Part 1A Paper 2: Ethics and Political Philosophy - Political Obligation Lecture 3: Fair play Chris Thompson cjt68@cam.ac.uk 1
Social Contract Theories Individuals have consented to the authority of the state. But when did I consent? What counts as tacit consent? The social contract is binding except in the case where the sovereign fails to protect people. (Hobbes) Right to revolukon when a government fails in its core duty the proteckon of life and property. (Locke) 2
Social Contract Theories A concern with Social Contract Theories is that individuals will misinterpret when the State has failed to uphold its part of the bargain. C.f. Locke s juskficakon for leaving the state of nature. As such, there may be a lack of polikcal stability. E.g. someone who rejects their polikcal obligakons and goes to live in the wilderness: Returning to a state of nature? AcKng unlawfully within a polikcal State? Either way, the State has juskficakon for using force 3
Overview of the lectures 1. The problem of polikcal obligakon 2. Social Contract Theory 3. Fair Play 4. Anarchism 4
Readings ARESO, R., 'The Principle of Fairness and the Free- Rider Problem', Ethics, 92 (1981-82): 616-33. SIMMOS, A.J., 'The Principle of Fair Play', Philosophy & Public Affairs, 8 (1979): 307-37. Reprinted in his Jus9fica9on and Legi9macy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001). CULLITY, G., 'Moral Free Riding', Philosophy & Public Affairs, 24, no. 1 (1995): 3-34. OZICK, R. Anarchy, State, and Utopia. (1974) Ch. 5. 5
Summary 1. PoliKcal ObligaKon 2. Public Goods 3. Excludability 4. Consequences 6
Summary 1. PoliKcal ObligaKon 2. Public Goods 3. Excludability 4. Consequences 7
1. PoliKcal ObligaKon PoliKcal ObligaKon An obligakon is a course of ackon that someone is required to take. How does someone acquire a polikcal obligakon, that is, an obligakon to obey the state? In part this queskon is addressed by providing an account of state legikmacy. 8
1. PoliKcal ObligaKon PoliKcal obligakon Fair play If you enjoy the benefits of living in a polikcal community, you have an obligakon to that community to pay your fair share. Fair play accounts of polikcal obligakons are not grounded in consent, but skll grounded in voluntary ackon. 9
1. PoliKcal ObligaKon PoliKcal obligakon A polikcal community is a mutually beneficial cooperakve enterprise. Other members of the community make sacrifices in return for the benefits of living in the society, so why shouldn t you? A society has a right to deal with free- riders. 10
1. PoliKcal ObligaKon Hart "... when a number of persons conduct any joint enterprise according to rules and thus restrict their liberty, those who have submijed to these restrickons when required have a right to a similar submission from those who have benefited by their submission." H.L. Hart 11
1. PoliKcal ObligaKon Rawls "... when a number of persons engage in a just, mutually advantageous, cooperakve venture according to rules and thus restrain their liberty in ways necessary to yield advantages for all, those who have submijed to these restrickons have a right to similar acquiescence on the part of those who have benefited from their submission. J. Rawls 12
Summary 1. PoliKcal ObligaKon 2. Public Goods 3. Excludability 4. Consequences 13
2. Public Goods Public goods on- rival: my use does not limit your use; and on- excludable: I cannot prevent you from using the good. 14
2. Public Goods Public goods Excludable on- excludable Rival Private goods Common goods on- rival Club goods Public goods 15
2. Public Goods Public goods Rival on- rival Excludable Private goods E.g. food, clothes Club goods E.g. Cinemas on- excludable Common goods E.g. Fish stocks Public goods E.g. defence, security, movies 16
2. Public Goods Public goods Public goods will tend to be under- produced. Public goods are subject to problems of free- riders: Behaviour that is rakonal at the individual level, generates sub- opkmal outcomes at the group level. E.g. You cannot be excluded from the benefits of defense and security. You skll get the benefits if you fail to pay your taxes, so why pay? But if everyone did this, then there would be no security and defense. 17
2. Public Goods Rivalry If a good is non- rival, then free- rider s use of the good does not diminish contributors use of the good, so no harm. But free- rider s non- contribukon might increase the costs of contributors in providing the goods. Perhaps a person should only be forced to contribute to the extent that they benefit i.e. to the extent that the scheme is just and fair. 18
Summary 1. PoliKcal ObligaKon 2. Public Goods 3. Excludability 4. Consequences 19
3. Excludability Excludability Excludable? Y Y Excluded? 20
3. Excludability Excludability Excludable? Y Y Excluded? o PO (no use) 21
3. Excludability Book throwing Someone, unsolicited, posts you books. Do you have an obligakon to pay for the books? 22
3. Excludability Excludability Excludable? Y Y Excluded? o PO (no use) o PO (no resp.) 23
3. Excludability Excludability Excludable? Y Y Excluded? Voluntary usage? o PO (no use) o PO (no resp.) 24
3. Excludability Street sweeping Every day a different person on your street sweeps your enkre street. Must you sweep the street when your turn comes? 25
3. Excludability Excludability Excludable? Y Y Excluded? Voluntary usage? o PO (no use) o PO (no resp.) o (?) PO (no resp.) 26
3. Excludability Excludability Excludable? Y Y Excluded? Voluntary usage? Y o PO (no use) o PO (no resp.) o (?) PO (no resp.) 27
3. Excludability The Public Address System Suppose the 364 other members of your neighbourhood decide to use a PA system to boradcast public entertainment. You somewhat enjoy listening to what others broadcast. When your allocated day to broadcast comes up, do you have an obligakon to parkcipate? 28
3. Excludability The Public Address System Suppose the 364 other members of your neighbourhood decide to use a PA system to boradcast public entertainment. You somewhat enjoy listening to what others broadcast. When your allocated day to broadcast comes up, do you have an obligakon to parkcipate? But what if it were a radio broadcast? 29
1. Fair play Excludability Excludable? Y Y Excluded? Voluntary usage? Y o PO (no use) o PO (no resp.) o PO (no resp.) PO 30
3. Excludability Excludability If a good is excludable, and someone (a society) excludes other from use, then then there is O polikcal obligakon, because there is no use. If a good is excludable, and someone (a society) chooses not to exclude, then voluntary acceptance of that good does OT create an obligakon. E.g. throwing books through a window. If a good is non- excludable, and people do not make voluntary use of it, then no obligakon (?). E.g. swept streets. If a good is non- excludable, but someone makes voluntary use of it, then this creates an obligakon. E.g. turning on the radio. 31
Summary 1. PoliKcal ObligaKon 2. Public Goods 3. Excludability 4. Consequences 32
4. Consequences Consequences How much polikcal obligakon does fair play give us? ot much. Unlike consent theories, it may be difficult to determine if someone has made voluntary use of a good (even if the person themselves does know). 33
ext week 4. Anarchism 34