But priority problem: how do you decide in conflicts of principles

1 Rawls Critique of Intuitionism March 6, 2014 Read Kymlicka Chapters 2-3 (and 1) About blindness, indifference to distribution of utility Rawls critique of utilitarianism Utilitarianism leads to counter intuitive results (slavery, torture, etc. might be permissible if aggregate good could be maximized by doing so), because it doesn t take individuals seriously Utilitarianism imagines a social spectator (Sidgwick) as if good is being maximised for a single amorphous agent, whereas actually some individuals welfare is being sacrificed for the sake of others (Kymlicka) Refining theories by testing them with situations Intuitions are not necessarily the last word Rawls: the goal is to achieve harmony between theory and intuitions, which creates a satisfactory equilibrium Intuition will always play some role Rawls critique of intuitionism (a normative theory) Makes a general assumption from a lower level intuition- makes a higher principle that involves lower ones; for example, don t hit someone s face and don t kick someone s leg could be grouped together into don t harm others Utilitarianism, consequentialism can put these higher principles under even higher ones: maximise happiness By trying to group these together, you ll get to a plurality of highest order principles; attempts to go further are wrong like utilitarianism, become too trivial and uninformative, ex: do the right thing Plurality of values echoed by Aristotle and the prof principles could be whole sentences How to adjudicate between highest order principles conflicts with intuitionism; intuitionists would use intuition to see which takes precedence. Rawls thinks one can go beyond intuition. Intuition allows for a plurality of principles of maximum generality. But priority problem: how do you decide in conflicts of principles Intuitionists can only rely on intuition: there is no way to adjudicate conflicts between highest order principles except by further intuitions; Rawls: we can do better if a method works, and it is intuitively acceptable, reflected equilibrium is reached. The method has been tested, it s useful, and it s informative

2 Different theorists or citizens will have different rankings between values (ex: between equality and utility, which can each be represented by distinct indifference curves (graph demonstrating equally preferable combinations between two values), and intuitionism cannot offer any reason for a higher order preferences of one of these indifference curves over another. An example of an indifference curve was given contrasting equality on the y axis with general utility (welfare) on the x axis What trade off would be equally preferable? Anything northeast of the curve because both principles are increasing some curves are flatter, some less so flat means equality (y) over general utility (x) non-flat means general utility (x) over equality (y) Constructive procedure, later constructivism borrows from Hobbes, Locke- idea of hypothetical contract Design contract that would capture our intuition of fairness, showing we can rely on this method Original position- when/before they made contract While painting an intuitively acceptable theory, adopt a theory for arguing for fair principles Principles are then seen as fair because they were chosen under these conditions that are not influenced by social or natural advantages like poverty, intelligence that would affect the bargaining procedure Central condition- people are behind veil of ignorance- they don t know what their real identity is (race, religion, natural endowment, etc.) or even their own conceptions of the good If using rational choice in the bargaining process, the outcome will reflect fairness Constructivist procedure uses rational choice (chooses self-interest) people think it assumes people are selfish- this moral objection follows tradition of proceduralism ex: the golden rule is a procedure- do unto others what you would like them to do to you couldn t produce remotely intuitive results if people worth interest masequist- do unto others would make them sadistic Rawls says put yourself in everyone s shoes- don t know what you are, so you have to put yourself in all shoes and ask what s in your self-interest Combining veil of ignorance with rational sentiment Utilitarianism trying to produce some good with its idea of maximising utility- what rights people have is derivative of the good; Bentham thinks rights are artificial

3 People have rights that take priority; if rights are prioritized over a good, it s assumed it s a thin good We don t assume any substantive view, but thin, minimal goods- anyone would want prior to their conception Maximising the general welfare is teleological Veil of ignorance- further assumption that people selfish- rational principles govern distribution of goods for all people No matter what one s conception of the good is, they would want as many primary goods as possible Rawls says the priority problem can be solved by organizing the plurality of principles into a lexical order (1.8) Claims that once it s all set up, the result has to be fair therefore they come up with two principles: 1. Liberty principle: each person has a right to maximum equal liberty 2. Difference principle: a. Goods should be distributed equally except when an inequality renders someone worse off b. Each person should have equal opportunity, such as for political office Rawls lexically orders these principles so liberty comes first, then equal opportunity, followed by equal distribution, or 1 2b 2a After these 2.5 principles are met, then you can start worrying about maximising utility (Rawls) Rawls Egalitarian Theory and Nozick s Libertarian Critique March 11, 2014 Recap- Rawls critique of intuitionism Intuitionism allows for a plurality of principles of maximum generality, but the priority problem; you can t adjudicate conflicts between principles and different people have different indifference curves Can t rule out intuitionism a priori but if a constructivist procedure can do better, the proof will be in the pudding; does it generate a better outcome (single highest principle or related plurality of principles, which capture our intuitions and thus achieve reflective equilibrium

4 Mill and Rawls both attack intuitionism. Rawls believes principles should be ordered lexically, and both hold that morality should be deduced from principle Every intuitionist/pluralist thinks maximising utility is one good thing but there are others; fairness, promises made, etc. (see Kymlicka and lending money) Mill chapter 5 talks of happiness as going beyond pleasure-pain Bentham- utility=happiness= pleasure pain; hedonic=pleasure based. Mill more accommodating; Bentham human happiness different than pig s happiness. Bentham says one will not substitute higher pleasures for lower ones. Mill wants to be conciliatory and at the same time wants to be loyal to Bentham and this father, James Mill. Mill suggests he is a hedonic utilitarian, and wants to be a one value philosopher Some utilitarians accepted general welfare, well-being, preference satisfaction- like consequentialism Intuitionists believe there are principles to apply to different situations; they try to make them one principle- there should be a determinate order of principles among them Rawls on intuitionism: he believes it s possible to go beyond intuitions, but there is no way to get beyond a plurality of principles. Intuition is important, but should be reduced when possible. Justice as fairness principles of justice chosen under original position- we can put principles in serial or lexical order-need to understand first principle before second and so on; either by a single principle or a plurality in a lexical order Mill and Rawls agree on a lexical order of principles Rawls constructivist procedure: hypothetical contract; not like state of nature because there is not claim it s real, and the parties themselves are not fully real; this idea of a contract is borrowed from Hobbes and Locke Artificial state of nature- stipulated (agreed) original position unlike state of nature No claim to be real or historical Parties not fully real Real society- Canada or US in 20 th -21 st centuries- is assumed to exist along with its production of primary goods and its Basic Structure Read Kymlicka on Rawls contract The real society- it exists- the production of primary goods exist- its primary structure exists If one accepts free market out-produces some collectively owned means of production Constructive procedure limits reliance on intuition by employing rational choice under specified controlled conditions

5 Fairness: principles would be chosen by people under certain conditions that made the choice fair, so principles would reflect this fairness. Thus principles can be seen as fair because they would be chosen under these conditions Before- liberty, equality, utility are important Since it s set up in a way that parties would choose what is fair 2 principles of justice A legislature of rational beings could make it a law Rawls wants to set up an experiment to capture equality unlike utilitarianism, by putting knowledge of ourselves behind the veil of ignorance- they choose therefore they are free, as opposed to taking people as they are with different abilities, prejudices. Certain liberties are constitutionalized so legislatures can t easily take them away Each person is to have equal right to the most extensive basic liberty compatible with similar liberty for others (liberty principle) maximum equal liberty possible with everyone else s liberty Rawls says maxi-min maximum minimum position you might be in- rational choice theory. One of the ways to minimise reliance on intuition is by using rational choice theory, a science of choosing rationally Whatever your conception of the good is, you want maximum liberty to realize that conception (ex: Buddhists would want a society where Buddhism is legal) Hart: the first important thing is liberty entrenched; it s just basic liberties and not the maximum version of (most extensive) basic liberties Difference between concept and conception: you can have a concept like justice, but different theorists have different conceptions of justice. This doesn t mean they can t have useful dialogue between them Social, economic inequalities are to be arranged so they are both: a) reasonably expected to be to everyone s advantage, especially to those worse off b) attached to positions and offices open to all Social, economic goods should be distributed equally when an inequality favours the worse off For example, of (10 14 13), (8 23 43), and (11 14 17), the second option is unjust in Rawls view, the third is the most just. A transition from the first to the third would be just

6 Prioritarianism: view that one should always give priority to the worst off Egalitarianism: view that favours equality for its own sake (they would choose the first option in the above example) Some people like Margaret Thatcher say socialists are making everyone worse off by making them equal while making no one better off. Recap of Rawls and intro to Nozick s Libertarian Critique March 18, 2014 Rawls two principles of justice: 1. Liberty principle: humans are deserving of basic human rights; they have fundamental inviolable rights 2. Difference principle: a) maximum standard of equal rights should be strived for- goods should be distributed equally unless an inequality renders someone worse off b) equal opportunity for political office, etc. Advantage of Bentham and Mill s greatest happiness principle- moral rules no longer mysterious, but are subordinate to promoting human happiness and welfare Prof: Let justice be done and so punish the world Golden rule- has to presuppose self-interest; doesn t take into account the individual preferences of people, for example can t just have jazz Universalization test- Kant s categorical imperative- logical contradiction, contradiction of will. Rawls chapters 27-28 what if parties in original position choose utilitarianism? Depends on how risk averse they are Rawls says they will want maxi-min Supposed to be better than intuition (Rawls theory) Procedural approach seems to have problems Difference principle is immune to levelling down objection- if one is blind, take the eyes of everyone else- Margaret Thatcher s argument Temkin: no change in distribution is justified which does not benefit someone Walzer s spheres of justice- different goods have different distributions, ex: medicine distributed according to need, and different spheres shouldn t invade each other Cohen s objection- his book Rescuing Justice and Equality in which he tries to rescue justice from John Rawls Attacks difference principle- if minimum is increased, inequality could be tolerated

7 It s possible to have an equal aggregate if people weren t so selfish Robert Nozick s libertarian critique Entitlement theory- goods can t be coercively redistributed, for there is an initial acquisition of property and transfers are consensual (non-coercive) Patterned Theory- first pick your favourite kind of justice theory, then imagine Wilt Chamberlain. Everyone gives Wilt money to see him play basketball, making him richer than everyone else. Should the government take away Wilt s money? Therefore Nozick argues that justice is unpatterned. Liberty upsets patterns, as some save, squander, or invest their money Libertarian Critique of Rawls Egalitarianism March 20, 2014 Robert Nozick follows Locke on self-ownership Cohen noticed Marxists have problems with property ownership. Individuals have inviolable rights Kant s injunction (second formulation of the categorical imperative): treat people as ends and never as means Rights as side constraints on action- can be done as long as they don t violate others rights that constrain those of the actor Dworkin- rights as trumps- rights can override, constrain other motivations to act. (Trump is a suit in playing cards that can beat any other suit). Nozick shares this view Even rights-consequentialism is ruled out (action is right if it maximises respect for rights overall, and minimises violation of rights, known as the utilitarianism of rights) because it treats some as mere means rather than ends The difference of rights consequentialism with deontological rights is that as opposed to having some rights fairly fixed, but with possible exceptions, deontological rights have no exceptions An example of rights consequentialism is income tax brackets Self-ownership: people own themselves (following Locke), but Nozick does critique Locke with his tomato juice example

8 Thus: entitlement theory has these elements: Principle of initial acquisition Principle of just transfer- if I transfer something to you by consent, it s yours- there is no coercion Principle of rectificatory justice- returning stolen stuff to rightful owner who abided by the principle of just transfer If initial acquisition is just, and transfers are non-coercive, transfers are just. No one has the right to take away what one has to give it to someone else. Coerced redistribution goes back to the Kantian injunction, as the people getting money taken from them would be used as a means to achieve equality Therefore whatever pattern emerges from a free market (and new ones constantly emerge) is just. A pattern in this sense means a guiding philosophy Wilt Chamberlain example- justice is unpatterned- liberty upsets patterns Page 168- patterned principles of distributive justice necessitate redistributive activities; likelihood is small that any actual freely-arrived at set of holdings fits a given pattern; likelihood is zero that it will continue to fit a pattern as people exchange things. From a point of view of a different theory, redistribution is a serious matter indeed, involving the violation of people s rights Taxation=coercing Neither Rawls nor Nozick think there are grounds for merit here Marxist- a BA graduate gets a poor job- not a just transfer Nozickian- just transfers are complicated, but the basic principle is good Page 169- taxation of earnings from labour is on par with forced labour (if you re working for someone else) Marriage example- an island of 26 males and 26 females, all heterosexual. Miss and Mr. A are the most attractive, B people are second best, and so on The two A s marry, the two B s marry, and so on. The Z people have no choice- have Y s left as enough and as good (Lockean Proviso) for the Z s? No, for there is now choice of who to marry. Lockean proviso and zip back argument- A s didn t have right to take it either therefor no one has the right to acquire anything if A s have no choice but to marry the opposite sex. Page 178-182 leaving someone worse off- what does it mean?

9 Nozick 182- I believe that the free operation of a market system will not actually run afoul of the Lockean proviso He compares it to the free market Ex: minimal night watchman state- protects security, some public goods- basic Hobbesian No matter what principle of initial acquisition, just transfers upset patterns This theory, entitlement theory of holdings- historical pattern changes every day- pattern would have to be reinforced daily Objections: What are basic rights or side constraints? Do equal rights not require equal freedom and thus equality of opportunity? Can you have equality of opportunity without some equality of outcome (requiring redistribution)? Are markets really free? If corporations are legal fictions invented and propped up by artifice (non-natural) then why can t artificial redistribution be justified? Corporations designed to make more money Recap- libertarian-egalitarian debate, and communitarianism March 25, 2014 Incommensurability (incomparable) - hard to always know what produces more happiness. There are different values that can be measured on a single scale, but not in practice- no way to compare them Objections to Nozick s libertarianism People are supposed to have fundamental rights of liberty, which act as side constraints These are supposed to be equal rights (your right to liberty equal to mine) But people don t have equal liberty without equal opportunity, which requires equal resources There are different ways to bring about equal opportunity. It may also require limiting inheritance or right to bequeath. Not all the time do you need to distribute resources ex: eliminate tuition

10 Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld- early 20 th century theory of rights Secondary rights- ability to change rights- immunity powers to change rights So some redistribution for the sake of justice is acceptable Capitalist markets not natural and free Capitalist markets are not natural, but require extensive legal framework including that which creates and gives legal personality and rights to corporations If inequalities arise from artificial legal framework, not violation of property rights to limit those inequalities through redistributive taxation, there is a problem with his assertion Marriage example- marriage between consenting adults should not be interfered with because of nature of love and marriage; autonomy should be respected. How much money one has does not require the same respect Communitarianism Two main categories of claims 1. Socio-metaphysical claim- from where people get their identities, purposes, goals, values, and their conceptions of the good, and also their judgements about what justice requires (Sandel, Taylor, MacIntyre) Another such claim: Walzer- different goods have different spheres (principles) of distribution, and different cultures have different conceptions of these goods and accompanying principles- prof disagrees with second part 2. Policy claim: state ought not to be neutral between different conceptions of the good as liberals wish, but ought to actively foster communal bonds la fraternité (solidarity) of famous French slogan liberty, equality, fraternity Other variant (Raz): state ought to support valuable options in society, especially those struggling to sustain themselves in economic market. Thus it needs not to be anti-perfectionist (contra liberals, Rawls, Dworkin, Nagel). For example: few people like opera- hard for market to sustain itself- could be more expensive as a result. Government subsidized the opera market to prevent this- some people disagree, say let opera go- Raz says state should provide viable options Sandel: liberal slogan: self is prior to its ends- Sandel- this is the unencumbered self, but falseself is constituted (made up) by ends No self without ends, but a collection of ends created by the community

11 Self discovers its ends through reflection on its own identity- it doesn t make up its identity by itself Sandel s critique of Rawls Original position experiment makes no sense since thin selves of the original position are incapable of the position they were tasked Individuals can t choose principles of justice apart from their conceptions of good Liberal response (Kymlicka) - conceptions of the good can be revised, endorsed Responsibility is the key concept of this liberal rejoinder -people would live their lives from the inside This leads to policy issue- liberals fear communitarian belittling of autonomous choice could lead to an authoritative society Liberals: this is teleological- some goal over property or rights Are principles of justice universal or particular to each society- two issues Communitarian Recap March 27, 2014 Two categories of communitarian critique 1. Socio-metaphysical critique (and Sandel methodological)- people aren t just thin selves behind veil of ignorance that choose ends rationally, but ends are formed by communities; different cultures have different values 2. Policy issues: wanting more communal bonds, solidarity, fraternité, etc. You don t have to imagine thin selves- the thought experiment (Rawls contract) to see which considerations are and aren t relevant- Rawls wants to separate contract from public considerations, prejudices- no appeal to tradition ex: wife and husband arguing about how he does the dishes- if you didn t know your gender Moved away from community- claimed policy issues (Sandel) - since people can t make choicesthey re thick selves- in policies and principles, they are discovering themselves Argument that liberal capitalism makes public egoists- it s bad- political movementpolitical philosophies wanted to distance themselves from political movement Rawls said his theory applied to US society and was not universal

12 In 1990s, communitarianism and libertarianism came apart Argument- different theorists had different meanings of community Sandel- local non-state Taylor- Quebec francophone- linguistic national culture, self determination Prof thinks PQ doesn t know what to say about crisis in Crimea Liberals seemed to have stronger arguments, intuitions. Sandel- communities would oppose pornography Liberal philosophy state should be neutral, but some liberal would defend state s actions as an expression of free speech- Christians, Conservatives, and radical feminists against pornography Sandel- since pornography is not accepted by the community, it s wrong. Looking at history, this way does not always yield justice Opposite argument- community does not trump individual rights- pornography is looked at in private that doesn t cause harm- see Mill s writings on what public could and couldn t interfere with. Feminists argue pornography is bad because it creates a rape culture by dehumanizing women and sex Community rights over individual rights doesn t work with homosexuality because it s counterproductive to procreation in society Whether justice is sufficient to create bonds to make community cohesive- some think community should not be involved to promote national culture (in education) Plato thought justice kept society together, as Aristotle did with the polis Alasdair MacIntyre- is patriotism a virtue? He thought yes (and Rawls political liberalism) ex: for stability in society, you want people to enforce rules ex: equalization payments between Canadian provinces- why would rich Alberta give money to poor provinces, unless Canada is regarded as one national family- some issue with rich people paying taxes Rawls seems statist on global justice- he doesn t think rich states owe poor states money- thinks it only occurs in the political community- more communitarianism than people who support global justice Charles Taylor- any Quebec government would have duty to promote French Canadian culture, even when overriding some English Canadian individual rights- some people are unhappy with those claims

13 Quebec Bill 101- immigrants, French Canadians had to send their kids to French Canadian schools- rights of Quebec people s self-determination? Some of Quebec s laws justifiable on communitarian grounds Rawls political liberalism 1993 based on papers published after 1971 theory of justice Theory of Justice is political, not metaphysical For a pluralist society (plurality of comprehensive doctrines such as religious views, political views, etc.- US society has this; metaphysical claims are not shared by everyone People free and equal, and are reasonable if they re willing to subscribe to a political conception of justice Overlapping consensus between different comprehensive doctrines (fascist, racist, etc.) Reasonable comprehensive doctrines willing to work out political conception of justice with other reasonable comprehensive doctrines In political arena, put aside personal reasonable comprehensive doctrines, because they are not shared by everyone ex: not right because of someone s religious views Public reason does not refer to or rely on any promise particular to any comprehensive doctrine Keeps constructivist procedure to display what reasonable people would choosereasonable comprehensive doctrine (RCD) behind veil of ignorance\ Citizens can t agree on moral authority- sacred text or institution If procedure correctly formulated, citizens should accept reasons with RCD- they can put aside RCD accept for way of doing politics on basis of public conception, but their RCD is reasonable because it allows them to make such an agreement- find a compromise for everyone Page 100- Justice as fairness aims to understand public basis of justification on questions of political justice- gives fact of reasonable problem- since justification is experienced to others Begin from shared ideas a political conception on general freedom of reason and judgement Criticisms Why can t we use CPD (comprehensive political doctrine; same as RCD) as something to argue for in parliament ex: that abortion is murder Liberals claim to be neutral based on an RCD Rawls is forced to recognize it as most important part of a society being free and equal Voice RCD and have parliament access these arguments Rawls, Canada, US- one should strive for a political conception independent of people s RCDs

14 April 1, 2014 Wolff s Philosophical Anarchism Freedom and autonomy conflict with coercion Contract tradition tries to make authority /legitimacy depend on consent Rousseau adds identification with laws and pre political unanimity Communism- forcing people to be free going to gulags, etc. -1950s critique of Rousseau For some, democracy is the solution to the puzzle- no obligation to obey laws of dictatorship, but in democracy people rule so not a problem- part of social contract For others, democracy offers no solution Premise 1: individuals are free, autonomous Premise 2: since they re free and autonomous, they shouldn t be coerced unless they threaten someone else s equal freedom Premise 3: states by definition rule by coercion Premise 4: People have rights and moral duty to exercise their own autonomy Conclusion: therefore individuals don t have duties to obey the state, and all state authority is illegitimate Premise: democracies with majority rule coerce minorities, people find themselves in either minority or majority, no matter how democratic a country is Conclusion: individuals in a minority don t have to obey democratic majorities, or laws of democratic states Robert Paul Wolff inventor of doctrine of philosophical anarchism, makes these points together Binary (2) options often problematic/artificial Multiply these problems by first pas the post system of ridings- government can be in power by getting a majority if it gets majority of seats Individuals have basic rights to autonomy One can t forfeit one s moral autonomy; it s inalienable (liberal tradition- one cannot self oneself into slavery)

15 Just as promising to be a slave cannot morally make you a slave, promising to obey laws of state cannot give you a moral obligation to obey the laws of a state- it would be like forfeiting one s autonomy- reminds me of Rousseau man is free, yet everywhere, he is in chains Intuition that slavery is very wrong- what about laws that limit freedom and are very right- are these laws illegitimate? He s not saying disobey moral law-duty to be moral ex: not kill other people- anarchists have no duty to obey because it s law, but because it s morally right He says liberal contract theory is founded on this point Philosophical anarchism, not political anarchism- believed good polis had no laws/authority or voluntary laws Marx- smash state and bourgeoisie There might be reasons to have laws- stop murder, etc. Moral people want morality enforced, but no obligation to obey a law because it s a law- judge according to one s own conscious, reason independent of it being law. Wolff doesn t address the chaos that might ensue 2 caveats (warnings) Might be independent moral duties to obey particular laws (don t murder, steal, fraud, etc.) but no moral duty added to a law by fact that it is the law Book published 1970 at height of protest movement Do you disobey every time you disagree with law or just for bad cases like racism? Many writers say people have self-bias Might be good reasons to have states Individual citizen has a moral duty enough to weigh each law independently and decide according to their conscience (without giving any moral weight to the fact that it is the law) Wolff- children in democracies learn to decide issues according to majority rule almost before they are old enough to count the votes. The individual has no duty to obey the decision decided upon by a majority any more than to obey decision decided by a tyrant or minority; in both cases they would be alienating their autonomy- doesn t matter if majority, minority or tyrant says it

16 Other challenges to majority rule Kenneth Arrow- cyclical voting Preferences A, B, C Rankings ABC 40% CAB 30% BCA 30% Depending on the order of vote aid pairings, different outcomes possible 70% prefer A over B 70% prefer B over C 40% prefer A over C 60% prefer C over A B would win vote with C, then A would win vote with B, but different pairings would lead to different outcomes Rousseau- representation is not real democracy Some defend majority rule on an instrumentalist basis, conceding (proving) Wolff s point Utilitarianism- satisfying wants- dictatorship if necessary Wolff- autonomy and authority genuinely incompatible -page 71 Embracing philosophical anarchism and treating all governments as non-legitimate bodies whose commands must be judged in each instance before they are obeyed- see book, In Defense of Anarchism When people get into power, sometimes they resent dealing with democracy But out of question to give up commitment to moral autonomy, men are no better than children if they not only accept the rule of others from force of necessity, but embrace it willingly and forfeit their duty unceasingly to weigh the merits of the actions which they perform they are then guilty of what Kant might have called the sin of willful heteronomy. Political Philosophy Class Notes April 3, 2014: Wolff Autonomy and authority genuinely incompatible, therefore we must either embrace philosophical anarchism and treat all governments as non-legitimate bodies, or else give up autonomy in the political realm and submit ourselves by implicit promise to whatever form of government appears the most just and beneficial

17 There is no universal or a priori reason for binding ourselves to a democratic government We need to not embrace it out of necessity, but willingly, and forfeit the duty (think for ourselves) to weigh merits of actions; one would then be guilty of what Kant might have called the sin of willful heteronomy (a repugnant thought) Philosophical anarchism is the only option left- only obey law if morally right First objection: Rawls vs. Nozick Libertarianism Socrates- even though condemned wrongfully, has duty to obey laws of state. Laws like fatherbrought him up, and he is grateful for laws. This is close to tacit contractual argument A.J. Simmons 1979 wrote book defending political anarchism like Wolff, but at greater length Joseph Raz defends political anarchism When we make a promise, we are no longer free (for a moral person). Promises can be overridden by more dire imperatives Suppose political obligation derives from something alien to a promise, or an implicit promise Placing oneself under an obligation through promising is not incompatible with autonomy, and on the contrary is an aspect of autonomy for political animals Promises and commitments are essential for social life among rational beings- enables rational agents to engage in joint projects (work, marriage) and joint rule. It s essential property of voluntary communities. Given that promises and commitments are essential requirements of social life, they are the essential means for engaging in communal cooperative life. It follows that so far from 1. Not being contrary to autonomous rational agency 2. They are indispensable tools of autonomous rational agency Marriage, etc. are not necessary sacrificing autonomy or with sacrifice, but gaining more autonomy as the unity creates more collaborative abilities than one would have alone So Wolff and the philosophical anarchist position generally are mistaken to view liberal contract tradition as antithetical to the notion of rational autonomy in holding that obligations to obey law can derive from contracts Problems with contract theory: No contract Hume- fathers can t bind sons Hypothetical contract is not a real contract so it isn t binding in a way that an actual contract is supposed to be (see Dworkin s critique of Rawls in N. Daniels) So it is not obvious that contract theory can show any prima facie (act as correct until proven otherwise) obligation to obey the law. For example. People who think abortion is murder, etc.

18 should go against an abortion law, as abortion supporters should disobey an abortion-banning law Duties from family don t arise by contract. If political obligation is like family, even though commitments/promises are never made to family, you have duties to your family because they are your family- prima facie- can all be overridden under certain conditions (current disintegration of family) Thus there are duties to obey in one s community The duty to obey democratic state laws didn t derive from promises we make, like family, but due to a great importance of family/political institutions, one has a duty out of respect to follow citizens to not violate their legitimate expectations. Wolff- there are obvious moral considerations concerning the value of order Another one us respecting wishes and especially legitimate expectations of citizens under that public order Therefore Wolff would judge each law according to his own conscious, but the above considerations mean that according to his own conscience, he ought to give special weight to the fact that law is the law How do we figure out moral laws with certainty? Public benefits like property rights, liberties Justifications of majority rule democracy Whatever objections one can raise- say majority over minority is tyranny- alternatives are worseminority over majority (compare to Churchill- democracy is the worst form of government except for all the others.