Proving A Monopolistic Agreement Case. Guangyao XU Nankai University School of Law

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Proving A Monopolistic Agreement Case Guangyao XU Nankai University School of Law

Legitimacy standard of monopolistic agreement: positive effects vs. negative 1 Plaintiff bears the burden to prove existence of monopolistic agreement, but sometimes happens the other way round; 2 Defendant may prove efficiency; 3 Plaintiff rebuts efficiency, indispensability, or proves elimination of competition; 4 Defendant then cross-rebut.

I Proof of monopolistic agreement (1) Proof of agreement Art 13, AML: Agreement, decision or concerted practice standard of proof must be clarified; decision and concerted practice may not be a contract

Decision: binding decisions of trade associations; do not satisfy the number of parties requirement; Concerted practice: may not prove the offer/acceptance element; Mainly presumptions: (a)act in concert; (b)in coordination, otherwise against actor s interest, or technically impossible.

(2)Proof of monopoly 1 Art 13, AML: six elements 2 Art 7, Judicial Interpretation: Defendant must prove the nonrestrictive effects; reverse burden of proof, but not per se illegal; For other horizontal agreements, Plaintiff must prove monopoly.

3 Art 14, AML Prohibition of vertical restrictions; Ideally, Art 7 of the JI should also apply to RPM;

4 Exclude or restrict competition : neutrality (1)Exclusion and restriction in purpose: Essentially tantamount to Art13(1)~(5), no need to look at effects; Does not serve any other legitimate purposes; If the agreement is cloaked with other legitimacy, then evaluation of contents, goals, enforceability and alike becomes necessary;

(2) appreciable effects EU de minimus notice: horizontal: combined market share less than 10%; vertical: less thn 15%; if network effect present: 5%. Above these threshold, need to evaluate parties market power.

II Efficiency: Defendant proof TFEU 101(1): Efficiency in production, sales and innovation cost efficiency non- cost efficiency

Art 15, AML: seven scenarios Defendant must prove: 1 which efficiency exactly; 2 direct causation (indirect link does not count); 3 probability of realizing these efficiency for cost efficiency, must calculable and demonstrable; for other efficiencies, must show their nature.

4 time and methods of realizing efficiency must prove it is not artificial; Realizing efficiency takes time, which does not preclude determination of passing a fair share to consumers; but the longer the time interval, the bigger efficiency there must be.

5 Passing over efficiency gains to consumers: efficient to whom? Merely beneficial to undertaking is not an efficiency : must be possible to pass over to consumers (in totality); E.g. lower price, better service, greater choice; consumers must not be worse off; If the agreement provides better quality but also higher price, then must balance: if consumers value quality over price, it is a fair share passing over.

III Restriction vs. efficiency Plaintiff can rebut the proof of efficiency: Even if efficiency is established, plaintiff can disapprove by arguing: a less restrictive means can be adopted instead; and the restrictive agreement can eliminate competition in the relevant market; Defendant shall then continue to rebut.

Negative Exemption Conditions TFEU 101(3) only indispensable restrictions allowed will not confer the ability to eliminate competition in the relevant market Art 15(2) of AML: will not severely restrict competition

IV Plaintiff must prove injury Must be antitrust injury comes from Defendant s illegal monopolistic conduct If caused by multiple causes, then the monopolistic agreement must be one of the important causes. If direct purchaser is an intermediary, then its loss of profit is the injury; If Plaintiff is an indirect purchaser, then the overpaid price is the injury.

V Evidence 1 Art 10, JI: Defendant s publicly-released information which is capable of proving its dominance can be produced by Plaintiff as evidence. People s Court can determined dominance accordingly, unless rebuttal evidence is produced. only limited to dominance proof if agreement cases need to prove parties market power, this rule can also be followed.

2 Art 12, JI: expert witness Lawyers, economists, tech specilists; expert testimony must be supported by facts and able to persuade others, including other experts, to reach similar conclusion ; ***Yet for follow-on actions, Plaintiff only needs to prove antitrust injury.

U.S. Daubet decision:court must consider the following when evaluating expert testimony 1 whether it is verifiable or verified 2 has it been peer-reviewed 3 known or potential errors must be considered; 4 whether the technology s operating standards exist or complied with; 5 whether it is generally accepted in its field; Expert s experience, normal methodology, etc. must also be considered.

Thank you xuguangyao2002@163.com