[Cite as State ex rel. Parks v. Indus. Comm. (1999), 85 Ohio St.3d 22.] Workers compensation Specific safety requirements Workshop and factory

Similar documents
[Cite as State ex rel. Petrie v. Atlas Iron Processors, Inc. (1999), Ohio St.3d. (No Submitted January 26, 1999 Decided April 28, 1999.

[Cite as State ex rel. Arce v. Indus. Comm., 105 Ohio St.3d 90, 2005-Ohio-572.]

[Cite as State ex rel. Griffith v. Indus. Comm. (1999), 87 Ohio St.3d 154.] Workers compensation Mandamus to compel Industrial Commission to grant

[Cite as State ex rel. Bishop v. Waterbeds N Stuff, Inc., 94 Ohio St.3d 105, 2002-Ohio-62.]

[Cite as State ex rel. Kroger Co. v. Indus. Comm. (1998), 80 Ohio St.3d 649.] Workers compensation Award of temporary total disability by Industrial

APPELLEES. [Cite as State ex rel. Tumbleson v. Eaton Corp. (1999), 87 Ohio St.3d 140.]

[Cite as State ex rel. Value City Dept. Stores v. Indus. Comm., 97 Ohio St.3d 187, 2002-Ohio ]

[Cite as State ex rel. Roadway Express v. Indus Comm. (1998), Ohio St.3d. has effectively determined applicant s condition to be permanent and at

[Cite as State ex rel. Gobich v. Indus. Comm., 103 Ohio St.3d 585, 2004-Ohio-5990.]

[Cite as State ex rel. Dillard Dept. Stores v. Ryan, 122 Ohio St.3d 241, 2009-Ohio-2683.]

. CONRAD, ADMR., APPELLANT, ET AL.

[Cite as State ex rel. Hartness v. Kroger Co. (1998), 81 Ohio St.3d 445.] Workers compensation Industrial Commission s denial of application for

{ 1} Appellant-claimant, Lowell B. Cox, sprained his back at work in

SYLLABUS OF THE COURT A trial court s order denying shock probation pursuant to former R.C (B) is not a final appealable order.

[Cite as State ex rel. Pepsi-Cola Gen. Bottlers, Inc. v. Indus. Comm. (2000), 88. Ohio St.3d 23.]

[Cite as State v. Rance (1999), Ohio St.3d.] compared in the abstract Involuntary manslaughter and aggravated

[Cite as State ex rel. Brown v. Hoover Universal, Inc., 132 Ohio St.3d 520, 2012-Ohio-3895.]

[Cite as State ex rel. Vance v. Marikis (1999), 86 Ohio St.3d 305.] (Nos and Submitted July 28, 1999 Decided September 1, 1999.

APPELLEE. [Cite as State ex rel. Gains v. Rossi (1999), 86 Ohio St.3d 620.] (No Submitted August 25, 1999 Decided September 29, 1999.

[Cite as Johnson v. Timmerman-Cooper, 93 Ohio St.3d 614, Ohio-1803]

The State ex rel. Savarese, Appellant, v. Buckeye Local School District Board of

[Cite as State ex rel. Kroger Co. v. Johnson, 128 Ohio St.3d 243, 2011-Ohio-530.]

SLIP OPINION NO OHIO- THE STATE EX REL. SUNESIS CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, APPELLANT,

[Cite as State ex rel. Sears Logistics Serv., Inc. v. Cope (2000), 89 Ohio St.3d 393.]

[Cite as State ex rel. LTV Steel Co. v. Indus. Comm. (1999), 85 Ohio St.3d 75.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO TENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

TENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

[Cite as State ex rel. AutoZone, Inc. v. Indus. Comm., 117 Ohio St.3d 186, 2008-Ohio-541.]

CITY OF CANTON ET AL., APPELLANTS,

[Cite as State ex rel. George v. Indus. Comm., 130 Ohio St.3d 405, 2011-Ohio-6036.]

[Cite as Schuller v. United States Steel Corp., 103 Ohio St.3d 157, 2004-Ohio-4753.]

[Cite as State ex rel. Beacon Journal Publishing Co. v. Maurer, 91 Ohio St.3d 54, 2001-Ohio-282.]

[Cite as Dzina v. Celebrezze, 108 Ohio St.3d 385, 2006-Ohio-1195.]

Page Ohio St.3d 265 (Ohio 2009) 910 N.E.2d 1009, 2009-Ohio CORRIGAN et al., Appellees, ILLUMINATING COMPANY, Appellant.

[Cite as Hannah v. Dayton Power & Light Co. (1998), Ohio St.3d.] Employer and employee Employer requires employee to perform a dangerous

[Cite as Ryll v. Columbus Fireworks Display Co., Inc., 95 Ohio St.3d 467, 2002-Ohio-2584.]

[Cite as State ex rel. Barnes v. Indus. Comm., 114 Ohio St.3d 444, 2007-Ohio-4557.]

[Cite as Soler v. Evans, St. Clair & Kelsey, 94 Ohio St.3d 432, 2002-Ohio-1246.]

SYLLABUS OF THE COURT A demand for discovery or a bill of particulars is a tolling event pursuant to R.C (E).

[Cite as State ex rel. La-Z-Boy Furniture Galleries v. Thomas, 126 Ohio St.3d 134, 2010-Ohio ]

[Cite as State v. Jordan, 89 Ohio St.3d 488, 2000-Ohio-225.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO TENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT O P I N I O N. Rendered on April 2, 2009

[Cite as State ex rel. Culgan v. Medina Cty. Court of Common Pleas, 119 Ohio St.3d 535, Ohio-4609.]

[Cite as State ex rel. Cincinnati Enquirer, Div. of Gannette v. Cincinnati Bd. of Edn., 99 Ohio St.3d 6, 2003-Ohio-2260.]

Adamsky, Appellant, v. Buckeye Local School District, Appellee. [Cite as Adamsky v. Buckeye Local School Dist. (1995), Ohio St.3d.

[Cite as State ex rel. Worrell v. Ohio Police & Fire Pension Fund, 112 Ohio St.3d 116, Ohio-6513.]

ON MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION. O DONNELL, J.

THE STATE OF OHIO, APPELLEE,

[Cite as State ex rel. Mun. Constr. Equip. Operators Labor Council v. Cleveland, 113 Ohio St.3d 480, 2007-Ohio-2452.]

ON MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION. PFEIFER, J.

[Cite as State ex rel. Montgomery Cty. Pub. Defender v. Siroki, 108 Ohio St.3d 207, 2006-Ohio- 662.]

The State of Ohio, Appellant and Cross-Appellee, v. Thompkins, Appellee and. [Cite as State v. Thompkins (1997), Ohio St.3d.]

CITY OF COLUMBUS, APPELLEE,

KOSTELNIK, EXR., APPELLANT, v. HELPER ET AL., APPELLEES.

APPELLEES. [Cite as State ex rel. Quarto Mining Co. v. Foreman (1997), 79 Ohio St.3d 78.]

[Cite as State ex rel. Conrad v. Indus. Comm. (2000), 88 Ohio St.3d 413.] Workers compensation Industrial Commission s denial of payment for

THE STATE OF OHIO, APPELLEE,

[Cite as Middleburg Hts. v. Quinones, 120 Ohio St.3d 534, 2008-Ohio-6811.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO TENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

[Cite as Oliver v. Cleveland Indians Baseball Co. Ltd. Partnership, 123 Ohio St.3d 278, Ohio-5030.]

[Cite as Baltimore Ravens, Inc. v. Self-Insuring Emp. Evaluation Bd., 94 Ohio St.3d 449, Ohio-1362.]

[Cite as Measles v. Indus. Comm., 128 Ohio St.3d 458, 2011-Ohio-1523.]

SYLLABUS OF THE COURT

[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as Torchik v. Boyce, Slip Opinion No Ohio-1248.

Page Ohio St.3d 196 (Ohio 2011) 957 N.E.2d 3, 2011-Ohio HUFF et al., Appellees,

THE STATE OF OHIO, APPELLEE,

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO TENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

[Cite as In re Guardianship of Hollins, 114 Ohio St.3d 434, 2007-Ohio-4555.]

THE STATE OF OHIO, APPELLANT,

[Cite as Minno v. Pro-Fab, Inc., 121 Ohio St.3d 464, 2009-Ohio-1247.]

[Cite as Cristino v. Ohio Bur. of Workers Comp., 118 Ohio St.3d 151, 2008-Ohio-2013.]

[Cite as Chari v. Vore, 91 Ohio St.3d 323, 2001-Ohio-49.]

[Cite as Zumwalde v. Madeira & Indian Hill Joint Fire Dist., 128 Ohio St.3d 492, 2011-Ohio ]

STATE OF OHIO, APPELLEE,

[Cite as State ex rel. CNG Financial Corp. v. Nadel, 111 Ohio St.3d 149, 2006-Ohio-5344.]

[Cite as State ex rel. Cincinnati Enquirer v. Heath, 121 Ohio St.3d 165, 2009-Ohio-590.]

THE STATE OF OHIO, APPELLANT,

[Cite as Ahmad v. AK Steel Corp., 119 Ohio St.3d 1210, 2008-Ohio-4082.]

THE STATE OF OHIO, APPELLEE,

[Cite as State ex rel. Gen. Elec. Corp. v. Indus. Comm., 103 Ohio St.3d 420, 2004-Ohio-5585.]

THE STATE OF OHIO, APPELLEE,

self-dealing and conversion of partnership funds for their own purposes without the knowledge and consent of the limited partners.

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO TENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT. Industrial Commission of Ohio et al., : (REGULAR CALENDAR) D E C I S I O N

[Cite as State v. Adkins, 129 Ohio St.3d 287, 2011-Ohio-3141.]

743 N.E.2d Ohio-249 (Cite as: 91 Ohio St.3d 182, 743 N.E.2d 901)

[Cite as State v. Dunlap, 129 Ohio St.3d 461, 2011-Ohio-4111.]

THE STATE OF OHIO, APPELLEE,

SLIP OPINION NO OHIO-69 THE STATE EX REL. CAPRETTA, APPELLANT,

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO HAMILTON COUNTY, OHIO

[Cite as In re D.S., 111 Ohio St.3d 361, 2006-Ohio-5851.]

[Cite as Toledo Bar Assn. v. Neller, 102 Ohio St.3d 1234, 2004-Ohio-2895.]

Court of Appeals of Ohio

THE STATE OF OHIO, APPELLEE,

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO TENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT. [William E. Mabe], Administrator, : (REGULAR CALENDAR) Bureau of Workers' Compensation,

with the judgment in York, we find that it does not fully or finally address the State Highway Patrol's liability in the present case.

31tt the 6upremce Court of OYjio

[Cite as State v. Homan, 89 Ohio St.3d 421, 2000-Ohio-212.]

[Cite as Cleveland Hts. v. Lewis, 129 Ohio St.3d 389, 2011-Ohio-2673.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO TENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

[Cite as Turner v. Cent. Local School Dist. (1999), 85 Ohio St.3d 95.] Torts Application of Political Subdivision Tort Liability Act in negligence

Transcription:

[Cite as State ex rel. Parks v. Indus. Comm., 85 Ohio St.3d 22, 1999-Ohio-200.] THE STATE EX REL. PARKS, APPELLANT, v. INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF OHIO ET AL., APPELLEES. [Cite as State ex rel. Parks v. Indus. Comm. (1999), 85 Ohio St.3d 22.] Workers compensation Specific safety requirements Workshop and factory safeguards Protections afforded by Ohio Adm.Code 4121:1-5-23(E)(1) and (2) extend to outdoor industrial injury. (No. 95-2376 Submitted December 16, 1998 Decided March 17, 1999.) APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Franklin County, No. 94APD07-1096. In June 1989, Joseph J. Parks, appellant-claimant, was employed as a tree service worker for appellee city of Toledo s Forestry Division when he received an electrical shock from a power line while trimming a storm-damaged tree. At the time of his injury, Parks was elevated in the bucket of a high ranger truck and was operating a chain saw. His workers compensation claim was allowed for high voltage injury, paresthesia involving right upper extremity. Parks also applied for additional compensation for violations of specific safety requirements ( VSSRs ), alleging that the city had not complied with Ohio Adm.Code 4121:1-5-23(E)(1) and (2). These rules require employers in the electric utility and clearance tree-trimming industries to provide insulated gloves or other protective measures to employees trimming trees around electrical power lines. Appellee Industrial Commission of Ohio denied Parks s VSSR application, explaining: [C]laimant has cited no specific safety requirement adopted by the General Assembly or the Industrial Commission which was violated when he sustained the injuries of record.

Claimant s application is denied for the reason that he was not injured in a workshop or factory. Workshop or factory is not defined in OAC [Chapter] 4121:1-5, but has been construed in STATE EX REL. YORK TEMPLE COUNTRY CLUB v. INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION to require a place with definitive and substantial boundaries. Claimant s testimony makes it clear he was outdoors and up a tree. Pursuant to OAC 4121:1-5-01(A) none of the provisions of OAC [Chapter] 4121:1-5 appl[ies] to his injury. Parks filed a complaint in mandamus requesting an order that the commission vacate its decision and grant his VSSR application. The court of appeals denied the writ. This cause is now before this court upon an appeal as of right. Gallon & Takacs Co., L.P.A., Theodore A. Bowman and Michael J. Niedzielski, for appellant. Betty D. Montgomery, Attorney General, and Cheryl J. Nester, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee Industrial Commission. Edward M. Yosses, Acting Law Director, and Lourdes Santiago, Senior Attorney, for appellee city of Toledo. LUNDBERG STRATTON, J. Appellant Parks contends that the city violated Ohio Adm.Code 4121:1-5-23(E)(1) and (2), regulations for electric utility and clearance tree-trimming industries. 1 These are specific safety regulations for acts that cannot practicably be performed indoors. In applying workshop and factory safeguards in other cases, this court has implied that Ohio Adm.Code Chapter 4121:1-5 governs only indoor activities. The issue before us in this case is whether the protections afforded by Ohio Adm.Code 4121:1-5-23(E)(1) and (2) also extend to outdoor industrial injury. For the reasons that follow, we hold that the 2

utility/tree-trimming protections in Ohio Adm.Code 4121:1-5-23(E)(1) and (2) apply to Parks s outdoor injury. The court of appeals held that Parks s injury was outside the scope of this rule because his injury did not occur in a workshop or factory as required by Ohio Adm.Code 4121:1-5-01(A). The court relied upon prior cases where we have held that, at a minimum, employees must be within a room or place to be safeguarded against the VSSRs listed in Ohio Adm.Code Chapter 4121:1-5. State ex rel. Waugh v. Indus. Comm. (1997), 77 Ohio St.3d 453, 674 N.E.2d 1385; State ex rel. Buurma Farms, Inc. v. Indus. Comm. (1994), 69 Ohio St.3d 111, 630 N.E.2d 686; State ex rel. Double v. Indus. Comm. (1992), 65 Ohio St.3d 13, 599 N.E.2d 259. In Buurma Farms, the claimant was injured while operating a conveyor, for which cited safety requirements specifically demanded accessible shutoff switches and safety guards. The conveyor might have been operated outdoors, but it was not. More important for this case, the conveyor did not have to be operated outdoors. Thus, because the claimant was injured in a building that could reasonably be considered a workshop, we held the employer liable for the asserted VSSRs. Buurma, 69 Ohio St.3d at 113, 630 N.E.2d at 687. Similarly, in Waugh, the specific safety requirement demanded protective footgear and applied indiscriminately to foot hazards. Waugh, 77 Ohio St.3d at 453, 674 N.E.2d at 1386. Hazardous foot conditions can occur indoors or outdoors. Thus, when the claimant in Waugh severed some toes while lawn mowing, we held that his employer had no notice, given the workshop or factory limitation, that Ohio Adm.Code Chapter 4121:1-5 required protective footgear for indoor and outdoor foot hazards. Accordingly, we refused to find VSSR liability. Waugh, 77 Ohio St.3d at 456, 674 N.E.2d at 1388. 3

The commission has discretion to interpret its own rules; however, common sense must prevail where the application of those rules gives rise to a patently illogical result. State ex rel. Lamp v. J.A. Croson Co. (1996), 75 Ohio St.3d 77, 78-79, 661 N.E.2d 724, 726. The risk presented by the combination of clearing tree limbs in the vicinity of power lines rarely, if ever, occurs indoors. Thus, imposing the general workshop or factory limitation on the rule regulating this activity would essentially eliminate the application of the entire provision. The court of appeals recognized this dilemma but determined that it lacked judicial authority to extend Ohio Adm.Code 4121:1-5-23(E) to Parks. However, Parks argues that the special requirements of Ohio Adm.Code 4121:1-5-23(E) prevail as an exception to the general terms of Ohio Adm.Code 4121:1-5-01(A). We agree. The [commission s] rules for specific safety requirements have the effect of legislative enactments and therefore are subject to the ordinary rules of statutory construction. State ex rel. Miller Plumbing Co. v. Indus. Comm. (1948), 149 Ohio St. 493, 496-497, 37 O.O. 197, 199, 79 N.E.2d 553, 555; State ex rel. R. Bauer & Sons Roofing & Siding, Inc. v. Indus. Comm. (1998), 84 Ohio St.3d 62, 66, 701 N.E.2d 995, 999. See, also, Johnson s Markets, Inc. v. New Carlisle Dept. of Health (1991), 58 Ohio St.3d 28, 36-37, 567 N.E.2d 1018, 1025-1026 (R.C. 1.51 used to settle the meaning of conflicting administrative regulations). R.C. 1.51 provides: If a general provision conflicts with a special or local provision, they shall be construed, if possible, so that effect is given to both. If the conflict between the provisions is irreconcilable, the special or local provision prevails as an exception to the general provision, unless the general provision is the later adoption and the manifest intent is that the general provision prevail. 4

Ohio Adm.Code 4121:1-5-23, a more specialized regulation, specifies precautions for precise vocational acts, whereas Ohio Adm.Code 4121:1-5-01(A) describes general principles for applying specific requirements. Moreover, Ohio Adm.Code 4121:1-5-01(A) contains no indication of an intent that it should prevail over Ohio Adm.Code 4121:1-5-23, regardless of which is the more recently adopted rule. The drafters could have inserted the word only to establish that the chapter applied exclusively to all workshops and factories subject to the Workers Compensation Act. They did not. Thus, activities that are regulated in Ohio Adm.Code 4121:1-5-23(E) and are obviously conducted outdoors must be considered an exception to the rule that Ohio Adm.Code Chapter 4121:1-5 protects activities occurring indoors in workshops or factories. With this construction of the rule, we can reconcile today s decision with Buurma Farms and Waugh, the cases that are most analogous, despite having reached the opposite result. Buurma Farms and Waugh establish that, where specific safety requirements regulate activities that can be performed indoors or outdoors, the Ohio Adm.Code 4121:1-5-01(A) workshops and factories restriction limits an employer s reasonable expectations of liability to VSSRs that are committed indoors. However, the rule must be different where activity is regulated but cannot be performed indoors. In that case, the employer cannot reasonably expect exemption because Ohio Adm.Code 4121:1-5-01(A) does not apply exclusively to workshops and factories. The city and commission also argue that the city is not a member of the clearance tree-trimming industr[y] under Ohio Adm.Code 4121:1-5-23(E)(1) and that neither paragraph (E)(1) nor (E)(2) was designed to regulate a municipality s tree-trimming activities. We disagree. Historically, municipal corporations were held to the same safety standards as employers in private corporations engaged in the same industry. State ex rel. 5

Post v. Indus. Comm. (1933), 127 Ohio St. 187, 187 N.E. 719, syllabus. Thus, in State ex rel. Sorrells v. Mosier Tree Serv. (1982), 69 Ohio St.2d 341, 23 O.O.3d 312, 432 N.E.2d 197, we held that the safety requirements aimed at the electric utility industry did not extend to a tree trimmer killed while trimming around a power line. The city and commission cite Sorrells to establish that Parks is not covered by tree-trimming regulations. However, the safety regulation purportedly violated in Sorrells, former Ohio Adm.Code 4121:1-19-02, required appropriate safety gear for the electric utility industry only; it did not also expressly apply to the treetrimming industry as does Ohio Adm.Code 4121:1-5-23(E). Id. at 343, 23 O.O.3d at 313, 432 N.E.2d at 198-199; Sorrells v. Mosier Tree Serv. (Mar. 26, 1981), Franklin App. No. 80AP-609, unreported, 1981 WL 3077. In fact, after Sorrells, the cited safety requirements were repealed and reenacted in the expanded scope of Ohio Adm.Code 4121:1-5-23. 1985-1986 Ohio Monthly Record 66 and 73. Similarly, the safety requirements for construction purportedly violated in State ex rel. Kilburn v. Indus. Comm. (1982), 1 Ohio St.3d 103, 1 OBR 137, 438 N.E.2d 422, also cited by the city and commission, have been superseded by Ohio Adm.Code 4121:1-3-01 et seq. Thus, the specific safety requirements for construction activities no longer restrict application of those rules to situations where construction is the employer s principal business. 1979-1980 Ohio Monthly Record 4-23. Thus, the reasons asserted by the city and commission to exempt municipalities from the instant specific safety requirements are not only inapplicable, they no longer exist. The city and commission also contend that, even if Ohio Adm.Code 4121:1-5-23(E) were to govern outdoor tree trimming, paragraph (G) of that rule exempts Toledo because Parks was riding an insulated vehicle-mounted elevating and rotating work platfor[m]. The commission made no such finding, and for us to do 6

so ignores that VSSRs are factual questions to be determined exclusively by the commission. State ex rel. Burton v. Indus. Comm. (1989), 46 Ohio St.3d 170, 171, 545 N.E.2d 1216, 1218. Consequently, we reverse the court of appeals judgment. A writ of mandamus vacating the commission s denial of Parks s VSSR application is granted, and this cause is returned to the commission for further review consistent with our decision. Judgment reversed and writ granted. MOYER, C.J., DOUGLAS, RESNICK, F.E. SWEENEY, PFEIFER and COOK, JJ., concur. FOOTNOTE: 1. Ohio Adm.Code 4121:1-5-23 provides, in part: (A) Unless the electrical conductors or equipment to be worked on are isolated from all possible sources of voltage or are effectively grounded, the employer shall provide protective equipment approved for the voltage involved, such as rubber gloves with protectors, rubber sleeves, hot line tools, line hose, line guards, insulator hoods, blankets, and access boards. Employees shall be instructed in the use of such tools and equipment and, when working on or when working within contact distance of an energized conductor, shall use such tools and equipment. * * * (E) [Regarding] [a]pproach distances to exposed energized conductors and equipment. (1) The requirements of this paragraph apply only to the electric utility and clearance tree-trimming industries. 7

(2) No employee shall be required to approach or take any conductive object closer to any electrically energized power conductors and equipment than prescribed in table 4121:1-5-23(E) to this rule unless: (a) The employee is insulated or guarded from the energized parts (insulating gloves rated for the voltage involved shall be considered adequate insulation); or (b) The energized parts are insulated or guarded from the employee and any other conductive object at a different potential; or (c) The power conductors and equipment are deenergized and grounded. 8