UGANDA DEFENCE REFORM PROGRAMME Issues around UK engagement Background At the request of the Ugandan authorities, DFID sponsored a workshop in Kampala in February 2001 to assess the progress made in implementing the recommendations of the Uganda Defence Efficiency Study (UDES) and the Logistics and Accounts Reform Project (LARP) report. The workshop was attended by representatives of the Ugandan People s Defence Forces (UPDF) and MOD, the British High Commission, DFID, MOD, and the Lavender team. Based on the workshop deliberations, the Lavender team has developed a proposal for a Uganda Defence Reform Programme (UDRP), to implement the outstanding recommendations. This proposal has been submitted to the Ugandan and UK governments for their consideration. Aim of this analysis The UDRP is an ambitious and politically-sensitive undertaking for both the Ugandan and UK governments. The problems it seeks to address are complex. There are also real questions as to whether the two governments share the same vision of reform. While both governments do agree that military reform can make a vital contribution to efforts to reduce poverty, maintain political stability and strengthen governance, there is legitimate scope for differences on how best the desired long-term outcomes can be achieved, and how quickly. The UDRP nonetheless offers an important basis for dialogue and cooperation. The key issue for the UK is how it can most constructively engage with the military reform issue in the context of its wider relations with Uganda. This paper examines some broader governance factors that will influence military reform in Uganda, complementing a recent risk analysis prepared by the UK Defence Adviser in Kampala which focuses on MOD/UPDF issues. Objectives of the UDRP The stated aim of the UDRP is to make Uganda defence modern, accountable, cost-effective and professional. This represents a long-term vision of where both Uganda and the UK would one day like the UPDF to be. This vision is heavily influenced by a Western model of a well-functioning military that operates according to sound principles of public sector management, within the rule of law, and under civil control. A professional army is understood as one that has core competency (i.e. fighting capability) and is loyal to a political authority. Critical to 1
professionalisation is the state s ability to provide the political direction, the infrastructure and the resources that the army requires to accomplish its constitutional tasks. Focus of the UDRP The LARP and the UDES studies were driven primarily by donor concerns about Uganda s high levels of military spending. The stated objectives were to maximise the efficiency of defence spending and to identify economies in resource use for possible re-deployment to non-defence areas. The recommendations were primarily technical in nature, reflecting the extreme political sensitivity of military reform for all parties concerned. Wider questions concerning the UPDF s political and economic roles, Uganda s security needs, and the issue of civil control were not addressed in any depth. The proposed UPDR maintains this narrow focus on the military and improving the efficiency of defence resource use. There are three phases: Phase 1 (With external assistance) the establishment of a Defence Reform Unit within the MOD to act as the engine of the reform process, and the conduct of a Defence Review to determine the road-map for reform; Phase 2 Reforms (to be undertaken by the MOD/UPDF themselves) to strengthen personnel management systems, audit functions, logistics procedures, procurement functions and catering; Phase 3 (With external support) measures to improve the capacity of divisional secretaries, logistics, IT strategy, manpower control, procurement, career management, finance, audit and output budgeting, and documentation. While the UDRP places emphasis on the need to develop strategic capacity within the MOD/UPDF to manage a wider reform process, the programme is very much based on a vision of internally-driven change. Underlying assumptions The underlying assumptions of the UDRP seem to be that successful reform of the MOD/UPDF in the areas specified is all that is needed to achieve sound management of the defence sector; that there is sufficient political will, a clear strategic vision, and technical capacity in the MOD/UPDF to push through the reforms despite their magnitude; and that if the political will, vision and skills are lacking, pressure from Museveni and external technical assistance will make the difference. These assumptions are problematic because of the politically contentious and complex nature of the proposed reforms, and the weakness of the institutional framework for managing them. 2
Critical issues How much scope for change is there? The UK is seeking assurances from Museveni and the senior military leadership that they are firmly committed to the UDRP, though it should be expected that their room for maneuver will be limited from the start. In line with other African countries that have liberation armies and one-party states, national security and regime security are closely intertwined in Uganda. It is likely that Museveni s vision of reform will be heavily shaped by the challenges of managing intramilitary competition, maintaining the Movement s political dominance, and ensuring a favourable succession. Allowing the military to engage in commercial activity (both in Uganda and in the Congo) is a very pragmatic response to the difficulties of funding a large army, controlling the military and managing relations with donors concerned about high military spending. In this context, there is no doubt some scope to push through elements of the UDRP which are consistent with extending civilian control over the military and increasing cost-effectiveness in the defence sector. But it is also likely that in the quest to maintain control over the political process, Museveni has struck bargains with the military that will foreclose the room for significant advances in democratic control over the military in the near future. However, Ugandan resistance to the UDRP should not simply be interpreted as stemming from a lack of commitment to reform, for there is clearly a strong desire for reform as evidenced by the discussion which took place at the February workshop. Rather, this resistance may very well stem from a feeling within the MOD/UPDF that they lack the support and the instruments to push through the difficult changes which the UDRP requires. Reform should therefore be understood in a much broader, longer-term transformative sense than is currently reflected in the UDRP - creating a political climate that is conducive to more accountable security decision-making and laying the institutional and human resource foundations to achieve this objective. What should be the objectives of reform? The aim of UDRP is to increase cost-effectiveness in the defence sector through the strengthening of financial management, procurement, logistics, and personnel systems. The ultimate goal is to achieve greater value-for-money in the use of defence resources thereby allowing more resources to be channeled to the social sectors. However, it is not clear that cost-effectiveness and financial accountability can be significantly improved without a stronger legal and administrative framework. Moreover, the focus on strengthening financial accountability is potentially at odds with the demands of political accountability that the UPDF sees placed upon itself by Ugandan citizens (and the leadership) who expect the UPDF to resolve the country s security problems. 3
For these reasons, it is difficult to separate the issue of improving costeffectiveness in the defence sector from the issue of enhancing Uganda s security. The UPDF shares the objective of strengthening financial management systems, but as a means to a different end namely increasing its operational effectiveness and, ultimately, the security of Uganda and the current regime. This approach is consistent with prevailing views among political and military elites on how best to promote the nation s development. In the current context, efforts to reduce the need for high military expenditure in Uganda (i.e. by resolving internal and regional political tensions) will likely do as much, if not more, to create a climate conducive to achieving the desired outcomes than reforms of financial management systems. From the UK s perspective, therefore, the priority should be to ensure that the assistance it provides for strengthening financial systems internal to the MOD/UPDF is complemented with support - external to the military - that will strengthen the appropriate civilian instruments of financial management. What kinds of models are appropriate? External assistance can do much to facilitate Uganda s reform process, but its path will probably be most strongly influenced by internal political and institutional factors. The Western experience suggests that the separation of the army from the party rather sooner than later is crucial to achieving military reform objectives. But attempting to extend civilian control over the UPDF too rapidly (especially under external pressure) may be counter-productive if it undermines political stability, and may simply not be compatible with patterns of civil-military relations in Uganda. Notwithstanding the range of formal mechanisms that exist across Africa for maintaining civil control over the military (most of which are a legacy of the colonial experience), experience suggests that where civilian control has actually been achieved, this has often been through institutional mechanisms of an informal nature that do not always mesh well with the Western democratic model. These mechanisms include political pacts negotiated between civilian and military leaders which specify the terms on which the military agrees to be managed and controled. Techniques may also include privileged access to rentseeking opportunities (through off-budget spending and irregular procurement procedures) and the co-optation of military officers into government positions 1. 1 See Rocklyn Williams, Africa and the Challenges of Security-Sector Reform, in J. Cilliers and A. Hilding-Norberg (eds) Building Stability in Africa: Challenges for the New Millenium, ISS Monograph Series, No 46, 2000; Robin Luckham, The Military, Militarization and Democratization in Africa: A Survey of Literature and Issues, African Studies Review, Vol. 37, No. 2, 1994. 4
External models (and technical assistance) can usefully serve to inform and inspire the development of a local approach to military reform, but they can t substitute for a local vision or commitment to reform. In the absence of national ownership and political coalitions (both within the military and in broader Ugandan society), reforms will likely be declared but not implemented, or implemented in an incoherent and unsustainable manner. Constructive engagement Engagement with the MOD/UPDF is necessary to buy in their support for reforms and to strengthen the instruments internal to the military that are necessary for professionalisation. But engaging only with the MOD/UPDF may mask the need for more fundamental changes external to the army - relating to political change, rule of law, public sector reforms and regional peace and stability that will be required before the technical reforms contained in the UDRP will make a difference. Engaging with the UPDF/MOD The conduct of a defence review offers an important entry-point to broaden the military reform process to encompass non-military actors. It is not necessary for the UK to bill the defence review as something that will build democratic oversight, even though this may be the ultimate objective. But it should be emphasised that civilian participation will increase the legitimacy of the process in the eyes of both the Ugandan public and donors, and will also result in a more effective assessment of the country s security needs. This may help to build consensus around the idea that security is not just about the absence of war or societal violence, but also about freedom from fear and want (human security). The process of producing the defence review is, therefore, perhaps more important than the final product. Until there is a climate conducive to debating security issues in more depth, then it is unlikely that the constituencies (both internal and external to the UDPF) that are needed to support wide-ranging military reform will emerge building these political coalitions should be an end in itself of the defence review process. More generally, there is a risk of producing a wide-ranging plan for military reform before there is the institutional capacity (both internal and external to the MOD/UPDF), the strategic vision (military and civilian), or the political support to implement it. Given the current sensitivity of military reform in Uganda, one cannot realistically expect a wide-ranging public debate in the near future. But at the very least, the UK should push for a broad-ranging internal governmental debate (including the relevant civilian policy sectors like finance, interior ministry, parliament, etc.) and a white paper of some form or another for broader public dissemination. The long-term objectives are to legitimise civilian participation in defence policymaking. The South African White paper process is perhaps the best 5
example of how this would work, though it was conducted in unique conditions that are not currently replicable in Uganda. For the UK, there are risks involved in supporting a defence review, not least of all the possibility that it will come up with conclusions that the UK does not support. Uganda sees potential security threats emanating from various directions, including the Sudan, Congo, Rwanda, the Nile River basin and internally, all of which could be used to justify an increase in defence spending above limits that the UK and other donors consider acceptable. This underscores why it is important that the defence review process should be as transparent, inclusive, broad (in its definition of security), and rigorous as possible. The civilian sectors Laying the groundwork for greater civil control over the military sector will require attention to a range of measures in the civilian sectors where, in some cases, the UK is already engaged: Strengthening the constitutional and legal framework that governs the military; parallel to the defence review process there could be a review of existing legislation/national security policies that covers the roles, relationships and structures of responsibility within the security sector (broadly defined); Building appropriate civilian expertise on security issues in finance, interior, foreign affairs ministries, the parliament, and relevant non-governmental groups; to an extent, the principle of civilian participation in security policy is already accepted as evidenced by the secondment of finance officials to the MOD. But the evidence suggests that they are often kept out of the loop when the military budget is executed. Increasing public debate on security issues, both within the parliament and society at large. Parliamentary defence committees should not be seen by the MOD/UPDF as simply an instrument for public oversight/control of their activities. But as is the case in many countries these committees can effectively represent the interests of the military and improve relations with the general public and the rest of government. Managing the risks The UDRP entails much greater risks for the Ugandan government than for the UK government. The UK can disengage at any point if problems arise, but the Ugandans require the assurance that the UK understands the complexity of these reforms and is engaged for the long haul. Maintaining stability in the army and confidence in Museveni s leadership must be a top UK priority. 6
The UK should apply the same principles of transparency to its programme of assistance for military reform that it expects the UPDF to adhere to. Keeping both the Ugandan and UK publics informed about the assumptions and risks involved in this engagement, and demonstrating how these risks are being addressed, will build support for the programme The overall reform programme should be civilian led. The UPDF has a central role to play, but the impetus for reform should be seen to come from the civilian policy sectors (MOD and finance ministry). Engagement by other donors, including the IFIs, is essential. The UK can play a constructive role by establishing a sensible framework for engagement, keeping other donor expectations realistic, and ensuring that there is a consistent message from the donor community. Dylan Hendrickson Conflict, Security and Development Group Centre for Defence Studies King s College, London 1 June 2001 7