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The Meir Amit Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center January 2011 Adar 1389 Week of December 30, 2010-January 6, 2011 Editor: Raz Zimmt Spotlight on Iran Highlights of the week President reorganizes office, removes 14 advisors Tensions between India and Iran escalate Ashura riots anniversary: more voices calling for legal action against reformist opposition leaders Registration begins for auction on President Ahmadinejad s car More Islamic enforcement, less love: Valentine s Day promotions banned Pictures of the week: students demonstrate in front of Egypt s Interests Section in Tehran against Egypt s alleged refusal to allow transport of humanitarian aid to Gaza Strip President reorganizes office, removes 14 advisors This week, President Ahmadinejad dismissed 14 of his advisors. The surprise move came only three weeks after he sacked foreign minister Manouchehr Mottaki. The president thanked and said goodbye to the 14 advisors at a ceremony held last Saturday. The advisors who were removed include press advisor Mehdi Kalhor, economic affairs advisor Davoud Danesh Ja fari, commerce advisors Abolfazl Tavakoli Bina and Mohammad Reza Etemadian, oil and gas advisor Kazem Vaziri Hamaneh, education advisor Sousan Keshavarz, 1

youth advisor Mohammad Javad Hajj Ali Akbari, local councils advisor Mehdi Chamran, and culture advisor Ali Asghar Zare i (various news agencies, January 2). The report was confirmed by Mehdi Kalhor, the president s dismissed media advisor, who noted he did not know why the president had made the decision to remove 14 of his advisors (Mehr, January 2). Mehdi Chamran and Davoud Danesh Ja fari denied that they had been the president s advisors in recent years (Fars, January 4). Ali Akbar Javanfekr, the president s media advisor, said the president s decision to remove some of his advisors and appoint others in their stead was normal and natural. He further stated that some of the laid-off officials had in practice stopped serving as the president s advisors even before (ISNA, January 3). Tehran Emrouz, a daily affiliated with Mohammad Baqer Ghalibaf, the mayor of Tehran and Ahmadinejad s political rival, claimed this week that the removal of the advisors reflected the growing distance between the president and key personalities formerly considered as his supporters. The daily reported disagreements on a number of issues between the president and many of his dismissed advisors. For example, Mehdi Kalhor, formerly considered one of the president s confidants, criticized the government s policy in several spheres, including the real estate construction policy, the plan to remove public employees from Tehran, and the conduct of the president s office chief. Mehdi Chamran, who was one of Ahmadinejad s major supporters when he was still mayor of Tehran, has distanced himself from the president in recent years due to disagreements on issues pertaining to the government s policy towards the Tehran municipality. Sousan Keshavarz was also one of the president s close allies, and was presented by him as a candidate for minister of education after the last elections in 2009. Her nomination was not approved by the Majles, however (Tehran Emrouz, January 3). Farda, a website affiliated with the pragmatic conservative bloc, claimed in a commentary article that the president s decision to remove his advisors had to do with the increasing status of the president s office chief, Esfandiar Rahim Masha i. The website claimed that the dismissal of the advisors was meant to remove from the president s office conservatives who are not associated with the ideological faction to which Masha i belongs (Farda, January 2). On several occasions in recent months, Masha i has provoked public and political scandals for making controversial remarks. Meanwhile, reports published on Iranian media say that he intends to run for president in the next elections, slated for 2013. Masha i now holds numerous positions in the president s office, including office chief, secretary of the government s Culture Committee, head of the young presidential advisors team, acting 2

president of the Supreme Council for Iranian Expatriates, member of the government s Economy Committee, the president s advisor on Middle East affairs, and the president s representative on the Broadcasting Monitoring Council. Tensions between India and Iran escalate This week, Iran s media have extensively covered the escalating tensions between Iran and India following last week s announcement by the Indian Central Bank that Iran will not be able to sell oil to India unless the current payment arrangements between the two countries change. Oil sales from Iran to India are currently facilitated by the Asian Clearing Union (ACU), allowing it to bypass the American sanctions on Iran s energy sector. The decision of the Indian Central Bank may make it more difficult for Indian companies to purchase oil and gas from Iran. The heads of the two countries central banks met for emergency discussions on Friday in an attempt to resolve the problem threatening their energy relations. India currently imports about 400 thousand barrels of oil from Iran per day, about 17 percent of its total oil imports. Iranian senior officials tried to play down the problem which arose following the announcement of India s Central Bank. Iran s deputy oil minister Ahmad Khaledi said in an interview given to Fars News Agency that the problem would likely be resolved by using foreign currency other than the dollar or the euro in oil transactions between the two countries (Fars, January 1). Ahmad Ghalebani, chairman of the national oil company, denied reports according to which the Indian Central Bank s announcement would cut off the supply of oil from Iran to India. In an interview given to ISNA News Agency, Ghalebani said that the disagreements between the two countries over the payment arrangements had caused no problems in the export of oil from Iran to India, and that the energy cooperation between the two countries proceeded as usual (ISNA, January 2). President Ahmadinejad at a meeting with the Indian Foreign Minister, February 2007 3

However, Iranian media have assessed this week that the Indian Central Bank s announcement reflects a fundamental change in India s foreign policy towards Iran. The conservative daily Keyhan claimed that the bank s announcement should be considered to reflect the secret understandings achieved between President Barack Obama and the Indian authorities during his visit to New Delhi last November. The daily claimed that despite the Indian government s announcement that it was a technical and tactical issue that did not reflect an intention on India s part to adopt the U.S. policy towards Iran, it was in fact a move designed to secure the interests of the U.S. and its Western allies. According to Keyhan, it is India that will suffer if the relations between the two countries take a downturn, seeing as Iran is its second most important oil exporter. Due to India s continuing population growth, that country will likely face a severe energy crisis in the next few years, and Iran is the only country able to satisfy its vital energy needs. The daily added that India forgot how Iran had supported it in 1994, when the international community was going to impose sanctions on it due to the Kashmir crisis, and how it had revived India s dying economy. India is now playing the Iran card to improve its relations with the U.S., Keyhan says, and Iran must not remain silent over the measures taken by India (Keyhan, January 3). The conservative daily Siyasat-e Rooz also strongly criticized India, claiming it could not ignore Iran s economic capabilities and regional status. India should have realized by now that imposing sanctions on Iran is a waste of time and resources. According to the daily, India s decision shows lack of political insight into global conditions towards Iran. If India wants to be a player on the regional and global scene, it cannot cooperate with the U.S. against other countries and may find itself internationally isolated, similarly to such countries as Germany, Britain, and France (Siyasat-e Rooz, January 1). The daily Tehran Emrouz also addressed the escalating tensions between India and Iran. An editorial published by the daily earlier this week claims that India wants to play the Iranian card to obtain benefits from the U.S. India s unfriendly conduct towards Iran, according to the daily, reflects the transformation of its foreign policy in recent years. Starting from the 90s, the dissolution of the USSR and the developments in China have led India s leaders to change their foreign policy and attempt to improve the international status of their country. India now wants to cooperate with the U.S. over the issue of Iran and take advantage of the cooperation in other spheres. The cancellation of the gas pipeline from Iran to India, the Indian vote in the UN and IAEA against Iran, and the recent trade problems between the two countries reflect a change in India s policy. Indian politicians are not interested in opposing 4

America s demand to change their country s policy towards Iran, since cooperation with the U.S. serves Indian interests and because they feel that, unlike China, their country is unable to resist the U.S. (Tehran Emrouz, January 2). A crisis broke out in India-Iran relations in November, when Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei expressed support for the struggle of the Muslim residents of Kashmir. Following the Supreme Leader s remarks, India lodged an official protest with the Iranian government. As tensions reached their peak, several Iranian media strongly criticized the Indian leaders and even warned them that they should not count on American support after changing their policy towards Iran. Ashura riots anniversary: more voices calling for legal action against reformist opposition leaders In recent days, top Iranian officials and government supporters have intensified calls to bring the reformist opposition leaders to trial on charges of orchestrating the riots that broke out in the country after the presidential elections in the summer of 2009. The calls to bring the opposition leaders to trial peaked around the anniversary of the demonstrations held by government supporters on December 31, 2010. The demonstrations had been held in response to the violent clashes that broke out on Ashura, the Shi ite day of mourning, on December 27 between security forces and supporters of the reformist opposition. In a speech given by Tehran s prosecutor general before the weekly Friday prayer at Tehran University, Abbas Ja fari Dowlatabadi said that the leaders of incitement would definitely be prosecuted. He noted that the Iranian people should know that those responsible for the incitement are the U.S. and the Zionist regime. According to Dowlatabadi, the regime must make sure that similar events do not happen again in the future, bring violators of public order to trial, and send many of them to prison. He noted that, by establishing the green movement, the reformist opposition leaders had compromised state security, and therefore committed a serious crime (IRNA, December 31). Judiciary branch deputy chief Seyyed Ebrahim Ra isi also said this week that the judiciary intended to prosecute the opposition leaders. Speaking at a conference held on the anniversary of the December 31 riots held in the city of Mashhad, Ra isi said that the biggest crime of the leaders of incitement was to allow the enemies of Iran to further their objectives. According to Ra isi, the opposition leaders did not seek to question the presidential election results, but rather rallied the people to the streets and attempted to wreak havoc to undermine the values of Iran. That is an unforgivable sin in the eyes of the Supreme Leader 5

and the Iranian nation, and there is no question that they are going to be prosecuted by the judiciary branch (IRNA, December 30). Pro-government demonstrations, December 31, 2010 Speaking at a press conference called earlier this week by Gholam-Hossein Mohseni Eje i, the judiciary spokesman addressed the prosecutor general s remarks on the intent to bring the opposition leaders to trial, saying that Dowlatabadi did not mean that they would be prosecuted in the near future. He added, however, that in general the cases of law violators should be reviewed, particularly those who had compromised the regime and assisted the enemy. It is always possible to prosecute the leaders of incitement, according to Eje i, and they will be prosecuted once circumstances allow it (ISNA, January 3). Intelligence Minister Heydar Moslehi also addressed this week the possibility of prosecuting the opposition leaders, saying that they were the ones interested in being brought to trial. Moslehi noted that the authorities had made a deliberate and wise decision not to arrest the opposition leaders, saying they were angered by said decision and accusing them of an attempt to undermine the regime and the revolution and of cooperation with Iran s enemies in the West (ISNA, January 1). In response to the threats made by senior regime officials to prosecute the opposition leaders, Mehdi Karoubi, one of the leaders of the reformist opposition, said that he welcomed such a trial. However, he demanded an open trial, so that all Iranians can hear both sides and make up their own minds. In an open letter published by the opposition leader, Karoubi said that a trial could reveal whether the opposition leaders had led the riots to seize power or was it the regime that had abandoned the values and the people s wishes to maintain its power (Saham News, January 3). 6

Registration begins for auction on President Ahmadinejad s car President Ahmadinejad s private car has been officially put up for auction this week. The proceeds will go towards promoting a national project to build low-cost apartments for families in need. The president s car, a white 1977 Peugeot, will be auctioned with 70 other classic cars from across the world at a function to be held in mid-february in the Abadan free trade zone in southwestern Iran. An official website (www.ahmadinejad-car.com) has been launched this week to allow potential buyers to register and place bids. Speaking at the website s launch ceremony, Ahmad Esfandiari, the head of the National Welfare Organization, said that putting up the car for an international auction was aimed to help provide housing to disabled and disadvantaged people. The website allows Iranians and citizens of other countries to take part in the auction. According to Esfandiari, it will remain online for one month, during which people can register for the auction. The highest bidders will take part in the auction itself. The website is available in four languages: Persian, Arabic, French, and English. The registration for the auction costs 50,000 tomans (about 50 dollars) for Iranian residents and 50 euros for foreign nationals. Registered users can then log into the website and place their bids for the car (Aftab, January 1). Photographs of the President s car (www.ahmadinejad-car.com) The proceeds from the auction go towards the Mehr project, whose aim is to build 200,000 housing units over three years for families of disabled and disadvantaged people. The project is run by the Welfare and Social Services Ministry, the Housing Ministry, and the Central Bank. The apartments built under the project will be sold to families in need, who will receive especially convenient loans and will not need to provide co-signers. 7

One of President Ahmadinejad s first initiatives after being elected president in 2005 was to allocate over one billion dollars to the Mehr-e Reza ( Reza s Grace ) foundation, aimed to help young couples obtain jobs, get married, and purchase housing. In October 2005, Ahmadinejad also declared a plan to sell justice shares, based on selling government companies under the economic privatization program and offering 50 percent of the shares to low-income households on convenient terms. According to the president, such projects are designed to promote the idea of social justice, improve the situation of the weaker sectors, and reduce social inequality. More Islamic enforcement, less love: Valentine s Day promotions banned Earlier this week, Iran s Print Shop Owners Association issued a directive prohibiting business owners from displaying ads and products that promote Valentine s Day, which will be celebrated on February 14. A memo sent by the association to businesses says that Valentine s Day-related posters, leaflets, or gift boxes are strictly forbidden. It is likewise forbidden to make holiday cards with Valentine s Day symbols (hearts, flowers, etc.) or conduct any kind of activity to promote the holiday. The Print Shop Owners Association threatened legal action against businesses who would violate the directive (ILNA, January 2). The memo issued by the Print Shop Owners Association (gizmotimes.wordpress.com) In previous years, the question of whether Valentine s Day should be celebrated in the Islamic republic sparked fierce debates in Iran. Even though it is a Western tradition, in recent years Valentine s Day has penetrated into Iran and is mostly celebrated in the big cities. The Valentine phenomenon is perceived by many in the religious establishment as an expression of a moral and social crisis experienced by Iran s younger generation, and a challenge to Iranian and Islamic identity. However, in recent years large portions of Iran s society have grown to realize that the phenomenon represents an actual need of young Iranians and that it can no longer be ignored or combated without providing alternative 8

solutions. Therefore, some have called to adopt national Iranian and even pre-islamic traditions to satisfy the needs and desires of the younger generation. One of the suggestions was to adopt Esfandgan Day, the day of love in Zoroastrian tradition (marked on February 17) as a substitute for Valentine s Day. Other suggestions include celebrating the day of love on marriage anniversary of the Shi ite Imam Ali and the Prophet s daughter, Fatemeh, which was established by the state as Family Day. Pictures of the week: students demonstrate in front of Egypt s Interests Section in Tehran against Egypt s alleged refusal to allow transport of humanitarian aid to Gaza Strip 1 1 The Egyptians allowed the Asian convoy to enter the Gaza Strip. However, they denied entry from Iranian (and Jordanian) participants, thus triggering the Iranian protest. 9