ORGANISATION FOR THE PROHIBITION OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS ACHIEVEMENTS OF THE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION AND CHALLENGES AHEAD ADDRESS BY AMBASSADOR AHMET ÜZÜMCÜ DIRECTOR-GENERAL AT THE GENEVA CENTRE FOR SECURITY POLICY GENEVA 23 MAY 2011 1
Ambassador Fred Tanner, Dr Khalid Koser, Dr Pal Sidhu, Ladies and Gentlemen, I am delighted to be at the Geneva Centre for Security Policy once again. My tenure in Geneva as Ambassador of Turkey until last year brought me in close contact with the Centre which is fast developing a global reputation for its top quality programmes. I regard it a privilege to have also served as a Foundation Council Member of the GCSP. This public discussion on the achievements and challenges of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) is most welcome because the Convention and what it has accomplished remains an understated part of the history of disarmament. The only international treaty, with near universal acceptance, that bans an entire class of weapons of mass destruction under conditions of verification deserves a more salient mention. And, it could offer lessons for other initiatives especially at a time of renewed hopes for progress in disarmament and non-proliferation. I am therefore grateful for this opportunity to discuss both the CWC regime - as it functions to produce concrete results - as well as its future in a highly dynamic international situation. 2
Behind this landmark agreement stretches a long history that is tragic in one respect but inspiring in another. The sad part relates to the fact that chemical weapons became a category of weapons of mass destruction that have been used most frequently, both in the battlefield and against innocent civilians. On the other hand is the exemplary determination of the international community to outlaw these weapons; a resolve that spans a century of efforts leading eventually to the conclusion of the CWC in 1992 and its entry into force as a new element of international law in 1997. An outstanding feature of this progression is the creation of a new international organisation with an unprecedented mandate to implement what were until then untested methods and procedures in the field of verification. In a relatively short span of 14 years, the OPCW has established both a notable record of accomplishment and a reputation for success. I will briefly describe to you how our work is slowly but surely contributing to strengthening norms not only in the context of disarmament and non-proliferation, but equally, in the field of multilateralism. Historically, the first major attempt to ban chemical weapons is represented by the 1899 The Hague Convention that proscribed the use of projectiles for the dissemination of what were at the time known as poison gases. 3
Unfortunately, the existence of this legal norm did not prevent the use of chemical weapons on a massive scale during World War I. Chemical weapons claimed 1.3 million casualties during this conflict with over 90,000 deaths. Efforts to establish a wider legal prohibition led to the conclusion of the 1925 Geneva Protocol that banned the first use of both chemical as well as biological weapons. The Geneva Protocol, did not, however, prohibit production of chemical weapons since the right of retaliation that the Protocol implicitly recognised, allowed countries to produce and stockpile chemical weapons. In our own times, chemical weapons were used in the Iran-Iraq conflict and by the former regime in Iraq against its own people. They have been used also by terrorists in the well-known attack on the Tokyo subway. Even more recently, militant groups in Iraq are known to have used chlorine gas with conventional explosives in a series of attacks that killed and wounded scores of innocent civilians. These incidents serve as stark reminders that even the most common chemicals can be misused to terrorise and to threaten security. The general desire to improve upon or to establish new and effective international legal instruments was encoded in the Charter of the United Nations which of course was inspired by the horrors of the Second World War. The Charter establishes the principles and mechanisms for the realization of a peaceful world order. Together with identifying the goals of social and economic development of all peoples, as well as the promotion of 4
international peace and security, it specifically mandates the General Assembly to consider the general principles of co-operation in the maintenance of international peace and security, including the principles governing disarmament and the regulation of armaments (Article 11, para. 1, Chapter IV). Such principles and objectives, including in the area of weapons of mass destruction were further elaborated in the resolutions and decisions of the United Nations. Both deliberative as well as negotiating bodies were setup to realise concrete results in pursuance of these objectives. When the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) was concluded in 1972, it also affirmed the recognized objective of effective prohibition of chemical weapons and bound the States Parties to continue negotiations with a view to achieve an agreement on effective measures to eliminate chemical weapons. After almost 20 years of negotiations, the Chemical Weapons Convention was opened for signature in Paris on 13 January 1993 as an instrument designed for a complete and comprehensive prohibition on chemical weapons. Unlike the preceding legal instruments, the Chemical Weapons Convention does not just prohibit the use of chemical weapons but aims to eliminate them altogether and forever. The Convention is the first multilateral treaty that not only establishes a comprehensive prohibition against an entire class of weapons of mass 5
destruction, but does so on non-discriminatory terms and under conditions of verification. The OPCW oversees the overall implementation of the provisions of the CWC. Together with carrying out the verification tasks entrusted to it, the OPCW provides a forum for consultation and cooperation among States Parties and, when needed, facilitates clarification, co-operation and factfinding that contribute to confidence-building among them. Destruction of chemical weapons being one of our core objectives, the OPCW has thus far verified the destruction of 65% of the 71,000 MT of declared chemical weapons stockpiles. The Convention requires the constant presence of OPCW inspectors as long as operations are being carried out at custom-made destruction facilities in the possessor States Parties. The Convention establishes not only the obligation to destroy chemical weapons but also the facilities that produced those weapons. Over the past 12 years, under OPCW verification, States Parties have successfully destroyed or permanently converted these facilities to peaceful purposes as allowed under the Convention. The Convention also establishes a challenge-inspection mechanism which is of great significance as a deterrent and a verification measure. The Secretariat has steadily enhanced its readiness to conduct such an inspection should a State Party request it. This fall, the OPCW will organise a major challenge inspection in Thailand funded by the European Union. 6
In addition to its chemical disarmament verification, the OPCW also verifies declared activities at industrial facilities involving chemicals that are of relevance to the Convention. There are nearly 5,500 declared such facilities around the world. The OPCW verifies declarations through a combination of data monitoring and inspections, whereby those facilities producing chemicals deemed to be of most relevance are most frequently inspected by the Secretariat. So far, more than 2,000 such inspections have been carried out in more than 80 countries. The aim is to verify that the facilities only operate for the declared peaceful purposes, and that their products are not diverted for proscribed uses. In addition, such inspections serve to build awareness in the inspected States Parties about the hazards associated with toxic chemicals. The OPCW also implements a monitoring regime over the global exports and imports of chemicals that are relevant to the Convention. Under the CWC, the transfer of certain chemicals, classified according to the possibility that they can be used as chemical weapons, is strictly controlled among Member States and, in certain cases, prohibited to States that are not parties to the Convention. Member States are required to carefully monitor such transfers and to report relevant information to the Technical Secretariat of the OPCW. While the Convention aims at controlling chemistry, it by no means intends to hamper the economic or technological development of its Parties. On the contrary, under its Article XI, the Convention provides for the promotion of international cooperation in the field of chemical 7
activities for peaceful purposes. In this area the OPCW has established a wide range of programmes. For instance, the OPCW trains chemists and engineers in industrial best practice to safely manage chemicals in a complex industrial environment. We have programmes designed to enhance analytical skills in chemistry. Other programmes provide funding for research projects and organise internships for qualified people at world-class research institutions. OPCW activities in the area of international cooperation engender a sense of belonging and a sense of ownership amongst our States Parties who represent developing countries or those whose economies are in transition. Despite the existence and progressive strengthening of clear norms against chemical weapons, there can never be a certainty against the criminal or terrorist use of either chemical weapons or the use of toxic chemicals as chemical weapons. Especially within the contemporary international security environment, there is a real threat of non-state entities acquiring dangerous weapons to use them for unlawful purposes. In this area, Article X of the Convention provides for mechanisms designed to assist States Parties particularly by enhancing their preparedness and capabilities to react to a possible attack involving chemical weapons. At the same time, a coordination mechanism among Member States is envisaged that would mobilise the provision of emergency assistance to the country that has been subjected to a threat of attack or actual attack with chemical weapons. 8
The development of national preparedness and access to mechanisms for emergency assistance in case of such attacks are essential parts of the security benefits that States derive by joining the Convention. Accordingly, the Secretariat collaborates extensively with States Parties with a view to ensuring effective emergency response capacity should a need ever arise. Though the OPCW was not established as an anti-terrorism agency, the comprehensive prohibition against chemical weapons that it is mandated to promote strengthens our ability to deal with the issue of global terrorism. OPCW s role and contribution in this respect accords entirely with the objectives of the United Nations Security Council s Resolution 1540. The Organisation s role is also clearly recognised in the United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy adopted by the UN General Assembly. As for our future challenges, they fall into two categories; unfinished business and adaptation, both structural and policy wise, to new conditions and a fast changing international environment. While over 65% of the declared stockpiles of chemical weapons have been destroyed, about 35% still remain to be eliminated. The task of eliminating huge arsenals of chemical weapons has proven to be far more daunting than the drafters of the Convention could have foreseen. This is due to the high level of financial and technological resources required to ensure elimination of extremely toxic chemical agents with due regard to the health and safety concerns and to the protection of the environment. 9
This challenge is particularly acute in the case of the two major possessor States Russia and the United States. Given the repeated assurances and progress demonstrated by both States Parties, I am confident that these two countries will uphold their obligation to completely eliminate their chemical weapons stockpiles (as soon as possible) even as they will not be able to meet the deadlines provided in the Convention. Another of our challenges relates to the universality of the Convention. Our 188 members represent over 98% of the global population. The rate of growth in our membership has been the fastest for any disarmament treaty, and it is a symbol of the international community s firm support for the Convention. However there still remain some countries that have not joined the Convention. Universal adherence to the Convention is crucial to the realisation of its object and purpose and its ultimate success. We should not allow exceptions to the global ban against chemical weapons. States that choose to remain outside the regime, in addition to being barred from importing certain chemicals for peaceful purposes, would find themselves increasingly isolated from the mainstream. Their non-adherence will also give rise to legitimate concerns about their intentions. We should all continue to urge these countries to join the rest of the international community in upholding the norms and obligations of the CWC. 10
Making the world free from chemical weapons is a challenging and multifaceted task. This goal has another vital pre-requisite. We cannot be confident that we have achieved a sustainable ban of such weapons unless there is effective domestic implementation of the Convention by all our States Parties. In order to derive fully the security benefits that the Convention offers, it is crucial for all States Parties to have in place the administrative structures and the domestic legislation necessary to give legal effect to their obligations under the CWC. The Convention sets out a concrete legal framework for disarmament and non-proliferation. States Parties must possess the ability to prevent and, if needed, to prosecute any individuals or entities who contribute whether knowingly or not - to chemical weapons proliferation or to the misuse of toxic chemicals for criminal or terrorist purposes. When OPCW Member States fulfil their obligations under the Convention, such measures translate into security enhancements for themselves and for other States Parties. This is an area where we will have to redouble our efforts to ensure further progress. Amongst our future tasks and challenges is also the need to keep abreast of the breathtaking advances in science and technology. As technology and science develop, and new chemical compounds or production methods are discovered, they could impact the prohibitions under the Convention. We, therefore, need to be ready to adapt the Convention s mechanisms accordingly in order to ensure that the Conventions prohibitions can never be circumvented. 11
A major part of the declared stockpiles of chemical weapons has already been destroyed. By the year 2016 only 1% of this arsenal will remain to be eliminated. Resources hitherto associated with the verification of chemical weapons destruction will need to be reassigned, and the Organisation will accordingly need to transition into a body that approaches security issues in a different perspective. Non-proliferation for one will emerge as a major preoccupation. This means greater focus and intensity of verification of the global chemical industry to ensure that it remains engaged only in peaceful activities. It will also mean deepening not only our programmes to promote security through verification and national implementation, but also activities for international cooperation and assistance and protection against chemical weapons. On the whole, the CWC and the OPCW are an outstanding example of the success of multilateralism for which the credit goes to all our States Parties. Guided by the vision of a world forever free from chemical weapons, they have spared no effort to ensure that the OPCW carries out its mandate effectively. There is much to learn from the example that has been established in the process, so that other current initiatives can benefit and yield further tangible progress not least here in the designated home of disarmament negotiations. I thank you for your attention. 12