Lagunowich 1 Michael Lagunowich Christian Appy U.S. Imperialism 4/24/17 Public Image and Covert Ops: A Case Study of Chile Democracy is capricious as the people that vote for it- meaning a democracy s objectives and policies change with the popular consensus. President Nixon decided to support business and military because, they are power centers subject to our influence. The others, the intellectuals are not subject to our influence (Kinzer 176). He spoke of intellectual leaders as dangerous because they could not be controlled, but similar to most presidents he guarded his public image for this reason. He knew that democracies led by intellectuals of foreign countries, and his own, were hard to control when public perception chooses the ruler. Nixon sought to ultimately stage a military coup in Chile covertly so that he could remain in good standing with the American people and exert direct control in Latin America simultaneously. Nixon publicly declared his presidential obligations to be to, protect American business abroad, fight Communism, and suppress challenges to United States hegemony in the Western Hemisphere (171). Stephen Kinzer s Overthrow suggests that the majority of his interests lied in protecting American businesses. The Kennecott, Anaconda, and ITT businesses that made millions off of Chile s copper and communications were threatened by nationalization (174). A key figure who made the entire affair more suspicious was Donald Kendall. Mr. Kendall was CEO of Pepsi-Cola, main campaign provider for Nixon, and good friend of a rich Chilean- Agustin Edwards. Through Kendall, Edwards warned him Allende s goal was to, nationalize
Lagunowich 2 the Chilean economy, force American businesses out, and steer Chile into the Soviet-Cuban orbit (172). Nationalization was synonymous with Communism during the overthrow of Mossadegh and Arbenz. Edward s message through Nixon s patron is arguably a display of corruption in U.S. politics, but the message did contradict Nixon s declaration of responsibilities. The weight of Nixon s interpretation of the message is overshadowed by the possibility of Nixon being pressured by Kendall, but it is highly likely they overlap. America also developed a sense of, fiduciary responsibility for Chile before Nixon was elected. Under President Kennedy and President LBJ, Chile received 1.2 billion dollars in aid during the 1960 s through the Alliance for Progress (174). The funding was meant to develop and showcase a capitalist system that was better than a Marxist one. After all that aid from the U.S. Government for Chile to go further left, men like Kissinger proclaimed, I don t see why we need to stand by and watch a country go Communist due to the irresponsibility of its own people (180). The money Chile got in aid was not in good faith and supported an attitude of patronization. American acts of good will almost never come without strings, i.e. Cuba and Vietnam as the U.S. government assumed the right to intervene in another country's politics. American exceptionalism, though dying and fragile, is still present in Nixon. This self righteousness and sense of superiority often justifies American tendencies to pervade another country s politics for benefits that America is due. The policy of protecting American businesses in Chile and suppressing Communist influence was done over many years. Prevention was the primary method for a decade starting in 1964 Allende s election became more inevitable. The earlier referenced aid from the Alliance for Progress was meant to encourage beneficial capitalist tendencies. More insidious donations:
Lagunowich 3 funding propaganda in newspapers and activists groups, training Chilean officers to think of Marxism as treason on American bases, and paying for half of Frei s campaign. Over the course of Chile s political season they spent roughly 5 million dollars politically and provided 163 million dollars in military aid (175-76). This large sum of cash would further raise the stake that the U.S. government felt they had in Chile when Allende would threaten U.S. control in an upcoming election. This long term prevention plan would easily blend in with the following operations developed under Nixon. The steps were prevention, Spoiling, the two tracks of the Anti Allende Plan, and the stage known as Allende After Inauguration. Spoiling was really a continuation of prevention except that the funds came out of the 40 Committee run by Kissinger (176). Many more donations for Allende s opposition, Allesandri, would come from ITT to the CIA via a simultaneous employee of both, John McCone. McCone was the former CIA director, a consultant for the CIA, and a board member of ITT (171). His involvement in CIA affairs was easily influenced by his place at ITT and further represents the corruption of U.S. officials foreign policy by means of personal gains of acting in favor of U.S. businesses. The following Anti Allende plan would continue to borrow methods from Spoiling and be continued in Allende After Inauguration. Track 1 of the Anti Allende plan intended to have Frei call Congress together and have democratic tradition be broken by not giving it to the candidate to receive the most votes while more propaganda was planted in the press. Frei ended up not going along with the plan. Track 2 entailed creating a chaotic climate for a military coup. Propaganda and paid activists groups would continue to be paid for as in previous stages, but now there was the added element of economic pressure. FUBELT was a rumor campaign started
Lagunowich 4 to strike fear into the Chilean government of what we would do economically if Allende were to be allowed in. This threat would come to fruition in the next stage and was arguably the most effective as it created a presence in daily life. After Allende was voted in, FUBELT was implemented. FUBELT included an invisible blockade that dropped Chile s credit rating, stopped creating new loans, suspended existing loans, and the creation of the ad hoc committee of prominent U.S. corporations in Chile. The ad hoc committee created a panic that could be felt as one third of Chile s buses and twenty percent of its taxis were out of service by lack of supplied parts (185-186). The U.S. foreign policy during overthrows often had to cross a line to make the people panic, misinformation was often not enough alone. Propaganda carried out by the Voice of Liberation in Guatemala did not carry weight enough weight to truly agitate the people until bombers came flying over cities. Propaganda about Allende in El Mercurio did not carry weight until people saw what they thought were Communist effects on their quality of life. At the same time FUBELT was failing, moves were being made to find a military candidate to take Chile in a coup. General Viaux, who led a failed coup against Frei, was found and funded, and ended up killing the army commander, General Renee Schneider. General Prats would fill Renee s place. Prats would be forced to resignation by a staged protest outside his house and would resign. General Pinochet would rise up and show himself to be sympathetic to American interests where neither Schneider or Prats were. As the economy would decline further, Pinochet would stage a successful coup in Chile concluding decades of intervention. Fear of domino theory and losing our stake that we chose to put in Chile, was cause for Nixon to consolidate power into the military as he thought that they would be, power centers subject to
Lagunowich 5 our influence (176). But this proved largely untrue as Viaux, Schneider, Prats, and Pinochet were cycled through. U.S. foreign policy shows a trend of mistakes in thinking that militaries can be controlled and will better suit our needs as we institute them into political climates of arising uncertainty. Beyond the issues in finding a suitable coup leader another hitch arose in the ITT Papers scandal. The papers detailed ITT s intentions and proposals to the CIA about overthrowing Allende. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee stated, ITT sought to engage the CIA in a plan covertly to manipulate the outcome of the Chilean presidential election (188). ITT s actions were not condoned because it would make U.S. corporations unwelcomed abroad. But it was also a way of deflecting- McCone of ITT and the CIA was a go between. The CIA did accept money to give to Alessandri (171). Kissinger s involvement around the death of General Schneider is also unsure as he encouraged Viaux to get ready to go, but in a meeting decided to, defuse the plot temporarily (183). These two are worth looking at together as they show the desire to preserve U.S. public image of noninvolvement while exerting control. Nixon s conviction was, If we let the potential leaders in South America think they can move like Chile and have it both ways, we will be in trouble Latin America is not gone, and we want to keep it (185). Foreign policy in Chile helps us understand motivators in helping big businesses, the escalation of covert ops and investment in them over years, and the overall solution being often wildly unpredictable and contradictory to what is expected of the United States. The U.S. government would be expected to support fellow democracies, and not to stage military coup d'etats. This overall expectation would be impossible for a U.S. president to meet while exerting what is perceived as necessary control without covert ops.
Lagunowich 6 Works Cited Kinzer, Stephen. "8: We're Going to Smash Him." Overthrow: America's Century of Regime Change from Hawaii to Iraq. New York: Times /Henry Holt, 2007. 170-94. Print.