Political Power and Economic Policy: Theory, Analysis, and Empirical Applications by Gordon C. Rausser, Johan F.M. Swinnen, and Pinhas Zusman TABLE OF CONTENTS Part 1. Political Power and Economic Analysis 1. Public Policy: The Lens of Political Economy 1.1. Introduction 1.2. The Lens of Political Economy 1.3. Literature Review 1.4. Structure and Major Themes of the Book 2. The Nash Solution to the Bargaining Problem 2.1. Introduction 2.2. The Nash Solution to the Bargaining Problem with Fixed Disagreement Payoffs 2.3. The Pivotal Axiom and Alternative Approaches 2.4. Conclusion 3. The Harsanyi Solution to the Bargaining Problem 3.1. Introduction 3.2. Endogenous Disagreement Payoffs 3.3. The n-person Bargaining Game 3.4. Reciprocal Power Relations 3.5. Conclusion 4. Political-Economic Analysis 4.1. Introduction 4.2. Organization of the Political System 4.3. The Political-Economic Structure 4.4. Conflict Resolution and the Equilibrium Relations 4.5. Conclusion 5. Normative Political-Economic Analysis 5.1. Introduction 5.2. Evaluation Criteria of Social Benefits and Costs 5.3. Political-Economic Efficiency Conditions 5.4. Evaluation of Structural Policies 5.5. Conclusion 6. Dynamic Political-Economic Analysis 6.1. Introduction
RSZ TOC 2 6.2. The General Structure of a Political Economy as a Dynamic System 6.3. The Dynamics of Political Power 6.4. Political Traps and Policy Reforms 6.5. Conclusion Part 2. Ideology, Prescription, and Political Power Coefficients 7. Political Power, Ideology, and Political Organizational Structures 7.1. Introduction 7.2. The Nature of Ideology 7.3. Ideological Commitment and Policy Formation 7.4. Implications for Empirical Analysis 7.5. The Organization of Interest Groups and Policy Formation 7.6. Interest Groups and the Organization for Collective Action 7.7. Political Enterpreneurs, Internal Group Organization and Within-Group Equilibrium 7.8. Group Political Preferences and Political Power 7.9. Implications of the Organization of Interest Groups 7.10. Government Structure 7.11. Political Parties 7.12. Conclusion 8. Political Power, Influence, and Lobbying 8.1. Introduction 8.2. General Formulation of the Framework 8.3. Costs of Organization 8.4. Lobbying as a Common-Agency Problem 8.5. Lobbying under Assymetric Information 8.6. Expanding the Framework: PERTs and PESTs 8.7. Conclusion 9. Constitutional Prescription and Political Power Coefficients 9.1. Introduction 9.2. Constitutional Rules and Policy-making Centers 9.3. Evaluation of Alternative Constitutional Rules 9.4. Constitutional Space Prescription 9.5. Conclusion Part 3. Analysis of Specific Structures 10. The Political Economy of Commodity Market Intervention 10.1. Introduction 10.2. The Political Structure 10.3. Policy Formation: The Political-Economic Equilibrium 10.4. Welfare Implications 10.5. Conclusion 11. The Political Economy of Public Research and Development
RSZ TOC 3 11.1. Introduction 11.2. Market Relations and the Demand for Public R&D 11.3. Management and Organization of Public R&D 11.4. The Political Structure 11.5. The Political-Economic Equilibrium Policy 11.6. Efficiency of the Political-Economic Equilibrium Public Research Policy 11.7. Conclusion 12. Political-Economic Analysis of Redistributive Policy and Public Good Investments 12.1. Introduction 12.2. The Government s Policy Decisions 12.3. Price Subsidies and Research Expenditures: Are they Complements or Substitutes? 12.4. Conclusion 13. Interest Groups, Coalition Breaking, and Productive Policies 13.1. Introduction 13.2. Interest Group Structure 13.3. Targeting Payments under Heterogeneous Adoption 13.4. Noncoincidental Consumer and Taxpayer Interests and Output Constraints 13.5. Other Transfer Schemes 13.6. Conclusion 13.A.1. Derivation of (13.23) 13.A.2. Derivation of (13.25) 13.A.3. Derivation of (13.26) 14. Policy Reform and Compensation 14.1. Introduction 14.2. The Model 14.3. Compensation, Ownership, and Mobility 14.4. Conclusions 14.A Appendix to Chapter 14 15. Political-Economic Analysis of Land Reform 15.1. Introduction 15.2. The Economic Structure 15.3. The Political Structure 15.4. The Political-Economic Equilibrium 15.5. Evaluating the Economic Efficiency of Land Reform 15.6. Conclusion 16. Political-Economic Analysis of Water Resource Systems 16.1. Introduction 16.2. The Structure of a Water Resource Political Economy 16.3. The Physical Water Resource Subsystem 16.4. The Economic Structure 16.5. The Political Power Structure 16.6. The Hydrological-Political-Economic Equilibrium
RSZ TOC 4 16.7. Conjunctive Water Use with Short Water Supply 16.8. Conclusion 16.A. The Effects of Districts Narrow Rationality on Water Prices and the Stationary Groundwater Level (Ample Water Supply at the Northern Source) 16.B. The Effects of Districts Narrow Rationality on Groundwater Level when Groundwater Pumping is Rationed (Short Water Supply) 17. The Political Economic Lens on Quality and Public Standard Regulations 17.1. Introduction 17.2. Interest Group Configuration 17.3. The Political Economy of Public Standards 17.4. Trade and Economic Development 17.5. A Dynamic and Strategic Political Economy Theory of Quality Regulation 17.6. Conclusion 18. Political-Economic Analysis in Transition Economies 18.1. Introduction 18.2. The Model 18.3. Restructuring the Intertemporal Tradeoff 18.4. Open and Closed Economies 18.5. Vicious and Virtuous Circles 18.6. Structural Conditions, Communist Organization and the Intertemporal Tradeoff. 18.7. Conclusion 18.A. The Monotonicity Property 19. The Power of Bureaucracies: The European Commission and EU Policy Reforms 16.1 Introduction 16.2 The Decision-Making Process 16.3 Status Quo Bias: The Importance of External Changes for Policy Reform 16.4 The Power of the Commission 16.5 Conclusion Part 4. Empirical Applications of Political Power Estimation 20. Political Econometrics 20.1. Introduction 20.2. Formulation 20.3. Estimation and Testing 20.4. Policy Instruments and the Negotiation Framework 20.5. Conclusion 21. The Political Econometrics of the Israeli Dairy Industry 21.1. Introduction 21.2. The Israeli Dairy Program 21.3. The Economic Structure of the Israeli Dairy Market 21.4. The Political Structure of the Israeli Dairy Industry
RSZ TOC 5 21.5. The Political-Economic Equilibrium in the Israeli Dairy Market 21.6. The Internal Structure of the Political Conflict 21.7. Conclusion 22. Flexible Policy Instruments Given a Political Power Distribution 22.1. Introduction 22.2. Specification and Estimation of the Constraint Structure 22.3. Estimation of the Policy Governance Function 22.4. Estimation of the Automatic Adjustment Rules 22.5. Validation and Assessment of the Automatic Adjustment Rules 22.6. Toward a Simpler Set of Automatic Adjustment Rules 22.7. Conclusion 22.A. Estimated Constraint Structure Equations 22.A.1. Supply Side Equations 22.A.2. Demand Side Equations 22.A.3. Behavioral Equations 23. Estimating Statistical Properties of Power Weight Parameters and their Temporal Shifts 23.1. Introduction 23.2. Empirical Formulation 23.3. Bootstrapped Standard Errors for Power Weight Parameters 23.4. An Empirical Application to Japanese Policy 23.5. Conclusion 24. Role of Institutions in the Joint Determination of PERTs and PESTs 24.1. Introduction 24.2. PERTs and PESTs in Developing and Developed Countries 24.3. The Impact of Development: A Conceptual Model 24.4. The Impact of Institutions 24.5. Econometric Analysis 24.6. Regression Results 24.7. Conclusions and Implications