The EU as a normative power: attempts of exporting regional co-operation to the Western Balkans

Master of European Affairs Tutor: Ole Elgström Department of Political Science The EU as a normative power: attempts of exporting regional co-operation to the Western Balkans Danijela Mikovic

Abstract This study departs from the constructivist approach to research the Manners` concept of the European Union as a normative power or norm exporter. The focus is diffusion of the regional co-operation model that EU has been promoting as a foreign policy goal. Study presents motives and policies behind that objective. Conditionality of regional co-operation is also the distinctive feature of the EU- Western Balkans relations. I analyze how the conditionality developed through policy instruments such as the Regional Approach, Stability Pact and Stabilization and Association Process to understand what type of norm diffusion took place. Furthermore, regional conditions are investigated to see the whether EU model of regional rapprochement has found a fertile ground in the Western Balkans. Finally, I will suggest that there is a limited prospect for the export of the regional co-operation model to the Balkans because of impeding regional conditions. Key words: EU, normative power, regional co-operation model, Western Balkans, conditionality

Table of contents 1 INTRODUCTION...1 1.1 RESEARCH PURPOSE, QUESTIONS AND PLAN...1 1.2 METHODOLOGY AND SOURCES...2 2 CONCEPTUALIZING EU IN THE INTERNATIONAL ARENA...3 2.1 EU UNLIKE OTHER INTERNATIONAL ACTORS...3 2.2 THE EU AS A PRESENCE OR AN ACTOR?...4 2.3 THE EU IN A CIVILIAN ROLE...6 2.4 THE EU AS A NORMATIVE POWER...7 2.4.1 Constructivist approach to the EU...7 2.4.2 Normative power in a global polity...8 3 PROMOTING REGIONAL CO-OPERATION IN EXTERNAL RELATIONS...12 3.1 PROMOTING REGIONAL CO-OPERATION AS A PART OF EU FOREIGN POLICY...12 3.1.1 Definition...12 3.1.2 Motives...13 3.1.3 Policy instruments...14 3.1.4 The EU as a role model...15 3.2 NORM DIFFUSION AND REGIONAL CO-OPERATION...16 3.2.1 Regional co-operation as a part of the EU normative set...16 3.2.2 Diffusion of regional co-operation model...17 3.3 ON THE CONDITIONALITY PRINCIPLE...17 4 EXPORTING REGIONAL CO-OPERATION TO THE WESTERN BALKANS...19 4.1 EU APPROACH TOWARDS THE REGION...19 4.2 EVOLUTION OF EU POLICY INSTRUMENTS...20 4.2.1 Regional Approach and Conditionality...20 4.2.2 Weaknesses of the Regional Approach...22 4.2.3 Stability Pact and Stabilisation and Association Process (SAP)...23 4.3 RATIONALE BEHIND PROJECTING REGIONAL CO-OPERATION MODEL...25 5 CONDITIONS IN THE WESTERN BALKANS...27 5.1 REGIONAL CO-OPERATION INDICATORS...27 5.2 PRE-CONDITIONS FOR THE REGIONAL CO-OPERATION...27 5.2.1 Political environment of the Balkans...28 5.2.2 Economic environment of the Balkans...30 6 CONCLUSION...31 REFERENCES...32

1 Introduction 1.1 Research purpose, questions and plan There has been general consensus among the scholars that the EU failed to constructively engage in the resolution of the Balkan conflict in the mid 90ies (Bretherton and Vogler 1999: 197, Ginsberg 2001: 85; Laffan et al 2000: 185, Petiteville 2003: 137). As it was interestingly portrayed by Ginsberg, the EU got burned in the former Yugoslavia. EU was heavily criticized because of its inadequate response; employing civilian approach in the military, inter-ethnic conflict (Ginsberg 2001: 85). It was claimed that the EU didn t act in manner of conventional superpower because it is militarily under-resourced. Implicitly, arguments were raised that the EU needs to develop military potential if wanting to be the influential player in the international politics (Bretherton and Vogler 1999: 197, Petiteville 2003: 137). Moreover, the unsuccessful policy of conflict resolution in the EU closest neighborhood negatively affected EU s international image and credibility (Ginsberg 2001: 85), thus placing even more importance on EU`s post-conflict engagement in the Western Balkans 1. The EU policy in the post-conflict period evolved gradually from the Regional Approach established to support the Dayton Peace Accord to the Stabilization and Association Process and the Stability Pact, in the aftermath of the Kosovo conflict. Underlying logic of both policy instruments was economic and political conditionality that had to be fulfilled by the countries of the Western Balkans in order to develop bilateral relations with the EU. The goal was to bring political and economic stability to the region. The EU based that approach on enlargement policies applied to the Central and East European Countries and on its own experience of post-war rapprochement through functional co-operation. Moreover, unlike previous experiences of the EU only encouraging regional cooperation in relations with the third countries, in the case of the Western Balkans regional co-operation principle was upgraded to the level of conditionality. Given this distinction, the purpose of this study is to investigate the role of the EU as the exporter of regional co-operation to the Western Balkans. Questions I ask are: 1. How can we explain the diffusion of the regional co-operation model in the context of the roles that the EU plays in the international arena? 1 EU coined the term Western Balkans to regionally group the countries: Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Serbia and Montenegro (also referred to Former Republic of Yugoslavia) and FYROM (Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia) (Ilic 2002: 65). Term Western Balkans will be used interchangeably with the term South Eastern Europe (SEE). 1

2. Why and how does EU promote regional co-operation in the relations with the third countries? 3. Why and how does the EU export regionalism to the Western Balkans? 4. What are the elements determining the success of externally induced regional co-operation? To answer these questions, chapter 2 will deal with the EU as a unique presence in international arena that projects specific influence to international system, acting as a normative power, or norm exporter. That is the context for understanding of the EU as a model or an exporter of regional co-operation to the Western Balkans. Chapter 3 will analyze EU policies and motives for diffusing regional cooperation model to external relations. Here I will relate the notion of the EU as normative power to the regional co-operation model as a norm. In chapter 4 I analyze gradual development of stronger ties and EU commitment to stabilize Balkans from the Regional Approach to Stabilization and Association Process. Emphasis will be on the overarching EU demand for intra-regional political and economic rapprochement to mitigate the consequences of war. I will follow the development of regional co-operation conditionality and identify what kind of norm diffusion technique took place. In chapter 5, conditions in the Western Balkans will be looked into, to see whether there is conducive or impeding climate for regional initiatives. Finally, in the conclusion I will argue that export of regional co-operation to the Western Balkans has been limited due to the non favorable terms in the region. 1.2 Methodology and sources In this study I sought to explain aspect of EU-Western Balkan relations by applying constructivist approach, within the idea of the EU as a normative power. I focused on the EU as a model of a regional co- operation to research why and how has this model been projected to the Western Balkans and with what success. Analysis of primary and secondary literature has been conducted to discover the specifics within regional co-operation aspect of the EU- Western Balkans relations. Numerous Internet sources have been utilized, mainly referring to the EU documents related to the Western Balkans. Moreover, Political Science journals and think-thank papers have been researched through to get the sense of different perspectives on the issue. Additionally, two interviews have been conducted with the officials in Brussels that have been analyzing EU external relations. These interviewees won t be cited here because the information collected from them served as background info and a guideline in the research process. 2

2 Conceptualizing EU in the international arena 2.1 The EU unlike other international actors Scholars questioning position of the EU in the international arena often conceive it as being an entity sui generis (Bretherton and Vogler 1999: 44, Knodt and Princen 2003: 195, Ginsberg 2001: 12; Laffan et al. 2000: 171). The EU in international politics cannot be classified as a state or an international organization because it possesses quite different characteristics. EU uniqueness derives form the fact that it is complex multi level governance (Knodt and Princen 2003: 204) with distinctive institutional setting and policy making procedures (Smith 2003: 17). EU comprises together sovereignty of member states and supranational institutions, constraining member states exclusive right to authoritative allocation and including them into multilevel decision-making process (Knodt and Princen 2003: 6). Policy system of the EU is split into multiple, overlapping and loosely related policy areas under the three pillars. Moreover, the EU is based on the consensual policy making that depends on the interaction between member states and supranational institutions (ibid: 204). Mentioned aspects have ramifications for the EU external relations 2 (Laffan et al. 2000: 214). These cover a broad range of intra-pillar or cross-pillar policies that the EU pursues towards the third countries. The EU external relations are multidimensional, spanning from the foreign policy to development, economic aid, trade, economic sanctions and association and co-operation agreements (ibid: 168, Panebianco 2004: 1). The EU foreign policy is characterized by multi pillar and multi level decision-making that displays problems concerning consistency and coherence. Horizontal inconsistency refers to non-coordinated and incompatible external actions that stem from different pillars. Vertical inconsistency describes problems of policy co-ordination between member states and the EU institutions. Additionally, there is an issue of the policy coherence exemplified by protectionist agricultural policy directly undermining the objectives of the development policy (Laffan et al. 2000: 170, Smith 2003: 65). Thus, it can be argued that the EU does not correspond to the picture of unitary actor with fixed preferences; rather its interests, institutional setting and actors vary with the respect to different policy areas (Longo 2003: 2 Terms European external relations and European foreign policy will be used interchangeably to refer to a broad spectrum of goals that EU pursues participating in international politics. 3

158). The EU foreign policy, it is argued, lacks the attributes of cohesion, purpose and continuity (Ginsberg 2001: 9). State on the other hand is a unitary, centralized entity that hierarchically structures domestic political forces and is able to formulate and implement coherent foreign policy. In the EU, intergovernmental nature of the foreign policy confirms the dominance of the member states. However, this dominance is limited by the actors at the EU level and by institutional rules that vary across pillars. In this respect the EU differs also from the international organization that depends solely on the amount of power given by the states as members and has no autonomy from them in acting externally. Moreover, the EU pursues wider spectrum of policies than international organizations (Knodt and Princen 2003: 203, 204). Therefore, the question appearing is how we can think of EU participation in international arena? 2.2 The EU as a presence or an actor? Despite the fact that the EU doesn t fit into traditional categorization of international actors, it is significantly present in international politics. Bretherton and Vogler differentiate between presence and actorness in explaining the EU participation in international arena. Presence relates to the capability of the EU to project influence in external relations, as an unintended consequence of internal policy making (Bretherton and Vogler 1999: 5). For instance, the fact that the EU has been widely imitated as a model of regional co-operation is a sign of its presence in the international arena. Presence is a precondition for the actorness, being the capacity to take on the purposive action in the international system (ibid: 35). Actorness derives from internal capabilities as well as opportunities offered in the external environment. However, presence is not equal to the actorness and does not predetermine it. The interplay between the presence and the actorness is important for the construction of roles that are on the EU disposal in the international system. The fulfillment of these roles depends on the capacity of the EU to act (ibid: 33). To be an actor in the external relations, EU has to fulfill five conditions, according to Bretherton and Vogler: - be committed to shared norms and values - be capable of structuring policy priorities and produce coherent policies - be effective negotiator - be capable of policy implementation - obtain democratic legitimacy for external policies 4

Evidence points that despite EU s significant presence in the international arena, it has been only partially realized as an actor (ibid: 248, Ginsberg 2001: 9). Nevertheless, the EU has proved itself as capable of taking purposive action in some areas of foreign policy, having impact on external actors (Ginsberg 2001: 48). If we understand actorness as the structured presence in the international arena, it can be argued that the EU displays significant actorness on the objective and subjective level. Objective aspect concerns the specific EU approach to the external relations while subjective criterion emphasizes positive evaluation of EU s international role by third parties. Longo argues that by exporting policy model of fight against organized crime, the EU increases its subjective and objective actorness in the international arena. On the objective level, the EU mobilizes political and economic resources-know-how, experience and consolidated institutional setting associated with particular policy model- for export activity. This widens the scope of external relations. On the subjective level, expert and financial resources that the EU dedicates, contribute to the positive international image. Implicitly, in the eyes of third parties, the EU is perceived as effective and as important player shaping the norms and practices of international co-operation in specific area (Longo 2003: 157, 169). External perception of the EU is important for the European Foreign Policy system conceptualized by Ginsberg as the relation between foreign policy inputs and outputs. If the EU is perceived by international actors as the influential in the international arena, that feedback reaffirms the EU international identity and strengthens foreign policy system, influencing future inputs (Ginsberg 2001:22). It can be claimed that by projecting internal practices to the external relations, EU opens up the space for the assertion of the role as an effective and important international player. However, Princen and Knodt argue that effective export of models is possible under the two conditions that to a degree correspond to Bretherton and Vogler s requirements for actorness. Primarily, the EU has to be able to formulate consistent policy based on internal consensus, underpinned by common interests and values. Additionally, the EU has to be of capable of implementing policy. That may be proven difficult in military issues where the EU lacks resources, meaning that clear and coherent policy is even more so important in influencing international arena (Knodt and Princen 2003: 201). On the contrary, the EU is more effective and recognized as the international actor when acting like a soft power ; using economic means for political ends; e.g. exporting norms and values through economic co-operation with the third countries (Petiteville 2003: 134). Soft power is one of the terms, alongside notions of civilian power and normative power, used to describe EU s unique international identity. These terms reflect the distinctiveness of the EU diplomacy: emphasis on the international law, multilateralism and non-military instruments in pursuing foreign policy goals (Smith 2003: 15). Thus, notion of the EU as the civilian power will be discussed next. 5

2.3 The EU in a civilian role The idea of the civilian power refers to the actor who uses diplomatic, economic and legal instruments to achieve influence in the international relations (Ginsberg 2001: 39). As a fairly broad term, civilian power is often contrasted with the military power that uses coercion; hard power to achieve influence. Civilian actors employ soft power; persuasion-action of obtaining a favorable response without using threats, to achieve civilian goals (Smith 2003: 22). The EU as the civilian power wields mostly diplomatic and economic instruments in aiming to project influence on other actors. Civilian power idea doesn t specifically only relate to the EU, as smaller states can be characterized as civilian powers too, in trying to exercise international influence through persuasion. However, it may be quite distinctive that the EU as the economic power chooses to behave in a civilian way (ibid: 23). Some have argued that it is not really a matter of choice. Considering the fact that the EU is military deficient; it has been maintained that civilian means are the only ones at the EU disposal, if it wants to influence international arena. Implicitly, conceptualizing the EU as the civilian model is a rationalization of its military weakness and attempt to justify its unclear international role (Ginsberg 2001: 40). On the other hand, it has been asserted that the EU is unique exactly because it is not a superpower and still projects significant influence to international arena (ibid: 41). Moreover, some claim that the EU civilian role has become even more important in the post Cold war environment of redefined notion of security (Bretherton and Vogler 1999: 198). Growing insecurity in the Eastern Europe after the fall of communism, transformed the traditional concept of security emphasizing military capabilities to the notion of soft security. Soft security is a multidimensional approach to societal insecurity that deals with issues spanning from potential armed conflict to economic, social and environmental concerns (ibid: 215). New security environment provides challenges that can be addressed exactly by civilian instruments, soft diplomacy, i.e. by mobilizing economic, financial, institutional and legal means to export values, norms and rules and achieve long term cultural influence (Petiteville 2003: 134). As we have seen in the case of the East European countries that are members of the Union today, the EU is capable of extending stability and security beyond its borders by playing the civilian role. Although there are obviously limits to the civilian role in the issues requiring military action, it is argued that the notion of the civilian power should not be easily disregarded. 6

2.4 The EU as a normative power Related to the notion of civilian power is the understanding of the EU as a normative power. This is the framework within which we can comprehend EU attempts to export of regional co-operation model to the external environment. However, before elaborating on a concept of a normative power, an overview of constructivist account of the EU is need. This approach emphasizes the importance of norms and values in international relations and is hence our theoretical point of departure. 2.4.1 Constructivist approach to the EU Social constructivism is a meta-theory, ontological perspective settled in between structuralism and individualism, claiming that the reality is socially constructed. Implicitly that means that actors, i.e. agents, are not independent from their social environment, i.e. structure. Distinctive contribution of social constructivism is the idea that agency and structure are mutually constitutive. Simply, agency creates, reproduces and changes structure while structure constitutes the identity and interests of agency. Thus, constructivism emphasizes that interests of actors are not provided exogenously but rather socially constructed by environment: institutional setting and norms (Risse 2004: 160-162). Norms are understood as intersubjective understandings that constitute actors interests and identities and create expectations as well as prescribe what appropriate behavior ought to be by expressing values and defining rights and obligations (Bjorkdahl 2002: 43). Two arguments stem from this definition. Firstly, actors in decision-making are not guided by rationality of maximizing their interests, named logic of consequence, but rather by logic of appropriateness. Within this logic actors apply the most appropriate rule in given social situation and not the one that is best in utility terms. Secondly, interests of actors are deeply rooted in the social structure in two ways. Social norms and institutions structure the behavior of agency and also serve as a reference point for actors identity, defining we feeling, and by that, defining their interests and preferences. Structure also influences discoursive and behavioral practices of agents in opening them up for argumentative rationality; possibility of persuasion by a better argument. That also includes patterns of socialization among agents (Risse 2004: 163-165). Applying the idea on the mutual constitutivness of agency and structure to the internal context of the EU, it can be argued that member states as the agency and EU as the structure, mutually shape each other. EU can be understood as the two-way process of policy-making and institution-building at the European level which then feed back into the member states and their political process and structures. Europeanization of domestic policies is the proof that 7

European normative and institutional setting deeply affects the identity, interests and preferences of member states. The EU provides political, economic and social framework; the reference point for member states interests and behavior (ibid: 162). A constructivist account of EU external relations claims that although member states seem formally in charge of decision-making in the foreign policy, whole set of formal and informal rules as well as socialization patterns constitute the European dimension of foreign policy. Therefore, the terms such as European identity, interests and responsibilities are widespread (Ginsberg 2001: 37). Incorporating constructivist argument into his analysis, Ginsberg asserts that European interests constitute the important share of the input in the European Foreign Policy system. Despite the fact that the EU is based on historical, cultural and linguistic diversity that precludes strong we feeling` of shared European identity; it is identified with the specific set of principles that reflect the notion of shared of identity and values among member states (ibid: 25). Indeed, in some aspects of the foreign policy EU pursues unique goals attributed to self-styled logic of policy-making. These represent the distinctive European interests, not as a reaction, response to the international context or stimuli but rather as a result of internal dynamics. Foreign policy goals such as support for regional integration efforts or human rights conditionality in signing agreements with the third countries, exemplify joint work of the member states and the EU in promoting the distinctive European diplomacy (ibid: 31). Therefore, the constructivist approach to the EU in international relations puts more weight on the role of European norms, values and interests in pursuing foreign policy goals, than just taking into account member states interests. Constructivists also pay attention to the influence of the socially constructed international norms on agents in the international system, the EU being one of them (Smith 2003: 17). Hence, constructivism enables us to conceptualize the EU as a projector of internal norms to the external environment, as a normative power (Manners 2002). 2.4.2 Normative power in a global polity The notion of the EU as a normative power was launched by I. Manners with the aim to discuss the ideational impact of the EU on international arena, contrary to previous empirical studies focused on the state-like features of the EU. Manners defines normative power as the ability to shape conceptions of normal in international relations (Manners 2002: 239). Corresponding to this notion of the normative power is the term of norm-maker or norm entrepreneur described as an agent of the social change with an ability to shape the collective behavior of others. In the international politics, norm entrepreneur acts as an agenda setter through presentation of innovative ideas and as a problem-solver (Bjorkdahl 2002: 459). 8

Similarly to this assertion, Manners claims that the EU redefines the concepts of normal in international arena by diffusing norms reflective of its own internal experience. EU s ability to do so stems from the fact that it is normatively different player in international arena than traditional states. EU s distinctiveness is rooted in the fact that it is the specific type of polity that overcomes the traditional concepts of power and nation state. Furthermore, its specific nature lies in the commitment to constitutive common norms and principles. Common constitutional norms are extremely important for EU`s international identity, given the fact that the EU was established as an elitist project, not based on the shared we-feeling among the peoples of Europe (Manners 2002: 240). Manners identifies core norms and minor norms as the EU normative basis. Core norms refer to peace, liberty, democracy, rule of law and respect for human rights and basic freedoms. Minor norms are social solidarity, anti-discrimination, sustainable development and good governance (ibid: 242). Considering the fact that EU is such rule base order, in relations with the third countries, it plays the role of the rule generator (Cremona 2004: 554). Core norms such as peace, democracy and human rights are claimed to be universal principles. Cosmopolitan nature of the EU norms (Manners 2002: 8) may be just the reflection of the normative globalization, increased acceptance of the norms in international system that the EU is a part of. Thus, export of the universal norms in the EU foreign policy may be considered to be just a reflection of the international trend (Smith 2003: 17). However, Manners asserts that EU distinctiveness derives from the fact that those norms originate from internal development. They form the normative foundation of the EU as a polity and are diffused through special type of diplomacy (Manners 2002: 240). According to Manners and Whitman, norms are diffused by following techniques: Contagion refers to the EU non-intentionally spreading norms, by its mere presence in international arena. Serving as a successful model of regional integration that provided effective response to economic globalization (Manners 2002: 244, Bretherton and Vogler 1999: 35), EU example is imitated by regional arrangements such as Mercosur. Informational diffusion stems from EU communication on policy initiatives and declarations to the external environment. Procedural diffusion of norms is performed through standing institutionalized relationship between the EU and the third party. Most notable example is the enlargement and membership conditionality, where norms of democracy, rule of law and protection of human rights became the basic exporting norms enshrined in the Copenhagen criterion (Manners 2002: 243). These are also the most evident norms promoted through EU external co-operation with the third countries (Petiteville 2003: 132). 9

Transference of norms takes place when the EU exchanges goods, trade, aid, or technical assistance with third parties through largely substantive or financial means (Manners 2002: 245). Given the fact that this definition is pretty vague, I will add Whitman`s definition stating that transference refers to financial and technical assistance relationship that the Community uses to pursue a policy (Whitman/Internet 3: 8). Thus, transference, as I interpret it, refers to spreading of norms through trade relations, financial and technical assistance that the EU uses in relations with the third parties. Most notable examples are Phare and Tacit programs in the Eastern Europe (Manners 2002: 244). Overt-diffusion of norms is a result of a physical presence of EU bodies and member states in the third countries or in international organizations. Cultural filter of norm spreading refers to adoption or rejection of norms by third parties as a result of the impact of international norms and learning (Manners 2002: 244). These techniques clearly demonstrate that the EU doesn t rely on the force to export norms to the international arena. Indeed, that is another feature of EU s distinctive international role. The fact that EU has the normative basis predetermines its normative behavior (ibid: 242). It acts as a role model, as nonmaterial exemplification found in the contagion of norms through imitation and attraction (Manners 2005: 8). By extending norms, the EU contributes to the reshaping of the normative structure in the international system and simultaneously strengthens its own international legitimacy as unique, European polity. Manners adds a normative dimension to the above discussed role of the EU, asserting that this is exactly what the EU should be doing in the international system. Not the least because the notion of normative power does not imply imperialism; EU does not impose norms to the countries that are then entangled in the process of learning (Manners 2002: 252, 244; Petiteville 2003: 134). It must be mentioned that the idea on the EU as a normative power has not been uncontested (Sjursen 2005, Diez 2005). Moreover because Manners himself is a bit vague in explaining the strategies of a norm diffusion and a motivation behind the EU as a norm exporter which I would assume opens up the platform for challenging his thesis. Neverthless, I chose his model because it enables us to place the EU as the regional co-operation exporter in a wider theoretical framework. To sum up, in this chapter I have argued that the EU as the unique form of governance projects this uniqueness in its international identity and roles. Albeit lacking military resources, it was maintained that the EU exercises influence in international politics acting like a civilian power, soft power or as it was 10

recently conceptualized, as a normative power. All these related and not undisputed terms, emphasize the use of instruments alternative to military force in pursuing foreign policy goals. I presented the constructivist approach that accents the role of norms and ideas in formulating EU foreign policy, to explain the idea of the EU as a normative power. This framework of the EU as the norm exporter will enable us to understand EU role as a promoter of regionalism in the relations with the third countries, namely Western Balkans. Hence, the subject of the next chapter is regional co-operation as EU foreign policy goal. 11

3 Promoting regional cooperation in external relations 3.1 Promoting regional co-operation as a part of EU foreign policy 3.1.1 Definition Promotion of the regional co-operation as EU foreign policy goal (Smith 2003: 2) clearly exemplifies how EU external relations are formed under the influence of the internal experiences. This is not the case only with the regional co-operation model but also with principles such as democracy, human rights, conflict prevention and fight against international crime (Smith 2003). The multidimensional nature of EU external relations is considered to be suitable for the export of EU economic and political principles to third countries (Panebianco 2004: 2). The EU has extensively promoted regional co-operation model in relations with groups of countries, as the scope of external relations has widened to cover development, security, human rights protection and promotion of values (Cremona 2004: 555). In the EU terminology, regional co-operation is broadly defined as joint efforts of neighboring countries to work together on the issues of common interests. This broad term has two sub sections. Regional integration, on the one hand, refers to removing policy imposed barriers to regional movement of goods, services, people and capital. Regional co-operation on the other, aims to reduce other barriers that can facilitate economic interdependence and common management of resources, such as barriers in transportation and communication infrastructure (Commission 1995 b: 2). This broad definition of regional co-operation is intended, according to Smith, to accommodate different types of regional co-operation possible without EU imposing exactly its own model in relations with the third countries (Smith 2003: 86). EU has actively promoted regional co-operation model from the early 60-ies. Since the first regional agreements signed with the African countries, the EU has supported regional efforts in the Middle East as peace promoting instrument. Regional co-operation model has been present in the Mediterranean in the most recent framework of Euro-Med partnership; in Asia within the context of co-operation with ASEAN, in Latin America when co-operating with Andean Pact and Mercosur. Moreover, regional co-operation has been introduced in the Eastern Europe, in the context of accession (ibid: 73-83). 12

3.1.2 Motives EU motives for promoting regional co-operation model reflect, according to Smith, rationalism and self interest on the one hand and `altruism`, on the other. Firstly, it is quite pragmatic to deal with countries on the regional level as it reduces the transaction costs. Moreover, the EU may be exercising leadership and thus strengthening international reputation and legitimacy by promoting the recognized successful model of co-operation, jointly supported from the EU institutions and member states. Supporting regionalism may also be a sign of competitiveness and rivalry as in the case Latin America where EU competes for markets with the US (ibid: 85). Implicitly, advancement of Union economic, political and geo-strategic interests is also significant motivation for supporting regional efforts (Bilal 2004: 15-16). Secondly and according to Smith, more altruistic EU motives for supporting regional developments refer to spread of values associated with peace, prosperity, human rights, etc. Functional regional co-operation is the foundational practice and the internal value that reflects the nature of the EU itself (Smith 2003: 70). Regional co-operation is considered instrumental to the achievement of peace, political stability and economic development. It is a recipe based on the model that has proved to be effective. This factor adds up to the legitimacy of pursuing regional co-operation as foreign policy goal. Moreover, if we take into account broad notion of soft security not only focused on defense of the territory but enhancing political, economic, environmental and social sources of insecurity, then regional integration can be understood ultimately as a security arrangement. Focus on the peace and co-operation in the EU international relations derives from the historical experience of reconciliation between former enemies, Germany and France (Smith 2003: 18). The fact that without reconciliation and establishment of peace after the World War Two, there would be no Union as we know it today puts these principles high on the EU foreign policy agenda. European regional co-operation proved that by nurturing common economic interests, political and security issues can be settled (Anastasakis 2002: 26). Implicitly, here EU represents a model of reconciliation (Ginsberg 2001: 26), model of security community 3 (Bretherton and Vogler 1999: 214) and island of peace (ibid: 198). Through encouragement of regional co-operation in the closer and wider neighborhood, EU projects security and stability beyond its borders, creating a larger security order (Charillon 2004: 4) and implicitly, advancing its own security position. However, as argued by Cremona, EU has not been successful in playing the neighborhood role because with the expansion to the East, it inevitably created exclusion towards the more distant neighbors (Cremona 2004: 564). Furthermore, from the economic standpoint, regional co-operation is considered to be beneficial for achieving economic growth through enhanced 3 Security community represents a group of states that are mutually assured in a non-military resolution of disputes (Vucetic 2001: 110). 13

efficiency, productivity and stronger leverage in the economic negotiations (Smith 2003: 84). It has proven to be effective response to the negative consequences of globalization (Bretherton and Vogler 1999: 35) and also a gateway for inclusion of countries in a global economy. Political stability-wise, by supporting regional co-operation among the countries, EU raises awareness on the importance of co-operation in the interdependent world. Thus, regional co-operation nurtures good neighborly relations, contributes to political stability, promotion of human rights and democracy and helps to address issues that countries cannot tackle alone, like environmental and illegal trafficking issues (Smith 2003: 84). I would argue that EU self-interest and altruistic motives for promoting regional model are not easily discernible. Ultimately, it could be argued that EU projecting its own model externally aims to assert its international role, to increase credibility and international reputation in the eyes of the third parties. Positive external perceptions are, according to Ginsberg, important for the strengthening of the Union foreign policy system. Moreover, peace and security as the results of regional co-operation efforts are also contributing to the security of the EU itself. Economic benefits of countries co-operating regionally also advance EU s economic position through mutual free trade agreements. Thus, I would argue that Union in supporting regionalist efforts that help to spread peace, security and political and economic stability, relies on the rationalist, utility logic as much as on the altruistic motives. 3.1.3 Policy instruments EU promotes regional co-operation either by grouping countries together when developing relations with them, as in the case of the Western Balkans, or by supporting regional integration efforts originating from the countries themselves (Smith 2003: 67). According to Smith, the instruments EU employs are: Financial assistance for cross-border co-operation and regional efforts through programs such as Phare, CARDS and Tacis. Offering regional co-operation agreements to the countries of one area (Smith 2003: 88). EU has concluded comprehensive co-operation agreements with regional groupings such as African Caribbean Pacific countries (ACP). These go beyond trade liberalization issues and incorporate development and political aspects, thus serving as a channel for exporting non trade regulatory principles (Bilal 2004: 3). Additionally, EU can offer bilateral co-operation agreements, such as Stabilization and Association Agreements for Western Balkans, which because of similarity in the content, treat the countries as a region. 14

Economic and political dialogue with groupings to nurture peace and conflict resolution. Principle of conditionality that makes Union aid, political dialogue or bilateral agreements conditioned, i.e. dependent, on the willingness of the countries to work together within the regional framework (Smith 2003: 89-91). First three instruments reflect soft diplomacy approach; economic, legal and diplomatic means to persuade countries to engage in the formation of regional groupings. EU usually does not pressure countries to co-operate regionally when they are relatively weakly linked among each other. However, the principle of conditionality to a certain extent implies coercion (Smith 2003: 92). Although non-military, coercion can take the shape of a negative conditionality in the form of suspension of aid (ibid: 198). Conditionality, as we will see, was strictly enforced in the Western Balkans, making the regional rapprochement dependent on the development of further bilateral relations with the Union. Considering the fact that all Western Balkans countries aim for the Union membership (Kotios 2001: 197), this condition has a significant weight. Implicitly, it is important to distinguish between EU efforts to externally induce regional co-operation as in the Western Balkans and the support that EU provides for regional initiatives coming from the countries themselves. In the latter, the EU as a successful integration may serve as a model, example that other countries want to imitate. 3.1.4 The EU as a role model EU as the integration model has inspired many regional arrangements around the world, especially in the developing countries. Regional groupings in Latin America and Africa tend to imitate institutional design and policy program of the EU. Most notable example is West African Economic and Monetary Union (UEMOA) that to a certain degree reproduced Union norms, legal provisions, institutions and policies. Mercosur also undertook the path of European type of integration. In many other cases, EU is an example and a benchmark for comparison. (Bilal 2004: 4-7). The Union itself stated doubts in the transferability of the European model, reminding that there are different approaches to economic integration (Commission 1995b: 7). Indeed, some regional efforts in Latin America, Africa and Carribean failed because European design didn t match their political and economic reality (Bilal 2004:7). The EU role in spreading regional model has been two-fold. It has been visible enough to attract countries wanting to imitate the successful recipe. In that sense, initiative for regional integration came from the developing countries themselves (Bilal 2004: 9). However, beside this passive role as a model, Union as the natural supporter of regional initiatives (Commission 1995 15

b: 5) has been an active promoter. Instruments such as development assistance and technical aid for regional initiatives, bi-regional co-operation and integration agreements, political dialogue and experience sharing have contributed to the export of the EU model (Bilal 2004: 9-15). This case corresponds with Manners claim that EU influences political actors by virtuous example, by non-purposely spreading ideas (Manners 2002: 242). However, EU as a model, by merely being present in the international arena, has not been passive. It has been using the attraction it has to influence the development of the endogenously initiated regional groupings through various incentives. 3.2 Norm diffusion and regional co-operation 3.2.1 Regional co-operation as a part of the EU normative set Peace, democracy and human rights are the core norms that comprise the EU normative basis, as argued by Manners. The EU diffuses these norms through relations with political actors and by that, redefines normative structure of the international system (Manners 2002: 242, 253). The Union considers regional co-operation principle to be the road to peace, political stability, economic development, to strengthening democracy and human rights (Smith 2003: 84). Additionally, regional co-operation reflects common core values that the EU was founded on: conflict resolution through cooperation, possibly integration and development of peace community (Sjursen and Smith 2004: 11). Considering the fact that regional co-operation facilitates achievement of the EU core exporting principles and is reflective of the fundamental EU values, I will assume that regional co-operation would also be a part of a normative set that EU exports. It was empirically confirmed as a foreign policy objective by Smith, although Manners did not specifically identify that principle as a part of the normative basis that EU extends to international arena. Thus, it will be maintained that regional co-operation model is a norm in the sense of proscribed appropriate behaviour (Bjorkdahl 2002: 43), on how to achieve peace, economic and political stability. In addition, it will be asserted that regional co-operation model is diffused through the exact techniques as core and minor norms. 16

3.2.2 Diffusion of regional co-operation model It has been already mentioned that EU serves as a regional cooperation model that other regional groupings attempt to replicate. This type of norm diffusion is contagion. Normative contagion refers to unintentional spread of ideas from the EU to the international system. Diffusion is not the result of EU policy (Manners 2002: 244) or externalisation 4 (Laffan et al. 2000: 179), but merely of the EU presence in the international arena (Bretherton and Vogler 1999: 35). In addition, the EU intentionally exports regional co-operation model through conditionality principle. Conditionality facilitates procedural diffusion and diffusion by transference (Manners 2002: 245) in the sense that it clearly states incentives for the adoption of norms and principles. Procedural diffusion refers to spread of norms through institutionalised relationship between EU and a third party. Example is the enlargement negotiations. (Whitman/Internet 3: 8, Manners 2002: 245). Transference refers to spread of norms through trade relations, financial and technical assistance that EU employs in relations with the third parties (Whitman/Internet 3: 8, Manners 2002: 245) 5. 3.3 On the conditionality principle Conditionality is understood as the linking, by a state or the international organisation, of perceived benefits to another state (such as aid or trade concession), to the fulfilment of economic/and political conditions (Charillon 2004: 258). EU political and economic conditionality set in the 1993 Copenhagen criteria has been the main catalyst of the reforms in the Central and East European countries (Ralchev 2004: 4). Conditionality has been an instrument to the EU as a magnet (Laffan et al. 2000: 50). It is exercised as a positive and negative conditionality. Positive conditionality entails rewards for complying with the given conditions, negative conditionality refers to punishment, e.g. in the form of suspension of aid, for breaching the principles. For instance, it is maintained that conditionality in 4 Externalisation is the spill-over of internal EU issues in the form of international policy or action. 5 My focus is on the spread of regional co-operation model through conditionality principle in the Western Balkans. Although it cannot be claimed that regional co-operation model was not diffused as a result of the EU physical presence in the region; i.e. overt diffusion, it cannot be empirically confirmed either. The same goes for the informational diffusion referring to strategic communications that the EU performs. Thus, I rely on the tangible evidence found in conditionality guidelines to determine what type of diffusion took place. 17

Stabilisation and Association Process (SAP) for the Western Balkans, being the EU reformed approach, is based more on the positive conditionality and rewards than on negative (Pippan 2004: 220). Considering the fact that conditionality is a top-down approach of introducing reforms and can be interpreted as the intrusion in the domestic policy agenda, there is a question whether principles such as democracy and human rights can be enforced in that way. Smith argues that democratic impetus has to come from within the country, while human rights and economic reform can be promoted through conditionality (Smith 2003: 134, 135). Implicitly, similar question will be posed later in relation to the regional co-operation model. This chapter provided a brief overview of a regional co-operation as a goal that the EU pursues in the external relations. By subsuming regional co-operation under the normative set that the EU exports to third countries, I have extended the Manner s theoretical argument on normative power to cover the distinctive aspect of the EU-Western Balkans relations. Hence, EU approach and policy instruments towards the Western Balkans will be analysed next, in the light of regional co-operation model and conditionality principle. 18

4 Exporting regional cooperation to the Western Balkans 4.1 The EU approach towards the region Overall EU policy approach towards the Western Balkans reflects security concerns. Commission stated: The EU s fundamental aim for the Western Balkans region (South East Europe) is to create a situation where military conflict is unthinkable- expanding to the region the area of peace, stability, prosperity and freedom established over the last 50 years by the EU and its member states (Commission/Internet 1). The principle of conditionality was the underlying logic of all policy instruments that EU applied to Western Balkans. Conditionality offered economic, financial and diplomatic incentives to encourage countries down the path of peace consolidation, political and economic reforms. Implicitly, economic and political conditionality reflected the comprehensive EU approach to security (Panebianco 2004: 4), already mentioned as the soft security. In that sense, security doesn t only refer to absence of military conflict and establishment of peaceful co-existence, but also has a political, economic and social dimension to be treated in the post-conflict, post-communist SEE countries. Ilic argues that security approach to the Western Balkans was a distinctive feature in comparison with the EU enlargement policy applied to Central and East European countries (CEEC), essentially reflecting economic and geopolitical concerns (Ilic 2002: 66). I would add that the distinction was the most visible in the conditionality of regional co-operation required from the Western Balkans. This is confirmed in the Commission s statement about the specific approach to the SEE being designed on the path of enlargement policy for CEEC and on the EU model of peace-building and regional rapprochement. The main principle of European construction is close co-operation among countries to achieve common goals, whilst respecting the national sovereignty and territorial integrity (Commission/Internet 2). Hence, security was to be addressed through regional co-operation model that in turn reinforces political stability and democracy- building through political dialogue, encourages economic prosperity through economic co-operation and stimulates solving of common problems such as environmental and trafficking issues (Smith 2003: 84, Anastasakis and Bojcic-Dzelilovic 2002: 1). Charillon asserts that the EU engagement in the SEE region can be considered to be interventionism. Although the EU lacks the instruments to be a hard power, the political objectives it pursues in the Near Abroad, i.e. its 19