Al-Kateb, Al Khafaji, Behrooz and Re Woolley. Migration Act 1958 (Cth)

SUPPLEMENT TO CHAPTER 29 Al-Kateb, Al Khafaji, Behrooz and Re Woolley Mr Ahmed Al-Kateb arrived in Australia by boat in December 2000 without a passport or visa. He was taken into detention under the Migration Act 1958 (Cth). Section 189 states that if an officer knows or reasonably suspects that a person in the migration zone is an unlawful non-citizen, the officer must detain the person. Section 196 further provides: Migration Act 1958 (Cth) 196 (1) An unlawful non-citizen detained under section 189 must be kept in immigration detention until he or she is: (a) removed from Australia under section 198 or 199; or (b) deported under section 200; or (c) granted a visa. (2) To avoid doubt, subsection (1) does not prevent the release from immigration detention of a citizen or a lawful non-citizen. (3) To avoid doubt, subsection (1) prevents the release, even by a court, of an unlawful non-citizen from detention (otherwise than for removal or deportation) unless the non-citizen has been granted a visa. In January 2001, Mr Al-Kateb lodged an application for a protection visa under the Migration Act on the basis that he was a non-citizen to whom Australia has protection obligations under the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees. His application was refused and subsequent appeals failed. In these circumstances, s 198(6) of the Migration Act required [a]n officer [to] remove as soon as reasonably practicable an unlawful non-citizen. In June 2002, Mr Al-Kateb himself indicated that he wanted to leave Australia for Kuwait, and if you cannot please send me to Gaza. In August he also stated I wish voluntarily to depart Australia, and ask the Minister to remove me from Australia as soon as reasonably practicable. However, Mr Al-Kateb was born in Kuwait in 1976 of Palestinian parents. His birth in Kuwait did not grant him citizenship of that country and the absence of a Palestinian state thereby left him as a stateless person, a term defined by the 1954 Convention relating to the Status of Stateless Persons as a person who is not considered as a national by any State under the operation of its law. The Commonwealth sought, without success, to remove him to Egypt, Jordan, Kuwait and Syria as well as to Palestinian territories (which required the cooperation of Israel). Mr Al-Kateb then brought proceedings seeking a declaration that he was being unlawfully detained and an order that he be released. His application in the Federal Court was dismissed: von Doussa J found that all reasonable steps had been taken to remove Mr Al- Kateb, but that removal from Australia is not reasonably practicable at the present time as there is no real likelihood or prospect of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future. Other proceedings raised the same issue, but were decided differently. In Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs v Al Masri (2003) 197 ALR 241, the Full Court of the Federal Court held that a person in a like position was entitled to be released from immigration detention if and when the purpose of removal becomes incapable of fulfilment. In April 2003, pending the determination of his High Court appeal, Mr Al-Kateb was released from immigration detention by Federal Court order made with the consent of the parties. By a majority of 4:3, the High Court then dismissed the appeal. Each of the judges gave detailed reasons with the exception of Heydon J, who agreed with Hayne J. The majority, McHugh, Hayne, Callinan and Heydon JJ, addressed two issues. First, they held that, as a matter of statutory construction, the Migration Act authorises detention even where 1

AUSTRALIAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW AND THEORY there is no prospect of a detainee being removed from Australia in the reasonably foreseeable future. Second, they held that the Act lies within the legislative power of the Commonwealth. On the first issue, Hayne J found the statute to be [184] intractable : Al-Kateb v Godwin (2004) 208 ALR 124 Hayne J: [181] It may be accepted that as soon as reasonably practicable [in s 198 of the Migration Act] assumes that the event concerned can happen, and that, if there is any uncertainty, it is about when the event will happen, not whether it will... In the case of a stateless person, there may be many countries which could properly be approached and asked to receive the person. Whether one of those countries agrees to take the person will ordinarily depend upon matters beyond the power of Australia. Indeed, whether the country of nationality of a non-citizen who is not stateless will receive that person, if expelled from Australia, will ordinarily depend upon matters beyond this country s power to control, perhaps even influence. What follows is that the most that could ever be said in a particular case where it is not now, and has not been, reasonably practicable to effect removal, is that there is now no country which will receive a particular non-citizen whom Australia seeks to remove, and it cannot now be predicted when that will happen. Nor is it to say that the time for performing the duty imposed by s 198 has come. The duty remains unperformed: it has not yet been practicable to effect removal. That is not to say that it will never happen. This appellant s case stands as an example of why it cannot be said that removal will never happen. His prospects of being removed to what is now the territory in Gaza under the administration of the Palestinian Authority are, and will continue to be, much affected by political events in several countries in the Middle East. It is not possible to predict how those events will develop. The most that can be decided with any degree of certainty is whether removal can be effected now or can be effected in the future pursuant to arrangements that now exist. Of course, it must be accepted in the present appeal that, as the primary judge found, there is no real likelihood or prospect of [the appellant s] removal in the reasonably foreseeable future, but that does not mean it will never occur. Whether and when it occurs depends largely, if not entirely, upon not only the course of events in the Middle East (his preferred destination being Gaza) but also upon the willingness of other countries to receive stateless Palestinians. [182] Because there can be no certainty about whether or when the non-citizen will be removed, it cannot be said that the Act proceeds from a premise (that removal will be possible) which can be demonstrated to be false in any particular case. And unless it has been practicable to remove the non-citizen it cannot be said that the time for performance of the duty imposed by s 198 has arrived. All this being so, it cannot be said that the purpose of detention (the purpose of removal) is shown to be spent by showing that efforts made to achieve removal have not so far been successful. And even if, as in this case, it is found that there is no real likelihood or prospect of [the non-citizen s] removal in the reasonably foreseeable future, that does not mean that continued detention is not for the purpose of subsequent removal. As so interpreted, the Act was held not to breach Chapter III of the Constitution: Hayne J: [187] The line which was drawn in the joint reasons [in Chu Kheng Lim v Minister for Immigration (1992) 176 CLR 1 at 33] was a line between detention reasonably capable of being seen as necessary for the purposes of deportation or necessary to enable an application for an entry permit to be made and considered and detention not so limited. The former was said not to contravene Ch III; the latter was said to be punitive and contrary to Ch III. Three points may be made about this division. First, to ask whether the law is limited to what is reasonably capable of being seen as necessary for particular purposes may be thought to be a test more apposite to the identification of whether the law is a law with respect to aliens or with respect to immigration. No doubt account must be taken of the fact that the provisions now in question impose the obligation to detain upon the executive. [188] If the relevant power is identified (as their Honours appear to have identified it) as the executive power to deport or exclude, it may readily be accepted that the legislative conferral of authority to detain in 2

SUPPLEMENT TO CHAPTER 29 custody for the purposes of an executive power identified in that way would be an incident of that power. It is important to notice, however, that the sections now in question (like the provisions under consideration in Chu Kheng Lim) require, rather than authorise, detention. True it is that the requirement is made of the executive: an officer must detain. But the provision is mandatory; the legislature requires that persons of the identified class be detained and kept in detention. No discretion must, or even can, be exercised. No judgment is called for. The only disputable question is whether the person is an unlawful non-citizen. And the courts can readily adjudicate any dispute about that. There is, therefore, nothing about the decision making that must precede detention which bespeaks an exercise of the judicial power. Nor is there any legislative judgment made against a person otherwise entitled to be at liberty in the Australian community. The premise for the debate is that the non-citizen does not have permission to be at liberty in the community. Secondly, for my part, I would not identify the relevant power in quite so confined a manner as is implicit in the joint reasons in Chu Kheng Lim. The relevant heads of power are aliens and immigration. The power with respect to both heads extends to preventing aliens entering or remaining in Australia except by executive permission. But if the heads of power extend so far, they extend to permitting exclusion from the Australian community by prevention of entry, by removal from Australia, and by segregation from the community by detention in the meantime. That is why I do not consider that the Ch III question which is said now to arise can be answered by asking whether the law in question is appropriate and adapted or reasonably necessary or reasonably capable of being seen as necessary to the purpose of processing and removal of an unlawful non-citizen. Those are questions which it is useful to ask in considering a law s connection with a particular head of power. For the reasons given earlier, the sections now in question are laws with respect to aliens and with respect to immigration. In part that is because a law to exclude a non-citizen from joining the Australian community is a law with respect to those two heads of power. Thirdly, the line which their Honours drew in the joint reasons in Chu Kheng Lim depended upon first concluding [176 CLR at 27] that, with certain exceptions, the involuntary detention of a citizen in custody by the State is penal or punitive in character and, under our system of government, exists only as an incident of the exclusively judicial function of adjudging and punishing criminal guilt. Their Honours described this as a constitutional immunity from being imprisoned by Commonwealth authority except pursuant to an order by a court in the exercise of the judicial power of the Commonwealth [176 CLR at 28-29]. As Gaudron J demonstrated in Kruger [v Commonwealth (1997) 190 CLR 1 at 109-110], the line which their Honours drew in Chu Kheng Lim is a line which is difficult to identify with any certainty. It is a line which appears to assume that there is only a limited class of cases in [189] which executive detention can be justified. And that assumption is at least open to doubt. But doubtful or not, it is an assumption which turns upon the connection between such detention and the relevant head of power, not upon the identification of detention as a step that can never be taken except in exercise of judicial power. That is why it is important to recognise that once the step is taken, as it was in Chu Kheng Lim, of deciding that mandatory detention of unlawful non-citizens can validly be provided without contravention of Ch III, it is plain that unlawful non-citizens have no general immunity from detention otherwise than by judicial process. At least in many cases it will be right to say that a law authorising detention divorced from any breach of the law is not a law with respect to a head of power and for that reason is invalid. As Gaudron J pointed out in Kruger [190 CLR at 111], the powers with respect to defence, quarantine and the influx of criminals may stand as exceptions to that observation. But so too do the aliens and immigration powers in so far as they empower the making of laws with respect to the exclusion of persons from Australia and the Australian community. In that, exclusionary, operation the laws do not infringe the limitations on power which follow from the separation of judicial power from the executive and legislative powers. If the line to be drawn is, as suggested in the joint reasons in Chu Kheng Lim, a line that depends upon connection with the relevant heads of power, these laws in their exclusionary operation have that connection. If the line to be drawn attaches importance to the characterisation of the consequences as punitive, it must be recognised that the consequences which befall an unlawful non-citizen whom the executive cannot quickly remove from Australia are not inflicted on that person as punishment for any actual or assumed wrongdoing. They are consequences which come about as the result of a combination of 3

AUSTRALIAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW AND THEORY circumstances. They flow, in part, from the non-citizen entering or remaining in Australia without permission, in part from the unwillingness of the executive to give the non-citizen that permission, and in part from the unwillingness of other nations to receive the person into their community or their unwillingness to permit that person to travel across their territory. The first of those considerations may be laid at the feet of the unlawful non-citizen concerned. Indeed, there may be other features of individual cases in which the unwillingness of others to receive the unlawful non-citizen can be seen to flow from the non-citizen s own conduct. These would include not only cases where the non-citizen impedes removal (by destroying identity documents or refusing to co-operate in the obtaining of new documents) but also cases of deportation on character grounds in which receiving countries are unwilling to accept persons who have committed criminal offences, or criminal offences of particular kinds, while living in Australia. It is no less important to recognise that the consequences befalling an unlawful non-citizen whom the executive cannot quickly remove from Australia fall on that person because otherwise he or she will gain the entry to the Australian community which the executive has decided should not be granted. But at its root, the answer made to the contention that the laws now in question contravene Ch III is that they are not punitive. It is necessary to explain why that is so. [190] Punishment and judicial power Because Immigration Detention Centres are places of confinement having many, if not all, of the physical features and administrative arrangements commonly found in prisons, it is easy to equate confinement in such a place with punishment. It is necessary, however, to notice some further matters. Punishment exacted in the exercise of judicial power is punishment for identified and articulated wrongdoing. H L A Hart identified the standard or central case of punishment in terms of five elements [Punishment and Responsibility (Clarendon Press, 1968) 4-5]: (i) It must involve pain or other consequences normally considered unpleasant. (ii) It must be for an offence against legal rules. (iii) It must be of an actual or supposed offender for his offence. (iv) It must be intentionally administered by human beings other than the offender. (v) It must be imposed and administered by an authority constituted by a legal system against which the offence is committed. That is not to say, of course, that it may not be appropriate to identify treatment of persons as punitive where those persons are not offenders. But punishment is not to be inflicted in exercise of the judicial power except upon proof of commission of an offence. Two features of the immigration detention for which the Migration Act now provides, and which have been identified earlier in these reasons, are then important. First, immigration detention is not detention for an offence. There is now no offence of entering or being found within Australia as a prohibited immigrant. Yet the law permitting detention otherwise than for an offence is a law with respect to a head of power. Secondly, where a non-citizen has entered or attempted to enter Australia without a visa, detention of that person excludes that person from the community which he or she sought to enter. Only in the most general sense would it be said that preventing a non-citizen making landfall in Australia is punitive. Segregating those who make landfall, without permission to do so, is not readily seen as bearing a substantially different character. Yet the argument alleging invalidity would suggest that deprivation of freedom will after a time or in some circumstances become punitive. Only if it is said that there is an immunity from detention does it become right to equate detention with punishment that can validly be exacted only in exercise of the judicial power. Once it is accepted, as it was by all members of the Court in Chu Kheng Lim, that there can be detention of unlawful non-citizens for some purposes, the argument from the existence of an immunity must accept that the immunity is not unqualified. The argument must then turn to the identification of those qualifications. That must be done by reference to the purpose of the detention. Neither the bare fact of detention nor the effluxion of some predetermined period of time in detention is said to suffice to engage Ch III. And because the purposes must be gleaned from the content of the heads of power which support the law, it is critical to recognise that those heads of power would support a law directed to excluding a non-citizen from the Australian community, by preventing entry to Australia or, after entry, by segregating that person from the community. It is essential to confront the contention that, because the time at which detention will end cannot be predicted, its indefinite duration (even, so it is said, [191] for the life of the detainee) is or will become punitive. The answer to that is simple but must be made. If that is the result, it comes about because 4

SUPPLEMENT TO CHAPTER 29 the non-citizen came to or remained in this country without permission. The removal of an unlawful non-citizen from Australia then depends upon the willingness of some other country to receive that person. If the unlawful non-citizen is stateless, as is Mr Al-Kateb, there is no nation state which Australia may ask to receive its citizen. And if Australia is unwilling to extend refuge to those who have no country of nationality to which they may look both for protection and a home, the continued exclusion of such persons from the Australian community in accordance with the regime established by the Migration Act does not impinge upon the separation of powers required by the Constitution. As Judge Learned Hand said in his dissenting opinion in United States v Shaughnessy [195 F 2d 964 at 971 (2nd Cir 1952)]: An alien, who comes to our shores and the ship which bears him, take the chance that he may not be allowed to land. If that chance turns against them, both know, or, if they do not, they are charged with knowledge, that, since the alien cannot land, he must find an asylum elsewhere; or, like the Flying Dutchman, forever sail the seas. When at his urgence we do let him go ashore pendente lite so to say we may give him whatever harborage we choose, until he finds shelter elsewhere if he can. (The decision of the Second Circuit Court of Appeals, from which Judge Hand dissented, was reversed by the Supreme Court of the United States [Shaughnessy v Mezei 345 US 206 (1953)].) To adopt and adapt what Judge Hand said in that case [195 F 2d at 971]: Think what one may of a statute... when passed by a society which professes to put its faith in [freedom], a court has no warrant for refusing to enforce it. If that society chooses to flinch when its principles are put to the test, courts are not set up to give it derring-do. McHugh J reached the same conclusion. He began by finding that the power to detain for the purpose of deportation was central and not merely incidental to the aliens power (and thus not subject to any test of proportionality as part of the characterisation process (see Chapter 15)). McHugh J: [135] If the power to detain aliens for the purpose of deportation was merely an incidental power, it would be impossible to justify the detention of an alien once it appeared that deportation could not be effected or could not be effected in the foreseeable future. But the power to detain aliens is not a power incidental to the s 51(xix) head of power. It is a law with respect to the subject matter of that power [136] Nor does the continued detention of a person who cannot be deported immediately infringe Ch III of the Constitution. Chapter III is always infringed where the detention of a person other than by a curial order whatever the purpose of the detention is authorised by a law of the Commonwealth and imposes punishment. However, a law authorising detention will not be characterised as imposing punishment if its object is purely protective. Ex hypothesi, a law whose object is purely protective will not have a punitive purpose. That does not mean, however, that a law authorising detention in the absence of a curial order, but whose object is purely protective, cannot infringe Ch III of the Constitution. Even a law whose object is purely protective will infringe Ch III if it prevents the Ch III courts from determining some matter that is a condition precedent to authorising detention. A law requiring the detention of the alien takes its character from the purpose of the detention. As long as the purpose of the detention is to make the alien available for deportation or to prevent the alien from entering Australia or the Australian community, the detention is non-punitive. The Parliament of the Commonwealth is entitled, in accordance with the power conferred by s 51(xix) and without infringing Ch III of the Constitution, to take such steps as are likely to ensure that unlawful non-citizens do not enter Australia or become part of the Australian community and that they are available for deportation when that becomes practicable. As Latham CJ pointed out in O Keefe v Calwell [(1949) 77 CLR 261 at 278]: Deportation is not necessarily punishment for an offence. The Government of a country may prevent aliens entering, or may deport aliens... Exclusion in such a case is not a punishment for any offence. Neither is deportation... The deportation of an unwanted immigrant (who could have been excluded altogether without any infringement of right) is an act of the same character: it is a measure of protection of the community from undesired infiltration and is not punishment for any offence. (emphasis added) It is open to the Parliament, therefore, to enact legislation that requires unlawful non-citizens to be detained so as to ensure that they do not enter Australia or the Australian community and can be deported when, and if, it is practicable to do so. To hold that Parliament cannot do so would mean that 5

AUSTRALIAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW AND THEORY any person who unlawfully entered Australia and could not be deported to another country could thwart the operation of the Migration Act. It would mean that such persons, by their illegal and unwanted entry, could become de facto Australian citizens unless the Parliament made it a criminal offence with a mandatory sentence for a person to be in Australia as a prohibited immigrant [137] Nothing in ss 189, 196 or 198 purports to prevent courts, exercising federal jurisdiction, from examining any condition precedent to the detention of unlawful non-citizens. Nor is it possible to hold that detention of unlawful non-citizens even where their deportation is not achievable cannot be reasonably regarded as effectuating the purpose of preventing them from entering Australia or entering or remaining in the Australian community. Indeed, detention is the surest way of achieving that object. If the Parliament of the Commonwealth enacts laws that direct the executive government to detain unlawful non-citizens in circumstances that prevent them from having contact with members of or removing them from the Australian community, nothing in the Constitution including Ch III prevents the Parliament doing so. For such laws, the Parliament and those who introduce them must answer to the electors, to the international bodies who supervise human rights treaties to which Australia is a party and to history. Whatever criticism some maybe a great many Australians make of such laws, their constitutionality is not open to doubt. In dissent, Gleeson CJ, Gummow and Kirby JJ held that the appeal should be allowed on the basis of their construction of the statute. Gleeson CJ: [129] The Act does not in terms provide for a person to be kept in administrative detention permanently, or indefinitely. A scheme of mandatory detention, operating regardless of the personal characteristics of the detainee, when the detention is for a limited purpose, and of finite duration, is one thing. It may take on a different aspect when the detention is indefinite, and possibly for life. In its application to the appellant, the Act says that he is to be kept in administrative detention until he is removed, and that he is to be removed as soon as reasonably practicable. That could mean that the appellant is to be kept in administrative detention for as long as it takes to remove him, and that, if it never becomes practicable to remove him, he must spend the rest of his life in detention... [130] Where what is involved is the interpretation of legislation said to confer upon the executive a power of administrative detention that is indefinite in duration, and that may be permanent, there comes into play a principle of legality, which governs both Parliament and the courts. In exercising their judicial function, courts seek to give effect to the will of Parliament by declaring the meaning of what Parliament has enacted. Courts do not impute to the legislature an intention to abrogate or curtail certain human rights or freedoms (of which personal liberty is the most basic) unless such an intention is clearly manifested by unambiguous language, which indicates that the legislature has directed its attention to the rights or freedoms in question, and has consciously decided upon abrogation or curtailment. That principle has been re-affirmed by this Court in recent cases. It is not new. In 1908, in this Court [in Potter v Minahan (1908) 7 CLR 277 at 304], O Connor J referred to a passage from the fourth edition of Maxwell on Statutes which stated that [i]t is in the last degree improbable that the legislature would overthrow fundamental principles, infringe rights, or depart from the general system of law, without expressing its intention with irresistible clearness... It is submitted for the respondents that the terms of the statute are general, but tolerably clear, and that if there is a silence on the particular problem raised by the case of the appellant, that is only because it is sufficiently covered by the general words. I am unable to accept that submission. The Act provides that the appellant must be kept in detention until he is removed from Australia under s 198, and s 198 provides that he must be removed as soon as reasonably practicable. The Act does not say what is to happen if, through no fault of his own [131] or of the authorities, he cannot be removed. It does not, in its terms, deal with that possibility. The possibility that a person, regardless of personal circumstances, regardless of whether he or she is a danger to the community, and regardless of whether he or she might abscond, can be subjected to indefinite, and perhaps permanent, administrative detention is not one to be dealt with by implication. In s 196, the period of detention of the appellant is defined by reference to the fulfilment of the purpose of removal under s 198. If that purpose cannot be fulfilled, the choice lies between treating the detention as suspended, or as indefinite. In making that choice I am influenced by the general principle of interpretation stated above. I am also influenced by the consideration that the detention in question is mandatory, not discretionary. In a case of uncertainty, I would find it easier to discern a legislative intention to confer a power of indefinite administrative detention if the power were coupled with a 6

SUPPLEMENT TO CHAPTER 29 discretion enabling its operation to be related to the circumstances of individual cases, including, in particular, danger to the community and likelihood of absconding. The absence of any reference to such considerations, to my mind, reinforces the assumption that the purpose reflected in s 196 (removal) is capable of fulfilment, and supports a conclusion that the mandated detention is tied to the validity of that assumption. Gummow J also addressed the constitutional issue, [156] Lest silence be taken as any assent. Gummow J: [156] A majority of the Court in Lim accepted the proposition that the power of the Parliament to authorise, and that of the executive to implement, the detention of aliens is limited by reference to the purpose of that detention. In their joint judgment, Brennan, Deane and Dawson JJ held that laws authorising the administrative detention of aliens will only be valid [176 CLR 1 at 33]: [157] if the detention which they require and authorize is limited to what is reasonably capable of being seen as necessary for the purposes of deportation or necessary to enable an application for an entry permit to be made and considered. Their Honours went on to explain that, were laws authorising immigration detention not so limited, the authority of the executive to detain could not properly be characterised as being an incident of the power to exclude, admit and deport. In these circumstances, the detention would properly be characterised as punitive and would thereby offend against the principle that the judicial power of the Commonwealth can only be vested in Ch III courts. In a separate judgment in Lim, McHugh J expressed a similar view, and one which likewise focused on the purpose of detention as the criterion upon which the constitutional validity of the detention was to be assessed. His Honour said [176 CLR 1 at 65-66]: If a law authorizing the detention of an alien went beyond what was reasonably necessary to effect the deportation of that person, the law might be invalid because it infringed the provisions of Ch III of the Constitution. Similarly, if a law, authorizing the detention of an alien while that person s application for entry was being considered, went beyond what was necessary to effect that purpose, it might be invalid because it infringed Ch III. McHugh J later added [176 CLR 1 at 71]: Although detention under a law of the Parliament is ordinarily characterized as punitive in character, it cannot be so characterized if the purpose of the imprisonment is to achieve some legitimate non-punitive object. But if imprisonment goes beyond what is reasonably necessary to achieve the non-punitive object, it will be regarded as punitive in character. Gaudron J analysed the issue not in terms of the limitations on legislative power imposed by Ch III, but rather as an issue of characterisation and the scope of that legislative power. In her Honour s view, which was further developed in Kruger, a law that was not appropriate and adapted to regulating the entry of aliens or facilitating their departure could not be characterised as a valid law with respect to naturalisation and aliens under s 51(xix). Although it proceeds on a different basis, the result of Gaudron J s analysis is consistent with the view expressed by Brennan, Deane, Dawson and McHugh JJ that the power of the Parliament to authorise the administrative detention of aliens is not at large and that the power does not extend to authorise detention for any purpose selected by the Parliament. There may be situations in which a law authorising the detention of aliens is so insubstantial, tenuous or distant in its connection with aliens that it ought not to be regarded as enacted with respect to the specified matter falling within the Commonwealth power [Dixon J in Melbourne Corporation v The Commonwealth (1947) 74 CLR 31 at 79]. However, between the reasons dictating invalidity in Lim, those advanced by Brennan, Deane, Dawson and McHugh JJ are to be preferred. [158] Consistently with McHugh J s analysis in Lim, it could not seriously be doubted that a law providing for the administrative detention of bankrupts in order to protect the community would be a law with respect to bankruptcy and insolvency (s 51(xvii)), or that a law providing for the involuntary detention of all persons within their homes on census night would be a law with respect to census and statistics (s 51(xi)). If such laws lack validity, it is not by reason of any limitation in the text of pars (xvii) and (xi) but by the limitation in the opening words of s 51, subject to this Constitution, which attract any limitation required by Ch III. In considering any limitation required by Ch III, it is not to the point that if no such limitation applies persons may be deprived of their liberty and detained without commission of and conviction 7

AUSTRALIAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW AND THEORY for any offence, so that to require of the Parliament that it attain its objective of detention by means of the criminal law is to allow form to triumph over substance. That which the Constitution may require is an expression of supreme authority in the Australian system of government. The nature of the Ch III limitation The respective submissions in the present case fixed upon the question whether the detention authorised by the Act was punitive or non-punitive in character. This reflects the general discussion in Lim and Kruger of the Commonwealth s power to impose administrative detention. However, there is often no clear line between purely punitive and purely non-punitive detention... [159] [The] coincidence of punitive and non-punitive purposes is not uncommon. In Veen v The Queen [No 2] [(1988) 164 CLR 465 at 476], this Court recognised that among the purposes which inform a criminal sentence are not only the punitive purposes of deterrence, retribution and reform, but also what may be seen as the non-punitive purpose of protection of society. Once it is accepted that many forms of detention involve some non-punitive purpose, it follows that a punitive/non-punitive distinction cannot be the basis upon which the Ch III limitations respecting administrative detention are enlivened. Accordingly, the focusing of attention on whether detention is penal or punitive in character is apt to mislead. As Blackstone noted, in a passage quoted by Brennan, Deane and Dawson JJ in Lim [176 CLR at 28], [t]he confinement of the person, in any wise, is an imprisonment and one which, subject to certain exceptions, is usually only permissible if consequent upon some form of judicial process. It is primarily with the deprivation of liberty that the law is concerned, not with whether that deprivation is for a punitive purpose. The point is encapsulated in the statement in Hamdi v Rumsfeld [72 USLW 4607 at 4621 (2004)] by Scalia J (with the concurrence of Stevens J), made with reference to Blackstone and Alexander Hamilton [The Federalist, No 84], that: The very core of liberty secured by our Anglo-Saxon system of separated powers has been freedom from indefinite imprisonment at the will of the Executive. In Witham v Holloway [(1995) 183 CLR 525 at 534], Brennan, Deane, Toohey and Gaudron JJ observed: [N]othing is achieved by describing some proceedings as punitive and others as remedial or coercive. Punishment is punishment, whether it is imposed in vindication or for remedial or coercive purposes. And there can be no doubt that imprisonment and the imposition of fines, the usual sanctions for contempt, constitute punishment. It is convenient here to return to the joint judgment in Lim. Having established that the involuntary detention of a citizen can generally only exist as an incident of the exclusively judicial power of adjudging and punishing criminal guilt, Brennan, Deane and Dawson JJ noted that the protection afforded by Ch III to aliens was not so far reaching. The principal reason for this is that, absent some authority conferred by statute, aliens have no right to enter or reside in Australia. The aliens power (s 51(xix)) and the immigration power (s 51(xxvii)) empower the Parliament to establish the conditions upon which aliens enter, reside in and leave Australia. It has long been recognised that this [160] includes the power to deport aliens on such terms as the legislature thinks fit. As a consequence of this, the Parliament has the power to authorise the executive to detain aliens for the purposes of deportation or expulsion, and as an incident to the executive powers to receive, investigate and determine an application by that alien for an entry permit [176 CLR at 32]. However, the purposes are not at large. The continued viability of the purpose of deportation or expulsion cannot be treated by the legislature as a matter purely for the opinion of the executive government. The reason is that it cannot be for the executive government to determine the placing from time to time of that boundary line which marks off a category of deprivation of liberty from the reach of Ch III. The location of that boundary line itself is a question arising under the Constitution or involving its interpretation, hence the present significance of the Communist Party Case [Australian Communist Party v The Commonwealth (1951) 83 CLR 1]. Nor can there be sustained laws for the segregation by incarceration of aliens without their commission of any offence requiring adjudication, and for a purpose unconnected with the entry, investigation, admission or deportation of aliens. To that latter proposition there should be entered the caveat expressed by Brennan, Deane and Dawson JJ in Lim as follows [176 CLR at 26 fn 66]: It is unnecessary to consider whether the defence power in times of war will support an executive power to make detention orders such as that considered in Little v The Commonwealth [(1947) 75 CLR 94]. 8

SUPPLEMENT TO CHAPTER 29 The judgments raised a host of other interpretive and historical issues, as well as the relevance of decisions that provided for the release of detainees in the United Kingdom (R v Governor of Durham Prison; Ex parte Hardial Singh [1984] 1 WLR 704, the United States (Zadvydas v Davis, 533 US 678 (2001)) and Hong Kong (Tan Te Lam v Superintendent of Tai A Chau Detention Centre [1997] AC 97). Disagreement was expressed most sharply by McHugh and Kirby JJ. They continued their exchanges on the role of the High Court in interpreting the Constitution (see Chapter 8 3) and produced a fresh area of disagreement on the use of international law in the interpretive process (see Chapter 18 2). McHugh J: [139] It is not true, as Kirby J asserts, that indefinite detention at the will of the executive, and according to its opinions, actions and judgments, is alien to Australia s constitutional arrangements. During the First and Second World Wars, the National Security Regulations authorised the detention of persons who, in the opinion of the executive government, were disloyal or a threat to the security of the country. Many persons born in Germany were detained under these Regulations in both wars, while many persons born in Italy were detained under the relevant regulation during the Second World War. However, detention was not confined to those born in the countries with which Australia was at war. As the detention of members of the Australia First Movement demonstrates, foreign birth was not a necessary condition of detention. P R Stephensen, one of the leaders of that Movement, was detained for almost three and a half years. During the First World War, reg 55(1) of the War Precautions Regulations 1915 (Cth) provided that where the Minister for Defence has reason to believe that any naturalized person is disaffected or disloyal, he may, by warrant under his hand, order him to be detained in military custody in such place as he thinks fit during the continuance of the present state of war. The validity of that regulation was upheld by this Court in Lloyd v Wallach [(1915) 20 CLR 299]. The Court unanimously held that the regulation was validly made under the War Precautions Act 1914 (Cth) which was enacted under the defence power. No member of the Court suggested that the regulation infringed Ch III of the Constitution. During the Second World War, reg 26 of the National Security (General) Regulations 1939 (Cth) provided: [140] The Minister may if satisfied with respect to any particular person that with a view to prevent that person acting in any manner prejudicial to the public safety or the defence of the Commonwealth it is necessary to do so make an order... directing that he be detained in such place and under such conditions as the Minister from time to time determines... This Court unanimously upheld the validity of the regulation in Ex parte Walsh [[1942] ALR 359]... During the greater part of the period when reg 26 was in force, the relevant Minister was Dr H V Evatt, who had been a Justice of this Court and was later to become President of the United Nations General Assembly. According to a speech he gave in Parliament on 19 July 1944, 6174 persons were detained under this regulation at the time when he became the Minister and 1180 persons were still detained under the regulation in July 1944. He does not appear to have thought that, in making orders under reg 26, he was acting in breach of Ch III of the Constitution. Nor am I aware of anybody else suggesting that detention under these Regulations infringed Ch III of the Constitution. The purpose of the detention was not punitive but protective. I see no reason to think that this Court would strike down similar regulations if Australia was again at war in circumstances similar to those of 1914-1918 and 1939-1945. Finally, contrary to the view of Kirby J, courts cannot read the Constitution by reference to the provisions of international law that have become accepted since the Constitution was enacted in 1900. Rules of international law at that date might in some cases throw some light on the meaning of a constitutional provision. Interpretation of the term aliens by reference to the jus soli or jus sanguinis is an example. But rules of international law that have come into existence since 1900 are in a different category. The claim that the Constitution should be read consistently with the rules of international law has been decisively rejected by members of this Court on several occasions. As a matter of constitutional doctrine, it must be regarded as heretical. In Polites v The Commonwealth [(1945) 70 CLR 60], the Court accepted that, so far as the language of a statute permits, it should be interpreted and applied in conformity with the established rules of international law. That is a rule of construction of long 9

AUSTRALIAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW AND THEORY standing. The rationale for the rule is that the legislature is taken not to have intended to legislate in violation of the rules of international law existing when the legislation was enacted. Accordingly, the law is construed as containing an implication to that effect. But, as Polites decided, the implication must give way where the words of the statute are inconsistent with the implication. No doubt the rule of construction had some validity when the rules of international law were few and well-known. Under modern conditions, however, this rule of [141] construction is based on a fiction. Gone are the days when the rules of international law were to be found in the writings of a few well-known jurists. Under Art 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice, international law includes: (1) international conventions establishing rules recognised by contesting states, (2) international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law and (3) the general principles of law recognised by civilised nations. International custom may be based on diplomatic correspondence, policy statements, press releases, the opinions of official legal advisers, official manuals on legal questions... executive decisions and practices, orders to naval forces etc, comments by governments on drafts produced by the International Law Commission, state legislation, international and national judicial decisions, recitals in treaties and other international instruments, a pattern of treaties in the same form, the practice of international organs, and resolutions relating to legal questions in the United Nations General Assembly [Ian Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law (Oxford University Press, 6 ed 2003), p 6]. Given the widespread nature of the sources of international law under modern conditions, it is impossible to believe that, when the Parliament now legislates, it has in mind or is even aware of all the rules of international law. Legislators intend their enactments to be given effect according to their natural and ordinary meaning. Most of them would be surprised to find that an enactment had a meaning inconsistent with the meaning they thought it had because of a rule of international law which they did not know and could not find without the assistance of a lawyer specialising in international law or, in the case of a treaty, by reference to the proceedings of the Joint Standing Committee on Treaties. In Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Teoh [(1995) 183 CLR 273 at 316 (emphasis added)], counsel for the Minister told this Court that Australia was a party to about 900 treaties. When one adds to the rules contained in those treaties, the general principles of law recognised by civilised nations and the rules derived from international custom, it becomes obvious that the rationale for the rule that a statute contains an implication that it should be construed to conform with international law bears no relationship to the reality of the modern legislative process. Be that as it may, the rule of construction recognised in Polites is too well established to be repealed now by judicial decision. However, this Court has never accepted that the Constitution contains an implication to the effect that it should be construed to conform with the rules of international law. The rationale for the rule and its operation is inapplicable to a Constitution which is a source of, not an exercise of, legislative power. The rule, where applicable, operates as a statutory implication. But the legislature is not bound by the implication. It may legislate in disregard of it. If the rule were applicable to a Constitution, it would operate as a restraint on the grants of power [142] conferred. The Parliament would not be able to legislate in disregard of the implication... Most of the rules now recognised as rules of international law are of recent origin. If Australian courts interpreted the Constitution by reference to the rules of international law now in force, they would be amending the Constitution in disregard of the direction in s 128 of the Constitution. Section 128 declares that the Constitution is to be amended only by legislation that is approved by a majority of the States and a majority of all the electors voting. Attempts to suggest that a rule of international law is merely a factor that can be taken into account in interpreting the Constitution cannot hide the fact that, if that is done, the meaning of the Constitution is changed whenever that rule changes what would otherwise be the result of the case. The point is so obvious that it hardly needs demonstration. But a simple example will suffice to show the true character of what is done if courts take a post-1900 rule of international law into account. Immediately before the rule was recognised, our Constitution had meanings that did not depend on that rule. Either the rule of international law has effect on one or more of those meanings or it has no effect. If it has an effect, its invocation has [143] altered the meaning of the Constitution overnight. As a result, a court that took the rule into account has amended the Constitution without the authority of the people acting under s 128 of the Constitution. It has inserted a new rule into the Constitution. Take this case. The issues are whether ss 189, 196 and 198 are laws with respect to aliens or are exercises by the Parliament and not the federal courts of the 10

SUPPLEMENT TO CHAPTER 29 judicial power of the Commonwealth. If this Court had to take a rule of international law into account in interpreting those powers, the rule would either confirm what was already inherent in the powers or add to or reduce them. If the international rule is already inherent in the power it is irrelevant. If it is not, its invocation alters the constitutional meaning of aliens or judicial power of the Commonwealth or both. Many constitutional lawyers probably the great majority of them now accept that developments inside and outside Australia since 1900 may result in insights concerning the meaning of the Constitution that were not present to earlier generations. Because of those insights, the Constitution may have different meanings from those perceived in earlier times. As Professor Ronald Dworkin has often pointed out, the words of a Constitution consist of more than letters and spaces. They contain propositions. And, because of political, social or economic developments inside and outside Australia, later generations may deduce propositions from the words of the Constitution that earlier generations did not perceive. Windeyer J made that point persuasively in Victoria v The Commonwealth [(Payroll Tax Case) (1971) 122 CLR 353 at 395-97]. But that is a very different process from asserting that the Constitution must be read to conform to or so far as possible with the rules of international law. As I earlier pointed out, reading the Constitution up or down to conform to the rules of international law is to make those rules part of the Constitution, contrary to the direction in s 128 that the Constitution is to be amended only in accordance with the referendum process... Failure to see the difference between taking into account political, social and economic developments since 1900 and taking into account the rules of international law is the error in the approach of those who assert that the Constitution must be read in conformity with or in so far as it can be read conformably with the rules of international law. Rules are specific. If they are [144] taken into account as rules, they amend the Constitution. That conclusion cannot be avoided by asserting that they are simply context or elucidating factors. Rules are too specific to do no more than provide insights into the meanings of the constitutional provisions. Either the rule is already inherent in the meaning of the provision or taking it into account alters the meaning of the provision. No doubt from time to time the making or existence of (say) a Convention or its consequences may constitute a general political, social or economic development that helps to elucidate the meaning of a constitutional head of power. But that is different from using the rules in that Convention to control the meaning of a constitutional head of power. Suppose the imposition of tariffs is banned under a World Trade Agreement. If that ban were taken into account whether as context or otherwise in interpreting the trade and commerce power, it would add a new rule to the Constitution. It would require reading the power to make laws with respect to trade and commerce as subject to the rule that it did not extend to laws that imposed tariffs. Such an approach, in the words of Dixon J, cannot be countenanced [70 CLR at 78]... Eminent lawyers who have studied the question firmly believe that the Australian Constitution should contain a Bill of Rights which substantially adopts the rules found in the most important of the international human rights instruments. It is an enduring and many would say a just criticism of Australia that it is now one of the few countries in the Western world that does not have a Bill of Rights. But, desirable as a Bill of Rights may be, it is not to be inserted into our Constitution by judicial decisions drawing on international instruments that are not even part of the law of this country. It would be absurd to suggest that the meaning of a grant of power in s 51 of the Constitution can be elucidated by the enactments of the Parliament. Yet those who propose that the Constitution should be read so as to conform with the rules of international law are forced to argue that rules contained in treaties made by the executive government are relevant in interpreting the Constitution. It is hard to accept, for example, that the meaning of the trade and commerce power can be affected by [145] the Australian government entering into multilateral trade agreements. It is even more difficult to accept that the Constitution s meaning is affected by rules created by the agreements and practices of other countries. If that were the case, judges would have to have a loose-leaf copy of the Constitution. If Australia is to have a Bill of Rights, it must be done in the constitutional way hard though its achievement may be by persuading the people to amend the Constitution by inserting such a Bill. McHugh J did concede that Mr Al-Kateb s situation was [133] tragic, to which Kirby J responded tartly: 11