Iran P5+1 Nuclear Negotiations and Outlook September 4, 2014

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1 Iran P5+1 Nuclear Negotiations and Outlook September 4, 2014 Suzanne Maloney

2 A decade of diplomatic frustration 2002 revelations of Iranian efforts, previously hidden, to master the full nuclear fuel cycle alarmed the world A year later, Tehran agreed to suspension of uranium enrichment & enhanced IAEA inspections» Terms were renegotiated and broadened in 2004 as Paris Agreement In 2005, Tehran abrogated its commitments and resumed uranium enrichment» Reflected deep-seated frustration with the return on the deal» Decision commanded brought support across Iranian political spectrum For next 8 years, Tehran s nuclear calculus appears unchanged by diplomacy or coercion» Diplomacy: 2005 referral to UN Security Council; 2006 decision by Bush administration; 2009 fuel-swap proposal; 2010 mediation by Turkey & Brazil» Coercion: covert campaign vs. scientists; internet sabotage; sanctions

3 After 30 years, sanctions began to bite US measures date back to November 1979, with varied bases» First measures initiated after Embassy seizure, then eased after hostages freed» Racheted up significantly in 1983; 1987; 1995 / 1996 9/11 transformed US sanctions policy, slowly turned vs. Tehran» US designations of Iranian banks and other entities for WMD/terrorism» Reputational campaign waged to persuade businesses to leave» Shift in European response to extraterritoriality Since 2009, sanctions have gone on steroids» Four UN Security Council resolutions, culminating in UNSCR 1929 (June 2010),» Subsequent US measures targeted Iran s refined petroleum imports; petrochemical exports; transportation and insurance; precious metals; Central Bank; autos; more» Follow-on measures from like minded states included EU assets freeze; ban on energy investments; crude boycott; ban on SWIFT access, precious metals trade Efficacy ensured by a constellation of factors, possibly unique» Mahmoud Ahmadinejad» 2009 elections upheaval and subsequent repression» Changing energy markets

Thousand barrels per day 4 Sanctions slashed oil production, exports 4,500 4,000 Crude oil production 3,500 3,000 2,500 Oil exports 2,000 1,500 1,000 Consumption of Oil Products 500 0

5 Iran s 2013 presidential election 2009 post-election upheaval and subsequent repression set low expectations for 2013 ballot Long-time power broker Rouhani ran a savvy campaign, benefitted from cross-factional support» Reformists banded together with traditional supporters of the Islamic system in final days of the race» Deliberate cultivation of youth, disaffected produced surprisingly strong mandate Regime is more stable today than in recent memory» Rouhani s mantra is prudence and balance; he leads a national unity government which has moved carefully to avoid exacerbating Iran s debilitating factional competition.

6 November 2013: a breakthrough deal Rapid progress underscores two important realities:» Washington s commitment to a diplomatic resolution» Tehran s endurance has limitations Deal froze major aspects of Iran s nuclear program» More comprehensive confidence-building gesture than previously contemplated» First successful negotiations between Washington and Tehran since 1981 These concessions came cheap; Iran received only modest sanctions relief» $4.2 billion in Iranian overseas assets repatriated» 6-month holiday for petrochemicals, automotive sector» Designations/enforcement of existing measures unaffected» Sanctions relief has proven to be less rather than more than bargain

7 Stalemate at the first deadline (July 2014) Extension of the talks for four months prolongs process, nets Tehran $2.8 billion in relief, but expectations lowered» Khamenei delivers defiant speech formalizing red lines of nuclear establishment insistence on maintaining current enrichment capacity» US Sec State acknowledges that a formula for a final deal remains elusive Differences are technical, not a function of domestic politics» Distance between the two sides on key technical issues was not unanticipated, but tended to be obscured by optimism attendant with early progress P5+1 cohesion remains strong but Ukraine, regional context intensify uncertainty Sanctions relief plans are part of the mix but do not appear to present a major obstacle

8 Scenarios (Another) November Surprise No Deal; Diplomatic Pause Diplomacy Craters; Military Strike Inadvertent Escalation 30 percent 50 percent 10 percent Wild card

9 Iran s no-deal sanctions exit strategy Denial» Self-sufficiency» Resistance economy Mitigation» Alternatives: condensate exports; electricity exports» Creative financing arrangements: local currency, barter, oil swaps» Reforms: TSP; privatization; revision of investment framework Evasion» Smuggling Retaliation» Threats intended to deter implementation of sanctions and/or raise the price of oil Moral suasion» Pharmaceuticals; airplane safety Bandwagoning with Russia

10 Implications for Iranian Energy Sanctions create severe limitations on financing, technology Tehran has quietly boosted output exports under interim deal, but 2015 crude exports & revenues are subject to considerable uncertainty due to likelihood of new Congressional measures Technocrats, led by Oil Min Zanganeh, are back in charge, but political & technical challenges remain» Aging oil sector generates massive gas reinjection needs, now in greater competition with domestic consumption and transportation needs Remaining foreign investors particularly China have hedged; domestic substitutes often merely Potemkin players Intensity of sanctions enforcement, together with problematic business environment and expectations of continuing external regulatory obstacles to trade and investment continues to deter early movers» Even best-case a deal will only entail gradual, reversible sanctions relief» Little to no prospect of significant new change in accessibility for US firms