File scanned from the National Security Adviser's Memoranda of Conversation Collection at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library THE WHITE HOUSE

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File scanned from the National Security Adviser's Memoranda of Conversation Collection at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library MEMORANDUM THE WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON ~ODIS MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION PARTICIPANTS: President Gerald R. Ford Vuong Van Bac, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Republic of Vietnam Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State and Assistant to the President Tran Kim Phuong, Ambassador of the Republic of Vietnam Lt. General Brent Scowcroft, Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs DATE AND TIME: Saturday, October 5, 1974 11:01 a.m. - 11:25 a.m. PLACE: The Oval Office The White House Kissinger: Minister Bac was in Paris keeping an eye on me during the negotiation. Ambassador Phuong also. [The press was admitted briefly to take photographs. ] President: We think you made a fine agreement. Bac: It was mostly Dr. Kissinger. President Thieu and Madame Thieu send their best wishes and their wishes for the recovery of Mrs. Ford. [The press was ushered out.] President: I want to reassure you we will support President Thieu in every way -- economically, politically, and diplomatically. Our problem is not us, but on the Hill. Bac: We are very grateful for your efforts and U. S. efforts and we hope they can be kept at adequate levels. President Thieu has asked me to give you this letter. [Tab A], ~/NODIS '~..-" 'DBCLASSIFIED '''''' ". E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5 NSC ~... JIn4198, State Dept ~uidelidos.< ~ - XGOS (3)- By _k.nara. Date ''-'flft c.l:asslej.ed ay~. HENRY A. KISSINGfli ',,

~/NODIS -2 President: Our people are not as enthusiastic about aid, but I will do my best to get adequate levels. The attacks on aid are not just aimed at Vietnam, but across the board. When I first came to Congress, the aid bill was $7 billion. Kissinger: Which would be $15 billion now. President: But there was strong support for it. Kissinger: And it shows if you start strong you can taper off. Bac: We are making that point too. President: What is the current situation in Vietnam? Bac: It is difficult, but not critical. The economy measures are difficult. We have to cut down on Qur use of ammunition and so on, and that is costly in terms of casualties. The most intense conflict is around Kontum and the supply line. Kissinger: The Vietnamese strategic problem is they must defend a 400-mile border and the Communists can hit anywhere. President: How is the military morale? Bac: It is good in the regular forces, but has been affected in the regional forces. What we don't know is whether we should use all we have now or be cautious. Kissinger: We will try to get you what you need. You know of the American baseball manager, Leo Durocher, who said "Nice guys finish last. II President: How is the economy in Vietnam? Bac: Our inflation is about 30 percent but it is not so catastrophic as the kind in Africa and Italy. The country is basically rich in resources, and in a year or two we should be self- sufficient in rice. President: As you close now? Phuong: Yes, and in some areas the Communists prohibit collection and try to drain it off. Bac: There should be good crops this year, ~s)3c.r::!tr INODIS

~/NODIS -3 Kissinger: We may have to have a confrontation on oil prices! Negotiations with the North Vietnamese in the morning and the South Vietnamese in the afternoon is a wearing experience. Bac: We should know soon whether oil is present in cornrnercial quantaties. The companies are sanguine, but that won1t solve our current problems. 11m trying to get increased aid now. I have visited Japan, and am going to France and Germany. All together last year we got about $100 million. It was substantial, but not compared to US levels. President: We will do our best. We admire President Thieu and want to be a good partner. Bac: President Thieu just heard that you will visit Japan and Korea soon. We would like to invite you to visit Vietnam on the way. President: That is unfortunately not possible on this trip. Please don~t misinterpret this; it is only a time problem. Another time I will do it. We will do our best. Bac: We know you are very busy. Maybe you could visit President Thieu along the way to Japan. President: I will talk to Dr. Kissinger about it. But it is likely to be very difficult. [The meeting ended with warm handshakes and farewells. ] ~~/NODIS

1 Saigon~ September I r ~ 1974 NGUYEN VAN THIEU President of the Republic of Vtet-Nam Dear Mr. President~ About a month ago~ I wrote to Your Excellency about the situation facing the Republic of Viet-Nam as the Communist side spurned all negotiations and stepped up their armed attacks in complete disregard of the Paris Agreement. Since then~ the situation has become even more serious. In fact~ the prospects for the resumption of the talks between the two South Vietnamese parties are bleaker than ever~ while the Communist generalized offensive continues unabated. Now the leaders of the Hanoi regime openly declare their active support for movements aimed at overthrowing the legal Government of the Republic of Viet-Nam while they intensify their infiltrations and military action~ thus baring their plans for a forcible conquest of the whole South Viet-Name His Excellency Mr. Gerald E. FORD President of the United States of America Washington D. C.

.. - 2 I think that the main cause for the increasingly defiant and bellicose attitude of the Communists resides in their believing that the United States is now wavering in its dedication to our common goal, namely a South Viet-Nam capable of defending itself and of deciding its own future. The utterly inadequate amount of military and economic aid to the Republic of Viet-Nam which has been voted by the U. S. Congress might have induced the Communists to make such speculations. This can in turn lead to very dangerous miscalculations on the part of the Communists, as they might be tempted to launch an all out offe.nsive to complete their forcible conquest \' of South VietrNam. Therefore, it is essential that the United States unmistakably demonstrates once again its attachment to a serious implementation of the Paris Agreement and its support for the Government of the Republic of Viet-Nam, if peace is to be restored in South Viet-Nam and in South East Asia. In this respect, I am most appreciative of your efforts made on September 12th to persuade leaders of Congress to restore the cuts in aid funds. I sincerely hope that Your Excellency will succeed in bringing the amounts of military and economic assistance up to the levels required by the new realities of the situation and the need for South Viet-Nam to achieve an economic takeoff.

- 3 The Government of the Republic of Viet-Nam had signed the Paris Agreement in good faith, under the double assurance that, on the one hand, Russia and Red China will exercise a restraining influence upon Hanoi and that, on the other hand, all necessary military equipments and economic assistance will be provided by the United States to the Republic of Viet-Nam to maintain its capabilities of self defense and to develop its national economy. The first assumption turned out to be an empty promise, as Russia and Red China continue to give North Viet Nam all the ingredients to pursue an aggressive war in South Viet-Nama But I am convinced that thanks to your generous efforts, the second assumption will be bome out. Our valiant soldiers by enduring daily sacrifices in the battlefields have proved beyond doubt our will to resist Communist aggression~ It would be unfortunate indeed if sufficient means could not be supplied to them because of the lack of resolve and misconception on the part of our allies. Beside providing us with an adequate amount of military and economic assistance, the United States can also show its support for the just cause of the Republic of Viet-Nam by solemnly restating our common goals. In this regard, I hope that some time in the near future, we can meet

~,... -, - 4 to discuss about ways and means to achieve a genuine peace in South Viet-Nam. Please accept~ Mr. President. the assurances of my lasting friendship and highest consideration..'

THE WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON 4580 I. PURPOSE MEETING WITH VUONG VAN :BAC FOREIGN MINISTER OF THE REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM SaturdayII October 5, 197:!' 11:00 a. rri~-, (15 minutes) The Oval Office From: Henry A. Kissinger To demonstrate the constancy of U. S. support for South Vietnam and to convey to President Thieu assurances that we are making a strong effort to secure adequate aid for his country. II. BACKGROUND, PARTICIPANTS &: PRESS ARRANGEMENTS A. Background: Recent Congressional cuts in U. S. assistance to South Vietnam undermine South Vietnamese confidence in continued U. S. support and in South VietnamI s ability to resist Communist pressures. 'Your meeting with Foreign Minister Bac and your conveying through him assurances of our continued support to President Thieu can help bdlster South Vietnamese confidence at a critical time. Bac is carrying a letter and verbal message for you from President Thieu. Bac will probably briefly review South Vietnam's current economic and military problems and press for higher aid levels. B. Participants: Foreign Minister Bac, Secretary Kissinger and Republic of Vietnam Ambassador Phuong. C. Press Arrangements: Press photo session. Meeting to be announced. Ill. TALKING POINTS 1. I share: your concern-about recent COllgressional cuts in Vietnam.aid leve1s. We are fully aware of the impact these cuts will have on South Vietnam. f~.!.:'o~ o ~...,f.-#<<t:" DBCLASSIFJED... B.O. 12958, Sec. ls NSC Memo. 11124/98, State De". G lpciines II IkI= NARA.l)atv.-J/l'J.I!l. _

\ 2. You may be assured that this Administration will do everything possible to provide adequate military and economic aid to South Vietnam. 3. We believe it may be possible to raise aid levels, above those so far establishe'd by Congress, and we will try our best to accomplish this. 4. Please convey to President Thieu my personal assurances that this Administration remains steadfast in its support for the Republic of Vietnam. President Thieuts efforts to defend his country 1 s independence and to promote its well being have earned our profound respect and admiration. Please give him my warmest personal regards. '.

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