COMPULSORY VOTING AND POLITICAL CULTURE A COMPARATIVE STUDY ABOUT INSTITUTIONS AND POLITICAL LIFE IN MODERN DEMOCRACIES.

COMPULSORY VOTING AND POLITICAL CULTURE A COMPARATIVE STUDY ABOUT INSTITUTIONS AND POLITICAL LIFE IN MODERN DEMOCRACIES # A first draft Thomas Denk Department of Political and Historical Studies Karlstad University Sweden Thomas.Denk@kau.se Paper prepared for the Workshop on Compulsory Voting Principles and Practice, ECPR Joint Sessions of Workshops, Helsinki, 7-12 May 2007

COMPULSORY VOTING AND POLITICAL CULTURE A COMPARATIVE STUDY ABOUT INSTITUTIONS AND POLITICAL LIFE IN MODERN DEMOCRACIES 1. Introduction Does the institution of compulsory voting have impact on political culture? This question actualizes a classic research problem: how political institutions and political culture are related to each other. One answer is that political culture is formed by the design of institutions (March & Olsen 1989; Peters 1999; Wildavsky 1987). According to this answer, the institution of compulsory voting is expected to have impact on political culture. The values and norms that create the institution are expected to be transformed to political culture. Another answer to the question is that political culture is a critical condition to political institutions (Almond & Verba 1963; Eckstein 1996; Di Palma 1990; Linz & Stepan 1996). With this answer, the institution of compulsory voting is expected to be grounded on political culture. Without a correspondent culture the institution is expected to collapse or to bee less consolidated. A third answer is that political institutions and political culture are connected to each other in mutual relations, which are characterized by interdependence (Coleman 1990; Easton 1965). In sum, even if they claim different causality between institution and culture, all three answers claim that culture is expected to mirror the design of institutions. The aim of this study is to give a contribution to the discussion about the relation between institutions and culture. To fulfill this aim, this study analysis if the institution of compulsory voting has impact on political culture. From both cultural and institutional theories there are expectations that the compulsory voting has impact on political culture. However, the empirical knowledge of the subject is limited. This study provides an empirical contribution that will fulfill some of this gap between theoretical expectations and empirical knowledge. 2. Sense of citizens obligation the dependent factor In their classic work, Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba (1963) discuss how political cultures are expected to have impact on the stability of democratic systems. One assumption in their discussion is that political culture has impact on political institutions. What Almond and Verba refer to with the term political culture is the particular distribution of patterns of orientation toward political objects among the members of the nation (Almond & Verba 1963:13). The pattern of orientation consists of three mental processes: cognition, affection 1

and evaluation (Almond & Verba 1963:14). These orientations are directed to different political processes, structures and roles. They can also have different loadings: negative, positive and indifferent (Almond & Verba 1963:14ff). Almond and Verba identify three main political cultures that consist of combination of different orientations to different objects. These combinations and their different political cultures are presented in table 1 (Almond & Verba 16ff; Eckstein 1996). Table 1 Types of political cultures 1 System as a general object Input Objects Output Objects Self as active participant Parochial 0 0 0 0 Subject 1 0 1 0 Participant 1 1 1 1 One of the most central aspects of political cultures regards to be the sense of citizen obligations, which refers to how citizens orientate towards different roles. According to Almond and Verba, citizens have obligations in relations to input roles and output roles. Obligations in relations to input roles are about participation; to be active in political decisions making. Obligations in relations to output roles are about following the political decisions (regulations); to obey laws. These obligations include cognitive orientations (to be aware about the possibilities to participate and about the decisions), affective orientations (feelings towards different roles) and evaluative orientations (judgement about different roles). When the orientations are indifferent towards citizen obligations, this indicates a parochial culture. If the orientations are positive towards obligations related to output roles, there is indication on subject culture. Citizens with subject culture have a sense of obligation to follow the laws, but are indifferent towards roles related to decisions making. However, in participant culture, the obligation to follow the law is completed with a sense of obligation to also participate in the creation of the law. According to Almond and Verba, this combination of obligations is a condition for democratic system, but only to a limit extent. The main argument in their study is that system stability presupposes a balance between the three cultures, and by that, a balance between different senses of obligations (Almond & Verba 1963:5ff, 337ff). 1 A positive or negative orientation toward the object are marked with 1, while 0 indicates indifferent orientation toward the object. 2

3. Compulsory voting the independent factor At the institutional level, the obligation of participation has been institutionalized in the existence of compulsory voting. Participation in a democratic election is a right of citizenship. However, some democratic systems also stipulate election participation as a duty of the citizen. The election participation is than a regulated form of political participation, where the election participation is responsibility for all citizens. However, this responsibility expresses and maintains differences between countries. In some countries, there is only a symbolic responsibility to vote. In other countries, there are sanctions enforced against citizens that do not participate in elections. However, some countries that have sanction against non-election participation do not or only in a limit extension enforce the sanction. In sum, there are differences in the level of enforcement within the group of countries that has compulsory voting. For example, Australia and Belgium have a strict enforcement of the elections law, while Greece and Italy have a weak enforcement (Gratschew 2002; 2004). 4. Linking political culture to compulsory voting What impact on sense of citizen obligation is compulsory voting expected to have? One answer to this question is found in cultural theory. 2 According to cultural theory, individual s preferences are exogenous. This means that preferences are expected to be related to social context. More specific, preferences are formed by how we wish to live with other people and how others would like to live with us. There are chains of means-end reasoning between preferences and ways of life (institutions). Individuals are expected to deduce their preferences from the ways of life that they live. Preferences are therefore regarded as consequences of different attempts to organize social life. This explains why social relations and institutions are expected to be maintained. They are expected to generate preferences that reproduce the social relations and institutions (Thompson et al 1990:57ff; Wildavsky 1987:4ff). Institutional theory provides a similar answer as cultural theory. In institutional theory the concept logic of appropriateness is central. The concept refer to situations where actors behave based on what they believe is proper behaviour in relation to institutions. If 2 There are difference between what is label political culture theories and what is label culture theory. Theories of political culture claims that political culture has impact on political systems (institutions), while culture theory claims that the design of institutions has impact on political culture. This fundamental difference is not always noted in discussion about institutions and culture. 3

institutions are effective, they have impact on the actors. The actors will behave in ways that confirm the norms of the institutions. By this, the norms of the institutions are adapted by the actors, who are expected to make conscious choice based on interpretation of the institutional norms (March & Olsen 1995). From the cultural and institutional theory, a hypothesis about the relationship between the institution of compulsory voting and the sense of citizen obligations may be developed. Patterns of institutionalized values and norms are expected to be transformed into the sense of citizen obligations. The institution of compulsory voting is based on the values and norms that stipulate that citizens a) should be political active and b) should obey laws. According to cultural theory, this two values and norms has a parallel in the sense of citizen obligation. The sense that it is an obligation for good citizen to be political active and to obey lays is two basic dimensions in the sense of citizen obligation. If the hypothesis is empirical supported, the sense of citizen obligation to be political active and obey laws is expected to be stronger in countries with compulsory voting than in countries without compulsory voting. Why is the institution of compulsory voting expected to have a general impact on political cultures? According to theories of political action, participation in elections is a unique mode of political participation. First, elections connect citizens and power holders. By this, election participation has political impacts that are unique. Second, election mobilizes peoples that are not political active between elections. Election participation has therefore extensions that are unique (Powell 2000; Verba, Schlozman & Brady 1995). With the argument of impact and extensions there are reasons to expect that institution of compulsory voting has a general impact on political culture. 5. Methods and design How may the impact of compulsory voting on political culture be tested? This study will use a comparative design to investigate whatever compulsory voting has an impact on political culture. More specific a most similar system design (MSSD) will be applied (Faure 1994; Frendreis 1983; Lijphart 1975; Przeworski & Teune 1970; Rose 1991). This design stipulates that systems that are as similar in background factors are selected. The design stipulates also that the selected system should have variation in the main independent factor, which for this study is the institution of compulsory voting. It is then up to empirical investigation to 4

analyses whatever there is variation in the dependent factor that has the same pattern as the independent factor. For this study, this means to investigate if there is a pattern of variation in political culture that correspondence with pattern of variation in the existence of compulsory voting. Six countries are selected to be included in the analysis: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Greece and Portugal. These countries are grouped in three pair. According to the principles of MSSD, the countries are grouped so that there are institutional similarities within the group. However, in one fundamental aspect the countries have an institutional difference. In each pair, one country has the institution of compulsory voting, while the other country does not have the institution of compulsory voting. However, the selection of Austria needs to be done with reservation. Two regions in Austria (Tyrol and Vorarlberg) are applying the institution of compulsory voting. The application of the institution has a weak enforcement and the regions are in minority in the country. In sum, Austria as country can be regarded as a country without the institution of compulsory voting on national level (Gratschew 2002; 2004). Table 2 Included countries Existence of compulsory voting Non existence of compulsory voting Pair 1 of countries Belgium Austria Pair 2 of countries Greece Portugal Pair 3 of countries Australia Canada To investigate the sense of citizen obligation, the analysis will use two different sets of survey. The reason for the use of two sets of survey is that the six selected countries are not included in one survey. The first survey was conducted in 2002. This survey was also about citizenships and part of the European Values Survey. In this survey, Austria, Belgium, Greece and Portugal were included. The second survey is a survey within the program of the International Social Survey Programme (ISSP), which was conducted in 2004 on citizenships. In this survey, data from Australia and Canada were collected. The questions used in the surveys were partly different, which makes comparison between the surveys quite risky. However, in both surveys the respondents were asked to mark on an eleven-point-scale in what extent they think that different obligations are characterized for a good citizen. 5

6. Background factors In applying MSSD, the selection of background factors is important. The factors that are used as background factors are the factors that the comparative analysis is controlling for. When MSSD are applied, the selected countries are expected to have similarities in the background factors. These similarities means that the background factors are factors that are theoretical relevant for the dependent factor, but according to the basic principle of MSSD - that differences are explained by differences - have no empirical impact on the dependent factor. Therefore, seven groups of institutional factors are selected as background factors for the analyses in this study. According to the cultural theory and institutional theory, these factors refer to institutional conditions that may have impact on political culture. Families of nations According to Francis Castles (1993; 1998), there are differences and similarities between countries that make it possibly to divide the countries into groups. Based on cultural, historical and geographical features, Castles identifies four families of nations: Englishspeaking family, Nordic family, Western European family and Southern European family. Which countries each group includes is presented in table 3, together with the characteristic that Castles identifies within each group (Castles 1998:8f). According to this division of countries, the three pair of countries selected for this study belongs to the same family of nations. Australia and Canada is included in the English-speaking family; Austria and Belgium are members of the Western European Family, and Greece together with Portugal is part of the group of Southern European family. What the countries have in common by its membership in respective group varies, but there are some similarities in the cultural, historical or geography background. Structure of state Political systems have different vertical structure; separation and relations of power between different political levels. Some systems are federations, while some systems have a more unitarian system. The six countries that are selected for comparative analysis are divided into groups by their vertical structure. Greece and Portugal have unitarian systems, while Australia and Canada are federations. The same goes for Austria and Belgium (Anckar 2002:131ff; Lijphart 1984; 1999). In sum, this means that the three pair of countries has similarities within the pairs when it comes to the vertical structure of political system. 6

Table 3 Families of nations Family Country Characteristic English-speaking family Australia Language Canada Political traditions Ireland Legal tradition New Zealand Ties with UK United Kingdom Settler nations USA Nordic family Denmark Legal tradition Finland Languages (not Finland) Norway Sweden Western European family Austria Historical legacy Belgium Religion France Policy diffusion Germany Italy Netherlands Southern European family Greece Mediterranean cultural Portugal Late modernization Spain Late democratization Governmental structure There are also two main models of governmental structures in modern democracies. The first model is the power-sharing model. In this model the governmental power is divided between different institutions. For example, in the U.S., the governmental power is divided between Congress, the President and the Supreme Court. The second model is the parliamentary model. In this model governmental power is concentrated to the parliament, and the government is based on the conditions within the parliament. It is this model that is applied in all six countries that is selected for this study (Anckar 2002:131ff; Lijphart 1983; 1999). Election system On a general level there are similarities in election system between the countries in each group. Belgium and Austria apply a proportional election system with is based on party list. Greece and Portugal have also a proportional election system and party lists. Another election system is applied in Australia and Canada. These systems are based on the principles of majority system and more on candidates than parties. However, there are some differences in 7

how the principle of majority system is applied. Voters in Australia have the possibility to rank their preference on candidates, and a candidate who wins a majority of first-rank-order preference wins the seat. If no candidate wins a majority, the candidate with lowest share of first-rank-order preferences is excluded and lower-rank-order preferences are transferred to remaining candidates. This procedure of selection and transferring are repeated until one candidate has a majority of first-rand-order preferences. Nevertheless, the basic principle of the majority system is the same as in Canada (Anckar 2002:13ff; 127ff; Blais & Massicotte 1996; Lijphart 1984; Powell 2000). Historical development of political regime The historical development of political institutions is different between the groups. In the first group, the countries are stable democracies inside the European Union. The countries in the second group are also inside the European Union, but both Greece and Portugal were late in their democratization. The last group consists of countries that are former colonies to United Kingdom, with means that they are members in the British Commonwealth. Both Australia and Canada are also stable democracies. Welfare system In his work about welfare system Gösta Esping-Andersen claims that there are different system of welfare. What Esping-Andersen identified was different welfare state-regimes, which refers to institutional arrangements, rules and understandings that guide and shape social-policy, expenditure developments, problem definitions, and response-and-demand structure of citizens and welfare consumers (Esping-Andersen 1990:80). According to Esping-Andersen there are three different types of welfare state-regimes. First, the liberal welfare state refers to systems that provide means-tested assistance, modest universal transfers or modest social-insurance plans (Esping-Andersen 1990:26). According to Esping- Andersen, USA and United Kingdom are examples of countries that are included in this type. Second, the opposite type to the liberal welfare state is the socialist (or social democratic) welfare state. The system that this type refers to is built on the principles of universalism and decommodification, which includes all social groups (Esping-Andersen 1990:27f). The three Nordic countries (Denmark, Norway and Sweden) together with Netherlands are included in this type. Third, between liberal and socialist welfare states are conservative welfare states. This welfare system is built on traditional family structure and social insurance. Two countries that are included in this type are Austria and Belgium (Esping-Andersen 1990:27). 8

The typology of Esping-Andersen has received critic. Some of the critic has claimed that the typology exclude important perspectives, such as gender perspectives (Sainsbury 1996; 1996). Other critics have claimed that the typology is incomplete, which the consequence that some countries are misplaced in the typology or can not be included in the typology. Francis Castles and Debra Mitchell have identified a fourth type of welfare states-regime, which they label radical. This welfare state-regime has much in common which the liberal, but use the taxsystems to redistribute income. According to Castles and Mitchell, both Australia and Canada belongs to this type of welfare system (Castles & Mitchell 1993:107ff). In a similar way have Stephan Leibfried identified a fifth type of welfare states-regime. This type refers to systems that have rudimentary systems of income transfer. Together with Italy and Spain, Greece and Portugal are included in this type (Leibfried 1992:253f). In sum, this means that there are similarities in welfare systems between the countries within each group. Economic system Paul R Gregory and Robert C Stuart (1989) have developed a comparative framework of economic system. This framework consists of four dimensions that include two alternatives in each dimension: organization of decision-making (centralization or decentralization); provision of information and coordination (market or plan); property rights (private or cooperative/public); incentive system (moral or material). This gives a total sum of 16 combinations, but Gregory and Stuart reduce these combinations to three main types of politico-economic regimes: capitalism, market socialism and planned socialism. A similar discussion about economic systems is presented by Raymond D Gastil (1987), which identifies five types of politico-economic regimes: 1. Capitalist: a high degree of economic freedom and relatively little market intervention by the state. 2. Capitalist-statist: substantial state intervention in markets and large public sector, although the state remains committed to the institutions of private property. 3. Mixed capitalist: an activist state with income redistribution, market intervention and regulation, although the size of direct budget allocation of recourses is not that large. 4. Mixed socialist: some economic freedom, private property and individual imitative within the framework of a socialist economy. 9

5. Socialist: basically command economies with little economic freedom, private property and individual initiative. In an empirical application based on this typology, Jan-Erik Lane and Svante Ersson found that Australia and Canada were member of the capitalist group, while Austria, Belgium, Greece and Portugal were members of the mixed capitalist group (Lane & Ersson 1997:139ff). In sum, this means that each pair of countries has similarities in their economic system. Summary of included factors Table 4 summaries the factors that are included in the analysis. Seven factors are included as background factors: families of nations, structure of state, governmental system, election system, political development, welfare system and economic regime. In these factors, the countries within each group have similarities. With the design of MSSD, this provides opportunity to control for these factors impact on the sense of citizen obligations. In the analysis, the strength in sense of citizen obligation will be the dependent factor. The analysis will estimate and compare the strength in sense of citizen obligation between the countries within each group. If there are differences in the strength between the countries, this will indicate that the main independent factor has impact on the strength in sense of citizen obligation. The main independent factor is the institution of compulsory voting, which according to the principles of MSSD, differs varies between the countries within each group. 10

Table 4 Included factors in the analysis Factors Group 1 Group 2 Group 3 Austria Belgium Greece Portugal Australia Canada Background factors Families of nations Western Europe Western Europe Southern Europe Southern Europe English speaking English speaking Structure of state Federative Federative Unitarian Unitarian Federative Federative Governmental system Parliamentary Parliamentary Parliamentary Parliamentary Parliamentary Parliamentary Election system Proportional Proportional Proportional Proportional Majority Majority Political development Stable democracy and independent state, inside the European Union Stable democracy and independent state, inside the European Union Late democratization, member of the European Union Late democratization, member of the European Union Former colony to UK, member of commonwealth, and stable democracy Former colony to UK, member of commonwealth, and stable democracy Welfare system Conservative Conservative Rudimentary Rudimentary Radical Radical Economic regime Mixed capitalist Mixed capitalist Mixed capitalist Mixed capitalist Capitalist Capitalist Main independent factor Institution of compulsory voting No Yes Yes No Yes No Dependent factor Political culture: strength of citizen obligations?????????????????? 11

7. Analysis The analysis will be divided into three steps. The first step compares the European countries, while the second step compares Australia and Canada. This split is a consequence of the use of different sets of surveys. In third step there will be an attempt to integrate the two previous set of analyses into a comparative analyse. Table 5 presents data for the European countries. The data consists of five survey questions about attitudes toward citizen obligations. The answers indicate what the individuals regard as characteristics of good citizens. Means for the five questions are presented in the table, together with the standard divisions and coefficients of correlations (eta). The coefficients of correlations express the correlation between occurrence of the institution of compulsory voting and the strength of the sense of citizen obligation. The conclusion from the first analysis is that there are no general patterns in the correlation between the institution of compulsory voting and the strength in sense of citizen duty. In some aspects, the sense of citizen obligation is stronger in countries with compulsory voting, while the citizen duty is stronger in other aspects in countries without compulsory voting. In the first group, the sense of citizen obligations is stronger in Austria than Belgium in four aspects and the same in one aspect. In sum, the patterns of correlations are deviant from the expected pattern. The sense of citizen obligation is stronger in the country without compulsory voting than in the country with compulsory voting. However, in the second group the pattern of correlation is more like the expected. When Portugal is compared to Greece, the sense of citizen obligation is stronger in only one aspect (to be active in voluntary organization). In four aspects the strength of citizen obligations is stronger in Greece. By this, the expected pattern is more evident in the second group than in the first group. However, in both groups, there are in general no strong correlations between the institution of voting compulsory and sense of citizen obligation. As indicated by the correlation coefficient, there is more variation within the countries than between the countries. 12

Table 5 Comparing countries in group 1 respective group 2 Group 1 Group 2 Belgium Austria Greece Portugal Institution of compulsory voting Yes No Yes No Aspect of citizen obligation Mean (Standard deviation) Mean (Standard deviation) Difference Correlation (eta) Mean (Standard deviation) Mean (Standard deviation) Difference Correlation (eta) Vote in elections 6,56 (2,82) (n=1876) 7,99 (2,35) (n=2216) -1,43 0,26 8,10 (2,32) (n=2528) 7,12 (2,70) (n=1462) 0,98 0,19 To be active in politics 3,41 (2,53) (n=1865) 4,03 (2,67) (n=2211) -0,62 0,12 5,37 (2,84) (n=2500) 5,18 (2,83) (n=1428) 0,18 0,03 (no significance) Form a independent opinion 7,81 (1,91) (n=1858) 8,75 (1,77) (n=2209) -0,94 0,25 8,52 (1,78) (n=2517) 8,28 (1,83) (n=1444) 0,24 0,07 To be active in voluntary organisation 5,35 (2,64) (n=1863) 5,17 (2,73) (n=2207) 0,18 0,03 5,94 (2,73) (n=2495) 6,54 (2,54) (n=1438) -0,60 0,11 Always obey lays/regulations 7,43 (2,08) (n=1878) 7,67 (2,17) (n=2222) -0,25 0,06 8,73 (1,67) (n=2547) 7,51 (2,19) (n=1480) 1,22 0,30 The second analysis is presented in table 6. Six aspects of citizen obligation are included in this analysis. What the analysis indicates is that the sense of citizen obligation is stronger in Canada than in Australia. In five of the six aspects the sense of citizen obligation is stronger in Canada than in Australia: always vote in elections, never try to evade laws, keep watch on government, to be active in associations, and to understand other opinions. This pattern of correlation is opposite to the expected. In this way, the correlation in the group is similar to the first group. Another similarity is that the correlations between institution of compulsory voting and sense of citizen obligation are weak; whatever the correlation is negative or positive. 13

Table 6 Comparing countries in group 3 Group 3 Australia Canada Difference Institutions of compulsory voting Yes No Aspect of citizen obligation Mean (Standard deviation) Mean (Standard deviation) Difference Correlation (eta) Always vote in election 6,17 (1,54) n=1865 6,32 (1,26) n=1194-0,15 0,05 Active in associations 4,26 (1,78) n=1787 4,57 (1,59) n=1165-0,31 0,09 Understand other opinions 5,91 (1,34) n=1834 5,99 (1,11) n=1188-0,08 0,03 (no significance) Keep watch on government 6,06 (1,30) n=1834 6,31 (1,08) n=1188-0,25 0,10 Always obey laws 6,43 (1,00) n=1868 6,47 (0,96) n=1196-0,04 0,02 (no significance) Never try to evade taxes 6,19 (1,28) n=1838 6,35 (1,18) n=1188-0,16 0,06 The third step in the analysis is to compare the three groups to each other. In table 7, the results from the previous steps are summarised. If the results are compared, three conclusions can be drawn. The first is that there are different patterns of correlations between the institution of compulsory voting and sense of citizen obligation. The correlation is negative in two groups, but positive in one group. The second conclusion is that the overall strength of correlation is weak. However, there are some exceptions from this conclusion. In the first group, the exceptions are the sense of obligation to vote in election and to form independent opinion. In the second group, the sense of obligation to obey laws has stronger correlation to the institution of compulsory voting than the aspects in general. The third conclusion is that there may be some contextual effects on the impact of compulsory voting. As indicated by the 14

analysis, the correlation between the institution of compulsory voting and sense of citizen obligation is different between the groups of countries. There are negative correlations in the first and third group, which is not expected according to the culture theory and institutional theory. However, in the second group (Greece and Portugal) there are positive correlations. Whatever these differences express contextual effects can not bee clarified by the analysis. Therefore, there are needs for more comparative analysis on the relation between institution of compulsory voting and political culture. However, one interesting (and paradoxical) conclusion can be draw from the conducted analyses: the expected pattern of correlation is found in the group that includes the country (Greece) that has the weakest enforcement of the institution of compulsory voting. Table 7 Summary of the analyses Strength of citizen obligation Pattern of correlation Pair 1 of countries Belgium < Austria Negative weak impact Pair 2 of countries Greece > Portugal Positive weak impact Pair 3 of countries Australia < Canada Negative weak impact 8. Conclusion Does the institution of compulsory voting have impact on political culture? In one way, the institution of compulsory voting has impact on political culture. However, the impact is not always the expected. In some settings the impact is negative, while it is in other settings positive. The same goes for different aspects of political culture. In some aspects the impact is negative, in other it is positive. In short, the impact of compulsory voting on the political culture is not uniform. The relation between institutions and political cultural may not be as simple as cultural theory and institutional theory stipulate. To design political institutions is not also to design political culture. The relation between institution and political cultural is fare more complex than a direct causal chain. Instead, institutions may have a contextual effect on the relation between political culture and political participation, as illustrated in figure 1. A conventional view of cultural theory and institutional theory is to assume a direct relation between institutions and political culture; that the design of institutions has impact on the political culture. An alternative view is that institutions have an impact on what effect political culture has on political participation. One simple illustration of this interaction by political institutions is 15

presented in table 8. The table presents the correlation between the sense of obligation to vote and participation in the last election to parliament. The correlation between the two factors is obvious in European countries (Austria and Portugal) without compulsory voting, while it is absent in European countries with compulsory voting (Belgium and Greece). In Australia there are a weak correlation between the sense of obligation to vote and participation in the last election to parliament, but the correlation is stronger in Canada. In sum, the analysis indicates that the institutions of compulsory voting replace the importance of political culture on election participation. This is another answer than the three answers that were presented in the introduction to the question on whatever the institution of compulsory voting has impact on political cultural. Figure 1 a) A traditional view about the relationship between political institution and political culture (direct effects) Institutions Institutional level Political culture Aggregated level b) Alternative view about the relationship between political institution and political culture (contextual effects) Institutions Institutional level Political culture Political participation Aggregated level 16

Table 8 An empirical illustration of the institution of compulsory voting as contextual factor Institution of compulsory voting Correlation between sense of obligation to vote and participation in latest election (Pearson s r) Belgium Yes 0,06 (no significance) (n=1731) Austria No 0,36 (n=2061) Greece Yes 0,13 (no significance) (n=2358) Portugal No 0,35 (n=1395) Australia Yes 0,11 (n=1824) Canada No 0,36 (n=1156) 17

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