A Dead Heat and the Electoral College

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A Dead Heat and the Electoral College Robert S. Erikson Department of Political Science Columbia University rse14@columbia.edu Karl Sigman Department of Industrial Engineering and Operations Research sigman@ieor.columbia.edu This paper can be downloaded from http://www.ieor.columbia.edu/~sigman/ Saturday, November 4, 2000 {NEW VERSION : AS THE EVIDENCE FROM STATE POLLS ACCUMULATES, THE CASE FOR A GORE ADVANTAGE IN THE ELECTORAL COLLEGE UNDER A DEAD HEAT POPULAR VOTE SCENARIO HAS SHARPENED.THE MOST INTERESTING QUESTION IS WHAT IS THE CRITICAL VALUE OF THE POPULAR VOTE AT WHICH THE ODDS OF WINNING THE ELECTORAL COLLEGE IS THE SAME FOR BOTH CANDIDATES. THE ANSWER IS 51.4 BUSH/48.6 GORE (OF THE TWO-PARTY VOTE). IN OTHER WORDS THE BREAK EVEN POINT IS A BUSH ADVANTAGE OF ABOUT 2.8 POINTS IN THE POPULAR VOTE. IF THE POPULAR VOTE IS EVEN, THEN GORE WINS WITH VIRTUAL CERTAINTY. IF BUSH LEADS BY 5 POINTS IN THE POPULAR VOTE, THEN BUSH WINS AN ELECTORAL COLLEGE LANDSLIDE.} With the anticipation of a close presidential election, the possibility arises that the Electoral College might induce an outcome different from the popular vote. What are the chances of a split popular vote-electoral College verdict? And does the Electoral College favor Gore or Bush in the sense that one is favored more than the other in case of a virtual tie in the popular vote? Finally, what is the probability of a tie in the Electoral College, with each major candidate receiving precisely 269 electoral votes? We attempt to answer these questions by trying to figure out the most likely combinations of state for Bush and states for Gore given a close national election. To do this, we use the wealth of information from state-level polls during the Fall campaign. Specifically, we use the vote estimates of 272 available state polls in all 51 states (including DC) to estimate the states two-party vote divisions under different scenarios of a national popular vote. 1 From pooling each state s polls and adjusting for the national trend at the time of the poll, we estimate the state vote relative to the national popular vote. (This 1 We have updated the polls via National Journal Polltrack, pollingreport.com, and hotlinescoop.com through polls through Nov 3. By two-party vote we mean that we only count the Bush and Gore vote and then renormalize so that the sum equals one.

assumes that the states maintain their relative positions as the national popular vote shifts.). Because these 51 estimates contain sampling error, they are only approximations of the true state preferences. Sampling theory, however, allows us to estimate the distribution of likely positions. We address three questions: 1. Suppose the popular vote were a virtual dead heat. What would be the probable Electoral Vote Outcome? 2. What is the critical value of the popular vote at which the two major candidates are equally likely to win the decisive Electoral College vote? 3. What is the probability of a tie in the Electoral College? The answers are: Gore is the virtual certain winner if the popular vote is actually tied. Gore is also favored (by lesser and varying amounts) if the popular vote goes to Bush but in the narrow range where the two-party vote is no more favorable to Bush than 51.4 Bush-48.6 Gore. Gore s decisive edge remains quite strong even if it is 51.0 Bush-49.0 Gore. The critical value is about 51.4 Bush/ 48.6 Gore. At this popular vote division, each candidate is equally likely to win the Electoral College given what we know about the configuration of the vote across states. If Bush wins at least 51.5 percent of the popular vote, he is favored in the Electoral College. With a close popular vote, a tie in the Election College is a slim possibility, even less than 1 chance in a hundred. But it could happen if a handful of states change over from one candidate to another. The Electoral Vote if there is a dead heat Here we ask: given what we know about the states vote outcomes relative to each other, what would happen if the popular vote is a virtual tie? We pool each state s state polls, adjusting for the national trend observed in state and national polls. 2 Then we adjust 2 We control for the national trend by regressing the polls reported two-party vote on state and date dummies (the methodology of least-squares dummy variable analysis or LSDV). (To use all available evidence to adjust for the national trend, we include the national polls as the equivalent of a 52 nd state.). In previous iterations we adjusted for the trend by regressing poll outcomes on Donald Green and Alan Gerber s index of the national trend (http://pantheon.yale.edu/~gogreen) in addition to state dummy variables The Green-Gerber index is a smoothed measure of the Gallup tracking poll using Kalman filter technology. We subtract the Green index times its coefficient from the state polls and adjust the uniform swing to the point where the population-weighted state polls show a.50-.50 dead heat. The choice of methodology appears to make little difference in the results. The state polls agree with the national polls in the sense that the sum of state polls (weighted by population) show a.50-.50 national outcome as when the smoothed Gallup reading is.50-.50. Similarly LSDV analysis shows that when the collective state

these 51 popular vote estimates so that the mean is.50 Bush and.50 Gore when the states are weighted by their populations. 3 Then, we solve this problem: given the means and plurality to Gore. From this information, we want to know each state s probabilities of the three outcomes: Gore, Bush and tie. The challenge is that this question is difficult to solve analytically because of the many permutations and combinations. We solve by computer simulation. We simulate one million sets of state vote outcomes, each representing a draw from the distribution of probabilities shown in Table 1. We count the proportion of the three outcomes: Bush wins most Electoral College votes, Gore wins, and a 269-269 tie. The key assumptions are: With proper adjustment for the partisan trend, the state polls accurately reflect the voting of states relative to each on election day, within the bounds of sampling error and sampling theory. As states change their vote, their change is uniform; all states move in lock-step with every movement of the national vote. Support for minor candidates does not change in a way to affect the two-party verdict. For instance, if Nader scores high in the early Fall polls, he scores high at the end. State turnout is proportional to state population (which also tracks the number of voters in1996) The national popular vote is a tie. From the simulations, the relative probabilities, given a popular vote tie are: Bush wins Electoral College Gore wins Electoral College Tie.000917 [0 percent].999069 [100 percent]. 000014 [0.00 percent] There are two important points. First, Gore has a decisive edge in the Electoral College in the case of a truly close vote. Second, the possibility of a tie appears to be very small under the dead heat scenario. To see the reasons for these results, consult Table 1 and Graph 1. Table 1 presents our estimates for the distribution of the state vote if the popular vote is a dead heat. Graph 1 shows the probability distribution of the Electoral College given a popular vote tie. polls are weighted by population or past number of voters, they match the national polls almost exactly. In other words, state and national polls share any bias they may have. 3 We actually weight by the number of House seats, which is proportional to population size. We have also weighted by the state s number of actual voters in the 1996 presidential election and get virtually no difference. The state polls agree with the national polls in the sense that the sum of state polls (weighted by population) show a.50-.50 national outcome as when the smoothed Gallup reading is.50-.50. Similarly LSDV analysis shows that when the collective state polls are weighted by population or past number of voters, they match the national polls almost exactly. In other words, state and national polls share any bias they may have

What accounts for Gore s decisive Electoral College edge if the popular vote is truly close? With a tied vote nationally, the state vote divisions would be configured so that Gore would be the heavy favorite (probability of.9 or better) in 21 states with 284 electoral votes, more than enough to win (See Table 1.) The critical value of the popular vote According to polls of the moment, Bush holds a slight lead in the popular vote. An important question is, how large does Bush s popular vote margin need to be to become favored in the electoral college. We compute this critical value--the balance point in the popular vote where the two candidates are equally likely to win the Electoral College. We have rerun our simulations with different outcomes, incrementally increasing the Bush vote until we find a popular vote outcome that erases Gore s Electoral College edge. Graph 2 summarizes these simulations, showing Bush s expected number of electoral votes (the means from the various simulations) as a function of the size of Bush s percentage point lead, with Graph 3 summarizing the associated probabilities of a Bush Electoral College win. It turns out that the critical value for the popular vote is about 51.5 Bush /48.5 Gore. Once Bush s popular vote reaches 51.5%, he finally wins a higher proportion of simulated runs than does Gore and Bush s expected Electoral College vote finally reaches 270. Note that if Bush receives 52.5% of the popular vote, his expected Electoral College vote reaches 314 and the probability of his winning the Electoral College is certain. A tie in the Electoral College Given a tied popular vote, a tied electoral college appears unlikely. From our computations, the maximal probability occurs when the popular vote is 51.7 Bush/48.3 Gore, yielding a probability of a little over one out of two hundred. It is of interest to consider just how a tie might happen. We offer an example: If we give Gore the favored 284, but take IA, ME, and NH away from him giving them and all the rest to Bush, then both have 269, a tie. Summary The purpose of this study is not to predict the popular support for Bush and Gore. Rather, it is to project the likely Electoral College verdict given the national popular vote division between the two candidates. To do this, we exploit state polls to project the likely distribution of states voting relative to each other and the error in these projections due to sampling error) This provides estimates of each state s probabilities of giving its plurality to Bush and to Gore, conditional on the national popular vote. From these probabilities, we estimate the probable national Electoral Vote verdict as a function of the national popular vote scenario. Our conclusion is that Gore holds moderate but

possibly crucial Electoral College advantage, in the sense that a dead heat in the popular vote certainly yields the Electoral College victory to Gore.

Table 1. Estimate of the State Vote given a Tied National Popular Vote State Electors Gore proportion of two-party vote given a national tie Sample size (Bush/Gore only) of pooled state polls Variance Probability Gore wins the state given a national tie 1 "AL" 9 0.418 1486.74 0.000164 7.15E-11 2 "AK" 3 0.328 319.74 0.00069 3.01E-11 3 "AZ" 8 0.462 1340.8 0.000185 0.002423 4 "AR" 6 0.489 2403.66 0.000104 0.138612 5 "CA" 54 0.553 7842.173 3.15E-05 1 6 "CO" 8 0.453 2493.9 9.94E-05 1.16E-06 7 "CT" 8 0.593 1521.59 0.000159 1 8 "DE" 3 0.548 1281.9 0.000193 0.999733 9 "DC" 3 0.829 454.14 0.000312 1 10 "FL" 25 0.512 7642.557 3.27E-05 0.98101 11 "GA" 13 0.443 1979.5 0.000125 1.68E-07 12 "HA" 4 0.619 812.7 0.00029 1 13 "ID" 4 0.362 1023.36 0.000226 0 14 "IL" 22 0.549 9947.727 2.49E-05 1 15 "IN" 12 0.419 3095.9 7.86E-05 0 16 "IA" 7 0.540 1274.2 0.000195 0.998082 17 "KS" 6 0.356 454.14 0.000505 6.83E-11 18 "KY" 8 0.479 982.72 0.000254 0.089045 19 "LA" 9 0.453 1900.66 0.00013 1.99E-05 20 "ME" 4 0.538 2179.21 0.000114 0.999833 21 "MD" 10 0.570 1594.41 0.000154 1 22 "MA" 12 0.662 413.34 0.000541 1 23 "MI" 18 0.525 9962.33 2.5E-05 1 24 "MN" 10 0.521 2682.66 9.3E-05 0.983649 25 "MS" 7 0.418 691.5 0.000352 5.8E-06 26 "MO" 11 0.505 2495.34 0.0001 0.686469 27 "MT" 3 0.403 2125.46 0.000113 0 28 "NE" 5 0.438 1033.5 0.000238 2.9E-05 29 "NV" 4 0.470 1507.26 0.000165 0.010513 30 "NH" 4 0.520 4710.48 5.3E-05 0.996314 31 "NJ" 15 0.570 5013.02 4.89E-05 1 32 "NM" 5 0.502 1306.46 0.000191 0.564783 33 "NY" 33 0.624 9534.56 2.46E-05 1 34 "NC" 14 0.469 2637 9.44E-05 0.000613 35 "ND" 3 0.399 945.16 0.000254 1.1E-10 36 "OH" 21 0.482 7979.42 3.13E-05 0.000538 37 "OK" 8 0.407 958.92 0.000252 2.42E-09 38 "OR" 7 0.496 1999.27 0.000125 0.357392 39 "PA" 23 0.528 8599.98 2.9E-05 1 40 "RI" 4 0.623 1147.66 0.000205 1 41 "SC" 8 0.427 1044.01 0.000234 8.91E-07 42 "SD" 3 0.358 475.26 0.000484 5.8E-11 43 "TN" 11 0.508 2561.34 9.76E-05 0.803934 44 "TX" 32 0.292 464.64 0.000445 0 45 "UT" 5 0.322 1229.8 0.000177 0 46 "VT" 3 0.539 3688.3 6.74E-05 0.999999 47 "VA" 13 0.436 2482.05 9.91E-05 5.75E-11 48 "WA" 11 0.527 3024.64 8.24E-05 0.998553 49 "WV" 5 0.481 1843.38 0.000135 0.047865 50 "WI" 11 0.526 3123.92 7.98E-05 0.998291 51 "WY" 3 0.317 831.04 0.00026 0

Graph 2 (see Appendix for detail numbers of the graph) E(C2) Graph 1 (see Appendix for detail numbers of the graph) 0.16 0.14 0.12 350 300 250 200 150 100 50 0 E(C2) = Expected number of electoral votes for Bush when the popular vote is 50-50 0.0% 0.1% 0.2% 0.3% P(C1=K) = Probability Gore Receives Exactly K Electoral Vote 0.4% 0.5% 0.6% 0.7% 0.8% 0.9% 1.0% 1.1% 1.2% 1.3% 1.4% 1.5% 1.6% 1.7% 1.8% 1.9% 2.0% 2.1% 2.2% 2.3% 2.4% 2.5% b = percentage increase in Bush's popular vote beyond 50-50 0.10 P(C1=K) 0.08 0.06 0.04 0.02 0.00 251 257 263 269 275 281 287 293 299 K 305 311 317 323 329 335 341 347

Graph 3 (see Appendix for detail numbers of the graph) P(C2>C1) = Probability Bush wins 1.2 P(C2>C1) 1 0.8 0.6 0.4 0.2 0 0.0% 0.1% 0.2% 0.3% 0.4% 0.5% 0.6% 0.7% 0.8% 0.9% 1.0% 1.1% 1.2% 1.3% 1.4% 1.5% 1.6% 1.7% 1.8% 1.9% 2.0% 2.1% 2.2% 2.3% 2.4% 2.5% b = percentage increase in Bush's popular vote beyond 50-50

Appendix Details for Graph 2 b E(C2) b E(C2) 0 231.1113 0.013 265.6986 0.0005 231.9381 0.0135 267.475 0.001 232.7698 0.014 269.2341 0.0015 233.6478 0.0145 271.0374 0.002 234.5772 0.015 272.8086 0.0025 235.5079 0.0155 274.624 0.003 236.4912 0.016 276.4019 0.0035 237.5083 0.0165 278.2295 0.004 238.5982 0.017 280.0485 0.0045 239.7063 0.0175 281.86 0.005 240.8799 0.018 283.7222 0.0055 242.0878 0.0185 285.5868 0.006 243.3479 0.019 287.4842 0.0065 244.6959 0.0195 289.3976 0.007 246.0477 0.02 291.3671 0.0075 247.4613 0.0205 293.3824 0.008 248.9287 0.021 295.4356 0.0085 250.4623 0.0215 297.5612 0.009 252.0217 0.022 299.7106 0.0095 253.6259 0.0225 301.9568 0.01 255.2858 0.023 304.2162 0.0105 256.9187 0.0235 306.5502 0.011 258.6359 0.024 308.8995 0.0115 260.375 0.0245 311.3315 0.012 262.1323 0.025 313.7597 0.0125 263.8811

Details for Graph 3 b P(C2>C1) b P(C2>C1) 0 0.000917 0.013 0.419305 0.0005 0.001232 0.0135 0.464247 0.001 0.001893 0.014 0.509529 0.0015 0.00267 0.0145 0.555816 0.002 0.003715 0.015 0.601293 0.0025 0.005203 0.0155 0.645877 0.003 0.007074 0.016 0.688519 0.0035 0.009711 0.0165 0.729713 0.004 0.01312 0.017 0.7683 0.0045 0.017292 0.0175 0.803086 0.005 0.022585 0.018 0.835473 0.0055 0.029398 0.0185 0.864388 0.006 0.03758 0.019 0.890191 0.0065 0.048195 0.0195 0.911672 0.007 0.060083 0.02 0.930624 0.0075 0.074367 0.0205 0.946231 0.008 0.091497 0.021 0.959139 0.0085 0.11171 0.0215 0.969411 0.009 0.134197 0.022 0.977698 0.0095 0.159992 0.0225 0.983837 0.01 0.188903 0.023 0.988663 0.0105 0.219449 0.0235 0.992203 0.011 0.254517 0.024 0.9947 0.0115 0.292158 0.0245 0.996525 0.012 0.332943 0.025 0.997752 0.0125 0.374693

Details for Graph 1 K P(C1=K) K P(C1=K) 251 0.000000 301 0.015750 252 0.000000 302 0.044697 253 0.000002 303 0.009399 254 0.000005 304 0.002620 255 0.000002 305 0.005452 256 0.000003 306 0.126969 257 0.000003 307 0.058001 258 0.000001 308 0.018739 259 0.000250 309 0.002084 260 0.000032 310 0.005875 261 0.000007 311 0.148241 262 0.000002 312 0.020521 263 0.000008 313 0.070422 264 0.000296 314 0.013107 265 0.000096 315 0.007746 266 0.000154 316 0.008297 267 0.000037 317 0.024227 268 0.000012 318 0.082134 269 0.000014 319 0.024603 270 0.001526 320 0.002224 271 0.000238 321 0.007408 272 0.000065 322 0.002097 273 0.000057 323 0.004298 274 0.000250 324 0.013993 275 0.001958 325 0.002493 276 0.000282 326 0.008250 277 0.000893 327 0.001085 278 0.000231 328 0.000197 279 0.000332 329 0.000694 280 0.000213 330 0.000192 281 0.002498 331 0.000461 282 0.001128 332 0.001468 283 0.000376 333 0.000042 284 0.012454 334 0.000064 285 0.001578 335 0.000016 286 0.003183 336 0.000021 287 0.000460 337 0.000063 288 0.001590 338 0.000021 289 0.016895 339 0.000047 290 0.003858 340 0.000021 291 0.007535 341 0.000002 292 0.002540 342 0.000006 293 0.002081 343 0.000002 294 0.001358 344 0.000003 295 0.079495 345 0.000010 296 0.011979 346 0.000005 297 0.003823 347 0.000004 298 0.000748 348 0.000001 299 0.002083 349 0.000000 300 0.103289 350 0.000000