Political Science 456 War: Theories and Practices Fall 2016 Professor Danielle Lupton Class Meets: M 7:00-9:30pm Office: 122 Persson Hall Case Library 515 Email: dlupton@colgate.edu Office Hours: T 2:45pm-4:45pm R 11:15am-12:15pm Course Overview This senior seminar delves deeply into the diverse explanations for the causes of war and explores how states engage in international conflict. In this class, we will address critical issues and questions focusing on the conduct of war and international security. Why do states engage in warfare to begin with? Under what conditions is war more or less likely in the international system? Which factors make states more likely win conflicts? In doing so, this course builds upon the knowledge students have already attained as political science and international relations majors while also introducing new ideas and concepts at a high level of intellectual engagement. Students will engage with academic scholarship employing a variety of methodological and conceptual approaches, apply the concepts addressed in class to real-world events, and conduct their own research throughout the course. Course Objectives By the end of this course, students should be able to: Analyze and explain key theoretical traditions across international security Identify distinct theoretical explanations for the causes of war Synthesize and critically evaluate these explanations Clearly articulate their own views on the causes and practices of war based on the theoretical and conceptual foundations addressed throughout the class Apply conceptual approaches of the theories and practices of war to contemporary conflicts Conduct independent research employing either quantitative or qualitative methods, produce clear a thesis and hypotheses based on current literature, and clearly explain their work and arguments to others Methods of Evaluation There are 6 graded elements for the course. These elements and their percentage weightings in the final grade are as follows: In-class participation (20%) Analysis Paper 1 (15%) Analysis Paper 2 (15%) Paper Proposal (5%) Thesis, Hypotheses, & Annotated Bibliography (10%) Final Research Paper (35%) Participation: This seminar is a reading intensive course. Effective participation requires that all students come to class having done all readings and prepared to discuss and debate those readings with others. Analysis Papers: Students will write two analysis papers throughout the semester. These papers are meant to critically engage with the readings from a given week. In doing so, students should not 1
merely summarize the readings, but compare and contrast the arguments of different authors, critique these arguments, explain the relevance of these arguments to current events, and offer solutions to the weaknesses in the authors arguments. Papers should be 6-8 pages, double-spaced, 12 point Times New Roman font with standard 1-inch margins. Papers are due uploaded to Moodle prior to the start of each class. Students will sign-up to write papers for a specified week during the first class session. Students who write papers for a given week are expected to contribute heavily to class discussion and help to lead discussion during that class period. Research Paper: In this course, students will write their own piece of research scholarship. In short, each of you in this class will become scholars of international security. Students will craft their own research question, present a clear thesis, and create new hypotheses to engage with current literature. Students will then test these hypotheses using either quantitative or qualitative methods. While students may write on any topic across international security pertaining to the causes or conduct of war, students must incorporate at least one of the theories addressed in class in their research paper. The final research paper should be 25-30 pages, double-spaced, 12-point Times New Roman Font with standard 1-inch margins. The final research paper is due uploaded to Moodle on Friday, December 9 by 5pm. A first draft of the research paper is due uploaded to Moodle on Friday, November 18 by 5pm. While the first draft is ungraded, students are highly encouraged to submit a well-crafted first draft, as this will allow for better and more helpful comments prior to the final submission of the research paper. Failure to submit a rough draft will negatively impact a student s participation grade. Proposal: To begin the writing process, students will submit a proposal specifying their research topic and question. The proposal is due uploaded to Moodle on Friday, September 23 by 5pm. More information will be available on Moodle. Thesis, Hypotheses, & Annotated Bibliography: After having refined their topic and question, students will submit a clear thesis, well-defined hypotheses, and substantial annotated bibliography. This document is due uploaded to Moodle on Friday, October 21 by 5pm. More information will be available on Moodle. The schedule of due dates for all components of the research paper are as follows: Proposal Friday, September 23 Thesis, Hypothesis, & Annotated Bib Friday, October 21 First Draft Friday, November 18 Final Research Paper Friday, December 9 Academic Integrity Students are expected to comply with Colgate s Academic Honor code in their work for this course, meaning that you will not lie, cheat, steal, or otherwise conduct yourselves dishonorably, and will do something if you observe others engaging in such conduct with other students. All papers must be written individually and based solely on your own analysis of the reading. Ignorance is not an excuse for academic dishonesty, and I have a zero-tolerance policy for plagiarism and academic dishonesty. Citing Sources: You must cite your sources including those provided in the syllabus properly using in-text citations when submitting written work. Anytime you borrow the ideas, concepts, or wording of another author you must correctly cite that author in your paper. Information regarding proper use and citation of published or unpublished sources can be found at the Dean of the College s website: 2
http://www.colgate.edu/offices-andservices/deanofthecollege/academichonorcode/theacademichonorcode/citingsourcesavoidingplagiarism You may also ask me for help in this regard. Grading Policies and Late Work Late submissions of all written work will be deducted a full letter grade (10 points) for each day the assignment is late. Extensions will be granted only in cases of extraordinary personal or family emergency. If you find yourself in such a situation, consult the professor as soon as possible. Late work, without an approved extension, will not be accepted one week after the original due date. It is your responsibility to ensure that your written work is uploaded correctly to Moodle. Technical difficulties are not an excuse for late submissions. If you encounter trouble with Moodle, remember that you can always email the paper directly to the professor or bring a hard copy to class. This course will use the following grading scale for all assignments and exams: A+ 97-100 B+ 87-89 C+ 77-79 D+ 67-69 F <60 A 93-96 B 83-86 C 73-76 D 63-66 A- 90-92 B- 80-82 C- 70-72 D- 60-62 Laptop and Cell Phone Use Laptops are not allowed in class. I highly recommend you print out all readings for class discussion so that you can refer to them in-class. We are a small group, and the use of laptops in class is distracting, both to those on laptops and to others in the course. Students should silence all cell phones and refrain from using their mobile devices throughout the course period. Students may not digitally record the professor or class without written permission from the professor. Students who feel they may need an accommodation for these policies based on the impact of a disability should contact the professor privately to discuss their specific needs. Students should contact Lynn Waldman, Director of Academic Support and Disability Services at 315-228-7375. Required Readings This course has three required books: Theory of International Politics by Kenneth Waltz (ISBN: 978-1-577666-70-7) Calculating Credibility by Daryl Press (ISBN: 978-0-801474-15-6) Why Leaders Fight by Horowitz, Stam, and Ellis (ISBN: 978-1-107655-67-6) These books can be purchased through the Colgate bookstore or through online outlets. A hard copy of each book is also available for loan on 2-hour reserves at Case Library. Journal articles and additional book chapter readings are made available on the course Moodle website under the E-Reserves heading. Additional readings are made available on Moodle under the Online Readings heading. Course Schedule PART I: THEORIES OF WAR 1. Theory and Methods in International Security- August 29 Waltz, Kenneth. 2010. Theory of International Politics (Long Grove: Waveland Press): Chapters 1-3 King, Gary, Robert Keohane, and Sidney Verba. 1994. Designing Social Inquiry (Princeton: Princeton University Press): Chapters 1-3. 3
Avey, Paul, and Michael Desch. 2014. What do Policymakers Want From Us? Results of a Survey of Current and Former Senior Security Decision Makers. International Studies Quarterly 58(2): 227-246. 2. Balances of Power, Alliances, and War - September 5 Waltz, Kenneth. 2010. Theory of International Politics (Long Grove: Waveland Press): Chapters 5-6. Walt, Stephen. 1985. Alliance Formation and the Balance of World Power, International Security 9(4): 3-43. Kugler, Jack and AFK Organski. 1989. The Power Transition: A Retrospective and Prospective Evaluation, in Handbook of War Studies, ed. Manus Midlarsky (New York: Routledge). Wohlforth, William. 2009. Unipolarity, Status Competition, and Great Power War, World Politics 61(1): 28-57. 3. Offensive Realism, Defensive Realism, and the Security Dilemma - September 12 Jervis, Robert. 1978. Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma, World Politics 30(2): 167-214. Glaser, Charles. 1997. The Security Dilemma Revisited, World Politics 50(1): 171-201. Mearsheimer, John. 2001. The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York: Norton): Chapter 2. Layne, Christopher. 2002. The Poster Child for Offensive Realism: America as a Global Hegemon, Security Studies 12(2): 120-164. Taliaferro, Jeffrey. 2000-2001. Security Seeking Under Anarchy: Defensive Realism Revisited, International Security 25(3): 128-161. 4. Misperception and War - September 19 Fearon, James. 1995. Rationalist Explanations for War, International Organization 49(3): 379-414. Jervis, Robert. 1998. War and Misperception, Journal of Interdisciplinary History 18(4): 675-700. Levy, Jack. 1983 Misperception and the Causes of War: Theoretical Linkages and Analytical Problems, World Politics 36(1): 76-99. Duelfer, Charles, and Steven Dyson. 2011. Chronic Misperception and International Conflict: The U.S.-Iraq Experience, International Security 36(1): 73-100. Altman, Daniel. 2015. The Strategist s Curse: A Theory of False Optimism as a Cause of War, Security Studies 24(2): 284-315. Paper Proposal Due September 23 by 5pm 5. Economic Interdependence and Conflict - September 26 Barbieri, Katherine. 1996. Economic Interdependence: A Path to Peace or Source of Interstate Conflict? Journal of Peace Research 33(1): 29-49. Gartzke, Erik. 2007. The Capitalist Peace, American Journal of Political Science 51(1): 166-191. Brooks, Stephen. 2005. Producing Security (Princeton: Princeton University Press): Chapters 1 and 2. 4
Copeland, Dale. 2015. Economic Interdependence and War (Princeton: Princeton University Press): Introduction, Chapters 1 and 2. 6. Diversionary War - October 3 Stein, Arthur. 1976. Conflict and Cohesion, Journal of Conflict Resolution 20(1): 143-172. Tir, Jaroslav. 2010. Territorial Diversion: Diversionary Theory of War and Territorial Conflict, Journal of Politics 72(2): 413-425. Davies, Graeme. 2012. Coercive Diplomacy Meets Diversionary Incentives: The Impact of US and Iranian Domestic Politics during the Bush and Obama Presidencies, Foreign Policy Analysis 8(3): 313 331. Oakes, Amy. 2006. Diversionary War and Argentina s Invasion of the Falkland Islands, Security Studies 15(3): 431-463. 7. Individual Leaders - October 17 Byman, Daniel, and Kenneth Pollack. 2001. Let Us Now Praise Great Men: Bringing the Statesman Back In, International Security 25(4): 107-146. Horowitz, Michael, Allan Stam, and Cali Ellis. 2015. Why Leaders Fight (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). Thesis, Hypotheses, & Annotated Bibliography Due October 21 by 5pm PART II: PRACTICES OF WAR 8. The Impact of Reputation, Resolve, and Credibility - October 24 Press, Daryl. 2005. Calculating Credibility (Ithaca: Cornel University Press). Lupton, Danielle. 2016. Leaders, Perceptions, and Reputations for Resolve, Chapter 1. Mercer, Jonathan. Bad Reputation. Foreignaffairs.com, August 28, 2013. 9. Military Power, Nuclear Weapons, and Coercive Threats - October 31 Schelling, Thomas. 2008. Arms and Influence (New Haven: Yale University Press): Chapter 1. Sechser, Todd. 2010. Goliath s Curse: Coercive Threats and Asymmetric Power, International Organization 64(4): 627-660. Pape, Robert. 1990. Coercive Air Power in the Vietnam War, International Security 15(2): 103-146. Sechser, Todd, and Matthew Fuhrmann. 2013. Crisis Bargaining and Nuclear Blackmail, International Organization 67(1): 173-195. 10. Regime Type and Military Effectiveness - November 7 Reiter, Dan, and Allan Stam. 1998. "Democracy and battlefield military effectiveness," Journal of Conflict Resolution 42(3): 259-277. Desch, Michael. 2002. Democracy and Victory: Why Regime Type Hardly Matters, International Security 27(2): 5-47. Biddle, Stephen, and Stephen Long. 2004. "Democracy and Military Effectiveness A Deeper Look, Journal of Conflict Resolution 48(4): 525-546. Brooks, Risa. 2006. An Autocracy at War: Explaining Egypt s Military Effectiveness, 1967 and 1973, Security Studies 15(3): 396-430. Downes, Alexander. 2009. How Smart and Tough are Democracies? Theories of Democratic Victory, International Security 33(4): 9-51. 5
11. Military Culture, Conflict Escalation, and Battlefield Effectiveness - November 14 Levy, Jack. 1986. Organizational Routines and the Causes of War, International Studies Quarterly 30(2): 193-222. Legro, Jeffrey. 1994. "Military culture and inadvertent escalation in World War II," International Security 18(4): 108-142. Kier, Elizabeth. 1995. "Culture and military doctrine: France between the wars," International Security 19(4): 65-93. Gelpi, Christopher, and Peter Feaver. 2002. "Speak softly and carry a big stick? Veterans in the political elite and the American use of force," American Political Science Review 96(4): 779-793. Pilster, Ulrich, and Tobias Bohmelt. 2011. Coup-Proofing and Military Effectiveness in Interstate Wars, 1967-99, Conflict Management and Peace Science 28(4): 331-350. First Draft Due November 18 by 5pm 12. War Termination - November 28 Reiter, Dan. 2003. Exploring the Bargaining Model of War, Perspectives on Politics 1(1): 27-43. Goemanns, H.E. 2000. War and Punishment (Princeton: Princeton University Press): chapters 1-3. Ramsay, Kristopher. 2008. Settling It on the Field: Battlefield Events and War Termination, Journal of Conflict Resolution 52(6): 850-879. Weisiger, Alex. 2016. Learning from the Battlefield: Information Domestic Politics, and Interstate War Duration, International Organization 70(2): 347-375. 13. The Future of Warfare - December 5 Abrahms, Max, and Philip Potter. 2015. Explaining Terrorism: Leadership Deficits and Militant Group Tactics, International Organization 69(2): 311-342 Wood, Graeme. What ISIS Really Wants, The Atlantic, March 2015. Kello, Lucas. 2013. The Meaning of the Cyber Revolution: Perils to Theory and Statecraft. International Security 38(2): 7-40. Gartzke, Eric, and Jon Lindsay. 2015. Weaving Tangled Webs: Offense, Defense, and Deception in Cyberspace. Security Studies 24(2): 316-348. Final Research Paper Due December 9 by 5pm 6