Bounds on Welfare-Consistent Global Poverty Measures

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Bounds on Welfare-Consistent Global Poverty Measures Martin Ravallion Departent of Econoics Georgetown University, Washington DC Shaohua Chen Developent Research Group World Bank, Washington DC Abstract: New easures of global poverty are presented that take seriously the idea of relative-incoe coparisons but also acknowledge a deep identification proble when the latent nors defining poverty vary systeatically across countries. Welfare-consistent easures are shown to be bounded below by a fixed absolute line and above by weakly-relative lines derived fro a theoretical odel of relative-incoe coparisons calibrated to data on national poverty lines. Both bounds indicate falling global poverty incidence, but ore slowly for the upper bound. Either way, the developing world has a higher poverty incidence but is aking ore progress against poverty than the developed world. Keywords: Global poverty; poverty lines; relative incoe; inequality JEL classifications: I32, O10 Correspondence: Martin Ravallion, Departent of Econoics, Georgetown University, Washington DC., 20057, USA. r1185@georgetown.edu. Acknowledgents: The authors thank Pre Sangraula and the World Bank s regional focal points for help in setting up the data base on national poverty lines and Qinghua Zhao for prograing assistance. Helpful coents were received fro Rebecca Blank, Benoît Decerf, Francisco Ferreira, Stephan Klasen, Doinique van de Walle and Michael Woolcock. These are the views of the authors and need not reflect those of their eployers, including the World Bank.

1. Introduction There is now aple support for the view that people are concerned about their relative incoes. Sociology and social psychology have long ephasized the relevance to defining poverty of concerns about shae, stiga and social exclusion. 1 Such social effects on welfare have also received attention in econoics, including Duesenberry s (1949) odel of how relative consuption influences savings, the arguents of Hirsch (1977) and Frank (1985) on how the evaluation of certain consuption goods depends on consuption relative to others, and the arguents and evidence that work effort is influenced by relative wages (Cohn, et al., 2014). The idea that welfare depends on relative incoe has also found support in survey data on subective self-assessents of welfare, as in (for exaple) Lutter (2005) and Knight et al. (2009). 2 And the idea has been invoked to explain the Easterlin paradox whereby average happiness appears not to rise uch with econoic growth (Easterlin, 1974; Clark et al., 2008). Econoic theory has also provided a rationale for why relative incoe atters; for exaple, Rayo and Becker (2007) show that the welfare relevance of relative position can eerge as a response to the constraints faced in aking choices (notably the difficulty in distinguishing close options and the boundedness of happiness). Furtherore, the literature suggests that poor people also care about relative incoes. 3 In this light, how should we easure global poverty? An appealing guiding principle requires that poverty lines should be welfare-consistent, eaning that they are oney etrics of soe reasonable concept of welfare. As Sen (1983, p.168) puts it an absolute approach in the space of capabilities translates into a relative approach in the space of coodities. 4 Whether the absolute standard is an index of utility or an index of capabilities ay be iportant for ipleentation, but the first-order issue is to deand welfare consistency in soe defensible sense when easuring global poverty, i.e., those we udge to be equally well off are all either 1 Iportant early contributions were ade by Davis (1959) and Runcian (1966). In the context of understanding poverty see (inter alia) Abel-Sith and Townsend (1966), Townsend (1979) and Walker (2014). 2 Surveys of this literature can be found in Frey and Stutzer (2002), Senik (2005) and Clark et al. (2008). 3 Anthropologists have long described behaviors consistent with this idea; see, for exaple, Geertz (1976) and Fuller (1992). Rao (2001) describes the iportant of celebrations to social networks aong poor people in rural India. Baneree and Duflo (2008) docuent expenditures on celebrations and festivals by very poor people in surveys for a nuber of countries. Ravallion and Lokshin (2010) find that the poorest within a (very) poor country (Malawi) put low weight on relative position but this atters ore to better-off strata. There is also evidence of adverse effects of relative position on health behaviors (Balsa et al., 2014). Sith et al (2012) provide a review of any studies showing behavioral responses to relative deprivation. 4 Sen was coenting on the sociological approach to easuring poverty in Britain taken by Townsend (1979). 2

poor or not-poor. The international poverty line for a given country can then be defined as the oney needed to achieve a globally coon level of welfare. 5 If individual welfare depends on both own incoe and relative incoe then differences over tie and space in the coparison group s level of living will require adustents to any welfare-consistent onetary poverty line. In principle, the relative coparison ight be upwards or downwards; in the forer case, one is deeed to be relatively deprived if one is poorer than the average for soe coparison group, while in the latter case one ay be gratified in knowing that one is better off than that group. But the key point is that the incoe-poverty line becoes relative specific to circustances at each date and place. This perspective iediately casts doubt on soe of the prevailing stylized facts about poverty in the world. There is evidence that the incidence of absolute poverty udged by a wide range of fixed real-incoe thresholds is declining in the developing world, as shown in Chen and Ravallion (2004, 2010, 2013). Econoic growth has played an iportant role, but it is less clear that this is also true when one takes account of relative incoe; indeed, the Easterlin paradox suggests otherwise. Is poverty also falling in growing econoies when a welfareconsistent allowance is ade for relative incoes? Siilarly, it is widely believed that poverty is a uch greater proble in the developing world than in today s rich world. Soe observers have even been tepted to clai that there is really little difference between rich and poor countries in the personal experience of poverty once one takes account of the social effects on welfare. 6 Is that still true when one allows for relative poverty? There are already easures in the literature that we ight consider turning to in addressing these questions. Explicitly relative poverty lines appear to have been first proposed by Fuchs (1967) who argued that poverty lines for the US should be set at 50% of the current edian. While not adopted officially in the US, a version of the Fuchs proposal has becoe the ost coon official ethod of easuring poverty in the OECD and Eurostat, and is used by any national governents in the OECD (though 60% of the edian is ore coon than 5 The definition of the poverty line as the point on the consuer s expenditure function corresponding to a reference level of utility needed to not be poor appears to have originated in Blackorby and Donaldson (1987). For further discussion see Ravallion (2016a, Chapter 5). 6 For exaple, with reference to case studies (ainly using qualitative ethods) in China, India, Norway, Pakistan, South Korea, Uganda and the United Kingdo, Walker (2014, p.14) clais that while aterial circustances vary enorously across the case-study countries, poverty feels very siilar in all settings; people siply cannot afford to live up to their own expectations and those of others. 3

50%). 7 The UN s Sustainable Developent Goals also include onitoring the proportion of the population living below 50% of the edian. Others have argued instead for using a fixed proportion of the ean rather than the edian, and this too has been applied at country level, including in the UK. 8 Advocates of such relative poverty lines have often argued that the absolute lines do not keep up with evolving standards for defining poverty in growing econoies. For exaple, Fuchs (1967, p.89) argued that.. all so-called iniu or subsistence budgets are based on conteporary standards which will soon be out of date. Siilar criticiss of the US official poverty lines have been ade by Citro and Michael (1995) (in an expert coittee report for the National Acadey of Sciences) and Blank (2008), aongst others. There is, however, a long-standing concern with the Fuchs proposal (and its variants as used by Eurostat and the OECD), steing fro the fact that the onetary line then has an elasticity of unity with respect to the edian. This is dubbed a strongly relative poverty line by Ravallion and Chen (2011) who point out that (for a broad class of poverty easures) this violates an intuitively appealing axio, naely that if all incoes increase (decrease) by the sae proportion then an aggregate poverty easure ust fall (rise); strongly relative easures turn out to have siilar properties in practice to standard inequality easures. 9 This concern is probably the ain reason why the Fuchs proposal has had very few followers in the developing world (or in the US). By contrast, what Ravallion and Chen call weakly relative lines also entail that the line rises with the ean or edian, but with an elasticity less than unity. A further issue, which has received little attention in the literature on poverty easureent, is what the coparison incoe should be. The literature on relative poverty has alost universally taken the coparison incoe to be either the (equally-weighted) ean or the edian, although there has been soe debate about which is better. 10 Accepting that relative 7 Exaples and discussions can be found in Fuchs (1967), Seeding et al. (1990), Blackburn (1994), Atkinson (1998), Eurostat (2005), Nolan (2007) and OECD (2008, Chapter 5). In the context of developing countries, also see Atkinson and Bourguignon (2001) and Garroway and de Laiglesia (2012). 8 See, for exaple, Drewnowski (1977), Duclos and Makdissi (2004), and de Mesnard (2007). The UK has used the ean in official poverty easures (Atkinson, 1998). 9 A ore foral discussion and evidence can be found in Ravallion (2016a, Chapter 8). 10 Advocates of the edian have argued that it is robust to easureent errors at the top and botto while advocates of the ean have argued that using the sae proportion of the edian as the poverty line underestiates poverty (although there is no obvious reason why one would have to use the sae proportion). A ore sophisticated critique of the use of the edian by de Mesnard (2007) points to soe paradoxical theoretical results in poverty easureent that are avoided using the ean as the coparison incoe level. 4

coparisons are welfare-relevant does not, however, iply that the national average is the relevant coparator for global poverty easureent. Naturally there is heterogeneity in coparison groups. Research in sociology and social psychology has ephasized the role of coparisons with siilar others, also called in-group ebers as distinct fro the outgroup who are not relevant coparators (Davis, 1959). It is hardly obvious that the overall ean (or edian) of the country of residence adequately characterizes the in-group. Depending on how that group is specified (neighbors, friends, school cohort, or co-workers) one can clearly obtain quite coplex forulations for a country-level easure of relative poverty. When easuring national poverty, the literature has subsued this coplexity into a single national etric. That is a seeingly reasonable siplification for the purpose of easuring poverty at the national level. But the key question is still begging: what is the relevant suary statistic for the national coparison incoe? This paper revisits the conceptual basis of global poverty easureent and proposes new easures that unify the (very different) approaches taken in the past, notably between developed and developing countries. Our theoretical starting point is the assuption that welfare depends on both own-incoe and relative incoe, defined as the ratio of own-incoe to a countryspecific coparison incoe. This provides a welfare-econoic explanation for why we see higher real poverty lines in richer countries. We recognize, however, that there is a deep identification proble in using national lines to identify international relative lines, as has been done in the literature following Atkinson and Bourguignon (2001). 11 The proble is that the properties of the observed national poverty lines are consistent with two rival hypotheses, with very different iplications for deriving international lines. It is one thing to believe that national lines reflect relative coparisons, but quite another to clai that they reveal the local costs of a globally coon level of welfare (even when augented to allow for easureent error and rando idiosyncratic factors). That ust be udged a strong assuption. The alternative interpretation is that richer countries adopt ore generous reference welfare levels for defining poverty. This can generate higher lines in richer countries even without relative coparisons. Identification of a unique schedule of relative lines fro cross-country variation in national lines is thus probleatic, though this point has not been acknowledged in the literature. 11 See Atkinson and Bourguignon (2001), Chen and Ravallion (2001, 2013), Ravallion and Chen (2011), and Jolliffe and Prydz (2017). 5

The paper akes three ain contributions. The first is to foralize the aforeentioned identification proble and so derive epirical bounds on the true global poverty easures so as to span the key paraeter uncertainty. 12 The lower bound is an absolute line, fixed in real ters, while the upper bound is a schedule of weakly relative lines that rise with the country-specific coparison incoe consistently with national poverty lines. The welfare-consistent global poverty easure lies between these bounds, depending on how uch the latent reference welfare level for defining poverty at the national level rises with the ean. The second contribution concerns how the coparison incoe should be set, as required for the upper bound. Here our ain point of departure fro past work is that we take account of the bearing that inequality has on relativist coparisons. We question the long-standing assuption that the coparison incoe level in relativist coparisons at country level is the edian or equally-weighted ean. 13 It is well recognized that the ean ay be too heavily influenced by very high incoes, which are probably less relevant to the relativist coparisons that are likely to be ade by ost people, who know little about how rich the rich are. As Duesenberry (1949) recognized, it is probably not relative incoe that atters but relative (observable) consuption. Nor is the edian a satisfactory fix. While concerns about easureent errors at the extrees are real, there is still aple inforation in the data, and it is far fro obvious that such inforation should be entirely discounted. 14 We argue that a better approach is to postulate that, while the relativist coparison ay put lower weight on richer people, it will never put zero weight on the rich, as is the case with the edian. 15 We provide a siple theoretical forulation that encopasses bow upward and downward relative coparisons. This provides a new perspective on easuring relative poverty. The third contribution is to provide new data on national poverty lines and survey-based distributions of consuption or incoe to ipleent the above ideas epirically. Our data on national poverty lines suggest that the rank-weighted ean is the relevant coparison incoe, 12 Chen and Ravallion (2013) note in passing that one ight interpret absolute and relative lines as lower and upper bounds but they do not discuss the identification proble that otivates this interpretation. 13 While our focus here is on global poverty, it can also be noted that studies of the effects of relative incoe on subective welfare have also relied at ties on equally-weighted eans, as in (for exaple) Hagenaars and van Praag (1985) and Lutter (2005). 14 The sae point can be ade about the use of a fixed proportion of any quantile corresponding to a fixed percentile. For exaple, Citro and Michael (1995) recoend using the 33 rd percentile of the distribution of consuer spending on food, clothing, shelter and utilities. This idea was adopted in 2011 by the US Census Bureau s Suppleentary Poverty Measure, which we return to. 15 Note that the edian is unresponsive to sall changes in incoes sufficiently far above (or below) the edian. 6

with lowest weight given to the richest. This iplies that a Gini-discounted ean is called for in setting our upper bound. We ipleent the new easures for the lower and upper bounds on a global basis, including countries at all levels of developent. Thus we provide globally-unified easures of poverty, in contrast to past work which has been bifurcated between rich and poor countries, with two distinct literatures. Our estiates draw on 1500 household surveys for 150 countries over 1990-2013. The following section discusses our data on national poverty lines and soe of their properties, as relevant to the rest of the paper. Section 3 reviews the easureent practices found in the literature. The paper s ain contributions are found in Sections 4-6. Section 4 outlines our theoretical approach to easuring relative poverty. In accounting for how national poverty lines vary across countries, we then show in Section 5 that a weakly-relative poverty easure using a Gini-discounted ean doinates both strongly and weakly-relative easures using either the ordinary ean or the edian. We find that higher inequality calls for a lower national coparison ean, but that a higher share of that ean should be passed onto the poverty line. The net effect is generally a higher national line than iplied by standard (strongly) relative easures, ost notably in poor countries. Finally, Section 6 provides our new estiates of global poverty easures. We find that the aforeentioned stylized facts about global poverty that it is falling and that poverty is a greater proble in the developing world are robust to taking relative incoe seriously. Soe new insights also eerge, including that the rich world is aking far less progress against poverty. Section 7 concludes. 2. National poverty lines National poverty lines have long provided the data used in setting global lines. In assessing poverty globally, the World Bank has argued that one should use a line with constant purchasing power, as best can be deterined, and that it should be set at a level that is reasonably representative of low-incoe countries (World Bank, 1990; Ravallion et al., 1991). Two people with the sae real consuption are treated the sae way no atter where they live. Ravallion et al. (2009) copiled a saple of national lines, including 75 observations for developing countries. On this basis they set a line of $1.25 at 2005 PPP, which becae the new international line for the World Bank. This was the ean poverty line of the poorest 15 countries in ters of consuption per capita. On allowing for the rates of price inflation in the set of national poverty 7

lines used in deriving the $1.25 international line, Ferreira et al. (2016) updated the $1.25 line to $1.90 a day at 2011 PPP. While there has been soe debate about the $1.90 line (see, for exaple, Klasen et al., 2016), it has since becoe widely accepted in the developent counity, as exeplified by its adoption in the UN s Sustainable Developent Goals. National lines have also been used to set international relative poverty lines (Atkinson and Bourguignon, 2001; Chen and Ravallion, 2001, 2011, 2013; Jolliffe and Prydz, 2017). While for a nuber of the OECD countries the national lines are directly proportional to the ean or edian that is not true of ost countries in the world. The ethods of setting poverty lines vary, with nuerous free paraeters, including nutritional requireents, the coposition of the food bundles and the allowances ade for non-food spending. Through their paraeterization at country level, national lines can be interpreted as social subective lines that reflect prevailing concepts of what poverty eans in each country. 16 It is then reasonable to expect that the variation in national lines across countries reflects differences in the coparison incoe. We have copiled a new data set of 145 national poverty lines. (A Statistical Annex is available describing the data sources.) This has entailed an extra 47 developing (non-oecd) countries on top of those used by Ravallion et al. (2009) as well as 24 OECD countries (not included in Ravallion et al., 2009). 17 For the developing countries, these are official national poverty lines or (when these could not be found) they are the lines set by the World Bank, as part of its analytic work at country level. For the US we have used the official poverty line. For the rest of the OECD countries we have used 60% of the per-capita edian, though we also test sensitivity to using 50% of the edian. Both the poverty lines and consuption levels are converted to per capita $US values using the PPP exchange rates for consuption fro the 2011 ICP (World Bank, 2015). 18 The survey dates range fro 2004 to 2012, with a edian of 2011. Figure 1 gives density functions for the poverty lines, survey eans and edians. The skewness evident in Figure 1 is as one would expect. The poverty lines are skewed further to the 16 The social subective line is the level of incoe below which people in a specific social context tend to udge theselves as poor but above which they tend to see theselves as not poor. For further discussion and references see Ravallion (2016a, Chapter 4). 17 Soe countries also have national cut-off lines for eans-tested social assistance. These are not strictly poverty lines so we chose not to include the. 18 All poverty lines are for specific years (often tied to specific survey dates) and consuption data are for that year or as close as possible; both poverty lines and consuption were then converted to 2011 prices using the country s consuer price index (or the ost appropriate index available), and then converted to PPP $ s using the 2011 PPP for consuption. When poverty lines are quoted as per equivalent adult (ainly OECD) we have re-scaled to per capita units by ultiplying by the ratio of ean equivalent adults per household to ean household size. 8

right than the edians, which are skewed further than the eans. The range in national poverty lines is large, fro $0.69 to $36 per day. The overall ean line is $7.82 per person per day (s.e.=$0.68; n=146). (For the non-oecd countries the ean is $4.71 ($0.32; n=122).) The edian is $4.38 and the ode is $3. While the World Bank s $1.90 line is well below the ode, it is clearly in a fairly dense part of the distribution (Figure 1). If we construct a band around the Bank s $1.90 line of (say) $1.80-$2.00 we find four countries (with their poverty lines): India ($1.82), Indonesia ($1.88), Ethiopia ($1.99) and Nepal ($2.00). The World Bank s international line is approxiately Indonesia s line. China s national line is slightly above this group, at $2.29. Recall that the Bank s $1.90 line is an update to 2011 prices of the $1.25 line proposed by Ravallion et al. (2009). In our new data set the ean poverty line of the poorest 15 countries in ters of the survey ean is $1.67 at 2011 PPP, slightly below the Bank s line. But one would not want to ake too uch of this difference. The $1.90 line is the ean for a soewhat larger group of countries, which could be considered ustified by the fact that we have a larger data set of national lines than used by Ravallion et al. (2009). If one focuses instead on the poorest 25 (about the sae proportion of the 122 non-oecd countries) then the ean national line is $1.91, alost exactly the Bank s 2011 line. We do not, of course, have national lines for all country-year cobinations; indeed, our 145 national lines account for only 10% of the nuber of estiates we will require of national poverty easures by date. So predicted values are needed to obtain a coplete set of lines for our upper bound. In past work the (equally-weighted) ean has been the ain predictor. We will introduce a ore general forulation of the coparison incoe later, but for the present descriptive purpose we also focus on the relationship between the national lines and the survey ean. Figure 2(a) plots the data for the full saple (including OECD). 19 Figure 2(b) gives the lines for the non-oecd countries but using instead a log scale for the ean to avoid the bunching up at low levels evident in Figure 2(a). Most countries are also identified. Of course there are coparability probles and easureent errors in the national lines. But the pattern is clear: national lines tend to rise with the overall ean. For exaple, while the ean for the poorest 15 countries is $1.67, for the richest 15 it is 20 ties higher at $27 a day. The slope of 19 These are ostly consuption eans for developing countries, and ostly incoe eans for OECD countries. However, this does not ake any difference in the relationship (on adding a control variable for the type of survey). 9

the regression line is 0.485 (White s.e.=0.020). 20 The overall elasticity (using a log-log regression) is 0.863 (s.e.=0.027). (If we use the edian instead of the ean, the slope is 0.564 (0.017) and the elasticity is 0.816 (0.026).) It is also notable that there is little sign of a flat segent at low eans; the relationship is positive fro the lower bound. It ight be argued that the true causal relationship is not as strong as Figure 2 suggests. Three concerns can be noted. First, the fact that soe of the national lines are strongly relative lines is likely to be biasing the relationship. However, the relationship is still evident if one drops the OECD countries, though the slope falls slightly, to 0.454 (s.e.=0.039) while the elasticity falls to 0.773 (0.044). (Using the edian instead for the non-oecd countries, the slope is 0.559 (0.042) and the elasticity is 0.740 (0.040).) Second, a bias due to correlated easureent errors in the ean and poverty line ight reain given that the national lines for developing countries are often calibrated to survey data (though the direction of bias is abiguous in theory, noting that there is also the usual attenuation bias). For exaple, one ethod of setting national poverty lines identifies the poverty line as the total consuption expenditure level at which pre-deterined food energy requireents are et in expectation. 21 Then, for fixed requireents, over (under) estiation of total expenditure will lead to an over (under) estiation of the poverty line. This is also likely using food Engel curves to set the non-food coponent of the poverty line. Acknowledging this concern, as a further check we used per capita private consuption expenditure (PCE) fro the national accounts as the instruental variable (IV) for the survey ean, under the assuption that the easureent errors in these two data sources are uncorrelated. That assuption can be questioned, although it should be noted that the national accounts in ost developing countries are not calibrated to household surveys. (Consuption is generally derived as a residual after subtracting recorded sources of doestic absorption at the coodity level.) The IV estiate of the slope is 0.471 (0.026) for the full saple and 0.425 (0.043) for the non-oecd sub-saple. Using log PCE as the IV the estiated elasticity is 0.844 (0.030) and 0.744 (0.051) for the non- OECD saple. So (again) this does not suggest there is anything but a sall bias in the relationship seen in the raw data in Figure 2. 20 All standard errors of regression coefficients in this paper are corrected for a general for of heteroscedasticity using White s (1980) ethod. 21 For a review of the ethods used to set national poverty lines see Ravallion (2012). 10

Third, there ay be oitted country effects correlated with ean incoe. An alternative ethod of deriving national poverty lines is to find the lines that are iplicit in data on the poverty rate. Using fitted distributions, Jolliffe and Prydz (2016) estiate over 600 national poverty lines this way, as iplicit in national poverty easures fro the World Bank s World Developent Indicators (such as World Bank, 2013). 22 The advantage of this ethod is that it generates ultiple lines for each country, so we can add country fixed effects. Ravallion (2016b, Appendix) estiates the elasticity of the poverty line to the ean allowing for country effects and finds an OLS elasticity of 0.52 (s.e.=0.04; n=598). Without the country effects the elasticity is 0.74 (0.01; n=609). So the elasticity is lower when we allow country effects, but it reains positive and statistically significant. However, it should be noted that the aforeentioned issue of correlated easureent errors is likely to be a greater concern for these iplicit poverty lines, as argued by Ravallion (2016b). Notice that the US is an outlier in Figure 2(a). The official poverty line for the US was $15.62 per person per day in 2011 (for two adults and two children). This is well below the line one would expect for a country with the US ean. Indeed, the US line is ore typical of countries with about half the US ean (around the values expected in developing countries with the highest eans). As noted, the US has been an exception to the otherwise coon usage of strongly relative poverty easures in rich countries. Instead, the official US line (set by Orshansky, 1965) has only been adusted for inflation over tie, such that it has fallen relative to the ean and edian. This has been a source of concern in the literature on poverty in the US, which has generally taken the view that the US line should have risen in real ters to better reflect rising overall living standards. 23 Proposed revisions to the official US line have et political resistance steing fro the fact that certain public spending allocations across progras and states depend in part on the official poverty rates (Blank, 2008). (Such political resistance to updating poverty lines is clearly not unique to the US.) It reains that, over the longer ter, poverty has clearly been relative in the US. While the official US poverty line has been held fixed in real ters since the id-1960s, if one goes back to the literature on poverty easures for the US in the early 20 th century one finds uch 22 Letting F it(.) denote the fitted cuulative distribution function for country i at date t and the observed headcount index as H it, the iplicit poverty line is F 1 it ( H it ). 23 See the discussions in Citro and Michael (1995) and Blank (2008). 11

lower real lines indeed, a (non-official) line that is roughly coparable with prevailing poverty lines today in the world s poorest countries. 24 A new suppleentary poverty line was introduced by the US Census Bureau in 2011 that explicitly acknowledges the relevance of relative poverty in the US (Short, 2012). The next section will return to this new easure. It is probably no surprise to readers that we see higher real lines in richer countries as evident in Figure 2. In identifying who is considered poor within its borders, a rich country tends to use a ore generous allowance ust as one finds in survey data on individual perceptions of poverty. 25 The food bundles are alost always anchored to stipulated nutritional requireents, although these vary, with higher ean requireents in places and ties with better nourished populations and often with higher activity levels. The food enus identified in practice for attaining given requireents also vary greatly, and are typically ore generous (such as with larger allowances for protein and ore diversified diets) in less poor places. Past research has also found that a large share of the ean-incoe gradient in national poverty lines is due to ore generous allowances for non-food needs in richer countries (Ravallion et al., 2009). However, these observations can be interpreted in two very different ways: either a line with higher purchasing power is needed to attain the sae level of welfare in a rich country as a poor one, or richer countries use a higher welfare threshold in defining poverty. It is also notable that there is a positive intercept in Figure 2. This pattern sees intuitively plausible, as it is unlikely that the poverty lines used by countries could fall to zero in the liit as ean consuption falls to its lowest level. Using the non-oecd saple, the predicted poverty line based on a linear proection is $0.96 (s.e. = $0.25) for the country with the lowest ean, which is $0.76, for the Deocratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). The DRC has an unusually low ean (Figure 2(b)). If one uses the country with the next lowest ean, Madagascar with a ean of $1.45, the predicted poverty line is $1.28. So these data are ore suggestive of weakly-relative lines, with an elasticity less than unity, but rising with the ean; using the linear proection for non-oecd countries, at the lowest ean consuption the elasticity is 0.36 (s.e.=0.12) while it approaches unity in high-incoe 24 While the US did not have an official poverty line 100 years ago, the ost credible and widely-cited estiate at the tie by Hunter (1904) was only a sall fraction of the current official line; indeed, the Hunter line appears to be close to the $1 a day international line (Ravallion, 2016a, Chapter 1). Kilpatrick (1973) found evidence that the ean subective poverty line in the US (based on survey data) rose over tie with average incoe with an elasticity of around 0.6. Also see the discussion in Blank (2008). 25 For a survey of the literature see Ravallion (2016a, Part 2). 12

countries. Naturally then, as the ean rises, the ratio of the poverty line to the ean tends to fall, as can be seen in Figure 3 (using a log scale for the ean, to ake the graph easier to read). The poverty lines tend to be roughly equal to the ean aong the lowest-incoe countries (Figure 2(a)). Thus, for the poorest countries (lowest ean), a very high proportion of the population would live at or near the national line even with no inequality. 3. Relative poverty lines in past practice As discussed in the introduction, our key guiding preise in forulating global poverty easures is that the required international coparisons of welfare ust be anchored to a defensible and coon concept of individual welfare. To the extent feasible with the data available, everyone s poverty status ust be udged by a consistent welfare concept. We can dub this welfare consistency. Fro this perspective, all current practices are questionable. The welfare relevance of relative incoe iplies that absolute lines in the incoe space do not correspond to a coon level of welfare. While national poverty lines are rarely revised quickly there is clearly political resistance they have risen over tie with sustained gains in overall living standards. This has happened in the rich world over the last 100 years (including in the US as we have noted) and in recent ties in growing developing countries including China, India, Indonesia and Vietna. 26 Strongly-relative lines: The ost coon approach to easuring relative poverty is exeplified by the relative poverty easures which copare each household s observed incoe to a poverty line that is set at a constant proportion of the current edian for the country of that household s residence. This poverty line can be written in the generic for: z k y( p ) (1). z Here z is the poverty line, k is a constant, y (.) is the quantile function (inverse of the cuulative distribution function, which is assued to be continuous and onotonic increasing) and fixed percentile that defines the coparison group. In the case of the original Fuchs (1967) proposal, k p 0. 5, although other paraeter values have been used since, as noted. z p z is a 26 China s official poverty line doubled over a period when average incoes increased by a factor of four, and India s official line has also increased in real ters (Ravallion, 2012). Indonesia s official lines for a given year are anchored to the average consuption bundle of the 20% living above the previous year s line. Jolliffe and Prydz (2016) point to other exaples of developing countries that have increased the real value of their national lines. 13

It is not clear why the quantile of any fixed percentile identifies a plausible coparison incoe. Why would incoes above or below this quantile not get a positive weight? The US is an interesting case. The new Suppleentary Poverty Measure (SPM) produced by the US Census Bureau acknowledges past concerns that the US official poverty line has not been updated in real ters (Short, 2012). The SPM deterines the poverty line by the quantile of the 33 rd percentile of the distribution of a subset of consuption spending deeed to be essential (coprising food, clothing, shelter and utilities). 27 Thus the SPM sets k=1.2 and p 0. 33 in equation (1). However, it reains unclear why y p ) is a plausible coparison incoe for any fixed p z (whether 0.5 or 0.33). In the case of the SPM it is also unclear why relative coparisons would only apply to essential goods. One can surely expect feelings of relative deprivation to respond as uch to a lack of non-essential goods. ( z A further concern arises when the poverty line is set at a constant proportion of the ean or edian, naely that the resulting poverty easure depends solely on the distribution of relative incoes in the population. If all incoe levels grow (or contract) at the sae rate then the poverty easure will reain unchanged when the poverty line is set at a constant proportion of the ean or edian. 28 Seeingly perverse poverty coparisons have been found using strongly relative easures. 29 The relevance of strongly relative easures to developing countries is especially questionable. Ravallion (2012) points out that if one uses a strongly relative line set at half the ean then its average value for the poorest 15 countries is a very low $0.64 a day, which is soewhere around a survival level (Lindgren, 2015; Ravallion, 2016b). The value for the country with the lowest ean would be only $0.38 per day, which is alost certainly not enough for survival beyond a short tie. Siilarly, the Garroway and de Laiglesia (2012) relative line, set at 50% of the current edian in each country, gives lines that are well below the lines typical of even low-incoe countries and even below likely biological inia (Ravallion, 2016b). In short, strongly relative easures alost certainly understate the social inclusion needs of globally poor people and have a seeingly perverse iplication for how these easures 27 This follows the recoendation of a National Acadey of Sciences Coission (Citro and Michael, 1995). 28 Note that this property does not depend on whether the line is anchored to the ean or the edian, given that the ratio of the edian to the ean is constant in an inequality-neutral growth process. However, the choice between the ean and edian can atter in other respects and obections to the use of the edian have been identified by de Mesnard (2007) and Kapke (2010). We do not discuss these issues here. 29 See, for exaple, the UNDP (2005, Box 3) and Easton (2002). 14 z

respond to econoic growth and contraction. There is a quick fix for these probles, naely to add a positive intercept to (1). But this brings its own probles as we will see next. Weakly-relative lines: Kakwani (1986) proposed a poverty line of the for: z z ( 0) (2) 0 z where z 0 is the absolute line, which is taken to be given, is the overall ean or edian and is a paraeter. If 0 1 then the elasticity of the Kakwani poverty line w.r.t. is positive but strictly less than unity; the liit is unity as goes to infinity. Chakravarty et al. (2015) provide an axioatic derivation for a line of the for in (2). Jolliffe and Prydz (2017) use a schedule of lines with the sae for, which generalizes the Garroway and de Laiglesia (2012) proposal for developing countries to allow a positive intercept, thus aking it weakly relative. There are two concerns with (2). The first arises when we take it to data on national poverty, which are either absolute or strongly relative. Yet (2) is not a hybrid of absolute and relative lines. That would require an extra paraeter, to deliver z 0 ( 1 w) z wk for 0 w 1 and 0 k 1, where kis the strongly relative line with weight w. Working fro this odification, we can fix z 0 exogenously and back out estiates of w and k fro the data when valid solutions exist. Setting z 0 $1. 90, the data in Figure 2(a) yield w ˆ 0. 791 (s.e.=0.122) and k ˆ 0.612 (0.075). (One ight also expect these paraeters to vary; if one drops the OECD countries one finds that w ˆ 0. 675 (s.e.=0.143) and k ˆ 0. 673 (0.095).) However, valid solutions do not exist using the edian as the coparison incoe, which would require values of k 1. 30 So an internally consistent schedule of poverty lines linear in the edian cannot be derived fro these data when one uses the World Bank s absolute line of $1.90 a day. A second concern arises when z0, as the poverty line iplied by (2) is then lower than z 0, which is a logical contradiction. And we cannot rule out the possibility that z0. Indeed, we will see in section 5 that fitting the linear schedule in (1) to our data on national lines yields predicted lines for the poorest countries that are well below z 0 $1. 90 (at 2011 PPP). 30 Using the edian one obtains an unconstrained k ˆ 1. 008 (0.144) on the full saple and k ˆ 1. 021(0.175) on the non-oecd saple. 15

The proble is ore coon using the edian; while our data indicate that only three countries have a survey ean less than $1.90 a day, 18 countries have a edian less than $1.90. 31 There are other exaples of weakly-relative easures in the literature. Foster s (1998) hybrid line is the geoetric ean of an absolute line and a strongly relative line. While this is weakly relative, it has a constant elasticity, which does not see plausible and is inconsistent with how national poverty lines vary across countries (as in Figure 2(a)). Fro this point of view, the hybrid easure proposed by Atkinson and Bourguignon (2001) is ore attractive as it has an elasticity of zero at low incoes, with the elasticity rising above soe point. However, it has the undesirable feature that the relative coponent goes to zero at zero ean. This alost certainly understates the costs of social inclusion in poor countries. A schedule of weakly-relative lines that avoids the aforeentioned probles is the piecewise linear for: z ax( z 0, ) (3) where 0. By construction, the hybrid line can never be below the absolute line. This is the for used by Ravallion and Chen (2011, 2013). 32 Following Atkinson and Bourguignon (2001) this hybrid line can be thought of as cobining a capability for subsistence with countryspecific requireents for a social inclusion. Our forulation in (3) is a generalization of the Atkinson-Bourguignon proposal; the generalization is to add a paraeter,, which can be interpreted as the lower bound to social-inclusion needs; the Atkinson-Bourguignon lines are the special case with 0. As we will see below, this generalization is crucial to welfare-econoic interpretation of global poverty easures. Neither the strongly nor weakly-relative easures described above are globally onotonic in own incoe, eaning that when coparing any two people (wherever they ay live) the one with the higher incoe cannot have higher easured poverty. While onotonicity holds within countries, it need not hold between the. So it is possible that a person who is absolutely poor is deeed less poor than soeone who is only relatively poor, as noted by Decerf (2017). However, as we will show in the following section, as soon as one is explicit about the welfare-theoretic foundation of the poverty easure this concern vanishes. 31 Using the Jolliffe-Prydz schedule based on (2) but using the edian we find in our data set that 15 countries have a poverty line less than $1.90. 32 Other exaples can be found in Budlender et al. (2015) and Jolliffe and Prydz (2017) (who also consider the piece-wise linear for as an option to the linear for in (2)). 16

All the approaches above in a literature spanning 50 years either explicitly or iplicitly treat the ean or edian as the coparison incoe in setting the relative line. As we will argue next, this is questionable if one thinks further about the nature of such coparisons. 4. Welfare-consistent relative poverty lines The essential idea of relative coparison is that individual econoic welfare depends (at least in part) on how the individual is doing relative to a set of coparators in society. Welfare-consistent weakly relative lines at the national level can then be rationalized by postulating an individual welfare function for household i in country of the for: where u u( y, y / ) (4) i i i y i is the individual s own consuption and i 17 i is the individual s coparison incoe. The welfare function is assued to be strictly and soothly increasing in both arguents ( y y / u 0 and u 0 in obvious notation). If relative deprivation, while if the distinction ade by Davis, 1959). yi i then person i can be said to experience yi i then she experiences relative gratification (interpreting A welfare function such as (4) can be readily used to otivate relative poverty easures. In the literature, iis assued to be either the ean or edian consuption or incoe for the country and date of residence. We relax this assuption shortly, but it is of interest to briefly work through its iplications. If we take the coparison incoe to be the ean ( ), such that i for all i, then the welfare-consistent international poverty line, z z, is defined by: u( z, z / ) u (5) This gives z as (iplicitly) an increasing function of for given z u, which is the fixed level of welfare to not be deeed poor in country. It is clear then that y i < z iplies (and is iplied by) u i < u z. A globally-welfare consistent poverty line can be defined as one based on a constant welfare level, u z for all. Notice that the poverty line defined by (5) will never be strongly relative given that the welfare function is strictly increasing in own consuption at given relative consuption, which sees a very reasonable assuption. The iplicit welfare-consistent line will rise with the ean,

with a positive elasticity less than unity. Strongly relative lines only eerge as the liiting case in which u y goes to zero, such that welfare depends solely on relative incoe. (Note that if (4) can be written as u u~ ( y / ) then the welfare-consistent poverty line takes the for z k where k u ( ).) i i ~ 1 z u Also notice that globally-consistent poverty easures based on the above forulation need not be globally onotonic in y i for those deeed to be poor, as noted in the previous section. This is a oot point, however, given that y i is not a valid oney-etric of welfare when relative incoe atters. A ore appealing property in this context is onotonicity in the individual equivalent incoe, y i e, defined iplicitly by u(y i e, y i e / ) = u(y i, y i / ) for soe globally constant reference ean. 33 This is assured for a broad class of global poverty easures. 34 The question is still begging: Are all incoe levels in society equally iportant in relative coparisons? The literature in econoics has said rather little about the appropriate coparison group in discussing relative poverty. 35 The assuption of an (equally-weighted) ean or the edian is alost universal in this literature. When foring the coparators for deciding whether a person is relatively deprived one ight not want to put equal weight on the richest stratu as the poor or iddle class. Indeed, Duesenberry s (1949) original forulation of the relative-incoe hypothesis postulated an un-equally weighted ean. When we allow the weights to vary by level of incoe, the extent of inequality can influence the level of the reference incoe used for relative coparisons. Suppose that the poor and iddle class are the ore relevant coparators for ost people. Higher inequality suggests that this reference group is relatively poorer, iplying a higher relative incoe at given own incoe. The use of the edian as the reference is one response to the concern that the rich get too high a weight in the ean. However (as noted), while we ight agree that the rich are less 33 If we also ipose hootheticity, such that u(y i, y i / ) is linear in y i, then y e i /z = y i /z (the welfare ratio in Blackorby and Donaldson, 1987). We will not require this property for our analysis. 34 This is the class of easures whereby individual poverty can be defined as p(y e i ) with p = 0 for y e i z (where z is the poverty line corresponding to ) and onotonically decreasing when y e i < z ; the global easure is a population-weighted aggregate of this individual easure. This holds for the entire class of additive easures characterized by Atkinson (1987). 35 As noted by Chen (2015). The coparison group has received soewhat ore attention in the literature on subective welfare following Clark and Oswald (1996); also see the survey in Clark et al. (2008). 18

relevant coparators, it surely cannot be plausible that they are irrelevant as coparators. Against this view, it ight be argued that relativist coparisons tend to be ore upward looking that the coparators for the poor are the iddle class, and for the latter, the rich. Then the arguent reverses, with higher inequality requiring a higher poverty line. 36 We propose an approach that encopasses both downward and upward looking relativist coparisons, otivated by the following thought experient. In keeping with the fact that we are easuring poverty at the country level, we follow the literature in postulating a coon coparison incoe within a given country. (In principle our approach could be applied at a ore disaggregated sub-national level, but that is not the present application.) To allow for either downward or upward coparisons, one can iagine a person aking a rando draw of a pair of incoes in the country of residence, so as to assess how she is doing relative to others. 37 Naturally, she focuses ore on the lower (upper) incoe if she akes downward (upward) coparisons. More generally one can iagine that she picks a coparisons point soewhere in the (closed) interval between the two incoes, depending on whether the observer tends to look upward or downward. To foralize this idea, let y k, y ) denote the contribution of the (k, l) ( l pair drawn in country to the assessent of the coparison ean for that country. We assue that y k, y ) is a point soewhere in the closed interval [in( y, y ), ax( y, y )] : ( l ( yk, yl) (1 ) in( yk, yl) ax( yk, yl) where [0,1] (6) The thought experient is repeated for ultiple pairs. With a large saple, in a population of size N, one will end up with an unbiased estiate of the coparison ean: k l k l 1 N 2 N N k 1 l 1 ( y y ) (7) k l With soe algebraic anipulation we can re-write this as: 38 36 Note that this is a separate issue to the point noted in the introduction that high inequality ay yield a direct disutility, thus requiring a higher onetary poverty line in high-inequality settings to assure welfare consistency. 37 This corresponds to one of the assuptions ade by relative deprivation theory in sociology, naely that social coparisons are rando in the relevant population (Davis, 1959). Alternatively, one ight iagine taking rando draws of single incoe levels within the population for the purpose of assessing a person s relative position. However, given that social coparisons can either look upwards or downwards, rather than draw a single incoe it would be ore inforative to iagine drawing a pair to help assess one s relative position. 38 The derivation uses the fact that 2 ( y y ) 2N and in( y y ) ( y y y y )/ 2. The approxiation requires large k N to be accurate. l 19 k l k l k l