The Extension of The Non-Proliferation Treaty

The Extension of The Non-Proliferation Treaty Research Paper 94/99 12 October 1994 This paper looks at the preparations for the international conference to be held in the spring of 1995 on the possible extension of the Non-Proliferation Treaty and considers the relevance to this of negotiations on a comprehensive ban on nuclear test explosions. More information on the latter issue may be found in Research Paper 93/73 Nuclear Testing and the UK. Richard Ware International Affairs and Defence Section House of Commons Library

CONTENTS Page Introduction 1 I The Treaty 1 II Parties to the Treaty 3 III The NPT Bargain 3 IV Progress in nuclear arms control negotiations 5 V The Question of Security Assurances 6 VI Possible outcomes of the conference 7 VII The European Union - a matter for joint action 10 VIII The "threshold" states and other causes of concern 11 Sources 16

Introduction Only five states - the USA, the Russian Federation, China, France and the UK - openly possess stocks of nuclear warheads. The vast majority of other states in the world have accepted a legal ban on the acquisition of nuclear weapons in return for certain assurances given by the nuclear five, including a pledge to work towards nuclear disarmament. The Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) which contains these mutual undertakings was negotiated in the 1960s and came into force in 1970. It was to be effective for 25 years, but can be extended indefinitely, or for a limited period, by a conference which is due to meet in April- May 1995. A very small number of states, some of which had supposedly accepted the NPT and some not, have taken covert steps towards the acquisition of nuclear weapons and, when this has been perceived as a threat to world security (Iraq, North Korea), they have become the object of action or threatened action by the United Nations Security Council. It is impossible to prove to what extent the existence of the NPT as such has really helped to prevent the large scale proliferation of nuclear weapon possessors which was widely anticipated and feared in the 1960s. There are no doubt other factors, including cost and fear of retaliation, which have played a part. However, the NPT has served as a valuable framework for the control of the trade in nuclear materials and the bargain between the possessors and non-possessors of nuclear weapons which lies at the heart of the treaty has more than symbolic importance. It is not a foregone conclusion that the 1995 Conference will run smoothly and conclude with the indefinite extension of the Treaty which is sought by the five nuclear weapon states and many other developed countries. Some of the largest and most influential of the developing countries which are parties to the Treaty question whether the nuclear weapon powers have held sufficiently to their side of the bargain and propose that the extension of the Treaty should be limited accordingly. I The Treaty The NPT was concluded in 1968 and came into force from 1970. The duration of the treaty is not specified, but under Article X(2) a conference is to be summoned after twenty five years in order to decide whether the Treaty shall "continue in force indefinitely, or shall be extended for an additional fixed period or periods", a formulation which leaves room for some legal ambiguity about the extension decision (see section vi). The conference is due to meet in New York from 17 April to 12 May 1995 under the chairmanship of Ambassador Jayantha Dhanapala of Sri Lanka. 1

The main obligations placed on the five states possessing nuclear weapons as of 1968, including the United Kingdom, are: and: "not to transfer to any recipient whatsoever nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices... and not in any way to assist, encourage or induce any nonnuclear-weapon state to... acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices" (Article I) 1 "to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control" (Article VI) The second of these commitments applies equally to the non-nuclear-weapon possessing parties which also undertake not to: "receive the transfer from any transferor whatsoever of nuclear weapons or nuclear explosive devices... not to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices; and not to seek or receive any assistance in the manufacture of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices" (Article II) and to accept safeguards administered by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) over: "all source and special fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear activities within the territory of such State, under its jurisdiction, or carried out under its control anywhere" (Article III). Under Article IV the states which renounce nuclear weapons are guaranteed access, as an "inalienable right", to the peaceful benefits of nuclear energy. Article VI refers to the technology of peaceful nuclear explosions (for tunnelling, river diversion etc) which, in the 1960s when the treaty was negotiated, was believed to have a significant potential, but which is now generally regarded as environmentally unsafe. No such explosions have taken place since the Soviet Union ended its programme in 1987. 1 The full text of the Treaty is in Cmnd 4474 and is also reproduced in the SIPRI Year Book 1969 and in Müller et al, Nuclear Non-proliferation and Global Order (1994). 2

The remaining articles are technical and procedural. Under Article VIII(3) the operation of the Treaty has been reviewed at special conferences held at five-yearly intervals. The review conferences have twice ended with the adoption of a consensus document and twice not (in 1980 and 1990), but this has not hitherto affected the validity of the treaty itself. Since the treaty text does not actually state that the 25-year conference replaces a routine five-year review conference there has been some confusion about its designation as "review conference" or "extension conference", and it was decided at the preparatory committee in 1993 to refer to it merely as "the 1995 Conference of the Parties to the Treaty...". The outcome of the 1995 conference is clearly more important that those of the review conferences because the future of the treaty is at stake. II Parties to the Treaty It was always intended that the NPT should become universal. Of the states officially possessing nuclear weapons, the USA, UK and USSR were original signatories, but France and China acceded only in 1992. The great majority of non nuclear weapon states are now members - 160 in all, making 165 parties when the 5 nuclear weapon states are included. Taiwan also accepts the NPT, but is not regarded as a state in international conferences. Among the more significant non-parties are Israel, India, Pakistan and Ukraine, though the latter may accede late this year following parliamentary ratification. Argentina and Brazil have yet to accede to the NPT, but have recently acceded to the Treaty of Tlatelolco which creates a nuclear-free zone in South America and therefore has similar effects. Argentina, Chile and Algeria have all expressed an intention to accede to the NPT in due course. III The NPT Bargain The NPT has been generally perceived as striking a bargain between the Nuclear Weapon States (NWS) and the Non Nuclear Weapon States (NNWS), whereby the former will pursue nuclear arms control and disarmament agreements in good faith among themselves and assist the NNWS in the use of safe civil nuclear energy, while the latter will forego any attempt to acquire nuclear weapons for themselves. The NNWS do not form a particularly coherent bloc. Several key regional powers (India, Pakistan, Israel, Brazil) have stayed outside the NPT. Among the NNWS states party to the Treaty there are a few which have the advanced technology, military delivery systems and aspirations to regional leadership which make nuclear weapons a plausible option and a mass 3

of others which have no conceivable interest in acquiring them. On the whole these latter states feel more vulnerable to possible nuclear threats from their more powerful regional neighbours than from any of the five declared NWS. Non-proliferation measures, including strict controls on the trade in technology related to nuclear weapons, are therefore in the interests of the majority of NNWS, regardless of the posture of the NWS. At the same time those larger and more populous NNWS which have chosen not to seek a nuclear military potential (eg Mexico, Indonesia, Nigeria, Egypt) regard the privileged status of the NWS within the NPT regime as an affront to the equality of states which is a principle of the UN Charter. Ideally they would like to see the NWS disarm and the threshold states be strictly controlled and deterred from proceeding any further. At past review conferences states such as these have used the "NPT bargain" to pressurise the NWS into pursuing their obligations under Article VI more actively and in particular have regarded the achievement of a comprehensive test ban treaty (CTBT) as a touchstone. It was the lack of progress by the NWS on a CTBT which formed the main bone of contention at the fourth review conference in 1990. On the whole the NPT has represented a good deal for most states and is valued for this reason, but there is an ambiguity in the original treaty which is now becoming more apparent. The preamble and Article VI both refer to "the cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and... nuclear disarmament". These words can be interpreted as constituting an implicit long-term commitment to complete nuclear disarmament by all states, but "nuclear disarmament" may also be interpreted as a process rather than an ultimate goal. In the context of the 1960s the distinction seemed academic. In the 1990s the quantitative nuclear arms race between the superpowers has effectively ceased and both the USA and Russia are dismantling warheads. The US representative at the third preparatory committee for the 1995 Conference emphasised that "the US is currently destroying approximately 2000 nuclear weapons a year, which is as fast as is technically possible". In these circumstances "nuclear disarmament" is clearly being implemented and may continue along present lines into the next century. However, the ultimate destination is still unclear. None of the declared nuclear weapon states is yet ready to anticipate what its stance on nuclear weapons is likely to be when the reductions already projected have been implemented in full and when decisions about the eventual replacement of the more modern existing systems, like Trident, have to be taken. A limited extension of the NPT now would create a further decision point on the permanency or otherwise of the treaty, perhaps in 2005 or 2020, at which time, assuming that non-proliferation is upheld in the mean time, the NWS would be forced to clarify their position. 4

IV Progress in nuclear arms control negotiations Under Article VI of the NPT all states are called upon to pursue both nuclear and conventional disarmament, but the main focus tends to be on the steps towards nuclear disarmament taken by the five nuclear-weapon states. Since 1990 the NWS have achieved a number of significant arms control agreements (especially the two Strategic Arms Reduction Treaties - START 1 and START II), a moratorium on nuclear tests is being observed by four of the five NWS (but not China) and negotiations on a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) have begun in the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva. Preliminary discussion has also begun on a possible multilateral treaty to ban the production of fissile materials, a proposal made by President Clinton in September 1993 but for which the Conference on Disarmament has yet to agree the terms of a negotiating mandate. Of these actual and proposed treaties, it is the CTBT which is still regarded as central to the long-term future of the Non-Proliferation Treaty because without it the five nuclear weapon states are free to continue the development of ever more sophisticated nuclear weapons, continually widening the gap between themselves and the NNWS. The five now accept the desirability of a CTBT in principle, but there are differences over the timescale and there are lobbies within the defence establishment of each country which have reservations about a complete and immediate cessation of nuclear weapon testing, often giving emphasis to the need for further warhead testing on grounds of safety. 2 The draft CTBT still contains numerous square-bracketed (non-agreed) sections and it is now unlikely that the work will have been completed before the 1995 NPT Conference, unless dramatic progress can be made either at inter-sessional talks this winter or early in the new year when the Conference on Disarmament resumes. 3 When the main 1994 negotiating session concluded on 7 September the issues of principle outstanding included: the precise scope of the proposed treaty, the status of the implementing organisation, the nature and stringency of the verification regime and the conditions for entry into force. According to Nuclear Proliferation News, 16 September 1994, the central area of disagreement lies in the scope and definition of the treaty and "the bulk of the responsibility for reaching agreement on scope lies with the P5 - the five nuclear-weapon states and permanent members of the UN Security Council". At issue under this heading is whether or not the treaty should allow laboratory ("hydro-nuclear") tests and what the permitted threshold for these should be and whether any allowance should be made for testing in exceptional circumstances related to safety. There is also some disagreement about whether the eventual treaty should ban test explosions only, or whether it should cover all 2 See Library Research Paper 93/73 on Nuclear Testing and the UK. 3 See Nuclear Proliferation News, Dfax, 2, 16 September 1994. 5

forms of testing including the computer-simulated tests on which the nuclear weapon states expect to rely in future. Another area of contention concerns the circumstances in which a party might withdraw from the future treaty. It has been agreed that a state might withdraw if its supreme interests were threatened by "extraordinary events" - language found also in Article X of the NPT - but there is no agreed interpretation of this phrase. Moreover the United States has proposed that states should have an opportunity to withdraw even without such a threat after a fixed interval to coincide with the first projected review conference. 4 Thus, while the principle of a comprehensive ban on nuclear test explosions is accepted, there are many significant areas of disagreement about the form of the treaty. V The Question of Security Assurances When the NPT was being negotiated many non-aligned states (ie those which were allied neither with the USA nor the USSR) demanded guarantees from the NWS that they would never be attacked with nuclear weapons ("negative assurances") and also that they would be assisted by the NWS if attacked or threatened by nuclear weapons ("positive assurances"). Positive assurances were given in the form of a UN Security Council resolution and declarations (to which China and France were not party) in 1968 5 and negative assurances were issued individually by the NWS after the NPT had come into force. There has been a long-standing demand on behalf of many NNWS for these security assurances to be put in the form of a more specific legally binding multilateral treaty and some would make this a condition of their agreement to indefinite extension of the NPT. Egypt, which feels vulnerable in the face of Israeli nuclear weapons was an early champion of this cause and in recent years it has been taken up vigorously by Nigeria on behalf of the non-aligned movement. The states of Eastern Europe, including those which formed part of the USSR, also have an interest in receiving renewed assurances from Russia. President Yeltsin said in his UN speech of 26 September that more precise security guarantees are required in order to reassure the NNWS. He went on to propose a special Security Council meeting at Foreign Minister level to adopt a resolution on positive security guarantees. 6 A new resolution of this kind would bind in France and China which remained 4 Nuclear Proliferation News, 16 September 1994, 5 5 (S/RES/255) 6 Nuclear Proliferation News, 30 September 1994, 5 6

aloof from the process in 1968. John Simpson comments in the latest SIPRI Year Book: "Security assurances have great symbolic value as a means of offering some substitute for the possession of nuclear weapons until a totally disarmed world is achieved and, in their negative form, as a method of reducing the utility of these weapons. However, the practical problems of reformulating them, together with the end of the bilateral structures of the cold war which were their original stimulus and the crowded agenda of the Conference on Disarmament (CD), suggest that progress may be slow. 7 VI Possible outcomes of the conference The 1990 review conference suffered to some extent from the breakdown of the familiar 3 bloc system (western, eastern, non-aligned third world) which had developed at UN conferences during the cold war and which prevailed in the 1960s when the NPT was originally being negotiated. The existence at earlier conferences of three relatively well co-ordinated and disciplined groups sometimes made complex negotiations between very large numbers of delegations easier than it would otherwise have been and allowed bargains to be struck around common interests. The collapse of the Soviet-led eastern group and increasing conflicts within the non-aligned have, in general, made universal conferences more difficult to manage and have added to the unpredictability of the outcome. Since most of the former communist states in Europe now have interests and concerns which they share with the western group there is also a growing tendency for international conferences to drift into North-South conflict. It is most unlikely that there will be a majority vote in favour of terminating the NPT in 1995, but it is conceivable that there could be a failure to reach any decision by majority (as occurred at the 1990 fourth review), in which case the legal status of the treaty would become dubious. 8 The draft rules which are being discussed at the preparatory committee meetings include provision for the Conference to be kept open (although possibly in recess) until a decision is reached. This could leave the status of the treaty in limbo, but avoids the difficulty created by the fact that there is no clear authorization in the treaty for another extension conference to be held in the future. This problem would also arise in the event of 7 SIPRI Year Book 1994, p.613 8 See Epstein & Szasz, "Extension of the Non-Proliferation Treaty", Oxford Research Group Current Decisions Report 14, 55 7

a decision to extend the treaty for a limited period (see below). In practice the main argument revolves around the choice between indefinite extension or extension for a limited period. In the latter case it is possible that conditions might be placed on further extension. Given that it is now unlikely that the CTBT will have been concluded when the 1995 conference takes place, some states may insist on a fixed-term extension in order to retain future leverage over a CTBT. Waverers may be influenced by their perceptions of the will of the NWS to achieve a permanent CTBT in the near future. While the fate of the CTBT is likely to dominate proceedings, there are other contentious issues which could also present obstacles to a consensus on extension of the NPT. These include the adequacy or otherwise of the existing security assurances offered by the NWS to the NNWS (see section v above) and the guarantee of access to nuclear technology for peaceful purposes to all parties. Iran, for example, has a long-standing complaint that it is discriminated against on political grounds. The USA, Russia, Japan, the European Union and most of the rest of Europe have come out firmly in favour of indefinite extension. President Yeltsin told the United Nations General Assembly on 26 September 1994 that, "next spring when the conference of parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty takes place, it is essential to adopt a decision to extend it unconditionally and in an open-ended way". 9 The British Government upholds the European Union position on the indefinite extension of the NPT, as does the Labour Party. 10 At its annual conference in September 1994 the Liberal Democrat Party accepted a policy amendment in favour of a limited extension. 11 The proposal for a limited extension also receives considerable support from western-based nuclear disarmament campaigns because of their anxiety that the NPT helps to entrench the possession of nuclear weapons by the NWS and because a decision on indefinite extension could lessen the pressure on the NWS to conclude a comprehensive test ban treaty. A number of states, including Indonesia and Iran have signalled that they will press for a fixed extension, possibly with conditions attached. Some Arab states may oppose extension as long as Israel is allowed to possess a nuclear potential outside of the NPT system and some have already signalled that the proposed future treaty to end the production of fissile materials for weapons should take account of existing unsafeguarded stocks, such as those 9 Nuclear Proliferation News, 30 September 1994 10 HC Debates, Vol 243, c248w, Vol 245, c523w: letter from David Clark MP to The Independent, 6 October 1993 11 The Independent, 20 September 1994 8

believed to have been acquired by Israel. At the third meeting of the preparatory conference in Geneva in September 1994 a number of other non-nuclear states expressed support for extension for a limited period and Iran declared that an indefinite extension would be "deeply alarming". 12 The majority of developing countries have yet to declare their position on the extension issue. Not all of the 164 parties to the treaty are likely to attend the conference. For many smaller and poorer countries with few diplomats and arms control specialists and little immediate concern with such matters it is difficult to justify full participation. Around 120-130 delegations are likely to attend and vote, but any decision has to be made by a majority of parties to the NPT. The number requires for a majority currently 8 stands at 83. Given the importance of the decision, the supporters of indefinite extension would prefer the extension of the NPT to be agreed by consensus in 1995, ie without a vote rather than by a majority vote. A determined effort to force a vote by those states opposed to indefinite extension could succeed if supported by around 40 states. In 1990 a group of 14 states led by Mexico prevented the final adoption of a consensus document 13, but a larger number could emerge at the 1995 conference. A compromise designed to avoid a divisive vote could centre on a long and renewable extension rather than an indefinite or fixed one. For example there could be a decision to extend for a further 25 years, with continuing five-yearly reviews (these will continue in any case as long as the treaty continues in force). However, there would be problems in framing such a compromise because it would have to acquire the same weight in international treaty law as the existing Article X(2) of the Treaty in order to empower a further decision-making conference in 2020. There is nothing in the present treaty which expressly authorises a second extension conference at some date in the future. This being so, the treaty could expire at the end of a fixed extension period, according to one interpretation. A continuation of the NPT legal regime could then be secured only by means of a new treaty or treaty amendment under Article VIII, either of which would be difficult and time-consuming to secure. Another interpretation is that, far from lapsing after another fixed period the treaty would actually continue indefinitely because there would be no provision for another conference to terminate it. The result of these contradictory interpretations is that the limited extension options are shrouded in legal uncertainty. By contrast, a simple decision to extend the treaty indefinitely would fulfil the requirement of Article X(2) and make the treaty permanent. The view that only one extension conference is legally possible within the constraints of the 12 Acronym no.4, September 1994 13 Müller et al, 82,99 9

existing treaty is not universally held, though it has been put forward on behalf of the presidency of the 14, by the USA and some other western countries 15. An alternative view is that a decision by the majority of parties of the treaty to interpret the treaty as if further periodic extensions were permissable by implication would be sufficient and it could be backed up by the UN Security Council if any parties to the treaties tried to use the legal uncertainty as an excuse to escape from their treaty obligations. An attempt at the third preparatory conference to obtain a definitive legal interpretation of this point, presumably by means of an advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice, was defeated 16. To some extent the legalistic debate may seem unreal. It is unlikely that any state will take the momentous decision to develop nuclear weapons because of the possible existence of a legal loophole in the NPT or that a state which is determined to pursue this course, as Iraq was before 1991, will be deterred by the fact that it is constrained by the NPT. The underlying issue is whether or not a group of a dozen or so potential proliferators see their national advantage lying on balance with non-proliferation. The authors of the latest SIPRI study conclude that, "In the run-up to the 1995 NPT Extension Conference, the essential question is whether the NWS are capable and willing of devising and implementing a strategy for nuclear arms control and reduction that mitigates the misgivings of the NNWS, particularly (but not exclusively) from the Third World, to a degree that the nuclear nonproliferation regime can be upheld...". 17 VII The European Union - a matter for joint action Following the accession of France to the NPT in 1992, all 12 member states of the European Union and all four of the states preparing to accede are parties. 18 Even before France joined the NPT there was a large measure of co-ordination of policy through the European Political Cooperation system. On 18 July the General Affairs Council of the EU decided unanimously to make their preparations for the 1995 conference a matter for "joint action" in the sense of article J.3 of the Treaty on European Union (the Maastricht Treaty), the first time that this mechanism has been used for an issue of security policy. The 12 could, in theory, decide to make further decisions on this joint action by qualified majority vote under Article J3.2. 14 EU NPT/CONF.1995/PC.111/14 15 See also Epstein & Szasz 56 and note 6; Simpson & Howlett, 58-9 16 Acronym No 4, p.6 17 Müller et al, 161 18 Austria, Finland, Sweden, Norway 10

According to the Council press release: The joint action is intended to strengthen the international non-proliferation system by promoting the objectives of the universality of the Treaty, ie that all States should accede to it, and of its indefinite and unconditional renewal. The joint action provides for EU initiatives, which will include demarches by the Troika, 19 with the aim of broadening the consensus on the EU s approach to non- proliferation prior to the Conference in 1995. As a result of these decisions the EU has already begun to speak with a single voice in the preparations for the 1995 Conference. One incidental effect of this is that when references are made to British and French nuclear weapons, for example during the discussion of Article VI compliance at the third preparatory committee, the British and French representatives do not necessarily have to respond separately. 20 VIII The "threshold" states and other causes of concern Obviously many states have the technological capability to create nuclear weapons, but have chosen not to do so, either because they saw no strategic utility in the possession of nuclear weapons or because they felt sufficiently protected by alliance with a nuclear-weapon possessing state such as the USA. Arms control specialists generally classify as potential nuclear proliferators only states for which there could be a possible intent to create weapons. Where there is some evidence of a will to turn civil nuclear or research facilities into the precursors of a military potential the states are sometimes referred to as "threshold states" in the context of the NPT. Possible intent is difficult to define, but most of the "threshold states" have a relatively recent history of conflict with a powerful neighbouring state, have troubled or fragile relations with the five nuclear weapon-possessing permanent members of the UN Security Council and are driven by the knowledge that other states in their region could be evolving a nuclear weapon potential. Precise definitions of "threshold" states vary. The Arms Control Reporter defines Israel, India and Pakistan as "suspected" nuclear weapon states; Algeria, Iraq, Iran, Libya, North Korea and South Korea as "problem" states; and only Taiwan as a "threshold" state. The SIPRI YearBook 1993 classified Israel, India and Pakistan as the "threshold" states. Israel has between 50 and 300 nuclear weapons according to SIPRI and also has advanced 19 ie diplomatic initiatives taken by the current EU presidency in conjunction with representatives of the previous presidency and the next presidency. In the second half of 1994 this means Germany, assisted by Greece and France 20 Acronym No 4, p.12 11

missile technology. Like India and Pakistan it is regarded by some sources as an undeclared nuclear weapon state rather than a "threshold" state. The IISS Military Balance 21 comments that "it is widely believed that Israel has a nuclear capability with up to 100 warheads". The maximum likely missile range is put at 1,500km. Pakistan confirmed in 1992 that it has the capability to produce at least one nuclear device. Ministers and ex-ministers have hinted at this at frequent intervals over the years, although "indiscrete" comments are usually followed by denials. This may in itself be regarded as a deterrence strategy aimed at India. US intelligence sources believe that no weapon is actually kept in assembled form, but that one could be assembled rapidly in a crisis. According to the CIA, "the distinction between whether or not those weapons are, in fact, assembled or only able to be assembled within a few days is a very small distinction" (ACR, 454.B.168 - the comment was applied equally to Pakistan and India). Pakistan is not known to have tested a nuclear device 22, but there have been suggestions of a so-called "cold test" in 1987 23. Pakistan s missile programme has depended mainly on Chinese technology. China was supposed to halt such transfers under pressure from the USA, but is believed to have continued covert supplies. India is in a similar position to Pakistan, with the difference that it has actually held one test explosion (in 1974). India also has a larger missile development programme, partly drawing on Russian technology. This is officially presented as "an experiment in re-entry technology". 24 There have been suggestions that if the BJP took power it would officially declare India a nuclear weapon state, but the party has divided views on this. 25 India has declined to accede to the NPT which it regards as discriminatory and takes part in the discussions only from the side-line. The asymmetry between India and Pakistan illustrates one of the inherent difficulties of the NPT regime. Pakistan regards its own security requirements as being primarily related to India and has indicated that it would be prepared to accede to the NPT if India did the same. India, by contrast, regards itself as vulnerable to nuclear threats from China, a declared NWS under the NPT, and therefore rejects the NPT regime on principle. 26 21 The annual survey published by the International Institute for Strategic Studies 22 SIPRI Year Book 1993, 247 23 Arms Control Reporter, 454.B.180 24 Military Balance, 150 25 Arms Control Report, 454.B.171,176; see also Arnett,E. "Military Technology: the Case of India" 357-362, SIPRI Year Book 1993 26 J. Simpson & D. Howlett, "The NPT Renewal Conference: Stumbling towards 1995", International Security, Summer 1994, 52 12

North Korea signed and ratified a safeguards agreement under Article III of the NPT in 1992, but suspicions continue about the sincerity of its renunciation of nuclear weapon ambitions and in March 1993 North Korea announced its intention to withdraw from the NPT. In 1992 North Korea admitted that it was building a "laboratory" capable of reprocessing plutonium which could be used for nuclear weapons. A subsequent IAEA inspection revealed that the facility in question is a full-scale reprocessing plant. There have been continual disputes with the IAEA over its inspections. North Korea has also continued quite openly to develop ballistic missiles which it has sold to Iran and Syria. 27 There have been unconfirmed reports that North Korea may already have sufficient plutonium for one weapon and that it may have attempted to test a device underground. 28 Joseph Bermudez in Jane s Intelligence Review 29 argued that North Korea s primary objective is to produce weapons and that it already had the capability to produce a small, crude, enriched uranium bomb. The conclusion of the IISS Military Balance 1994-1995 is that "there is still no categorically confirmed information over North Korean possession of nuclear weapons". There is, however, strong evidence of a desire to acquire missiles which could deliver nuclear warheads within a range of 1000km. An alternative explanation is that the isolated North Korean regime is attempting to increase its international bargaining power by fuelling suspicions. Talks between US and North Korean officials are now once more under way following the death of Kim Il Sung and the North Koreans seem to be seeking substantial "compensation" should they be forced to give up their existing nuclear facilities. South Korea also showed interest in a military nuclear programme in the early 1970s, but came under heavy US pressure to desist. One of the reasons for the decision of the Carter Administration to keep US forces in South Korea was that otherwise the South Koreans might have insisted on developing an independent nuclear weapon programme. The civil nuclear programme has subsequently been subject to stringent safeguards. It is said that the underlying anxiety felt in Japan (see below) is that a unified Korea might eventually develop nuclear weapons on the basis of the technology being developed in the north and the wealth of the south. 30 Iran is an NPT state with a safeguards agreement but there are some doubts about its compliance and future intentions. The CIA has claimed that Iran has "a clandestine nuclear weapon programme which could produce a nuclear weapon by the year 2000". 31 There have 27 SIPRI Year Book 1993, 245-6 28 Arms Control Report, 457B.179,181 29 September 1991, p.405 30 Selig Harrison in International Herald Tribune, 2 November 1993 31 SIPRI Year Book 1993, 251 13

been sporadic, but unconfirmed reports of nuclear warheads from the former Soviet Union being taken secretly to Iran, but Russian intelligence sources believe that Iranian nuclear weapons are at least ten years away. 32 The IAEA has found no evidence of violations of the safeguards agreement. 33 While there is a general suspicion of Iranian intentions, there is as yet little hard evidence and, as the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists has pointed out, much of the discussion is pure speculation. 34 According to A. Ehteshami in the recent Oxford Research Group publication, 35 "Although Tehran regards the possession of nuclear weapons as un-islamic, it does not try to disguise its interest in such a capability, concerned as it is by the security implications of the political and geostrategic developments in and around the Middle East." While some states are still selling nuclear-related technologies to Iran, the USA has been campaigning for a general boycott on the grounds that Iran s attempts to acquire certain nuclear technologies were inconsistent with peaceful uses. Iran has responded by carrying out a strong diplomatic offensive in the run-up to the 1995 Conference and is alleging contraventions of its rights under Article IV of the NPT. It seems that Iran will try to increase the pressure on the West to lift its embargo by seeking to block indefinite extension of the NPT and there have been rumours that it may withdraw from the NPT altogether if this fails. 36 Iraq, which is also a party to the NPT, has reluctantly cooperated with the UN committee which has been supervising the destruction of the nuclear capability which it was assembling before the Gulf War, and reports indicate that the capability has been effectively dismantled. There are worries that Iraq could resume nuclear weapon development were the pressure to be relaxed and recent displays of Iraqi belligerence will have strengthened this concern. Libya has a research reactor and Col Gadafy has occasionally hinted at a bomb programme, but in recent years he has described such reports as deliberate US disinformation. Algeria has research reactors obtained from Argentina and China, but announced that it would sign the NPT at the end of 1993 and the reactors were already under voluntary safeguards agreements. There is little hard evidence of a bomb programme, but there were suspicions of contacts with Iraq before 1992 and there are continuing anxieties about the attitude of a possible future fundamentalist regime, particularly in the event of Iran breaking out of the NPT regime. 32 Arms Control Reporter, 453.B.152,156 33 ibid. 453.B.161 34 Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, March 1992, p.11 35 Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, p.4 36 Acronym No 4, 18 14

Syria is sometimes regarded as a "problem" country, but there is no hard evidence. Both Russian and US intelligence sources have discounted any capability or intention (ACR, 453.B.151). South Africa has now acknowledged and renounced its previous efforts to develop a nuclear capability. Brazil and Argentina, which were once regarded as threshold states, are now no longer regarded as having nuclear weapon ambitions. Taiwan probably has the technological capability to develop weapons and there have been occasional rumours of intention, but little hard evidence. Occasional statements by Japanese ministers have suggested a deliberate policy of maintaining a nuclear weapon potential which could be translated into a capability in the event of North Korea developing weapons and US extended deterrence failing. 37 Because of statements such as these, and the large amount of plutonium available, Japan is sometimes regarded as a threshold state by other states in the region. Selig Harrison, 38 notes that discussion of a possible future nuclear weapon status is no longer taboo in Japan, a point also made in the new edition of the IISS Military Balance. 39 Japan in a category by itself as the only state which has actually experienced a nuclear attack. It clearly has the necessary economic potential, access to plutonium and the scientific know-how to develop its own weapons, but strongly upholds the non-proliferation regime and is peculiarly aware of the dangers which it would face should that regime break down. RJW/JML 37 Arms Control Reporter, 602.B.250; 602.E-2.1 38 International Herald Tribune, 2 November 1993 39 p.147 15

Sources The Arms Control Reporter Nuclear Proliferation News, Dfax The Military Balance 1994-1995, IISS H. Müller, D. Fischer & W. Kötter, Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Global Order, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 1994. Strengthening the Non-Proliferation Treaty: Decisions Made, Decisions Deferred, Acronym No 4, September 1994. D. Albright & M. Hibbs, "Spotlight shifts to Iran", Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, March 1992. D. Lockwood & J.B. Wolfsthal, "Nuclear weapon developments and proliferation", SIPRI Year Book 1993, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 1994. E. Arnett, "Military Technology: the Case of India", SIPRI Year Book 1994, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 1994. J. Simpson, "Nuclear arms control and an extended non-proliferation regime", SIPRI Year Book 1994 J. Simpson & D. Howlett, "The NPT Renewal Conference: Stumbling towards 1995", International Security, Summer 1994 William Epstein & Paul Szasz, "Extension of the Non-Proliferation Treaty", Oxford Research Group Current Decisions Report 14, August 1994 A. Ehteshami, "Iran and Iraq" in Oxford Research Group Current Decisions Report 14, August 1994 S. Burnie, "Plutonium and nuclear weapons in North-east Asia", Oxford Research Group Current Decisions Report 14. Edward Mortimer, "Terms still to be decided", Financial Times, 12 September 1994 16

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