PSCI 1040-004 University of North Texas The Branch
The President in the Constitution Qualifications Thirty-five years of age Natural-born citizen Chester Arthur (1881-1885) may have been born in Canada Resident in U.S. for 14 years Term limit
Powers of the President Art. I sec. 7 Veto, pocket veto powers Art. II sec. 1 The executive Power shall be vested in a President Art. II sec. 2 Commander in Chief of the armed forces, incl. state militia when called into service Art. II sec. 2 May grant pardons and reprieves, except for impeachment Art. II sec. 2 May make treaties with advice and consent of Senate (2/3 vote) Art. II sec. 2 May appoint, with advice and consent of the Senate, ambassadors, public Ministers and Consuls, judges, and all other officers of the U.S. Art. II sec. 3 Must deliver information on the state of the union to Congress Art. II sec. 3 May convene either or both houses of Congress Art. II sec. 3 May adjourn Congress if the House and Senate cannot agree on an adjournment date Art. II sec. 3 May receive foreign ambassadors and other ministers Art. II sec. 3 Must take care that the laws be faithfully executed
Four kinds of presidential power 1 Enumerated powers 2 Implied powers 3 Informal powers 4 Statutory powers
Presidential powers Enumerated powers Expressly granted to the President in the Constitution You can cite article, section and clause for each and every one They are certain. Include: Pardons Commander in Chief Making treaties
Presidential powers Implied powers Not explicitly granted in the Constitution Arguably necessary in order to make an enumerated power effective Generally little argument about them Include: order agreement
Presidential powers Informal powers Not granted in the Constitution Not implied. Powers of persuasion that go along with being President Informal but very real Include: Use of presidential status as bargaining chip Meeting w/ Pres Trip on Air Force 1
Presidential powers Statutory powers Congressional powers passed on to the President Must be tightly canalized Sometimes struck down by courts Include: Budgeting power Control of tariffs
Presidential elections in the Constitution Election Election is by electors Electors are appointed in a manner directed by state legislatures 14 th Amendment states that if a state denies N% of the adult male population the vote for elector, it will have its representation in the House reduced by N%. Never enforced.
Presidential selection: the electoral college Each state has a number of electoral votes equal to its number of representatives plus senators D.C. has three The number varies from 3 (DC, VT, MT, WY, AK, DE) to 54 (CA) Every state except NE and ME awards all electoral votes to highest vote-getter
Presidential selection: the electoral college What do NE and ME do? Divide by Congressional district Each US House district elects its own elector Overall state winner gets both electors representing US Senators Why not elsewhere? Arguably makes NE, ME less of a prize for candidates Therefore campaigning concentrated elsewhere States try to attract promised from candidates by making themselves big all-or-nothing prizes
Presidential selection: the electoral college Candidate with majority of electoral votes is President If nobody has majority? Thrown to Congress House picks President from top 3 candidates Each state gets one vote (CA, TX = DE, WY) What if still no majority? Senate picks VP from top 2 candidates (for VP) Some suggestion that framers thought this would be the normal course of events
The electoral college consequences Possible to win Presidency but to not have the most popular votes (1888 (Harrison beats Cleveland), 2000) Possible to win Presidency on plurality only most people voted for someone else (1992, 1996) Bias in campaigning Candidates concentrate on biggest, closest states Not to very small states (DE) Not to states that are fairly certain (CA, TX, NY) The states where the most electoral votes are up for grabs
The electoral college alternatives Alternative 1: Constitutional amendment to jettison it Straightforward popular vote Why would DE, WY, MT, etc, agree to this? Alternative 2: Everyone does what NE, ME do Good: Doesn t require amending Constitution Just state law Who wants to be the only state that does this? Collective action problem Small states still have disproportionate influence
The electoral college alternatives Alternative 3: Conditional plan States can assign their votes however they want 14th Amendment? State can (maybe) assign its state votes to the winner of the national popular vote Conditional: only would go into effect if states with a majority of electoral votes pass identical / similar laws Then winner of national popular vote automatically wins Electoral College Downside: If this had been in place in TX in 2000: All of TX s electoral votes would have gone to Gore But 61% of TX voters supported Bush
The presidential selection process 1 Declare candidacy Why declare? Who runs? Why? 2 Obtain party nomination OR be George Washington How? By what process? What strategies should one use? What are primary voters like? 3 Run the general election campaign What strategies? What is the electorate like? How do they decide?
Historical methods of nomination None King Caucus candidates nominated by Congressional caucuses Conventions (with emphasis on party leaders and activists) Smoke-filled rooms, wheeling and dealing Often many ballots (esp. for Democrats)
Methods of nomination Growing role of mass primaries Humphrey s 1968 nomination is last gasp of old system Nomination system changes in 1972 to MOL current scheme Great reduction in the influence of party leaders (Superdelegates?) Growth of candidate-centered campaigns (resources are candidate s and not party s) Public airing of intra-party disputes (limits success in general election)
Nomination strategies dynamics Nomination politics is a dynamic process what happens when is important. Resources used as investments using resources to do well now helps you get the resources to do well later. Success rewarded and failure punished (both relative to expectations). This results in candidates either climbing up to success or spiralling down in flames early in the campaign cycle. Also, it creates the pattern of the rapid winnowing of the viable candidates to a few front-runners, as well as allowing relative unknowns to be thrust upon the scene.
The primary electorate(s) Primary voters generally appear to behave randomly and chaotically: Rapidly fluctuating preferences Low levels of political knowledge, knowledge of candidates Pattern of backing winners per se Willingness to evaluate candidates without information Little evidence for policy or ideology as basis of choice
The primary electorate(s) BUT: Non-political factors can be signals of political ones Some candidates receive support as Not-Mr.X (Mondale, Hart) We should expect rapidly fluctuating preferences as voters add to their small initial stores of information
Nomination strategies issue positions What positions should you take on what issues? Problem: What wins you the nomination might lose you the election Primary voters and gen l election voters have different preferences Primary voters more extreme (only from one party)
Nomination strategies issue positions General solutions: candidates between party and general medians Balancing of probability of winning with the desirability of the candidate to primary voters Central candidates are squeezed out by outlying candidates
How do voters decide? Straight partisanship in decline as exogenous force Retrospective voting voting based on social outcomes Endogenizes party ID Often economic (pocketbook vs. sociotropic) Where does this leave campaigning?
How do voters decide? Issues and policies more important over time but only modestly Candidate evaluation social- and cognitive psychological models Affective Based on likes and dislikes In practice, all four are used (even by the same person). All four can influence the vote decisions of a single person or a group of people. Example Carter and Reagan 1980.
Presidential control Problem: to make presidential policy take effect, esp. within the executive branch Why is this a problem? A subordinate might not obey out of 1 Misunderstanding (of order, of what the rules are...) 2 Simple disobedience (Is this willful? Does it matter?)
When are presidential orders self-executing? Control or self-execution is easier when 5 conditions met: 1 Belief that the order is the President s 2 Clarity of order 3 Publicity of order 4 Ability to carry it out is there 5 Propriety of order Consistency, clarity, rightness all matter here
Creating conditions for presidential control Two factors that assist the President in controlling his subordinates are both facets of public opinion: 1 Professional reputation public opinion within the Washington community 2 Public prestige President s standing with the people at large
Organizing the presidency Critical elements Vice president (bucket of warm spit or position of power?) Cabinet (and executive branch proper) White House staff / EOP / Presidential branch Don t execute laws not executive branch proper Political aides to President How to organize? Organizational style (leadership style) is like home style the question is not what works? The question is What works for me, here and now.
Archetypes of presidential organization Bureaucratic/hierarchical Eisenhower, Reagan (2) Relatively clear chain of command that is enforced Limits on access More delegation Downsides: prone to inactivity (Ike) and runaway/rogue subordinates (Reagan?)
Archetypes of presidential organization Spokes-and-hub FDR, Carter, Reagan (1), Clinton Muddier chain of command Fewer limits on access, greater inclusiveness Less delegation Downsides: prone to confusion, wastes of President s time (Carter and tennis courts)
Some important distinctions 1 Type of policy Foreign policy more centralized, greater presidential involvement. Actors: DoState, NSC Domestic policy messy, complex, more delegation, experimentation over time in structure, presidential activity sporadic (by interest? politics?). Actors: cabinet, OMB, WH staff Economic policy more structure than domestic but not much. Actors: CEA, OMB(?) 2 Type of decision Routine cabinet, bureaucracies predominant Adaptive (changing) EOP, WH staff predominant Full-blown crises kitchen cabinet predominant
Line-item veto A statutory federal line-item veto became active on 1 January 1997. As passed, it allowed the President to: Cancel dollar amounts specified in Appropriations bills Strike new entitlement programs or expansions of current ones Delete a variety of targeted tax breaks with few recipients Congress could cancel the rescission by passing another bill, subject to the normal veto and override provisions. 26 June 1997: Supreme Court rules that congressional plaintiffs in suit lack standing since no provision has been cut.
Line-item veto 25 June 1998: Supreme Court strikes down law in new case (Clinton, et al. v. New York City, et al.) following the use of the line-item veto by Clinton Why? Constitutional requirement that legislation be passed by both houses of Congress and presented in its entirety to the president for signature or veto Majority opinion:... this act gives the president the unilateral power to change the text of duly enacted statutes... Justice John Paul Stevens wrote for the majority. Such line-item vetoes are the functional equivalent of partial repeals of acts of Congress..., but there is no provision in the Constitution that authorizes the president to enact, to amend or to repeal statutes... Ways out: 1 Constitutional amendment 2 Break down spending, tax bills into many mini-bills 3 Structure as conditional spending(?)
Legislative veto A legislative veto is a legislative action overturning an executive action or decision following a grant of authority to that executive agency. Example: Immigration and Nationality Act allows an Attorney General to not deport an illegal alien, and allows either House or Senate to undo this action.
Legislative veto I.N.S. v. Chadha, 1983, declares this (and with it other legislative vetoes) to be unconstitutional. Why? This procedure is essentially the same as a private bill a bill that creates an exception to a universal law. We already have procedures for enacting private bills into law the same as any other law. This procedure omits action by both houses of Congress and presentment to the President for signature/veto Note that legislative vetoes of various kinds are still fairly commonly used and adhered to insofar as agencies seek pre-approval from Congress for their actions.
Role of information An actor with more information has more control over the choice of outcomes than an actor with less information. Two kinds of pertinent informational benefits Bargaining power (what will X accept?) Controlling sets of alternatives Getting some labeled as viable or unviable Affecting beliefs about how actions outcomes President / executive branch historically has had more information has the agencies doing the actual work has the intelligence-gathering agencies made binding economic estimates (OMB) BUT: GAO est. 1921, much more active lately CBO est. 1974: Different set of economic estimates, estimates of effects of legislation
Getting presidential proposals passed Going public: engaging in direct lobbying of the people to influence congressional action Public support for President congressional support for President 10-point drop in approval 3-point drop in roll-call success rate Most important: public support for President on a given issue rather than generally Deflection of introductions in President s desired direction President has easier access to television news (barring C-SPAN) Good or harmful?
What is a bureaucracy? Bureaucracies have two important traits: 1 Definite and learnable chain of command Strict hierarchy 2 Definite and learnable set of rules and procedures Rationalize, depersonalize decisions Bureaucrats make technical (how-to) decisions...... not policy (what-to) decisions Downside procedures might not be best Examples include...
Types of agencies in the U.S. agencies Cabinet departments Subsidiary / line agencies Parts of cabinet departments; heads report to Secretary Independent agencies Government corporations Corporations like any other, w/ Pres. appointing Board of Directors Examples include FDIC, FSCLIC, Eximbank, COMSAT, TVA Parastatals Agencies or gov t corporations that compete in the market Example: Post Office in package delivery
Types of agencies in the U.S. Independent Regulatory Commissions (IRC s) FCC, ICC, SEC, etc. Combine quasi-legislative, quasi-executive, quasi-judicial power Make rules w/in broad guidelines from Congress Enforce those rules with implementation, fines, etc. Decide what the rules mean / if you really broke them President appoints, Senate confirms commissioners NOT removable by President (except for cause) Long, staggered (and usually fixed) terms
Iron triangles An iron triangle is a combination of 1 An executive agency 2 The authorizing committee(s) for that agency 3 The client interest group(s) of that agency. Example: The USDA, the Agriculture committees, and the NFU. Theory: Politics gets made inside the triangle, at least usually. Who is absent? Who is not part of the triangle? Why? Iron triangles have weakened somewhat, now cozy triangles.
Bureaucratic capture Iron/cozy triangles are part of a larger capture theory of bureaucracies. Question: is regulation in the public interest or the interests of the regulated firms? Would you want to be regulated? Answer: Sometimes you might want to be regulated. Why? Regulation can help you to engage in price-fixing and cartel behavior. Examples: railroads, airlines
Why do we see waste? 1 Just plain old waste (incl. political benefits) 2 Accounting tricks not necessarily waste at all 3 Purchasing other goods 4 Thing being bought isn t what you think 5 Weird specs and one-offs
Presidential control of the bureaucracy Appointments (subject to Senate approval) Get the right agents in to control the civil servants BUT: Limited numbers Limited powers and usually short time in office Bureaucrats ability to delay Problem of capture Orders Choices in Neustadt s words Neustadt s five criteria, consistency BUT ability to issue orders limited, bureaucrats can delay
Presidential control of the bureaucracy Institutional tools OMB and central clearance Central clearance of legislative requests Central clearance of funding requests Central clearance of proposed rule changes All put a presidential stamp on executive-branch activities Limits ability of bureaucracy to do things Pres. doesn t want Doesn t necessarily help the Pres. make the bureaucracy do something he actively wants
Congressional control of the bureaucracy General hearings and investigations Those conducted by the whole body Likely to reach useful conclusion? Time consuming Committee hearings and investigations Appropriations subcommittee and authorizing committee Longer-term interactions with bureaucracy Greater specialization Mandatory reports Useful without accompanying hearing/investigation? Informal controls Casework, bureaucratic unsticking Sometimes points out flaws in programs
Congressional control Institutional tools GAO Can conduct investigations, audits, etc. CBO Does some investigation of effects of programs Inspectors general Problems of capture? Who watches the watcher? Budget power Congress can cut budget of offending agency But will it? Is the threat credible?
Congressional control Impeachment Used rarely 12 federal judges (1 trial closed on judge s retirement) 1 Secretary of War 2 Presidents 1 Senator (dismissed for want of jurisdiction) Procedures
Procedures and congressional control There are a number of legal restrictions on rulemaking that enhance the ability of Congress to control the bureaucracy. Administrative Procedures Act Requires that before a new rule or rule change can take effect: 1 Agency must announce intent 2 Agency must solicit comments from all interested parties 3 (Sometimes) Agency must announce provisional rule, get comments again 4 Agency must hold quasi-trial hearings with witnesses, opportunities for cross-examination and testimony 5 Agency must demonstrate that rule is sensible given the evidence it has, supply reasons for rejecting alternatives
Procedural control APA ctd. This has two main effects: 1 Delays process, giving Congress more time to change things 2 Subjects the agency to the same pressures that Congress will face, so they ll know if they re likely to irritate Congress Achieves low-cost, broad compliance but not necessarily full compliance the agency knows that it has a certain area to play around in to do what it likes, as long as no one complains. Congressional Review Act All proposed new rules submitted to House and Senate Congress then has 60 legislative days to formally disapprove Constitutional? Or legislative veto?
The Texas Governor The TX Constitution sets up a weak legislature The TX Constitution also sets up a weak governor
TX Governor powers Can call special session of legislature Session limited to that subject Can veto bills Has extended veto period at end of session Has line-item veto over budget Appoints some officials Limited in number, rel. to President Senatorial courtesy Limited pardon/clemency power Can pardon/commute iff Board recommends Governor appoints that Board
Plural executive Who do we elect to the federal executive? President and Vice-President as a pair
Plural executive Who do we elect to the TX executive? Governor Lieutenant Governor (NOT a running mate of the Governor) Attorney General Comptroller of Public Accounts Commissioner of Agriculture Commissioner of the General Land Office TX Railroad Commission (3) (Oil & gas) State Board of Education (15) Why? Problems?
TX bureaucracy Texas has a strong bureaucracy, substantial discretion Result of weakness of other branches Lack of powers to control bureaucracy Bureaucrats have information Also very fragmented Tremendous amounts of power...... but scattered over many agencies
Governor s control of bureaucracy Limited Many bureaucratic positions elected, not appointed Many agencies independent; not even nominally controlled by Gov. even if appointed Doesn t mean no influence Does mean that Governor is reduced to power to persuade sooner than President But the power to persuade is what matters
Legislative control of bureaucracy Limited Legislature has similar powers as Congress Part-time legislature meeting every 2 years Hard to control that way Too busy dealing with legislating to oversee Sunset laws Agencies die unless specifically re-created by Legislature every so often (12 years) Doesn t seem to have great effect in practice