FHSMUN SARASOTA SECURITY COUNCIL THE SITUATION IN SYRIA Author: Brian D. Sutliff Introduction In the wake of the initial optimism of the Arab Spring of 2011, with the toppling of entrenched regimes in Egypt, Tunisia, and Yemen, many domestic and international observers pondered the possibilities of the removal of the Assad government in Syria. Over the past eighteen months, the violence in Syria has devastated cities such as Aleppo, Damascus, and Homs, threatened to ignite sectarian violence between the Alawite and Sunni communities, and created enormous humanitarian and security concerns in surrounding countries, including Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, and Turkey. The number of Syrians killed thus far is impossible to determine with any precision but generally accepted estimates point to over 35,000 killed, with the death tolls on some days approaching 250. The resulting humanitarian crisis has sent over 400,000 refugees into neighboring countries, with over 100,000 refugees into Lebanon alone 1 and Iraq, Jordan, and Turkey are all housing tens of thousands of Syrian refugees as of the end of October 2012. Unfortunately, according to the International Crisis Group (ICG), Syria indeed has become an arena for outside meddling, but the meddling has been far more effective at sustaining the fighting than ending it. 2 Avoiding regional conflagration and the potential for a larger war throughout Iraq, Syria, and even in the Kurdistan regions bordering southern Turkey must be a foundational priority for the international community. As the Security Council continues to monitor developments in Syria and strives to mediate a peaceful solution to the conflict, delegates must consider the benefits and costs of any potential course of action. Scale of the Conflict The rapidly escalating death, internally displaced persons (IDPs), and refugee tolls in Syria match some of the most horrific violence in the most recent war in neighboring Iraq, particularly during the period from 2005-2007. During the recent 4-day Eid al-adha holiday truce (October 26-29, 2012), over 420 people were killed in repeated shelling, suicide bombings, 1 United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), Number of Syrian refugees in Lebanon passes 100,000 mark October 23, 2012. Found at: http://www.unhcr.org/508671c36.html 2 International Crisis Group (ICG), Syria s Mutating Conflict August 1, 2012 p. i.
and armed clashes between Syrian security forces and rebel forces. 3 Once the poorly enforced truce ended, Syrian warplanes resumed aerial bombardments in eastern suburbs of Damascus and in Homs while rebel forces assassinated a leading Syrian general. 4 As the conflict has intensified in recent months, the possibility of prolonged civil war, with elements of violent ethnic and/or sectarian reprisals and campaigns of assassination, expulsion and intimidation, looms ever larger. As the violence in Syria constantly threatens to spill over into surrounding its countries, Turkey has responded with retaliatory shelling 5 as well as forcing a Syrian jet to land in the Turkish capital of Ankara because of suspicions that the plane was carrying Russian-made munitions to the Syrian security forces. 6 Given the collapse of Syrian political institutions and the stark possibility that relinquishing power may lead to enormous economic, legal, military and political consequences for the Assad regime and its Alawite allies, astute observers cannot be surprised by the likelihood that Assad and his security forces, as well as their makeshift civilian militias, known as shabbiha, may choose to fight rather than seek a negotiated political transition. While the Assad regime and its allies have become increasingly ostracized internationally, the international community must bear in mind that merely seeking the removal/replacement of the Assad regime without having any clear ideas about the composition and intentions of any new government may cause the current conflict to further metastasize. International Responses The United Nations, the Arab League, and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) have all held emergency meetings regarding the violence in Syria as well as to consider what diplomatic, economic, legal, political, and security options are currently available. In November 2011, the Arab League formally suspended Syria from membership as a result of Syria s violent repression of political demonstrations; Syria argued that the move was illegal because it was not approved unanimously Lebanon and Yemen opposed the suspension and Iraq abstained. 7 The possibility of armed intervention in the Syrian conflict, all the way from the enforcement of no-fly zones for the Syrian air force to the actual introduction of armed international forces, presumably from NATO countries, including Turkey, remains a considerable risk. Turkey s recent call for establishing safe zones for refugees in northern Syria 8 would require the introduction of considerable outside forces, an eventuality that is not being publicly embraced by many political leaders. 3 BBC News, Damascus car bombings as Syria ceasefire ends October 29, 2012. 4 Reuters, Syrian Air Force on Offensive After Failed Truce October 30, 2012. 5 Tim Arango & Anne Barnard, Turkey Strikes Back After Syrian Shelling Kills 5 Civilians New York Times October 3, 2012. 6 Ellen Barry & Rick Gladstone, Turkish Premier Says Russian Munitions Were Found on Syrian Jet New York Times October 11, 2012. 7 Neil MacFarquhar, Arab League Votes to Suspend Syria Over Crackdown New York Times November 12, 2011. 8 Jeremy Bowen, Turkey: Risk Worth Taking for Syria Safe Zones BBC News September 27, 2012.
The potential divisions within the international community hinder possibilities for comprehensive and consistent policies. Syria s increasing diplomatic isolation may only lead to increased ties with its few remaining allies and/or customers: China, Iran, and Russia, as well as the non-state actor Hizbollah. China recently proposed a multi-step plan 9, similar in at least broad outlines to proposals by former Secretary-General Kofi Annan and current UN-Arab League envoy Lakhdar Brahimi. China s newest proposal may be aimed at preventing further strains in its relations with leading Arab League trading partners, including Qatar and Saudi Arabia. American, British, and French policies towards the conflict in Syria are all at least in part predicated by their recent experiences with political and security change in Egypt and Libya. UN System Actions If the messenger truly matters in diplomacy, Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon has sent two of the leading lights of the UN, former Secretary-General Kofi Annan and former Algerian Foreign Minister and UN UnderSecretary-General Lakhdar Brahimi, to underscore the importance of peacefully resolving the Syrian conflict. Before his departure from Syria on August 2, Annan had proposed a 6-point plan for resolving the crisis that included the deployment of a UN military observer mission in Syria for several months; the observer mission was removed in mid-august 2012 as a result of increasing violence in the country. 10 Annan s proposal also included appeals to the Syrian government and its opponents to permit timely delivery of humanitarian aid, the release of arbitrarily detained persons, protection for internally displaced Syrians, and freedom of movement for journalists and UN personnel. Ultimately, the most important point of Annan s 6-point plan was for a coordinated political transition in Syria, although it did not require the imminent departure of the Assad family. 11 Brahimi s overtures have thus far not produced significant improvements nor reductions in violence, in large part because both the Assad regime and the rebels appear intent on focusing on securing military victory. Who are these guys anyway? Syria s Splintered and Fractious Opposition While removal of the Assad regime, and probably Ba ath Party loyalists from government bureaucracies and Alawite officers from military leadership positions, may be the preferred outcome for Syria s opposition groups and much of the international community, the identities and motivations of many of these opposition groups are not entirely clear. The oftclaimed presence of al-qaeda fighters in Syria 12 and the constant denunciations by the Assad regime and the opposition forces of terrorists fighting for the other side certainly heighten the current tensions. The International Crisis Group recently noted that most armed groups have yet to develop a firm ideology or leadership structure; membership fluctuates, with fighters shifting 9 Rick Gladstone, China Presents Plan to End Syrian Conflict New York Times November 1, 2012. 10 BBC News, UN Syria observer mission over, Security Council says August 16, 2012. 11 Reuters, Text of Annan s six-point peace plan for Syria April 4, 2012. 12 Rod Nordland, Al Qaeda Taking Deadly New Role in Syria s Conflict New York Times July 24, 2012.
from one faction to another based on availability of funds, access to weapons, personal relationships in other words, based on factors having little if anything to do with belief. 13 Amidst the overall fluidity of these Syrian opposition groups, it is clear that any new Syrian political and military leadership may include either hostile elements or groups focused on avenging past injustices. US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, speaking in Zagreb, Croatia on October 31, 2012, asserted that the Syrian National Council (SNC) could not be an effective government as most of its leaders have lived outside of Syria for decades. 14 After the Syrian National Council (SNC) members met in Qatar in early November 2012, they announced a broadening of their coalition, leading to official French and Turkish recognition. 15 US and NATO preferences for new leadership in Syria may also run counter to the preferences of Syrian Sunni communities and parties, including the Muslim Brotherhood, and their foreign sponsors, including Saudi Arabia and Qatar, as well as the Syrian Shi a community and its Iraqi 16, Iranian, and Hizbollah sponsors. Syrian diaspora and expatriate communities are also likely to continue to seek to influence the ascendancy and composition of any new political and security leadership. Sanctions Economic sanctions are an often proposed route for international pressure but sanctions are unlikely to lead to any immediate resolution of the Syrian conflict. The Arab League, the European Union (EU), and the United States all imposed tighter economic sanctions against Syria in late 2011 and in the summer of 2012, yet the Assad regime has been able to cling to power while the Syrian economy suffers potentially catastrophic setbacks; in May of 2012, the Syrian Oil Minister claimed that international sanctions had already cost Syria at least $4 billion USD in a country with an annual Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of approximately $108 billion total for 2011. 17 Within the UN, imposing sanctions will be significantly more difficult as both China and Russia have vetoed previous Security Council resolutions designed to impose strict economic sanctions against Syria. 18 Furthermore, sanctions regimes must be effectively and consistently enforced; unfortunately, given many lucrative examples of smuggling and sanctions evasion, including the Oil-for-Food sanctions scandal in which allegations of corruption were raised against the administrator of the program, Benon Sevan, then Secretary-General Kofi Annan and his son Kojo, British MP George Galloway, Russian intelligence sources, and multinational oil companies; while subsequent investigations have not sustained many of the charges against specific individuals or corporations, the hint of another sanctions scandal may pose a significant challenge. 13 International Crisis Group (ICG), Tentative Jihad: Syria s Fundamentalist Opposition October 12, 2012 p. i. 14 Associated Press, Clinton seeks major shakeup of Syrian opposition in new bid to rally country against Assad October 31, 2012. 15 Steven Erlanger, France to Let Syria Council Establish Ambassador New York Times November 17, 2012. 16 Yasir Ghazi & Tim Arango, Iraqi Sects Join Battle in Syria on Both Sides New York Times October 27, 2012. 17 Jonathan Masters, Syria s Crisis and the Global Response Council on Foreign Relations October 29, 2012. Found at: http://www.cfr.org/syria/syrias-crisis-global-response/p28402 18 Rick Gladstone, Friction at the UN as Russia and China Veto Another Resolution on Syria Sanctions New York Times July 19, 2012.
Military Intervention Military resolution of the conflict in Syria has been broached at various points but, save a Syrian invasion of a neighboring state such as Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, or Turkey, or Syrian deployment of chemical weapons 19, at least several Security Council member states, including China and Russia, are likely to oppose authorizing any large-scale occupation of Syria. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) boasts the aerial and logistical capacity to conduct air and missile strikes against Syrian targets, similar to previous bombing campaigns in Kosovo in 1999 and Libya in 2011. Without Security Council authorization, however, these actions may come up against domestic legal and political challenges as well as embroil these countries in dangerous and prolonged military actions. Deploying a peacekeeping mission to Syria may be another option that will be discussed at the Security Council but it would likely take at least 6 months to assemble a sizeable peacekeeping force; this would also depend upon member states being willing to send their respective military and police forces into the Syrian conflict. If any peacekeeping mission could be approved by the Security Council, given the current context and seeming impasse, developing an appropriate mandate and force size in the midst of a rapidly evolving, and potentially deteriorating, security situation would require constant monitoring by the Security Council. Full-scale military intervention is not necessary for other states and non-state actors to exert considerable influence and/or impact on the Syrian conflict. The smuggling and/or steering of weapons into the Syrian conflict threatens to deepen and prolong the conflict, in part by creating situations of proxy wars between the, sometimes ephemeral, allies of the various parties to the conflict. 20 While the US and a number of its allies are reported to be steering significant weapons to various elements of the Syrian opposition, Iran is reported to be involved in significant transporting of weapons to the Syrian government and security forces, in part by flying through Iraqi airspace. 21 Establishing and enforcing restrictions, or even an outright embargo, on weapons shipments to the various actors in the Syrian conflict presents a challenging but vital step towards preventing further deterioration of the security situation and a resultant worsening of the current humanitarian crisis. The Israeli-Palestinian Dimension As with most Middle Eastern political and security situations, potential conflicts invariably include discussions of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. With tensions over the Golan Heights, previous Israeli bombings of Syria 22 as well as hundreds of thousands of Palestinian 19 BBC News, Obama warns Syria chemical weapons use may spark US action August 21, 2012. 20 Eric Schmitt, CIA Said to Aid in Steering Arms to Syrian Opposition New York Times June 21, 2012. 21 Michael R. Gordon, Iran Supplying Syrian Military via Iraqi Airspace New York Times September 4, 2012. 22 David Sanger & Mark Mazetti, Israel Struck Syrian Nuclear Project, Analysts Say New York Times October 14, 2007.
refugees already in Syria 23, the potential for a renewed war in the Gaza Strip is already exacerbating the tensions in Syria and throughout the region. By the middle of November 2012, stray bullets and mortar rounds from the Syrian conflict landed on the Israeli side of the Golan Heights and the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) responded with the first warning shots into Syrian territory in nearly 40 years. 24 While a ceasefire was announced on November 21, 2012, the security situation in Israel and the Palestinian Occupied Territories is always of paramount concern for the entire region as well as the international community. Conclusion What Comes Next? Crafting a comprehensive peace settlement that ends the Syrian conflict must be the longterm goal of the Security Council but it is absolutely imperative that a sustained ceasefire be achieved without further delay. Bridging the differences between Security Council members, particularly amongst the Permanent Members, will be fundamental to any successful ceasefire and related diplomatic initiatives. Syria s neighbors must also strive to avoid further inflaming the current conflict while also ensuring that Syrian military and security actions do not imperil their own populations. UN agencies involved in supplying humanitarian relief to the 400,000+ Syrian refugees as well as hundreds of thousands of internally displaced Syrians will also need greater sustained financial and logistical support in order to accomplish the critical tasks of saving lives and ultimately preparing Syrian refugees for voluntary repatriation efforts once the security situation is vastly improved. If the Assad regime is ultimately displaced by this conflict, Syria and its international partners must confront a serious of challenging questions as to what comes next for Damascus and the region. The rupturing of the political and security arrangements that have governed Syria for decades could quite conceivably erupt into prolonged sectarian conflict and/or civil war. Furthermore, as has been observed in neighboring Iraq, regime change may well be accompanied by a regional and/or international scramble for influence, with access to weapons and oil revenues serving as the preferred coins of the realm. While the Security Council must focus most immediately on ending the current conflict and ensuring that any ceasefire obtained is actually sustainable and enforceable, it is abundantly clear that Syria s economy and infrastructure will need to be rebuilt, regardless of the ultimate outcome of the current conflict. Guiding Questions: What has your country done so far in relation to the Syrian conflict? How has your country voted, or indicated it would vote, on Security Council resolutions? Would your country contribute financially, logistically, and/or militarily to a peacekeeping mission authorized by the UN System? 23 The Economist, Stateless and hapless as ever November 17, 2012. 24 Isabel Kershner, Israel Fires into Syria After Shell Hits Post New York Times November 11, 2012.
Under what conditions would your country support the strengthening of economic sanctions against Syria? The use of military force? What steps can the UN, the Arab League, neighboring countries, and even non-governmental organizations (NGOs), take to stave off further humanitarian crisis in Syria and throughout the region? What forms of assistance can your government, intergovernmental organizations, including the UN System, the international financial institutions (IFIs) such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank Group, take to assist in rebuilding Syria s economy? Resolutions: S/RES/2059 Middle East July 20, 2012. S/RES/2052 Middle East June 27, 2012 S/RES/2043 Middle East April 21, 2012 S/RES/2042 Middle East April 14, 2012 S/RES/2028 Middle East December 21, 2011 Reports of the Secretary-General: S/2012/523 Report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of Security Council resolution July 6, 2012.