Center for American Progress Middle East Trip Report

Center for American Progress Middle East Trip Report On January 4-11, 2014, a senior delegation organized by the Center for American Progress traveled to the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Jordan, Israel, and the Palestinian Authority. The trip objective was to understand trends in the region and views on the U.S. role by participating in high-level meetings with key leaders. The meetings informed CAP s policy research on the region. The delegation spent three days in the UAE, meeting with government officials, U.S. military and diplomatic personnel, and private sector leaders. In Jordan, a small portion of the delegation met with King Abdullah while others met with foreign ministry and intelligence officials. Finally, the delegation spent three days in Israel and the West Bank, meeting with members of the Knesset, Israeli foreign policy experts, political leaders, U.S. diplomats, Palestinian officials, investors, and students, and Israeli President Shimon Peres. The discussions covered a wide range of topics, including Iran and its nuclear program, the civil war in Syria, Egypt and the Muslim Brotherhood, ongoing Israeli-Palestinian negotiations, regional trade, increased domestic energy production in the United States, and perceptions about the U.S. role in the region. This memorandum summarizes key findings from this trip. 1. Perceptions of U.S. retrenchment, continued desire for U.S. leadership. The overriding perception is that the United States is retreating from the region. Secretary of State John Kerry s active engagement during the past year and a continued robust U.S. military presence tempers this dominant view about a diminishing U.S. role in the region. Kerry s efforts are widely appreciated and he gets high marks for having a team with experience and knowledge of the region. Some question whether Kerry has the White House s full backing. Emiratis, Jordanians, and Israelis generally praise his high level of activity; Palestinians are more skeptical and cynical about his efforts. The US military and intelligence presence remains formidable even as U.S. ground troops continue their exit from 12 years of intensive combat in Iraq and Afghanistan. Many in the region continue to look to America for leadership and worry that our domestic economic and political problems, growing domestic energy production, and expressed desire to rebalance to other regions will leave them abandoned without outside support. Overall, the narrative of U.S. disengagement has hardened to the extent that it is largely impervious to the facts of continued U.S. engagement in the region, whether the continued and robust U.S. military presence or Secretary Kerry s diplomatic efforts. Better consultation and communication with allies like the UAE and Israel may improve matters, but these partners appear likely to remain critical of U.S. policy regardless of its substance, in part because this narrative has taken on a life of its own. 1

The entrenched regional assumption and acceptance of U.S. military and political hegemony is now more than ever a double-edged sword for the United States. What President Obama and many Americans see as a prudent recognition of the limits of American power in the broader Middle East after a decade of military over-commitment, regional states see as disengagement. The broader sense is that the region itself has not recognized the limits of American power, and continues to want the United States to solve its problems without regard to these limits, and in some respects so they can avoid their own hard choices. Better communication and consultation with key regional partners could help alleviate the sense of abandonment and reinforce the reality of continued strong U.S. engagement in the region. Nonetheless, it will likely take time to wean the region off its extreme dependence on a hypercommitment of U.S. power to the region bred by the war in Iraq. 2. Regional tensions: Multilayered regional competition for influence underway. Countries in the region are engaged in an intense competition for political and economic influence with each other in multiple arenas: Saudi Arabia and other Sunni states seek to counter Iran and its largely Shia allies in Iraq, Syria and Lebanon; Qatar and Turkey and their financial and political support to Islamist groups like the Muslim Brotherhood are challenged by other countries like the UAE, Jordan, and Israel strongly opposed to these groups. Multiple actors are using financial aid, the media, and military support to advance their agendas. Wealthier and more internally cohesive countries like the Gulf States vie for support in countries lacking resources and facing greater internal divisions like Syria, Lebanon and Yemen. None of these regional alignments along particular issues of common concern make it easier for the United States to craft a coherent regional engagement strategy. For example, while Emirati, Israeli, and Jordanian officials evinced something of a common understanding of the regional strategic landscape and threats one Emirati leader even went so far as to say it was easier to defend Israeli policy than American regional policy this common understanding is undercut by differences in priorities. All three states put different issues at the top of their lists of strategic priorities. The UAE s priority is Egypt, and it views the struggle against the Muslim Brotherhood as dealing with a threat to how the UAE sees itself as the vanguard of a modern Middle East against the reactionary threat of Islamism. Israel s top priority is Iran and its nuclear program. Jordanian officials focused primarily on the effects of the ongoing civil war in Syria and Israeli-Palestinian negotiations as their strategic priorities. Arguments that U.S. allies and partners in the region are approaching something of a strategic convergence should be taken with a strong dose of salt. While they may share a similar assessment of the regional strategic landscape, their strategic priorities differ strongly and will likely prove difficult to assemble into a coherent alignment. On the Israeli-Palestinian front, the United States has had some success in quietly reasserting its own strategic priorities. Managing the differences in strategic priorities within the region and between regional states and the U.S. could prove to be a significant challenge going forward. - 2-2

Finally, while many traditional U.S. partners are critical of current U.S. policies, these same partners are quick to acknowledge that they do not have better ideas. For example, many would concede that things like the Syrian chemical weapons agreement advanced by Russia and the United States has worked thus far. 3. Iran: Skepticism about recent diplomacy, pleas for greater consultation with the region. Few people the delegation met with were encouraged by the recent interim nuclear deal with Iran, but no one offered a clear alternative to the current strategy. Iran s regional role and its support for terrorist networks are cited as problems requiring attention along with its nuclear efforts. Key partners in the region were caught off guard by secret bilateral U.S.-Iran talks in Oman and other locations and felt they were not kept sufficiently apprised of the status of ongoing P5+1 talks. There was a broad plea for greater consultation with the region in advance of major diplomatic moves with Iran. But our discussions reinforced doubts as to whether we and some of our allies have shared criteria for what constitutes a security-enhancing deal with Iran. Where process and lack of consultation was the UAE s main concern on U.S. policy toward Iran, Israelis expressed concern over substance. Calling Iran the most dark and threatening cloud in the region, close advisors to Prime Minister Netanyahu called for increased sanctions and a halt to enrichment rather than the Geneva agreement. Israelis stressed that the deal over Tehran s nuclear program should not obscure Iran s overall negative behavior. Few expressed the view that a final deal with Iran is likely in six months, if at all. Israeli President Shimon Peres offered three additional recommendations on the Iran negotiations: 1) focus on restrictions to weapons delivery systems; 2) continue to work with the Russians; 3) include terrorism and related threats in the P5+1 discussions. 4. Israeli-Palestinian talks: Hopes for small steps forward soon, doubts about major advances. Israelis, particularly those close to Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, expressed some optimism about the possibility of a framework agreement to keep the talks going. There were low expectations that the content of this forthcoming agreement would result in much tangible progress on the ground. Palestinians were more skeptical about the prospects of a step forward, but those supportive of a two-state solution see the window for a lasting two-state solution closing as settlements expand. In our meetings in the West Bank, leaders focused on the importance of economic development and the need to remove restrictions to access and movement as a means to help the economy. Israeli and Palestinian domestic political dynamics substantially complicate the diplomatic efforts to achieve progress. 5. Syria: Regional disarray and competition for influence. U.S. regional partners are substantially divided on dealing with Assad, and no one has a remedy for ending the civil war. Some argue that getting to more cohesive support for the Syrian opposition within the London 11 group is difficult due to the divergent strategies pursed by countries like Qatar and Turkey and private support going to extremist Islamist groups. The September 2013 deal to eliminate Syria s - 3-3

chemical weapons arsenal is broadly seen as a very positive step, especially in Israel and Jordan. But the Obama administration s pullback from the threat of force is described as a sign of weakness and indecision by many actors in the region. 6. Jordan: Under pressure, requiring more support. Jordan s King Abdullah received high marks throughout the trip as a leader who is trying to achieve progress in the face of considerable pressures. Many leaders across the spectrum in Israel, the Palestinian territories, and the UAE note that as difficult as the current situation is in the Middle East, it would be impossible to manage without stability in Jordan. After years of pressures from Iraq s civil war, Jordan is now facing huge spillover effects from Syria s civil war with serious destabilizing risks. King Abdullah of Jordan feels encircled and under pressure from the broader regional tensions outlined in point 2 above, particularly on Syria. He sees some Gulf States supporting groups in Syria that could ultimately undermine broader regional security. Continued and increased humanitarian support as well as stepped up security cooperation on support on surveillance and military equipment that can help strengthen Jordan. In particular, support to Jordan for its energy and water crises can build a stronger foundation for progress there. 7. Egypt: Lack of clarity about U.S. policy, concerns about Muslim Brotherhood s next moves. The Obama administration s approach to cut portions of aid to Egypt after last summer s ouster of former President Morsi has confused many in the region. The delegation had a vibrant and open exchange with UAE leaders about the next steps forward on the political roadmap, but all agreed that Egypt requires a stronger economic model that creates jobs. A strong point of contention was whether the current Egyptian authorities efforts to crackdown on the Muslim Brotherhood would succeed or create a possible extremist backlash that could undermine stability. Interestingly, Jordan and the UAE have two different approaches for dealing with the Muslim Brotherhood, with the UAE seeking to defeat it in direct confrontation and Jordan seeking multiple ways to contain the movement, including political inclusion. Whatever the differences in dealing with their own Brotherhood organizations, our Emirati, Jordanian, and Israeli interlocutors called for a hands-off U.S. approach to Gen. Sisi s Egypt. Regional perceptions of U.S. relations with the Brotherhood have recovered from their previous lows, but remain fragile. Actions or statements that specifically highlight abuses against the Brotherhood (as opposed to general or systemic abuses) should be avoided to forgo any perception that the United States favors the Brotherhood. Similarly, engagement with Brotherhood organizations particularly Egyptian Brotherhood members in exile should be calibrated or outright avoided to prevent false assumptions from taking further root in the psyches of regional partners. 8. Basic needs challenges: Continued demographic, economic, and social pressures strain the entire region. A youth bubble, high unemployment, and continued social pressures sparked in part by a more open media environment in the region challenge all countries in the region, including the - 4-4

wealthier states. More than half of the population is under the age of 25 in nearly all countries of the region, and these fundamentals will require countries to implement substantial reforms or face growing pressures. 9. Persistent traditional security threats such as terrorism and cross border conflicts and America s unique role addressing these threats. The threats posed by terrorist networks and traditional conflicts inside and across border remain, and the unique U.S. role in supporting partners and providing an overarching security umbrella remains vital. No other country, including rising powers in Asia more dependent on the energy resources of the region than the United States, is willing or able to undertake the same responsibilities the United States has on these traditional security threats. For example, the UAE hosts U.S. air base with the only ongoing forward deployment of fighters and tankers. Similarly, the United States has deployed a squadron of fighters and air defense batteries to Jordan. Moreover, in the Emirates the U.S. military is partnering with the UAE military to facilitate inter-gulf Cooperation Council cooperation on missile defense as well as conducting air warfare exercises analogous to the Air Force s Red Flag in Nevada. Regional complaints about U.S. policy process and substance are perhaps due in part to the United States continued political and security dominance in the region. There are no viable alternatives to American diplomatic and military power, and none are particularly desired whatever issues regional governments have with the United States. China is not viewed favorably in the region; as a senior U.S. diplomat related, Chinese workmanship is not highly regarded by in the Gulf thanks to a stillinoperative pipeline intended to bypass the Strait of Hormuz. Nor are China s overseas investments in other parts of the world like Africa viewed favorably. An Emirati government leader noted that the Chinese do not buy so much as a single bowl of rice from local economies that award them contracts. There are no real alternatives to American military power. While the U.S. military presence in the region and the Gulf in particular has shrunk since the end of American involvement in Iraq s civil war, it remains robust and comparable to 1990s levels. Moreover, the United States is playing a vital role in crafting cooperative defense relationships between the Gulf Cooperation Council states and between the region and other U.S. partners in Europe and Asia. Key to this effort are joint missile defense, air warfare, and countermine exercises that have stood up over the last decade, mainly in cooperation with the Emirati military. To the extent that other nations involve themselves in regional security, it is under U.S. leadership. 10. Opportunities to create greater energy, water, food, and economic linkages. In the midst of this complicated regional mix, many continue to work to increase prosperity and economic growth. Our delegation met with important business leaders who are working within the region s significant constraints to advance an economic agenda that creates jobs and a better life. Throughout the region, there are significant opportunities to expand the scope of intra-regional - 5-5

cooperation, but this requires vigilance on the persistent traditional security threats as well as farsighted reform agendas to create jobs and deal with the basic needs of the people. The Gulf region is broadening its economic and energy linkages and sees itself bridging Africa, Asia, and Europe. The UAE in particular is looking beyond the Middle East to Africa and Asia. DP World, the multinational port operator, views Africa as a growth hub with huge potential, while an Emirati leader emphasized the UAE s comparative advantage over China and Turkey in forging economic relationships in Africa. Moreover, a senior U.S. diplomat said Ethiopia and potentially Zimbabwe could serve as a breadbasket for the Gulf. Indeed, Emirates airline s map of destinations emphasizes routes to South Asia and Africa over those to the rest of the world. In contrast, Israel, the Palestinians and Jordan to a great extent are focused on reaching across the Mediterranean to Europe to increase trade and sell products including natural gas. Together with the recent gas field discovery off Israel and Cyprus and the Red-Dead canal agreement between Israel, Jordan, and the Palestinian Authority, the international economic future of Israel, Jordan, and the Palestinians appears oriented far more toward Europe and the Mediterranean than to their east. Combined with differing strategic priorities, the differing international economic orientations of the Gulf and the Levant suggest that viewing the Middle East as a single, coherent region may be an analytical anachronism. While links across this region as traditionally conceived are important, breaking the Middle East down into sub-regions with different strategic and international economic priorities and outlooks may create more options and greater flexibility for U.S. policy. CAP Delegation Members Neera Tanden, Carmel Martin, Carol Browner, Rudy deleon, Brian Katulis, Caroline Wadhams, Dan Arbell, Peter Juul, Ken Sofer, Megan Adams Delegation Members from Outside of CAP Gen. (Rt.) James Mattis, Stanford University, former Commander of CENTCOM; Tony Podesta, Podesta Group; Bruce Jentleson, Duke University; Jim O Brien, Albright Stonebridge Group; Michael Hanna, Century Foundation - 6-6