Gowing migratory flows Intense competition from Asian manufactures Disruptive impacts of the digital revolution Reactions Rise of nationalisms Opposition to new trade agreements Resistance to immigration Anti globalization movements

195 1953 1956 1959 1962 1965 1968 1971 1974 1977 198 1983 1986 1989 1992 1995 1998 21 24 27 21 213 216 World GDP and trade do not recover after the crisis 15 Variation in the volume of global merchandise exports and GDP, 1952-216 a (Percentages) 1 5 7.8 8.6 5.4 3.9 6.5 5.3 2.9-5 -1-15 Exports GDP Average export growth Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), with data from the World Trade Organization and International Monetary Fund. a Figures for 216 are projections.

6Q1 6Q4 7Q3 8Q2 9Q1 9Q4 1Q3 11Q2 12Q1 12Q4 13Q3 14Q2 15Q1 15Q4 2 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 21 211 212 213 214 215 The ongoing transition in China s economic model has reduced its demand for imports China: consumption, investment and trade 5 48 46 44 42 4 38 36 34 32 3 A. Consumption and investment, 2-215 (Percentages of GDP) 5 4 3 2 1-1 -2-3 B. Trade volume: year-on-year variation, Q1 26-Q2 216 (Percentages) Household final consumption expenditure Gross fixed capital formation Exports Imports Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), with data from World Bank, World Development Indicators, National Bureau of Statistics of China and World Trade Organization.

The incomes of the middle class in developed countries stagnated Change in real income by percentile of the world population between 1988 and 28 (Percentages) 8% 7% 6% 5% 4% 3% A C A. The middle class of emerging economies B. The middle class of developed countries C. The world s richest 1% 2% 1% % 1 5 1 15 2 25 3 35 4 45 5 55 6 65 7 75 8 85 9 95 99 Percentile Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), with data from Ch. Lakner and B. Milanovic, World Panel Income Distribution (LM-WPID), 213 [online] http://go.worldbank.org/nwbuki3jp. B

The tensions of globalization have large implications for emerging economies Risks Repercussions Continued imbalances and adjustments More protectionism Less offshoring Migratory tensions Growing digital gaps Weak growth Greater exposure to financial volatility and indebtedness Worsened social indicators

B. The region s fragile participation in international trade

The region shows a fragile participation in global trade Latin America and the Caribbean and developing Asia: Share in world exports of goods and services, 2 and 215 (Percentages) Latin America and the Caribbean Developing Asia 9 6 8 7 5 6 4 5 4 3 3 2 2 1 1 Goods (total) High-tech goods Services (total) Modern services Goods (total) High-tech goods Services (total) Modern services 2 215 2 215 Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), with data from UN COMTRADE database.

2 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 21 211 212 213 214 215 216 2 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 21 211 212 213 214 215 216 In 216 the region s exports are projected to fall 5% and its imports 9%, completing 4 years of contraction 3 2 1 Latin America and the Caribbean: annual variation in merchandise trade, 2-216 a (Percentages) A) Exports B) Imports 3 2 1-1 -5. -1-9.3-2 -2-3 -3 Volume Price Value Volume Price Value Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), based on countries official information. a Figures for 216 are projections.

The sharp contraction of the region s imports weakens perspectives for investment and growth Latin America and the Caribbean: projected variation in the value of merchandise imports by category, 216 (Percentages) Latin America and the Caribbean: structure of merchandise imports by category, 215 (Percentages) Consumption goods -3.7 Consump tion goods 19% Fuels 1% Capital goods Intermediate goods -1. -7.3 Bienes de capital 16% Fuels -2.5-25 -2-15 -1-5 Intermedi ate goods 55% Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), based on data from national central banks, customs offices and statistical offices.

The largest drops in exports and imports will be in South America and the Caribbean Latin America and the Caribbean: projected variation in merchandise trade by value, volume and price, 216 (Percentages) A) Exports B) Imports 5 5-5 -1.1-3.1-5. -5-5. -2. -6.3-1 -7.6-9.4-1 -15-15 -12.6 Caribbean South America Central America Mexico Volume Price Value Latin America and the Caribbean -2-16.7 South America Caribbean Central America Mexico Volume Price Value Latin America and the Caribbean Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), based on countries official information.

In 216 there is a deep reduction in the region s trade deficit Latin America and the Caribbean: trade balance with the world and with selected countries and regions, 214-216 a (Millions of dollars) 15 1 5-5 -1-15 World United States European Union China Other Asia 214 215 216 Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), based on data from national central banks, customs offices and statistical offices. a Figures for 216 are projections.

Trade falls with all the region s main partners Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC): variation in the value of merchandise trade by origin and destination, 215-216 a (Percentages) A) Exports B) Imports LAC -2-1 LAC -2-12 United States -9-4 World -11-9 World -15-5 United States -1-8 Asia (including China) -2-4 Asia (including China) -8-3 China -17-2 China -7-2 European Union -18-1 European Union -14-4 -25-2 -15-1 -5 216 215-25 -2-15 -1-5 216 215 Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), based on countries official information. a Data for 216 are projections.

Same as in 214 and 215, intraregional trade falls the most, especially in South America Latin America and the Caribbean: annual variation in the value of goods exports to the region and to the rest of the world, 27-216 a (Percentages) 4 3 2 1-1 -2-3 27 28 29 21 211 212 213 214 215 216-14 -2-4 -1 Variation in the value of intra-grouping goods exports, January-June 216 with respect to same period of 215 (Percentages) Grouping Variation Andean Community -19.1% Pacific Alliance -12.% MERCOSUR -11.7% CARICOM -7.8% Central American Common Market -1.3% Intra-regional exports Exports to the rest of the world Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), based on countries official information. a Figures for 216 are projections.

2 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 21 211 212 213 214 215 216 217 218 219 22 2 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 21 211 212 213 214 215 216 217 218 219 22 A modest recovery of the region s trade is projected for the remainder of this decade Latin America and the Caribbean: value of merchandise trade, 2-22 a (Index: 21=1) A) Exports B) Imports 14 14 12 12 1 1 8 8 6 6 4 4 2 2 Central scenario Pessimistic scenario Central scenario Pessimistic scenario Optimistic scenario Optimistic scenario Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), based on countries official information.

C. A political scenario with new uncertainties: Mega regional trade negotiations: TTP, TTIP, RCEP Climate change: future of the Paris Agreement Migration Future of the digital era

An uncertain political scenario for the regulation of global trade TPP 11% of world population 36% of world GDP 23% of world exports 26% of world imports 28% of FDI inflows 43% of FDI outflows TTIP 11% of world population 46% of world GDP 41% of world exports 44% of world imports 28% of FDI inflows 46% of FDI outflows RCEP 48% of world population 29% of world GDP 29% of world exports 28% of world imports 3% of FDI inflows 26% of FDI outflows

The political economy of the current globalization An international system with few regulations and weak multilateral mechanisms favors the stronger players (firms and governents) who have: Greater negotiating power (large countries and blocs vis-a-vis small ones) Greater market power Greater ability to mobilize resources across borders Lock-in effect of Business As Usual (BAU) on policies and interests (by definition future generations do not have a voice today)

US trade with Canada and Mexico accounts for 6% of total trade among TPP members TPP: top 1 bilateral trading relationships and cumulative share in intra-group exports, 215 a (Billions of dollars and percentages) 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 USA-CAN USA-MEX USA-JPN MLS-SNG AUS-JPN USA-SNG JPN-MLS JPN-SNG AUS-USA USA-VTN 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 Value Cumulative share (righthand axis) Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), with data from UN COMTRADE database.

The TPP at a crossroads: implications for the region With TPP Chile, Mexico and Peru enjoy cumulation of origin and improve access to Japan for their agricultural exports Some loss of policy space (for example in intellectual property) but less than for Asian TPP members Countries from the region who are not TPP members could suffer export diversion, especially in the USA (for example Central America with Viet Nam) Reduced flexibility of Pacific Alliance vis-a-vis future convergence with Mercosur Without TPP Renegotiation of NAFTA (in terms more favorable to the USA) Uncertainty about the other US free trade agreements in the region Greater room for convergence between the Pacific Alliance and Mercosur The return of bilateralism in the USA?

Possible scenarios of the new hemispheric context in the production sphere A geopolitical adjustment of trade and FDI flows Increased infrastructure spending: Impact on prices of metals Fiscal expansion, higher interest rates, a stronger dollar More carbon-intensive production, less support for renewable energies Increases in hydrocarbon production, effect on prices Support for reshoring in the United States: Lower taxes on repatriation of profits Managed trade and investment with China and Mexico Pressure to invest locally

Tasks for the region in the new global and hemispheric context Given the current uncertainty, moving forward with regional integration is more necessary than ever Promote convergence between the different regional integration mechanisms Move towards a single digital market Implement a regional infrastructure program Develop regional value chains Speed up implementation of the trade facilitation agenda At the national level, productive diversification requires industrial and trade policies consistent with the technological revolution and with a big environmental push