Contextual Obstacles to Attaining MDGs: the Case of Public Sector Reforms in Fiji by Subhash Appana

Contextual Obstacles to Attaining MDGs: the Case of Public Sector Reforms in Fiji by Subhash Appana Introduction Fiji embarked on the inevitable track to the United Nation s Millenium Development Goals (MDGs) after September 2001 when the present government was installed through the ballot box. In inaugurating the Millennium Development Goals in 2000, UN Secretary General, Mr. Kofi Annan, declared that, we will have time to reach the Millennium Development Goals. - ( ) only if we break with business as usual. Public Sector Reforms epitomizes one of these major breaks from the manner in which the public sector has been managed traditionally. It promises a leaner, more efficient and better financially endowed government that can then focus its attention on meeting its more important objectives objectives that are succinctly encapsulated in the MDGs. The MDGs are thus considered here as enhancing goals because they would place a country in a considerably strengthened position to pursue its more ambitious objectives; and effective public sector reforms is proposed here as a requirement for meeting those ends of MDGs by 2015. Fiji embarked on the path to public sector reforms in 1992 even though discussions had begun in the late 1980s. The process has had a stop-start character since then. Various obstacles have been identified in a number of reports prepared by government departments as well as researchers. Most of these stem from the unique context that Fiji presents. The context of reforms in Fiji is plagued with structures that not only hinder the use of New Public Management as the model for reforms, but they also compromise and distort its impact. This paper focuses specifically on selected contextual obstacles that have acquired particular significance given the unique socio-political and economic context in which these reforms have been implemented. It highlights the complex interplay of political considerations, economic imperatives and socio-cultural concerns that have continued to hamper Fiji s attempts to realise the well articulated objectives of public sector reforms. The paper concludes that unless reforms are managed more effectively, Fiji s hopes of meeting the MDGs by 2015 might remain just that a mere hope. Paper presented at the EROPA 20th General Assembly and Conference, Hanoi, Vietnam, 9-14 October 2005; published in Asian Review of Public Administration, Vo. XVII, Nos. 1-2, (January-December 2005), pp. 33-51 1

Context of Reforms New Public Management (NPM), the predominant model used for public sector reforms, assumes a culture of public service honesty, the presence of effective institutions of public accountability, a vibrant democratic political framework, and the pre-requisites of a competitive market mechanism. 1 Furthermore, the building of democratic institutions in traditional contexts (like Fiji) requires fundamental changes in society, politics and public administration. Effective public administration requires publicly deliberated transparent national decision making, an effective planning and evaluation apparatus, and a meritbased civil service capable of meeting customer quality requirements and/or capable of managing a contracting-out or privatisation process that does not compromise quality standards. It is within this framework that public sector reforms are implemented using the NPM model of reforms. NPM however, is seen not just (as) a change in management structure or techniques; rather, it is an ongoing change effort to alter administrative process and culture that in turn takes place within a larger economic, social, and political reform context. 2 This is the larger agenda of reforms. However in order to reach the stage where reforms begin to have a cultural impact, existing contextual obstacles have to be identified, understood and overcome. This section discusses the socio-political and economic context within which reforms are carried out in Fiji. It is divided into five parts: colonial experience, girmit 3, government, politics and coups, urban Fijian, and institutions of accountability. Colonial Experience (paternalism) Fijian 4 society and culture, which are largely colonial constructs, are the dominant structures that provide the general environment in Fiji for historical reasons even though there are other subcultures that have evolved around this. What was frozen by Governor Sir Arthur Gordon in 1875 as Fijian Society was derived from what prevailed as the state of affairs in an ever-changing milieu of power struggles in pre-colonial Fiji at that point in time. 5 In 1876, Governor Sir Arthur Gordon established the Great Council of Chiefs to facilitate his Nigeria-learnt doctrine of indirect rule. Howard 6 writes that, The council was used by Gordon to help legitimate his efforts to create a stable and uniform colonial state, and his power over the council was considerable. This helped keep the Fijian chiefs within the ambit of national administration and it also strengthened the traditional bond of mutual dependence between the chief and his people. This relationship of dependency underwent a significant change over time as the dependence of the commoner on the chief increased, and the dependence of the chief on the commoner began to be replaced by his dependence on the colonial administration. The dependence of the commoner on the chief was thus, to a large extent, indirectly replaced by his/her dependence on the colonial administration. This dependency was institutionalised further through the establishment of an administrative apparatus called 1 Siegel (1999). 2 Klingner (2000, p. 369). 3 Girmit is a butchered version of the word agreement of indenture; a more acceptable system of slavery used by Britain to supply its colonial labour needs. 4 For the purposes of this paper, the term Fijian is used to refer to the component that is widely considered to be the indigenous population of Fiji. 5 Routledge (1985). 6 Howard (1991, p. 27). 2

the Fijian Administration for the management of Fijian affairs. The relationship between these institutions and the colonial government was characterized by paternalism and this paternalism and its concomitant expectations systems have prevailed into contemporary Fiji. There is thus a virtually accepted expectation that the Fijian must be given preference in national allocations decisions as of right. This tends to encounter tensions when considered in conjunction with the tenets of good governance. Girmit (the ethnic variable) The Indo-Fijian population, which currently comprises some 38-40% of Fiji s approximately 480,000 people, arrived into a largely undeveloped and relatively unstable British colony as indentured labourers with the rights of semi-slaves 7 in 1879. Since then, the Indo-Fijian has played a critical role in providing Fiji with cheap labour that formed the backbone of its development into the most advanced country in the South Western Pacific region. From the colonial era up till the turn of the century, sugar was Fiji s main export earner; this was where the contribution of the Indian immigrants was largely concentrated. The sizeable presence and demographic concentration of this distinctive community in selected urban and rural farming areas in Fiji has made the Indo-Fijian appear like a threat to the Fijian population. Colonial administrators created this myth and European planters, Fijian chiefs, bureaucrats and politicians perpetuated it because it paid short-term dividends. On the other hand, the circumstances and manner in which the girmitiya 8 arrived in Fiji between 1879 and 1916 made them believe that they had rights to a permanent presence in this new land. This was again a myth and their struggle for a dignified existence on equal circumstances is now a matter of continuing history. For the purposes of this paper, it is important to note that the Indo-Fijian presence provides a convenient bogey for both justifying and diverting public attention from questionable practices in public office. Government Fiji has a Westminster type of government with political alignments being largely ethnic based for historical reasons as discussed earlier. This has prevented the two main communities from forging political bonds necessary for this type of democracy to work. Three coups 9 have been executed since Fiji attained its independence from Britain in 1970. Each of these was ostensibly justified in the name of indigenous rights against the threat of foreign domination by the Indo-Fijian community. The fallout from these coups has seen the development of a culture of political patronage and extreme unpredictability in public decision making. Decisions for indigenous concerns has repeatedly blatantly been used to disguise questionable undertakings on a personal as well as national scale. In addition to the three coups, Fiji has also had three constitutions in the past 3 decades. Ethnic-based socio-political demarcations, persisting traditional 7 See Gillion (1962, pp. 6-7). 8 Indian labourers who came on girmit. 9 The first coup was executed on 14 th May 1987 by L-Colonel Rabuka as a last resort to prevent bloodshed; the second in October 1987 to reassert Colonel s Rabuka s authority over the country; and the third on 19 th May 2000 to overthrow the Peoples Coalition Government ostensibly because it was headed by an Indo-Fijian PM. 3

structures, political instability, and a relatively fluid constitutional framework have not helped in the development and maintenance of a strong public sector ethos, strong and respected public institutions of accountability, and a tradition of robust public discourse necessary for the healthy functioning of a democratic government. Truly democratic institutions have thus not had the chance to develop and take root adequately in Fiji. Politics and Coups Fiji s multi-party political system has historically been characterized by clear ethnic alignments in political party membership and voting patterns. The trend was broken by the April 1987 elections when the Fiji Labour Party broke through the ethnic-divide and polled significant numbers of cross-cultural votes in the urban areas to emerge victorious. This landmark cross-cultural political experiment was not allowed to gain momentum as a coup was executed one month later by L-Colonel Sitiveni Rabuka. After the 1987 coups, the perpetrators were pardoned and rewarded with promotions, public appointments and preferential treatment in the public domain. It became clear that institutions of public accountability were disrupted, destroyed and heavily compromised after the 1987 coup. Thirteen years later, only five 10 of which were dedicated to strengthening and re-establishing necessary public accountability mechanisms, another coup in May 2000 shattered all expectations of predictability in the institutions of accountability and good governance. 11 The relationship between the rule of law and violent political uprising is therefore, still not clear in the thought patterns of the Fijian. This is likely to persist so long as the Indian bogey remains as an effective rallying point. It is this blatant disregard of the institutions of law that continues to influence abusive and arrogant behaviour among politicians and bureaucrats. There are important linkages between the politician/bureaucrat and the urban Fijian. Urban Fijian Society Fijian society today is very different from what Governors Gordon and Thurston attempted to structure on the basis of what they perceived to be Fijian society in 1874. Instead of being a virtually static, slowly changing, and structural-functionalist type supportive entity, contemporary Fijian society is fraught with contradictions and expectations that stem from shared colonial and continuing post-colonial experiences. Since the relaxing of Fijian Affairs regulations in 1960 12, a sizeable proportion of Fijians moved into urban and peri-urban areas. This urbanization of the Fijian has continued unfettered into the new millennium even though concerns have been expressed at times about this by Fijian leaders. Some 50% of Fiji s population now lives in Suva which is predominantly the main destination of internal migration. With the shrinking of the sugar industry 13, and the accompanying slow-down of the rural economy, Suva (in particular) has seen a burgeoning of the Fijian squatter population. 10 From 1987 to 1995 national focus was on stabilising the political landscape, enacting the 1990 constitution, organizing the 1992 and 1994 general elections, and consolidating the SVT government and PM Sitiveni Rabuka s leadership. Only in 1996 was the Public Enterprise Act enacted. 11 Appana (2003). 12 Before 1960 Fijians were required by law to remain protected in their villages. 13 Fiji s sugar output has almost halved its peak rates because of continuing uncertainties with land leases and international sugar prices. 4

On the other hand, the advent of education and the fact that the influences of modernization could not be prevented from affecting Fijian society, has continued to lead to the emergence of an urban Fijian community that is physically removed from their traditional bases. The ill-prepared urban Fijian is faced with an alien set of conditions of existence as the traditional village umbrella no longer acts as a buffer to support his/her existence and the traditional obligations that he/she carries with him to the new setting multiplies the economic pressures on him/her in ways that can be unbearable. 14 This, when taken in conjunction with the rising alarming poverty levels, 15 has created new expectations systems and intensified the challenges on old allegiances and values. Urban life thus continues to create its own pressures and challenges that have led to the forging of new alliances and relationship patterns. Expectations systems of dependency continue to be forged around politicians, chiefs, and provincial 16 and kinship-relationships systems. Public Institutions of Accountability Exponents of democracy differ on its institutional requirements as well as the arguments which can best be pushed in support of it (Duncan & Lukes, 1970, p.191). This paper focuses on public institutions that are necessary for good governance within the democratic framework. Institutions of public accountability covered here include: Auditor General, Public Accounts Committee, Privileges Committee, Police, Military, and Judiciary. The Auditor General performs the task of auditing all government accounts annually and preparing a detailed report for parliamentary scrutiny. In Fiji the AGs office is both toothless and under resourced; it is also neither taken seriously nor supported by government. In 2002, PM Qarase expressed disapproval of the Auditor-General s 2002 report, saying that the AG s job entails auditing accounts and not making recommendations or expressing opinion on policy and political matters (fijilive, 16/10/02). Similar sentiments were expressed earlier this year (2005) when the latest report was tabled in parliament. The Public Accounts Committee (PAC), on the other hand, is chaired by a nominee of the opposition who are either ignored or reviled. The PAC has been weakened further through non-cooperation from government, 17 and 14 Vusoniwailala (1986) uses the kinship field to show how traditional expectations can become an unbearable economic burden on the urban Fijian. The kinship field is defined as a geographical area within which ones genetically linked village is located. This field expands for offspring and carries with it the related traditional obligations. 15 In 2002, of the total workforce of 280,000, 131,000 belonged to the working poor group, 70,000 in the money economy and 61,000 in the subsistence-farming category according to the National Advisory Council Cabinet Sub-committee Report on Poverty 2002. Since then, urban migration trends have continued with an expanding squatter population as land lease problems especially for cane farmers have persisted and the rural economy has stagnated (fijilive 15/4/03). 16 There are 14 colonially-demarcated provinces in Fiji with calls being made intermittently for the formation of at least 2 more. Relationships within and across selected provinces are very strong. 17 The Fiji Labour Party (FLP) has used the boycott-approach on a number of occasions to stymie government initiatives; this has been reciprocated by the Soqosoqo ni Duavata ni Lewenivanua (SDL) government in the Public Accounts Committee. 5

government is able to do this because of the nature of politics in Fiji. 18 In addition to this, the privileges committee, which looks into complaints against high office bearers, has repeatedly failed to show its effectiveness by citing and disciplining a minister or MP. Members of parliament have repeatedly flouted procedural rules especially in the Fiji Senate without being sanctioned. The media has even referred to parliament as that circus in Veiuto in light of these antics. On a more serious note, a remarkable number of MPs have blatantly made inflammatory racist remarks in parliament without being cited for these. It is partly in response to this that calls have been made for the setting up of an Ethics Committee (fijilive, 9/11/02). In addition to the above mentioned institutions of accountability, the law enforcement arm of government has an indispensable role to play in ensuring accountability in public conduct. Fiji s police force is both under-resourced and in need of technical expertise especially in the area of white-collar crimes. Police leadership has also recently found itself entangled in deliberate procedural webs that have thwarted attempts by the Police Commissioner to operate as an independent CEO within the public sector reform framework. 19 The Fiji military on the other hand, has found its integrity as a custodian of law and order questioned during the periodic coups that have become part of politics in Fiji. Attempts are being made to re-establish the FMF as a neutral entity, but over time the Commander of the FMF has found himself at loggerheads with the government. The main issue of contention at present involves government proposals for granting amnesty to the coup perpetrators of 2000. This has led to several reactions from government mainly aimed at applying administrative sanctions in order to elicit compliance from the FMF. Firstly, the issue of the Commander s work contract renewal was raised, then he was subtly offered a diplomatic posting, and finally financial disbursements to the military (and police) were placed under the CEO Home Affairs. This last measure has the potential to dangerously undermine the independence and effectiveness of both the military and the police force in Fiji. Finally, Fiji s judiciary has remained commendably untarnished over the years given the types of challenges that it has faced so far. It has however, displayed a reluctance and lack of uniformity in passing sentence on civil service infractions and coup-related cases. 20 On a more ominous note, persistent post-sentence attempts have been made to neutralise the deterrence element in sentences passed. The little-understood Compulsory Supervision Order (CSO) provision of the Prisons Act has recently been interpreted in 18 The Opposition has historically comprised Indo-Fijian ort Indo-Fijian dominated parties; this has given predominantly Fijian-dominated governments an acceptable excuse for not cooperating with or responding positively to opposition concerns. 19 Commissioner Hughes recommendations to demote one and fire one officer for involvement in the 2000 coup and laxity were overturned by the Police Services Commission. The High Court later reversed this and the Commissioner s original decision stood. A number of senior posts have been vacant in the police force for a considerable amount of time now (FT 19/7/05). Some $5.6m approved via a supplementary budget in early 2005 is being held up by the Finance Ministry because they can only approve $4.2m (FT 20/7/05). 19 20 Sentences passed on mutineers and coup supports by the magistrates courts have differed from those passed by higher courts; magistrates court sentences have been remarkably lower. On the other hand, there have also been considerable discrepancies seen in sentences passed by magistrates courts in Suva and Labasa. 6

non-conventional ways to facilitate this. 21 The most questionable invocation of the CSO provision was seen in the release of former Vice-President and high chief Ratu Jope Seniloli. 22 This tends to bring into question the universal democratic understanding that everyone is equal in the eyes of the law. It needs to be noted that the lack of uniformity in court sentencing and dubious usage of the CSO provision however, is not confined to only cases involving coup-related felons. The context of public sector reforms, and the implementation of policies and programs to meet the MDGs in Fiji, is fraught with unique problems and obstacles. The colonial experience forged a system of paternalism and political patronage that found renewed vigour and life in the aftermath of the coups of 1987 and 2000. Colonial demands for labour also led to the introduction of a migrant Indo-Fijian community who have made a life in Fiji and expect the rights of equal citizen in their country of adoption. This has not only affected government and politics, but also created a convenient bogey for lack of predictability in public conduct of politicians as well as bureaucrats. There are numerous recorded cases of corruption, abuse of office and over-expenditure in public offices. Lack of accountability and transparency has also been allowed to persist with the professed need to help Fijians in order to meet the rates of progress made by Indo-Fijians. 23 In addition to these, the Fiji Police and Military Forces find themselves faced with bureaucratic as well as contextual constraints. All these factors, coupled with the intensifying personal demands of the developing economy, create a unique context for the implementation of public sector reforms and the attainment of MDGs in Fiji. Public Sector Reforms in Fiji Public sectors reforms have three major components in Fiji: public enterprise restructuring, financial management reform, and civil service reform. This paper takes the wider definition of public sector reforms and incorporates its three components, thus examples mentioned encompass all three types of reforms undertaken. Public sector reforms in Fiji have been characterized by enthusiastic verbal start-offs, followed by long periods of gestation accompanied by vaguely-focused discussions, followed by frantic activity, followed by unexplained hiatuses. 24 There is little to show in terms of outcomes from the various programs implemented even though various institutional frameworks have been enacted and 12 Public Enterprises have been restructured so far. The fact that between 2000 and 2004, public enterprises paid F$14m (US$9m) in taxes and F$10.79m 21 Compulsory Supervision Order (CSO) is a provision that allows for the early release of prisoners for exemplary conduct within prison. The importance of the deterrence component in court sentences has traditionally been recognized by the Fiji Prison Service in exercising this provision. Prisoners have been considered to be eligible for early release on CSO only after they have served half of their sentences even though this has not been stipulated in the relevant legislation. In the case of coup convicts, this convention has been blatantly ignored. 22 This chief administered the oaths of public office to the rebels in May 2000, was sentenced to 3 years imprisonment, and was released in 3 months on CSO on unverified medical grounds. 23 This is a highly problematic and misleading assertion that disregards: ways of life, consumption patterns, savings and investment patterns, cultural peculiarities and quantitative realities. The UNDP and Fiji Government 1997 Poverty Report statistics show that about 54 per cent of the poor are Indo-Fijians. 24 See Appana (2003) for details. 7

(US$7m) in dividends does not call for accolades because non-restructured entities might have shown comparable performances. A number of common problems have been identified by various studies on public sector reforms in Fiji. 25 These include: objectives inadequately explained, not enough awareness of reform benefits, changes in political direction, lack of coordination at central agency level, increasing territorialism, CEOs not acting as Champions of Change, and need for wider grounding. There are however, a number of unique contextual obstacles that warrant closer scrutiny. Contextual Obstacles As mentioned earlier Fiji s unique colonial experience, forced multi-racial existence, Westminster-style of democratic government, periodic coups and the inevitable dictates of modernization and the money economy have created a unique cultural orientation. This has not only impacted on the conduct of public officials, it has also impacted on the orientation and workings of public institutions of accountability. This section analyses and discusses a number of contextual obstacles that affect public sector reforms, and in the process, hinder Fiji s progress towards the MDGs. The Urban Fijian The Urban Fijian phenomenon as a major factor on Fiji s political-economic scene has not been recognized adequately in contemporary academic discourse. Removed from the quasi-welfare network of the village umbrella, this ever-increasing and politically significant group finds itself torn between traditional obligations and the economic dictates of modern urban living. The urban Fijian receives calls for assistance from his near kin, his extended family, his wife s family, his clan, his tribe, his village, his island, his district, his province, his church ( ), his friends, his workmates, his professional associates, sporting and cultural groups and, at times, in plural Fiji, even the call of his (Fijian) race. 26 This has forced him/her to forge new relationships and the most important of these is the urban Fijian s relationship with and reliance on their politicians and the government. This differs markedly from the relationship that the village/rural Fijian has with their politicians and the government. The urban Fijian expects government assistance in obtaining jobs and venturing into business schemes. A number of companies have been registered specifically for the purposes of obtaining and servicing government contracts. One of the most prominent of these is Strategic Air Services Ltd. (SASL) which has a highly controversial contract with Airports Fiji Ltd. (AFL) for the provision of air traffic management (ATM) services. On the other hand, the reverse reliance of the politician on the important vote of the urban Fijian compels him/her to use his influence on the political process as well as the bureaucracy to ensure that the urban Fijian voter is assisted even if this means circumventing the established systems of decision making. In the process, necessary principles of impersonality and predictability in public decision making are compromised. 25 CAPAM Country Case Study; Reddy, N. (2001); Appana, S. (2003); Ministry of Public Enterprise and Public Sector Reform (July, 2005). 26 Vusoniwailala (1986, p. 171). 8

This tendency is augmented by the fact that traditional kinship bonds as well as newly forged educational and military networks persist into the national bureaucracy. These kinship bonds have actually intensified with their concomitant reciprocal expectations in the face of newer modern demands emanating from the continuously changing urban environment. Provincialism and Clientele relationships Fiji comprises 14 provinces with persisting tribal and kinship relationships still influencing individual conduct as well as national decision-making. The forces of inclusion and exclusion are very much at play within the Fijians who are an exclusivist group that recognises and amplifies alignments from the confederacy (matanitu) 27 level right down to the level of the smaller communal landholding unit (mataqali) and beyond. These divisions are further compounded by differences in Christian denominational affiliations. Resource allocation decisions continue to be made via provincial allocations and preferences are seen in terms of the relative influence of individual provinces in national politics. This has tended to strengthen these provincial bonds in both the rural and urban areas as the rural dweller moves into new urban surroundings. In the modern urban environment, instead of weakening, these traditional bonds have actually strengthened because the Fijian has attempted to work out a means of coming to terms with his changed circumstances of existence. Social undertakings (like annual fundraising for the Methodist Church and the annual hosting of Great Council of Chiefs meetings) are organized according to provinces. These province-based groupings have also proved to be extremely useful in garnering electoral support during elections, and mass grassroots support during political upheavals. There is another angle to the kinship relations-enforced networks that pervade Fijian society. The old culture of dependency and expectations that were an integral part of the colonial administration continued through the Mara years. Mara s rule via the Alliance government, after independence in 1970, was based on patronage. 28 His position and prestige depended ultimately on his control of clientele relationships. The fact that he was a chief supported this, but did not prevent him from losing the 1977 and 1987 elections. Mara s return to power on the back of Rabuka s coups served to reaffirm these networks, but a new twist emerged with coup collaborators and supporters joining the network with new and ambitious expectations. Institutions of governance and public accountability were compromised and a system of paternalism began to characterize the public service. The 2000 coup again raised expectations of special treatment for Fijians. The 2004 appointment of CEOs as part of civil service reforms provides an interesting case in point. Mercer, an international consulting firm, was hired at an undisclosed sum of F$4m to go on a world-wide search for the most suitable candidates to replace local Permanent Secretaries as CEOs. After a painstaking search, all CEOs were located in Fiji; all were ethnic Fijians with one Indo-Fijian. A local white was later hired to head the Public Service Commission. 27 In addition to the 14 provinces Fiji was also geographically divided into 3 bigger entities called confederacies by the colonial administration. These include: Tovata, Kubuna and Burebasaga. 28 Robertson & Tamanisau (1988, p.104). 9

The present SDL government s Affirmative Action Blueprint for Fijians is a hastily drawn-up plan for Fijian affirmative assistance. It makes no mention of the need for control; neither does it clearly specify qualification requirements. In its attempts to satisfy Fijian interests it has made flimsy assumptions about Fijian unity and uniformity of demands. The Blueprint is basically targeted at ensuring a 50/50 ethnic parity in commerce and the professions by the year 2020. At the 2002 Economic Summit in Lami, Finance Minister Ratu Jone Kubuabola said that development initiatives that attempted to address the disadvantaged position of certain ethnic groups should be seen as attempts at creating equity and consolidating national unity rather than fostering racism. 29 On a preemptive and ominous note the Minister said, that this was necessary for continued peace and harmony among the different ethnic groups in Fiji. As part of this program, 50% of all state contracts have been earmarked for Fijian-owned businesses. 30 This has important implications for the contracting out of services previously provided by government departments and public enterprises because the merit criterion that underpins the NPM model for public sector reforms would have to be compromised in light of these sociallyoriented objectives of government. These intensifying expectations systems and the specialness accorded the Fijian have not only led to systematic frustrating of public institutions of accountability, it has created a culture of lack of appreciation and disrespect for the indispensable institutions of state. Lack of respect for institutions of state The May 1987 overthrow of the Bavadra government and its aftermath proved to the general populace that the institutions of state could be defied (violently if necessary) without any subsequent sanctions. Rabuka and his cohorts were pardoned and promoted after the 1987 coup largely because the Fijian actually believed that the Bavadra government would favour the Indo-Fijian and therefore, work against Fijian interests. The National Bank of Fiji (NBF) was ransacked with impunity 31 as the forcefully installed general manager did his utmost to circumvent all control mechanisms and assist the Fijians and Rotumans to access funds for their betterment. The list of clients who unscrupulously plundered the NBF however, had many non-indigenous names. 32 The most prominent prosecution in this case was that of the then GM whose case was dismissed in 2003 with the magistrate citing incompetence in the Office of the Director of Public Prosecutions. Reasons given were that the case had dragged on for too 29 See fijilive (15/9/02) for more of this address. Ratu Jone went to great lengths to assure the rest of Fiji that the Affirmative Action Plan for Indigenous Fijians does not undermine the aspirations and interests of other ethnic groups or promote ethnic domination or discrimination by indigenous Fijians. It merely attempts to bridge the gap between indigenous Fijians and other ethnic groups. 30 At a March 2003 Indigenous Fijian Business Council symposium in Nadi, PM Qarase qualified this to Fijian majority-owned businesses. He also said that this would apply to government permits, licenses and quotas as well (fijilive, 13/3/03). 31 The estimated value of this scam was anywhere between F$220-250m. See Grynberg, R., D. Munro and M. White (2002) for a detailed study of the NBF case. 32 See Review (November, 1995, pp. 1A-4A) for corporate borrowings. Most of these were companies involving Fijian participation. Major exposures are given on p. 42, and special GM authorizations totalling $365,308 listed on p. 49. 10

long and it was impossible to have a fair trial because of it. 33 More significantly, not one of the personalities identified in the NBF saga was ever convicted. Thirteen years later, only five 34 of which were dedicated to strengthening and reestablishing necessary public accountability mechanisms, another coup in May 2000 shattered all expectations of predictability in the institutions of accountability and good governance. Both the coups were justified in the name of protecting the indigenous community from the hegemonic designs of the Indo-Fijians. Part of the fallout of the 2000 coup crisis involved a public disagreement between the Fiji Law Society and Chief Justice Tuivaga on the issue of constitutionality of his drafting a decree that helped the military abrogate the 1997 constitution. 35 The President of the Fiji Law Society did not mince his words when he said that good intentions cannot take precedence over a judge s solemn duty to uphold the constitution. 36 Farmer Chandrika Prasad and the Citizen s Constitutional Forum 37 successfully challenged the abrogation of the 1997 constitution in Fiji s Court of Appeal and this added further to the general confusion that prevailed regarding the role and legitimacy of that constitution. 38 Lack of widespread acceptance of the 1997 constitution has often been blamed for the 2000 coup. There is some credence to this argument, but both parliament and the GCC had unanimously endorsed it. Questions only arose after expectations were thwarted and plans disrupted by the unexpected victory of the Fiji Labour Party in the 1999 elections. Speight was the front man for a variety of interests including radical nationalist Fijians operating on the fringes of indigenous politics, opportunistic Fijian politicians defeated at the last elections and keen to settle old scores, elements of the military who knew well the potential fruits of coup support from the 1987 experience, and business interests as well as traditional leaders and chiefs who felt threatened by the arrival of Chaudhry s People s Coalition Government. This coup was supposed to mobilize full Fijian support because of its racial rationale, but when overt military support failed to materialize, it began to unravel. Punishment for the dissidents has varied with a lot of questions being left unanswered. The public recognizes that these trials involve merely the front people for the coup. Many of the chiefs, businessmen and leaders who were involved have not been punished. Some have even acquired high public positions. This sends mixed signals to the populace who speculate that had the military been headed by a more understanding commander, none of these heroes would have had to go through the ignominy of trial and prison. They point to the 1987 coup and the subsequent election of Rabuka as PM of Fiji. The 33 See fijilive (29/3/03) for details of the Makrava dismissal. 34 From 1987 to 1995 national focus was on stabilising the political landscape, enacting the 1990 constitution, organizing the 1992 and 1994 general elections, and consolidating the SVT government and PM Sitiveni Rabuka s leadership. Only in 1997 was the present Constitution promulgated. 35 The CJ was assisted by two other judges, one of whom later replaced him as CJ. 36 Chen Young in FT (16/4/01, p. 5). The CJ subsequently banned Mr. Young from appearing in his courts. 37 The Citizen s Constitutional Forum is an NGO that operates at the forefront of the battle for social justice in Fiji. 38 Other NGOs and the Fiji Labour Party also assisted the farmer (fijilive, 15/5/01); See also Mary-Louise O Callahan, The Indian farmer who stood up for Fiji s democracy, (Australian, 3-4/3/01, p.11). 11

relationship between the rule of law and violent political uprising is therefore, still not clear in the thought patterns of the Fijian. It is this blatant disregard of the institutions of law and accountability that have influenced subsequent abusive behaviour and bad management among politicians and bureaucrats. Lack of appreciation of the need for accountability and transparency As seen earlier, lack of appreciation of the tenets of good governance can largely be traced to the coups and subsequent developments because persons of influence have largely benefited from the coups and the culture of corruption and abuse of office that they spawned. Initial widespread acceptance of non-transparent and abusive decisions stemmed from the rationalization that they were necessary to meet legitimate Fijian expectations. Since 2000, annual reports by the Ombudsman and the Auditor General have highlighted an escalating trend in this direction. The 30 th Annual Ombudsman s Report highlighted investigations being unnecessarily delayed by the then Police Commissioner. 39 PM Qarase subsequently expressed disapproval of the Auditor- General s 2002 report, saying that the AG s job entails auditing accounts and not making recommendations or expressing opinion on policy and political matters as the AG had called for greater powers of enforcement that are currently lacking in the AG s office. 40 In Fiji, the AG s reports are thus seen as part of routine while the government machinery grinds unquestioned and unchecked. In another case that totally shook public confidence on the concept of public accountability, approximately $25 million was disbursed mainly to villagers and farmers in the Tailevu and Naitasiri areas as agricultural assistance after the 2000 coup and in the lead-up to the 2001 elections. Amid allegations of vote buying, this scam resulted in only one casualty after he threatened public disclosure and later filed a writ against the government through his lawyers. 41 Abuse of public office and corruption have thus become part of the work environment in Fiji. Institutions of public accountability do exist, but are ineffective because they do not operate in an impartial and upright manner. The then PSC chairman, Sakeasi Waqanivavalagi admitted at a press conference that scams, nepotism, favouritism and visible corruption are rife in the Fiji civil service. 42 The Auditor General and Ombudsman s offices do not have necessary powers of enforcement of their investigative findings. The police force is continuously harassed by the bureaucracy in its attempts to operate independently and impartially. The law courts have exhibited a questionable level of consistency in dealing with coup-related crimes. Many of the active supporters of the 39 fijilive (7/8/02). More abuses appear in this report. 40 fijilive (16/10/02). The AG s office has been likened to a toothless tiger. 41 The Permanent Secretary for Agriculture issued an ultimatum to government to lift his suspension or he d reveal names in the scandal (fijilive, 5/4/02). He was later sacked and filed a writ in the High Court against his dismissal (fijilive 20/6/02 and 21/6/02). Details were revealed of questionable orders and disbursements through 11 government ministers. One former government official was jailed for 3yrs in 2005 after painstaking investigations. 42 He said this in making a case for the restructuring of the top posts in the public service so that Permanent Secretaries positions become upgraded to CEO. Under a proposed system, PSs would operate as CEs and disciplinary functions would be delegated to them. Any laxity on their part to adhere to the strictest standards, he said, could easily lead to a non-renewal of their one-year employment contracts (fijilive, 12/12/02). Those public CEO were later hired on 5-yr contracts! 12

siege of parliament that followed Speight s coup were never charged and now hold public positions of authority and influence. Rules on public tendering procedures have repeatedly been flouted with impunity despite calls for regularity. Tender approvals by the NLTB, AFL and Telecom have raised public concerns. 43 A $23m airport refurbishment project undertaken by a Singaporean company in partnership with a local tenant of Nadi Airport was questioned by another construction company who had a substantially lower bid. 44 Barely a year later, the airport complex was found leaking and called for estimated additional repair works of $10m. 45 The Commerce Commission appears to be totally ineffective in scrutinizing the public tendering process. It is usually in these circumstances of lethargy or impotence in the institutions of public accountability that the media assumes a pivotal role. In Fiji however, there is a lack of understanding and appreciation of the need for public criticism because silence is seen as a conformist virtue. Culture of Silence Fijian society has traditionally prided itself on its conformism and homogeneity. Today however, it is characterised by fragmentation rather than the homogeneity that is wistfully alluded to in uncritical writings on Fiji. Lawson (1991, p. 276) says that.. Fijian cultural homogeneity is not grounded in fact, either historically or in terms of contemporary political reality. It is a myth which has its origins in the colonial era and which has developed, partly by accident and partly by design, into a powerful rhetorical device to serve the political interests of the chiefly establishment. It has continued to serve the political interests of ethnic-based political alliances. There are provincial, traditional support, and vanua alignments that are important socioeconomic and political considerations. Thus a comparative lack of open dissent among Fijians tends to reinforce the idea of homogeneity and consensus amongst the Fijian community. This is because Fijian dissent, when viewed within the domain of national politics, is characterised by a debilitating culture of silence that inhibits constructive discourse essential for the vibrant functioning of a democratic system 46. Wah (1997, p.152) attempts to explain this by saying that the taukei have a unique reified idea of 43 Fijilive 5/3/04 reported that the NLTB had awarded a $5m IT tender to a US company when a local tender had been for $2.7m. Fijilive (20/9/02) reported that a controversial Pakistani businessman was awarded the tender to provide identification cards for delegates and journalists at the 2002 African Caribbean Pacific Summit after it had already closed. The tender had apparently been awarded to a local company and then withdrawn. The police spokeswoman was reported to have said, This man had a lot of connections most of Government jobs such as printing, provision of computers and IDs for the ACP Summit was awarded to him. Telecom s CEO and COO have been accused of circumventing procedures in awarding costly contracts to foreign experts when the required expertise is locally available (fijilive, 12/3/04). 44 This was later raised as a matter in parliament by Chaudhry (fijilive, 28/11/02). 45 See fijilive (15/2/04 and 19/2/04). The new CEO laid the blame on the previous management of AFL. No action has been taken in this case. 46 The term culture of silence appears to have been coined by Robertson & Tamanisa (1988), but it was used as a concept and popularised by Fiji Economist Wadan Narsey. 13

political correctness that prevents open dissent in the public arena. Part of the reason for this lies in the reverence that is accorded to chiefs who are usually also public office holders. Part of this also stems from the fact that public dissent can erupt in violence. On the other hand, it usually pays to be silent in Fijian society as there are socio-cultural bonds of communality and reciprocity that often come into play at some point in time. These considerations become particularly important because governments make resource allocations decisions and it would pay to be seen to be supportive of them. 47 In contrast to this, the material accoutrements and political potential of traditional office have led to disputes within traditional groupings on the question of chiefly succession. Ascendancy to traditional Fijian office has been far from smooth in the contemporary era. 48 Additionally, contemporary ethnic Fijian politics comprises a variety of interests. These include: radical nationalist Fijians operating on the fringes of indigenous politics 49, ambitious members of the clergy 50, opportunistic Fijian politicians defeated at the last elections keen to settle old scores 51, and elements of the military whose involvement is the inevitable consequence of a politicized armed force whose loyalties lie to individual leaders rather than to the institution of the army. 52 These contradictory interests not only hold the potential for political dissent and upheaval, they also force unproductive compromises in decisions of national importance. The assumption of Fijian unity thus glosses over and hides important differences and contradictions that emerge in times of crisis. Many of the aspirations of Fijians, that underpin these conflicting interests, are submerged in this cloak of cultural homogeneity. An express desire to participate and succeed in the commercial sector is one major area in which traditional culture has been challenged. The culture of silence, however does allow public office holders to reward their kin and supporters, as well as self without open criticism from the powerful Fijiansanctioned voice of dissent. It also allows non-entertainment and arrogant dismissal of criticism from non-fijian-sanctioned quarters. This raises the issue of parliamentary opposition. Opposition seen as pesky threat 47 Widespread Fijian dissent against governments has led to changes in government. Hence fears of negative reactions from government have never featured in the decision to protest. Militant trade union protests have only been supported by Fijian trade unions when the case for support has been overwhelming. 48 The Taukei Naua title was disputed some time back. The Tui Vuna title continues to be disputed despite the untimely demise of the leader of the unhappy faction. The Qaranivalu s hold has continued to be contested. Perhaps the most reported headship dispute involved the title of Tui Ba with both Sorokoba and Bulu staking their claims openly. There is a simmering dispute regarding the title of Tui Cakau even though the issue has been considered resolved. The post of Vunivalu is still vacant because of failings on the issue of unity even within the oft-exalted chiefly house of Mataiwelagi. And there are already murmurs about who will succeed the Tui Nayau (the late Ratu Mara). 49 These include urban non-chiefs and lesser chiefs who have a non-traditional power base as union leaders, businessmen, retired civil servants, or educated elites, etc. 50 Church leaders have played a central political role in mustering mass support during elections or during political upheavals. 51 In a lot of instances they come with debt portfolios worked out on the basis of continued income flow from holding political positions. 52 Lal (2000). 14

In the Westminster system of government the house(s) of parliament is/are a central forum for debate on issues of national importance. These debates must be conducted with an upright spirit of contributing to improvements in the management of the country. In Fiji, parliamentary composition has historically been determined on ethnic lines. Thus parliamentary opposition has been equated with Indo-Fijians working against the Fijian community because Fijian establishment-backed parties have ruled government for most of the time since independence in 1970, and Indo-Fijian backed parties have operated as a noisy opposition. 53 This has tended to distort the effective functioning of parliament as another important institution of governance in Fiji. There are historical factors that contributed to this development. The colonial administration was heavily influenced by Ratu Sukuna s thinking when it came to deliberations on Fijian affairs, not the least of which was on the issue of popular democracy. Ratu Sukuna rejected western democracy, universal franchise, and widespread modern education while championing a social order under the rule of chiefs (Scarr, 1980). The Fijian thus traditionally saw the concept of government as rule by the chiefs. This was reinforced by the incorporation of chiefs into the institutions of government by the colonial administration. Loyalty and subservience to chiefs therefore, was seen as loyalty to government. There is little arguing that the Fijian sees ruling Fiji as a God-given right. Democracy is acceptable to the Fijian so long as it does not harm the natural order of things. 54 Lal 55 put this more specifically when he pointed out that the institutions of parliamentary democracy were predicated on the fulfillment of certain conditions, one of these being that the chiefs should always be in control. This has now been extended to include certain inner ruling elites who are able to influence opinion and control the national purse strings. Since 1987, the concept of chiefly state became a prop on which rural support was mobilized to project special groups into positions of authority and influence. 56 This has now been innovatively modified to present Fijian leaders carrying considerable economic benefits both immediate and promised and supported by chiefs as the acceptable alternative. Parliamentary opposition within the framework of democratic politics is thus seen as attempts at working against and undermining the Fijian system, culture and people. Lawson 57 says that constitutional opposition is a sine qua non of modern democratic politics. This is a form of institutionalized opposition that is focused on expressing dissent on policies and programs rather than on the legitimacy of the constitutional regime itself. 58 The scenario that prevails in Fiji twists and distorts these premises in various ways. Firstly, the legitimacy of the 1997 constitution was questioned by failed 53 Apart from the one-month rule of the Bavadra government in 1987 and the one-year rule of the Chaudhry government in 1999-2000, Fiji has been governed by chief-backed Fijian political parties. The 1997 Constitution was meant to change the prevailing ethnic alignments, but failed to do so under the Chaudhry government. 54 Robertson & Tamanisau (1988, p. 106). 55 Lal (1988, p. 70). 56 Constitutional review proposals have consistently attempted to marginalise the influence of the urban Fijian vote (in favour of the rural vote) because dissent has continued to come from the urban voter. 57 Lawson (1991, p. 12). 58 Hofstadter (1969, p. 4). 15