The 2005 SSM Research Series 14 Social Stratification and Social Mobility in Late-Industrializing Countries 後発産業社会の社会階層と社会移動 Hiroshi Ishida (ed.) 石田浩編 March 2008 The 2005 SSM Research Committee 2005 年 SSM 調査研究会 科学研究費補助金特別推進研究 (16001001) 現代日本階層システムの構造と変動に関する総合的研究 成果報告書
The 2005 SSM Research Series 14 Social Stratification and Social Mobility in Late-Industrializing Countries 後発産業社会の社会階層と社会移動 Hiroshi Ishida (ed.) 石田浩編 March 2008 The 2005 SSM Research Committee 2005 年 SSM 調査研究会 科学研究費補助金特別推進研究 (16001001) 現代日本階層システムの構造と変動に関する総合的研究 成果報告書
刊行のことば 本書は 文部科学省科学研究費補助金 ( 特別推進研究 ) 現代日本階層システムの構造と変動に関する総合的研究 の助成を得て行われた 2005 年社会階層と社会移動調査 (SSM 調査 ) の研究成果報告書 2005 年 SSM 調査シリーズ ( 全 15 巻 ) のうちの一冊である SSM 調査は 1955 年以来 10 年毎に行われている全国調査である このような継続性を持った社会階層と社会移動に関する調査は世界に類を見ない もちろんそれぞれの年の SSM 調査プロジェクトは独自の研究テーマを持っているが 親や本人の階層などの基本変数は継続的に測定されているので 長期にわたるトレンド分析が可能になる 本シリーズの中にも このようなトレンド分析を行っている論文が多数収録されている この継続性は SSM 調査の貴重な財産である 2005 年 SSM 調査研究プロジェクトでは このことを踏まえた上で 新たな方向に踏み出した それは本格的な国際比較と若年層調査である 本プロジェクトの基本的なねらいは 次のような問題群に解答を与えることであった グローバリゼーションと新自由主義の進行する中で 労働市場の流動性は高まっているのか それともそうではないのか また高まっているとすれば それはどの階層を流動的にしているのか 特定の階層は保護的制度に守られて流動化していないのではないか このような 流動化 と 階層の固定化 という一見すると相反する問題にアタックすることが 本プロジェクトの基本的なテーマであった このテーマを追求するために 国際比較と若年層調査は不可欠であった グローバリゼーションと新自由主義はいわば普遍的な変動要因である ただしこれらは直接的に個々の社会の社会階層 社会移動に影響を及ぼすのではなく それぞれの社会のローカルな制度との相互作用を通じて 社会階層 社会移動に影響を及ぼしたり 及ぼさなかったりする また新自由主義や労働市場の流動化に対する人々の評価 ( これは公共性問題といえよう ) も社会によって異なりうる これらの問題に答えるためには 国際比較が必要になる しかしあまりに異なる社会と日本を比べることは意味をなさない そこでわれわれは 同じ儒教文化圏に属し 教育制度も類似しているが 日本よりも早くグローバリゼーションにさらされている韓国と台湾を比較の対象とした 労働市場の流動化は若年層にもっとも影響を及ぼすと考えられる フリーターやニートの問題をはじめとして 流動化の矛盾は若年層に集中しているといえよう この問題に関しては既に多くの研究がなされているが 本プロジェクトでは SSM 調査の蓄積を活用して 社会階層と社会移動という視点からこの問題にアプローチすることにした たとえば 誰でもフリーターになるわけではなく 出身階層や本人の学歴によってフリーターになる確率は異なると考えられる このような社会階層論 社会移動論の道具を用いることで フリーター ニート問題に新しい光を当てることができるだろう このような理論的関心に基づいて 国際比較と若年層調査を行った 国際比較では 韓 i
国と台湾の階層研究者 6 名に研究プロジェクトメンバーとなってもらい 彼ら 彼女らの全面的な協力の下に韓国と台湾で SSM 調査を実施した 調査票は日本調査とかなりの部分を共通にして 日本 韓国 台湾で厳密な比較分析が行えるようにした また産業や職業の国際比較ができるように それぞれの社会のデータに国際標準産業分類コードと国際標準職業分類コードを割り当てた 日本側メンバーにも東アジアの専門家がいて 膨大な時間を費やしてくれたが これらの作業は困難を極めた 調査票設計段階の調整から始まり 調査票の翻訳やバックトランスレーション 調査設計の調整 コーディングにおける無数ともいえる細かい確認事項などの作業を経て 調査データが完成した 若年層調査も多くの困難に直面した 大阪大学の太郎丸博氏をヘッドとする若年層調査タスクグループが実査を担当したが 低い回収率の問題や 郵送調査 ウェブ調査ゆえのデータ クリーニング コーディングの難しさがあった しかし太郎丸氏をはじめとするタスクグループの献身的な努力により 若年層調査データも完成した 本シリーズに収録されている論文は このような調査データの分析に基づいたものである 本プロジェクトでは 8 つの研究会からなる研究体制をとって それぞれの研究会でメンバーが論文構想を報告して相互にコメントをしあい より良い論文を執筆することをめざしてきた その成果が本シリーズに集められている これらの論文を通じて 日本のみならず 韓国と台湾の階層状況に対する理解が深まることを期待する 本プロジェクトを推進するに当たり 実に多くの方々のお世話になった あえて一人一人のお名前をあげることはしないが ここに感謝の意を表します また調査にご協力いただいた対象者の方々にも心より御礼申し上げます 2008 年 3 月 2005 年 SSM 調査研究会 ii
付記 1. 本研究会による刊行物のリスト 2005 年 SSM 日本調査コード ブック 2007 年 11 月 2005 年 SSM 日本調査基礎集計表 2007 年 11 月 2005 年 SSM 調査シリーズ ( 研究成果報告書集 )(2008 年 3 月刊 ) 第 1 巻 三輪哲 小林大祐 編 2005 年 SSM 日本調査の基礎分析 構造 趨勢 方法 第 2 巻 高田洋 編 階層 階級構造と地位達成 第 3 巻 渡邊勉 編 世代間移動と世代内移動 第 4 巻 阿形健司 編 働き方とキャリア形成 第 5 巻 米澤彰純 編 教育達成の構造 第 6 巻 中村高康 編 階層社会の中の教育現象 第 7 巻 土場学 編 公共性と格差 第 8 巻 轟亮 編 階層意識の現在 第 9 巻 中井美樹杉野勇 編 ライフコース ライフスタイルから見た社会階層 第 10 巻 菅野剛 編 階層と生活格差 第 11 巻 太郎丸博 編 若年層の社会移動と階層化 第 12 巻 前田忠彦 編 社会調査における測定と分析をめぐる諸問題 第 13 巻 有田伸 編 東アジアの階層ダイナミクス 第 14 巻 石田浩 編 後発産業社会の社会階層と社会移動 第 15 巻 佐藤嘉倫 編 流動性と格差の階層論 iii
2006 年 SSM 若年層郵送調査コ-ド ブック 2008 年 3 月 2006 年 SSM 若年層郵送調査基礎集計表 2008 年 3 月 2005 年 SSM 韓国調査コード ブック 2008 年 3 月 2005 年 SSM 韓国調査基礎集計表 2008 年 3 月 Taiwan Social Change Survey, 2005: Social Stratification and Social Mobility in Three Countries, User Guide and Codebook February, 2008 付記 2. 文部科学省科学研究費補助金研究組織等 研究課題 現代日本階層システムの構造と変動に関する総合的研究 (16001001) 研究種目特別推進研究 研究組織研究代表者 : 佐藤嘉倫 ( 東北大学大学院文学研究科教授 ) 研究分担者 : 近藤博之 ( 大阪大学大学院人間科学研究科教授 ) 研究分担者 : 尾嶋史章 ( 同志社大学社会学部教授 ) 研究分担者 : 斎藤友里子 ( 法政大学社会学部教授 ) 研究分担者 : 三隅一百 ( 九州大学大学院比較社会文化研究院教授 ) 研究分担者 : 石田浩 ( 東京大学社会科学研究所教授 ) 研究分担者 : 中尾啓子 ( 首都大学東京都市教養学部教授 ) ( 研究協力者については 全リストを第 15 巻に掲載した ) 研究経費 ( 単位千円 ) 直接経費 間接経費 総額 平成 16 年度 19,700 5,910 25,610 平成 17 年度 186,600 55,980 242,580 平成 18 年度 29,400 8,820 38,220 平成 19 年度 32,700 9,810 42,510 計 268,400 80,520 348,920 研究発表 全リストを第 15 巻に掲載 iv
Preface Social stratification and social mobility constitute a central concern in modern sociological inquiry. The study of intergenerational mobility, in particular, represents one of the most sustained traditions in sociological investigation. The accumulation of research in this field is centered around the intellectual community known as RC28, that is, Research Committee 28 on Social Stratification and Mobility of the International Sociological Association. The RC28 community contributed to the advancement of the study of social mobility in the world by identifying important research questions, stimulating the innovation in analytic technique, and promoting large-scale cross-national comparative research. Notable examples of comparative research on social mobility include The Constant Flux: A Study of Class Mobility in Industrial Societies, written by Robert Erikson and John Goldthorpe, and Social Mobility in Europe, edited by Richard Breen. The authors of the chapters in this volume are all associated with the RC28 community, and we owe a great deal to the researchers in this community. We build on the knowledge accumulated by previous accomplishments. We use the same class schema and educational coding system and reply on similar analytical methods for the analysis of mobility tables. With respect to the countries studied in the volume, we depart from the previous work. Our nations, late-industrializing nations, were not systematically studied in the previous comparative work. The motivation for this study was to throw light on the late-developers and compare the experience of mobility among nations with different path of industrialization. This volume grew out of the project on social mobility in late-industrializing nations that was part of the 2005 SSM research enterprise. The requirements to join the project were the availability of the large-scale national surveys that are suited for the analysis of intergenerational mobility and the familiarity with the analytic framework and methods of mobility studies carried out in the past. My connection with Columbia University where I had appointment in the 1990s was instrumental in attracting people to this project. I was fortunate to find scholars trained at Columbia, Carlos Costa-Ribeiro and Florencia Torche, who shared interests in this project. Through my Columbia connection, I was also able to recruit Kuo-hsien Su. The RC28 committee proved to a useful connection as well. The participants of the RC28 meetings, Jongchun Cha, Hyunjoon Park, Wei-hsin Yu, and Xiaogang Wu, joined the project. In the end, this project of social mobility in late-industrializing nations was able to gather researchers from Brazil, Chile, China, Japan, Korea, and Taiwan. The v
Japanese, Korean and Taiwanese teams are associated with the 2005 SSM project and use the surveys conducted by the 2005 SSM project in their respective nations. We had three workshop meetings in Tokyo: 19-20 February, 2005, 17-18 February, 2006, and 15-16 December, 2007. In addition, some of the members were able to hold an informal meeting on 28 May, 2007, the day after the RC28 meeting in Brno, Czech Republic. The chapters included in this volume are based on the findings reported in these meetings. In addition to the project members who wrote chapters in this volume, there were other scholars who contributed to our project. Celi Scalon, then the University Research Institute of Rio de Janeiro (IUPERJ), was part of the Brazilian team at the initial stage of the project. Yu Xie of the University of Michigan took part in the workshop in February, 2006 and offered valuable technical and substantive advice. Richard Breen of Yale University, Mike Hout of the University of California, Berkeley, and Robert Mare of the UCLA inspired us with good examples when they presented their work in Tokyo in March 2006. Yoshimichi Sato of Tohoku University and many others from the 2005 SSM project participated in the workshops and offered useful comments. Their inputs are highly appreciated. March 2008 Hiroshi Ishida vi
The 2005 SSM Research Series/ Volume 14 Social Stratification and Social Mobility in Late-Industrializing Countries Edited by Hiroshi Ishida CONTENTS Preface to the 2005 SSM Research Series Preface to Volume 14 1 Trends in Intergenerational Class Mobility and Education in Japan Hiroshi Ishida and Satoshi Miwa 1 2 Intergenerational Mobility Patterns in Taiwan: The Case of a Rapidly Industrializing Economy Wei-hsin Yu and Kuo-hsien Su 49 3 Trends in Intergenerational Social Mobility across Four Cohorts in South Korea Hyunjoon Park and Jongchun Cha 79 4 Trends in Class Mobility and Education in China Xiaogang Wu 105 5 Social Mobility Trends and Education in Brazil Carlos A. Costa-Ribeiro 133 6 Social Mobility and Education in Contemporary Chile Florencia Torche 177 Publication & Presentation List 206 vii
Trends in Intergenerational Class Mobility and Education in Japan * Hiroshi Ishida and Satoshi Miwa (University of Tokyo) Abstract This paper examines change and stability in the pattern of intergenerational class mobility in Japan in the late 20th century. The first set of analysis examines the trends in social fluidity. Japanese economy experienced high-speed growth in the 1960s and early 1970s, followed by a recession and sustained economic growth until early 1990s when serious recession hit the country. By 2005 the country slowly moved out of the phase of recession. Despite these fluctuations in the economy, there seems to be stability in the pattern of association between class origin and class destination. The uniform difference model applied to mobility tables created from six surveys does not show any systematic trend. There is no clear tendency towards greater openness in post-war Japan, contrary to the prediction of the industrialism thesis. We then analyze more detailed pattern of mobility by using the core social fluidity model of the CASMIN project. The findings suggest no systematic change in the core social fluidity model across six surveys. Finally, birth cohort and age group are replaced with survey year to examine further trend in the data. Although there seem to be some fluctuations by birth cohorts and age groups, there is no noticeable trend and the dominant pattern is the stability in the pattern of association between origin and destination in the late 20th century Japan. The second set of analysis focuses on the role of education in intergenerational mobility. It asks whether education mediates the process of intergenerational inheritance and mobility. Our findings suggest that education mediates the effect of class inheritance of the service class (I+II) and the routine non-manual class (III), but does not affect the inheritance effect of other classes. Education also mediates the hierarchy effect and the positive affinity effect. This mediating role of education in social fluidity does not seem to change across survey years. The stability in the role of education is probably explained by the fact that both the pattern of association between class origin and education and the pattern of association between education and class destination after controlling for origin have not changed in the post-war period. Key words: intergenerational class mobility, education, trends 1. Introduction A lively debate on the Japanese distinctiveness has been concerned with reference to various features of Japanese society, such as family and kinship, attitudes and consciousness, industrial management and labor relations, or educational system (e.g., * Paper presented at the workshops on Social Mobility in Late-industrializing Nations, held at the University of Tokyo, Tokyo, Japan. - 1 -
Nakane 1970; Dale 1986; Koike 1988; Ishida 1993; Sugimoto 1997). This study will concentrate on the further issue of social mobility, that is, the patterns of intergenerational class mobility in contemporary Japan. Theories of industrial society claim that an industrial technology and economy has profound influence on social structure and process (Kerr et al 1960; Kerr 1983). Industrialism is believed to have brought about the range of changes including the pattern of social mobility. This study will examine whether the pattern of social mobility and its relationship to education are shaped by the forces of industrialization in post-war Japan. The first part of this study will analyze empirical data on the trends in social mobility in post-war Japan in order to verify the hypotheses about long-term trends in mobility among industrial nations. The second part of this study focuses on the role of education in social mobility. It will examine the relationship between class origin and education and between education and class destination by presenting the results of cross-temporal comparisons of five surveys conducted in post-war Japan. 2. Japanese Industrialization Process Japan has experienced dramatic changes in social structure in the 20th century. Figure 1 shows the changes in the industrial distribution of the labor force in Japan in the 20th century. In 1920 over 50 percent (55%) of the labor force was engaged in primary production, and since then its proportion declined gradually until the Second World War. However, the agricultural population grew immediately after the war because many men who returned from the battle fields went back to the original farming villages, and the destruction of industries in urban areas and food shortage forced people to move back to farming areas. The trend was quickly reversed by the end of 1940s when the flux of population began moving from the farming areas to cities. The movement out of the farming took place rapidly, and by 1960 only a third of the labor force was in the primary production and by 1970 less than 20 percent (19%) engaged in the primary production. The farming population continued to decline until the 1990s when the proportion reached six percent in 1995. If we use the declining proportion of the primary production as an indicator of the industrialization, Japan experienced the rapid course of industrialization in the late-1950s and 1960s. The trends in the proportion of the secondary sector where the manufacturing industries are concentrated show the impact of the War. Industrial production steadily increased until the beginning of the War in 1941, and more than a quarter (26%) of the labor force was engaged in the secondary production. However, industrial production was quickly reduced due to war-time destruction. It was not until mid-1950s when the industrial production recovered to the level of pre-war. By 1955 the proportion of the labor force in the secondary sector was 23 percent. In response to the outflow of population from the farming areas in the late 1950s and 1960s, the proportion of people engaged in the secondary production increased to 34 percent in 1970 after which the rate stabilizes. The tertiary sector in Japan increased steadily in the post-war period (1945-2005), but the increase is most dramatic in the early part until 1975. By 1975, the majority (52%) of the labor force was engaged in the tertiary sector. Japan s industrial structure in the late-1970s already resembles that of other industrial countries. However, the increase in the tertiary sector was not accompanied by the substantial - 2 -
decline in the secondary sector, unlike the experience of many western nations (Cole and Tominaga 1976). The process of Japanese industrialization is characterized by almost simultaneous expansion of the secondary and tertiary sector. In other words, the declining farming population is accompanied by the expansion of both blue-collar and white-collar employment. These features are related to the Japanese experience of the late and rapid course of industrialization. The process of economic growth in Japan, however, did not follow a linear pattern. Figure 2 shows the trend in the rate of economic growth during the post-war period. The figures represent the changes in the Gross Domestic Products (GDP). The post-war economic development can be divided into three distinct stages: (1) high economic growth period (1955-1973), (2) low-growth period (1974-1990), and (3) economic recession period (1991-2004). Beginning in the late 1950s, Japan achieved a rapid and substantial economic expansion until November 1973 when the oil crisis hit Japan. The GDP growth rate during this period averaged 9 percent, exceptionally high growth. It is in this period when most dramatic changes in the industrial structure happened in Japan. Despite the oil shock, Japan quickly recovered and entered the stable and sustained low-growth period until 1990. The average GDP growth rate was 4 percent. During the 1990s and early 2000s, Japan experienced the worst recession in the post-war period, and the average GDP increase was only one percent. These economic indicators suggest that the pace of the Japanese economic development during the post-war period differs among the three stages: the accelerated fast growth during the first stage, the stable economic expansion during the second stage, and finally the stagnated period during the last stage. Another aspect of societal transformation which is relevant to our study is the expansion of the Japanese educational system. Figure 3 shows the trend of expansion in three levels of education: the proportion of those who attended minimum compulsory education of primary school, the proportion of those who advanced to higher level of education after the compulsory education, and the proportion of those who were enrolled in the institutions of higher education. The spread of the primary education is already over 90 percent at the turn of the century in 1905. The advancement rate beyond the compulsory education jumped after the introduction in 1947 of the new educational system modeled after the American comprehensive educational system. The compulsory education was extended from six years of primary school to nine years of primary and middle schools, and there was an upgrade of the minimum level of education. The advancement beyond the compulsory level escalated during the 1960s, and the expansion of the higher education system took place in the 1960s and early 1970s and again beginning in the late 1990s. Different stages of the educational system expanded at varying time points, and the process of the educational expansion followed a non-linear pattern. 3. Hypotheses about Change and Stability in Intergenerational Mobility A number of theories and hypotheses have been advanced about the trends in intergenerational class mobility among industrial nations. We present five hypotheses or predictions about the long-term trends in class mobility. These hypotheses are not always written explicitly in the works of scholars cited below, but can be derived from their various writings (see, Breen 2004; Erikson and Goldthorpe 1992b; Goldthorpe - 3 -
1985b; Vallet 2001 for further discussions on these hypotheses). The first hypothesis is called a threshold hypothesis. This hypothesis argues that intergenerational mobility rates increase dramatically when a society transforms from the pre-industrial to industrial stage. An historical increase in mobility rates is observed when a society reaches a level of industrial maturity (Lipset and Zetterberg 1959; Davis 1962). Urbanization and massive migration from the farming to the urban areas lead to a sudden increase in the intergenerational mobility. Japan experienced rapidly increasing rate of mobility following the transition from a feudal society to an industrial society in Meiji Japan (Mitani 1977) and also at the time of rapid economic development of the 1950s and 1960s (Yasuda 1971; Tominaga 1992). According to this hypothesis, we expect a dramatic increase in absolute mobility rates (especially total mobility and outflow rates) in the 1950s and 1960s when Japan turned into a truly mature industrial society. The second hypothesis, which derives from the work of industrialism thesis, predicts the continuous increase in mobility rates and the weakening of the association between class origin and class destination, as societies experience industrialization (Blau and Duncan 1967; Bell 1973; Treiman 1970, 1990; Treiman and Yip 1989). The industrialism thesis predicts that all industrial societies converge towards a more mobile and fluid society, exhibiting an increased rate of both absolute mobility (such as total mobility and outflow rates) and relative mobility (or social fluidity). According to this hypothesis, there is a positive correlation between the level of industrialization and the openness of societies. This prediction is based on the notion that the principle of allocation of labor moves from particularistic criteria of social background to universalistic criteria of educational attainment (Parsons 1951; Levy 1966). As the level of industrialization progresses, jobs are more likely to be allocated by people s ability and achievement than by family background. Industrialization promotes a meritocratic form of social selection, and produces greater fluidity and openness in industrial societies. American and Japanese scholars who subscribed to the modernization theory (Jansen 1965, Ward 1967, and Dore 1967) claimed that the Japanese society has transformed and caught up to the Western nations in the 1950s and 1960s because of the increased use of achievement in allocating people to positions. As a strong believer of the industrialism thesis, Tominaga (1979, p.63) argued that Japan experienced a rapid and consistent increase in mobility rates during the post-war period, and that Japanese society became increasingly open in the 1950s and 1960s. As shown in Figure 2, the economic growth was particularly marked in the postwar period until the oil crisis in 1973. Therefore, the second hypothesis predicts a continuous increase in relative mobility rates especially in the period of rapid economic expansion until the mid-1970s in Japan. The trend of openness should be weakened during the time of economic recession during the 1990s and 2000s. The third hypothesis, in contrast, emphasizes stability in trends of intergenerational mobility. In his classical study of social mobility, Sorokin (1959) claims that there are short-term fluctuations of mobility rates which reflect historical events and contingencies. However, over the long term, there is stability and no perpetual trend in the fluctuations (Sorokin 1959, p. 63). Featherman, Jones and Hauser (1975), and more recently, Erikson and Goldthorpe (1992b) take up a similar position. Although there are changes in occupational and class structures following industrialization, the strength and pattern of association between class origin and class destination remain remarkably stable in industrial societies. Class origins continue to - 4 -
affect the allocation of class positions in a similar way over time. Therefore, the third hypothesis predicts that there is a cross-temporal stability in relative mobility rates in post-war Japan (see also Kojima and Hamana 1984; Kanomata 1987, 1997; Imada 1989, 1997; Seiyama et al 1990; Hara and Seiyama 1999; Ishida 2001). The fourth hypothesis is called the post-industrial rigidity thesis, and claims that there is an increased rigidity in class structure in post-industrial Japan. This hypothesis became increasingly popular among the media and the scholarly after the collapse of the bubble economy in the late-1980s. Toshiaki Tachibanaki (1998), an award-winning economist, argued that Japan s income inequality has increased greatly in the late 1980s and that Japan has become one of the most unequal nations in the world. Toshiki Sato (2000), a sociologist, claimed that there was an increased rigidity in the upper non-manual class, or what he called the intellectual elite, in the 1990s and that the intergenerational barriers to entry into the upper non-manual class became increasingly high. As shown in Figure 2, the Japanese society entered the recessionary period beginning in the 1990s, and both the media and the scholarly work claim the increased economic gaps and inequality in Japanese society (see, for example, Ohtake 2005; Shirahase 2005, 2006). Therefore, the post-industrial rigidity hypothesis predicts a trend of increasing rigidity and decreasing openness in Japan beginning in the 1990s. Finally, the fifth hypothesis pertains to the historical institutional hypothesis which focuses on the impact of historical institutional changes on mobility rates. The most dramatic changes in the Japanese social structure took place immediately after the defeat in the Second World War. The American Occupation Forces introduced a number of social policies which are likely to have had impact on social structure and processes. The policies were introduced for the purpose of democratizing Japanese society. The dissolution of financial cliques (big business groups) and the land reform which distributed pieces of land to peasants should have increased fluidity in the society and reduced the reproduction of the top owners. Therefore, according to the historical institutional hypothesis, we should expect to see increased fluidity among those who experienced the post-war social policies. These five hypotheses will be examined using empirical data of intergenerational class mobility in post-war Japan. Some of the hypotheses are not necessarily incompatible with each other. It is possible that Japan experienced a historic increase in observed mobility rates in the 1950s (the threshold hypothesis) and, at the same time, an increased rigidity in the 1990s (the post-industrial rigidity hypothesis). However, the second continuous hypothesis and the third stability hypothesis are not compatible to each other. 4. Hypotheses about Class Origin, Class Destination, and Education The second part of this study examines the relationship among class origin, class destination, and education. In particular, it will empirically investigate the effect of class origin on the attainment of educational credentials, the effect of education on the allocation of individuals to different class destinations, and the role of education in intergenerational mobility. The analyses include cross-temporal comparison of six national surveys conducted in post-war Japan. First, we will focus on the studies regarding the effect of class origin on educational attainment. The industrialism thesis predicts that particularistic criteria, - 5 -
such as class origin, play a diminishing role in educational and socio-economic attainment among industrial societies (Parsons 1951; Levy 1966; Blau and Duncan 1967; Bell 1973). Because of an increased urbanization and development of free mass education of industrialized nations, the dependence of educational attainment upon class origin is reduced (Treiman 1970). Critics of the industrialism thesis, however, point out that socio-economic as well as cultural obstacles to equality of educational opportunity persist in industrial nations (e.g., Bowles and Gintis 1976). The educational success of children is often dependent upon familial well-being and the cultural environment of their home (Featherman and Hauser 1978; Halsey et al. 1980). The advocates of cultural capital theory argue that children from advantaged cultural backgrounds benefit more from their schooling because they are already equipped with the linguistic and cultural competence which is necessary to succeed in school (Bourdieu 1973; 1974; Bourdieu and Passeron 1977; Bernstein 1977). These theories predict that the linkage between class origin and educational attainment is far from being diminished in industrial societies. A number of studies of cross-cohort trends in educational attainment (e.g., Mare 1981; Halsey et al. 1980; Raftery and Hout 1993; Shavit and Blossfeld 1993) also report a finding that is not consistent with the industrialism thesis: a cross-cohort stability or increase in the effects of social origins on school-grade progressions. In Japan studies analyzing trends in the relationship between social background and education report the results that are consistent with those in other nations. The effect of social background on educational attainment appears to be stable in post-war Japan (Ushiogi 1975, 1978; Fujita 1981; Ehara 1984; Kariya 1995; Ishida 2007). Furthermore, Ishida (1993) shows that the overall impact of all social background characteristics on educational progression is not particularly smaller in Japan than in Britain and the United States, despite the prevalence of educational credentialism which seems to imply that the attainment of education is open to any talented individual. Second, we will focus on the association between education and class destination among industrial societies. The industrialism thesis (Kerr et al. 1960; Treiman 1970; Treiman and Yip 1989; Hout 1989) claims that individuals who attain higher level of education are placed at the top of the occupational hierarchy. It also predicts an increasing effect of education on the allocation of individuals to class positions as society continues to industrialize. According to the functionalist account (Davis and Moore 1945), these highly educated people perform important functions in the society which cannot be fulfilled by other people. It predicts a positive correlation between educational level and desirability and prestige of positions in the society. This positive correlation, however, does not need to come from a functionalist explanation. The highly educated possess an enhanced ability and resources to obtain the most desirable positions in the society. They could restrict entry into the highly desirable positions, such as professional jobs, to those who possess appropriate certifications (Collins 1979; Parkin 1979). Studies dealing with the relationship between education and labor market outcomes (occupational status, income and other rewards) are too numerous to report. The human capital theory (Mincer 1974; Becker 1975), for example, views education as the investment in human capital and predicts a positive correlation between years of schooling and wage. Within the framework of class analysis, the most comprehensive and up-to-date study is that of Shavit and Muller (1998). They try to explain cross-national variation in the effect of educational qualification on entry class and entry - 6 -
occupational status by institutional features of industrial societies. Ishida (1993) also shows that the effects of educational credentials on occupational status and income are not particularly greater in Japan than in Britain and the United States. The results, according to Ishida, are evidence against the educational credentialism thesis which imply greater socio-economic returns to education in Japan. Third, we will examine the role of education in intergenerational class reproduction and mobility. We consider the three pairs of association between class origin and destination, between class origin and education, and between class destination and education at the same time, and determine how much of the association between class origin and class destination is mediated by education. Previous research reports that the extent of mediation by education depends on the types of class reproduction and mobility (Robinson and Kelly 1979; Kerckhoff, Campbell, and Trott 1982; Robinson 1984; Yamaguchi 1983; Ishida, Muller, and Ridge 1995). The reproduction of ownership of production (such as farming and petty business) is likely to go through the direct transmission of physical capital without the means of education, but the reproduction of control over labor is likely to be facilitated by educational achievement. By representing the association between class origin and class destination by different effect matrices, we will evaluate whether education uniformly affects different effect matrices. The role of education may turn out to be very different depending on the kinds of association between origin and destination, represented by effect matrices. Three themes discussed above will be examined within the context of change. We will examine whether the linkage between class origin and education and between education and class destination has changed in postwar Japan. The examination of the trend in the effect of class origin on educational attainment in post-war Japan provides an opportunity to empirically verify the prediction of the industrialism thesis that the effect of class origin weakens as society continues to industrialize. The persistence and stability in the association between class origin and education will be consistent with the cultural capital argument. Similarly, the trend analysis of the effect of education on class destination will empirically evaluate the prediction of strengthening the linkage between achieved level of education and class positions in industrial nations. We will also examine whether the mechanism through which class origin affects class destination has changed during the post-war period in Japan. In particular, we will evaluate whether the mediating role of education has changed in Japan. The effective use of education in the reproduction of the professional-managerial class, for example, might have strengthened in the post-war period due to the increased importance of education in allocating people to class positions. As the tendency for the association between education and class position to be strengthened, the mediating role of education might have strengthened. 5. Data and Variables The Japanese data sets used in this study are derived from the Social Stratification and Social Mobility (SSM) surveys conducted in Japan. These surveys were conducted in 1955, 1965, 1975, 1985, 1995, and 2005 with virtually same questions on the core items, such as the respondents employment conditions and social background. These surveys, therefore, provide us with the unique opportunity to conduct cross-temporal comparisons using virtually identical variables. The age range is set to 30 to 64, so that the analyses - 7 -
include only those respondents who have completed their educational attainment. We also restrict analysis to men because female respondents were excluded in the SSM surveys prior to 1985. This study uses three variables: class origin, class destination and education. Class origin refers to the class of the respondent s father when the respondent was growing up. 1 Class destination refers to the respondent s current class. In order to determine class categories, the following four questions are used: occupation, employment status, managerial status, and firm size. The class schema is shown in Table 1. 2 Our analyses are based on the six-category version of Erikson-Goldthorpe- Portocarero class schema (Erikson, Goldthorpe, and Portocarero 1979): the professional managerial class or the service class (I+II), the routine non-manual class (III), the urban petty bourgeoisie (IVab), the farming class (IVc+VIIb), the skilled manual class (V+VI), and the unskilled manual class (VIIa). Education refers to educational credentials which include both academic and vocational qualifications. Konig, Luttinger, and Muller (1988) describe the procedure for constructing a comparable educational classification across countries. We use three levels of education: the lowest is defined as the social minimum of elementary education (Low); the middle level includes higher levels of vocational qualifications and intermediate academic qualifications (Middle); and the highest level includes all tertiary qualifications (High). 3 We will use the terms education and qualifications interchangeably throughout the paper. 6. Trends in Absolute Rates of Intergenerational Class Mobility We first present the trends in the distributions of class origin and class destination across six survey years from 1955 to 2005 (Table 2). The distribution of class destination represents the (male) class structure of the Japanese society at the time of the survey. There are several noticeable trends apparent in changes in the class destination. First, the most striking trend deals with the rapid contraction of the farming class in post-war 1 In the Japanese data sets, slightly different operationalization of the father s class is used depending on the survey years. The 1955 Survey used the father s longest employment as the measure of father s class. The rest of the surveys used the father s main employment as the measure of father s class. An additional caution is required in the use of the 1955 Survey. It did not ask the question of managerial status to the respondent nor to the father. In other words, the proportion of the professional managerial class is probably slightly underestimated at the expense of the routine non-manual class because some of the clerical job holders might have lower managerial status. Similarly, the proportion of the skilled manual workers is probably slightly underestimated at the expense of the non-skilled manual workers because some manual workers in class VIIa might hold a foreman status which entitles them to be assigned in class V. 2 For details of class schema, see Erikson and Goldthorpe (1992b, chapter 2). For justification of collapsing the full 10-category version of the class schema, see Ganzeboom, Luijkx, and Treiman (1989). On the use of more disaggregated tables, see Erkison and Goldthorpe (1992a) and Hout and Hauser (1992). On service class, see Goldthorpe (1982). 3 For details of the educational classification scheme, see Konig, Luttinger, and Muller (1988) and Ishida, Muller, and Ridge (1995, appendix). In the Japanese data sets, the first category includes those with the compulsory level of education, the second category high school graduates and old system junior high school graduates, and the third category old system high school graduates, junior college and university graduates. Note that the Japanese classification used in this study differs from that used in Ishida, Muller, and Ridge (1995). - 8 -
Japan. The largest drop in the share of the farming class took place from 41 percent in 1955 to 24 percent in 1965, and the share continued to drop until 1985. Second, the skilled manual working class expanded rapidly from 7 percent in 1955 to 15 percent in 1965, and remained stable around 18 percent from 1975 to 2005. Third, the professional-managerial class expanded steadily throughout the post-war period. The share of the professional-managerial class was only 10 percent in 1955, but it doubled to 20 percent by 1965 and has continued to grow, reaching 37 percent by 1995. The professional-managerial class was already the largest class in the class structure by 1975. Judging from these changing shares of various classes, the most dramatic changes in the Japanese labor market probably took place from 1955 to 1965. The rapid migration of population out of the rural area was absorbed into the urban areas. Moreover, what is apparent in the trend of class destination distributions is that there was a simultaneous expansion of the white-collar sector (the professional-managerial class) and the blue-collar sector (the skilled working class) during the rapid industrialization process from 1955 to 1965. In contrast to many other industrial nations that experienced the expansion of the blue-collar sector first and much later that of the white-collar sector, the white-collar sector in Japan began its expansion almost at the same time of the blue-collar sector, largely due to the late and rapid industrialization process. Fourth, the share of the routine non-manual class, the petty bourgeoisie, and the non-skilled working class remained fairly stable across survey years. It is important to notice that there was no sign of declining significance of the urban petty bourgeoisie in the postwar Japanese class structure, at least until 1995. The share of the urban proprietors remained around 20 percent from the 1950s to 1990s. We already know that Japan had the relatively large petty bourgeoisie sector in the 1970s, compared to European nations (Ishida, Goldthorpe and Erikson 1991), and the persistence of this sector across survey years suggests the continued importance of this sector in Japan. However, there is evidence that the urban self-employment has declined from the late-1990s, primarily due to the declining value of the assets during the recession (Ishida 2004). The share of the non-skilled working class remained stable at about 10 percent. This trend suggests that this class never expanded to constitute a demographically significant group in Japan, unlike many industrial nations where the non-skilled working class was at one point in time the major social force within the class structure. The distributions of class origin do not represent the class structure of any given time period since the age of the fathers varies substantially and men without any son never appear in the distributions (Blau and Duncan 1967). Instead, they show how the origins of the respondents in a particular survey year have changed over time. 4 There are changes parallel to those which were observed in the class destination distribution: the contraction of the farming class and the corresponding increase in the shares of the skilled working class and the professional managerial class. However, compared with the class destination distributions, there seems to be a time-lag in the changes in the distribution. The gradual decline of the farming class was observed from 1955 to 2005. There is also a gradual increase in the share of the professional managerial from 1955 to 1995. The share of the skilled working class increased most rapidly from 1975 to 1985. Table 2 reports the total mobility rates for the six survey years. The rate increased dramatically from 1955 to 1965 and continued to increase modestly until 1985. 4 It should be remembered that the operationalization of the father s class is slightly different in 1955. - 9 -
From 1985 to 2000, there is a plateau in total mobility rate at about 68 percent. The trend is closely related to the changes in the class origin and class destination distributions. In 1955, over 60 percent of the fathers were engaged in primary production and about 40 percent of the respondents were in the farming class (IVc+VIIb). A large share of the farming class in both generations implied high intergenerational inheritance. However, rapid contraction from 1955 to 1965 of the farm sector both in the class origin and class destination distributions meant the mobility out of the farming class, and the total mobility rate jumped from 48 percent in 1955 to 60 percent in 1965. This finding is consistent with the prediction by Lipset and Zetterburg about the historic increase in mobility rate when a society enters a mature industrial stage. Trends in the dissimilarity index between class origin and class destination parallel those of total mobility rates. When the dissimilarity index is low, the total mobility rate is low. As the dissimilarity index increases, there is a corresponding increase in total mobility rate. However, the reduction in the dissimilarity index after 1985 does not accompany the reduction in the total mobility rate probably because the farming class has sufficiently shrunk by 1985 in the class destination. Table 3 presents outflow mobility rates which are computed from the 6 by 6 Japanese mobility tables for the six survey years. Features of cross-temporal changes across survey years more or less correspond to the characteristics of the changes in the class destination distributions. Outflows to the farming class (IVc+VIIb) decreased dramatically, especially from 1955 to 1965. On the other hand, outflows to the professional managerial class increased steadily. Outflow rates to the petty bourgeoisie remained at a high level throughout the period. Table 4 presents inflow mobility rates for the six survey years. Trends in inflow rates generally parallel those in outflow rates, but they are much less apparent. Inflows from the farming class have declined, and inflows from the professional managerial class increased. Our particular interests pertain to the outflows from the farming class (see figures in italic in Table 3). The intergenerational stability (that is, the sons of the farming class who themselves became the farming class) is dramatically reduced from 61 percent in 1955 to 40 percent in 1965, following the rapid contraction of the farming class during this period (see distribution of class destination). It is worth noting that these sons of the farming class were found in both the blue-collar sector (the skilled and non-skilled working classes) and the white-collar sector (the professional-managerial class) since the outflows to these classes increased from 1955 to 1965. Therefore, migration out of the farming implied mobility into both the manual working class and the upper white-collar class. Figure 4 shows the changes in the outflow rates from the farming class and the expansion of education. The figure was drawn by dividing our respondents into different birth cohorts and computing rates by cohorts. From Figure 4 we can observe that the outflow rates from the farming to the manual working class (V/VI and VIIa combined) increased as the proportion of those who had more than senior high school education expanded. Similarly, the changes in the outflow rates from the farming to the professional-managerial class parallel the changes in the proportion of those who attended the institutions of higher education. These figures suggest that the outflows from the farming class are probably facilitated by education. Table 5 presents how education was used to achieve such mobility out of farming. The table disaggregates the outflow rates from the farming class by education level. From 1955 to 1975, there is a dramatic reduction in the intergenerational stability of the - 10 -
farming class, especially among those with low education (from 56 percent to 24 percent). In return, the increased proportion of the sons of the farming class with low level of education moved into the manual working class from 1955 to 1975 (from 11 percent to 26 percent). We should bear in mind that the new educational system which extended the compulsory education to middle school was introduced in 1947 in Japan. Therefore, the respondents who were in the lowest level of education (compulsory education) in the 1965 and 1975 survey contained those who completed middle school. Middle schools under the new educational system assisted students (especially from the farm background) find non-farm employment, and the students from the farm background migrated into urban areas on the massive scale (Kariya, Sugayama, and Ishida 2000). The result is the massive outflow of the sons of the farmers with middle school education. After 1975, the sons of the farming class who had senior high school education moved into the manual working class and the professional-managerial class. Education, therefore, appears to have helped the sons of the farming class move out of their class of origin. We have already learned the distinctive feature of the Japanese manual working class in comparison with European nations: a very weak demographic stability or demographic identity (Goldthorpe 1985a, 1987; Ishida, Goldthorpe and Erikson 1991). In particular, the Japanese working class is characterized by its low level of intergenerational stability (outflow rate) and its low level of intergenerational self-recruitment (inflow rate), compared with the working class in European nations. The demographic character of the Japanese working class is clearly separated from that of the European working classes (Ishida 2001). It is therefore important to examine whether this feature has changed over the course of economic development in post-war Japan. Table 6 presents outflow rates from and inflow rates to the two manual working classes, that is, class V+VI and VIIa combined. By looking at outflow rates, we find the intergenerational stability of the working class has not changed much: that is, the sons of the working class who were themselves becoming the working class constitute about 45 percent. Although there is a temporal decline in the intergenerational stability in 1995, the level of stability in 2005 remains at 49 percent, the same level observed in 1975 and before. From the inflow recruitment perspective, the percentage of self-recruitment shows some fluctuations. Self-recruitment declined from 22 percent in 1955 to 15 percent in 1975 and then increased from 1975 to 35 percent in 2005. There is a steady declining trend in the share of the farming class of 54 percent in 1975 to 29 percent in 2005. However, the distinctive inflow pattern in Japan, vis-a-vis Europe, is still apparent in 2005. The petty bourgeoisie (IVab) and the farming class account for about the majority (50 percent) of the class origin among the working class. In other words, the recruitment into the working class is still predominantly from the self-employment sector even in 2005. Furthermore, the recruitment into the working class from the white collar class (I+I and III) increased steadily from 6 percent in 1955 to 15 percent in 2005. However, it is worth noting that the self-recruitment increased sharply from 25 percent in 1995 to 35 percent in 2005. The increased proportion implies the increased closure, at least in absolute rate, of the manual working class. In order to examine the role of education in the intergenerational stability and self-recruitment of the manual working class, we present in Table 7 the outflow rates from and the inflow rates into the working class by education and survey year. The examination of the outflow rates shows that the main destinations, aside from staying in - 11 -