Towards a Political Sociology of Security Studies OLE WÆVER*

Special Section on The Evolution of International Security Studies Towards a Political Sociology of Security Studies OLE WÆVER* Centre for Advanced Security Theory, Department of Political Science, University of Copenhagen, Denmark Endowed now with a convincing history of itself, security studies needs a sociological analysis of its workings. The post-kuhnian sociology of science in the Buzan & Hansen (2009) volume is too sociologically thin and offers a disembodied history of ideas, not a sociology of flesh-andblood scholars. This article suggests how a sociology of security studies can be strung between the two poles of a sociology of international relations and theories of expertise. Special attention must be paid to the role of security theory for policy analysis, as well as the variation over time and geographically in the institutional chains connecting academe and policy, especially the changing nature of think-tanks. The centre of analysis should be networks of scholars manoeuvring these cross-pressures and making research and other career choices. Through its focus on form, this approach can explain dominant styles of scholarship in the USA and Europe as ways of meeting contrasting demands from academic institutions and policy relevance. The article ends with an assessment of the prospects for security studies. Keywords international security security studies sociology of science expertise history of security studies THE PUBLICATION of The Evolution of International Security Studies (Buzan & Hansen, 2009) leaves the field of security studies much enhanced on two accounts. It now has, first, a comprehensive and compelling history of itself, and, second, the raw material from which to construct an analytical, sociological understanding of what it is and how it works. With phase one completed, a follow-on volume ought to pull together in a theoretically informed manner the insights accumulated about the nature and form of international security studies. A sociology of security studies would also entail a more political understanding of the field. Political forces frame, condition and impact the scholarly production, and this production in turn is involved in the political struggles over security and other societal issues. However, it is not sufficiently The Author(s), 2010. Reprints and permissions: http://www.sagepub.co.uk/journalspermissions.nav SAGE Publications, http://sdi.sagepub.com Vol. 41(6): 649 658, DOI: 10.1177/0967010610388213

650 Security Dialogue vol. 41, no. 6, December 2010 political to have broad-brushed pictures of interests, agendas and presumptions, because we need to understand how decisions are made at that very point where academic work is produced. Here, two simultaneous sets of demands intersect: scholarly peer recognition and political relevance. The politics of security studies is condensed at moments of decision in relation to publications (and oral presentations): about what to write, say and accept for publication, whom to hire and fund, and whom to listen to and cite, decisions made by scholars, policymakers, foundations, journalists and many others. In the first section of this article, I will argue why the authors (post-)kuhnian sociology of science will not do. The second part presents my proposed perspective through two structural pictures of international security studies at its formation and institutionalization. For both phases, the Buzan & Hansen book provides a good observational basis from which to start a theoretical analysis. I end with a brief discussion of the outlook for security studies. Forget Kuhn! Get Sociological and Get to Practice and Power Buzan & Hansen (2009: 39 65) present their analytical framework as post- Kuhnian sociology of science. It is post-kuhnian in the sense that they add to Kuhn first a layer of international relations sociology of science (debate on external versus internal factors) and then their own (as they admit, somewhat ad hoc-ish) model of five drivers. Post-Kuhnian here means not anti- but to continue along the route laid out by Kuhn (1962), only further. However, Kuhn is not sociology of science, but rationalized history plus historicized prescriptive philosophy of science. Kuhn has no systematic sociological understanding of scholars, but a model of how larger cognitive units (paradigms) travel through time (with the help of scholars) and what rules of interaction in research communities will stimulate scientific productivity. Buzan & Hansen take from Kuhn primarily the refutation of standard optimism about facts leading to cumulative progress. This opens for influence from all kinds of factors, internal and external to academe (a useful step), but it tells us little about how these interact (and therefore is not sociology of science). A proper sociology of international security studies would explain scholars choices and moves. The five drivers are fine factors surely at play but they need to channel into micro-sociology. A sociologically sound understanding avoids (ultimately functionalist) explanations where factors shape research (Collins, 1998). One has to work inside-out, starting with scholars in their immediate social context, which is mainly other scholars in relation to whom they act strategically, then adding as a second layer their working conditions, funding and academic institutions, and then finally larger political and eco-

Ole Wæver Towards a Political Sociology of Security Studies 651 nomic processes. It is methodologically suspect to link directly from, say, economic and political factors to academic texts. One needs to understand the setting within which a given text was produced as academic text and how that was conditioned by broader factors. The post-kuhnian framework leads to an intellectualist bias, a story of disembodied ideas with a thin political economy of security studies. 1 A more thoroughly sociological and political framework will get closer to actual, living scholars making choices about what to work on, how to design theories and where to publish all conditioned by many drivers. It must avoid both extremes of either reducing international security studies to instruments for policymakers (i.e. nothing but political ideology) or, conversely, idealizing it as pure thinking. Ostensibly trivial, this is harder than it sounds. Most treatments actually fall into either extreme. Steering this course demands a focus on reward systems and gatekeepers, and requires one to take seriously how these function as academic institutions that is, with the currencies appropriate for this world of ours (recognition, publications, citations). Academic reward systems and regulatory evaluations can be studied without either, in a Mertonian manner, sanctifying these academic institutions as guaranteeing an insulated system of pure intellectual merit (Merton, 1973) or, conversely, making the anti-mertonian mistake of ignoring the peculiarly academic institutions (Diesing, 1991). International security studies is a challenging case involving intense interaction with extra-academic actors and where relevance as experts counts strongly but still most of the main figures (see the author index in Buzan & Hansen, 2009: 365 367) made their names as scholars with academic publications, citations and positions. These were granted by fellow scholars. Politics of Academic Authority and Expertise Naturally, I cannot provide a sociological theory of security studies in this brief piece. That would demand another major work (Buzan & Hansen, 2020?). But, I illustrate some main features in two steps. Domain of Knowledge One focal point must be how international security studies was carved out as a domain. When international security studies emerged in the 1940s as an independent field, a key novelty was to establish civilian expertise on 1 Their two most internal drivers are debate and institutionalization. The first de facto becomes ideas, not scholars. The second is closer to sociology but still more about institutions as context than networked research as practice.

652 Security Dialogue vol. 41, no. 6, December 2010 matters military (Smoke, 1976; Betts, 1997; Wæver & Buzan, 2007; Buzan & Hansen, 2009: 66 67, 88 89). Previously it was taken for granted that the military provided the relevant expertise. For several reasons the contributions of science during World War II and the novel military challenges defence was opened to more kinds of expertise. This was closely connected to the emergence in the early-to-mid 1940s in the USA of security as new guiding concept (Wæver, 2008) defining a broader military-plus field of knowledge for reasons of both policy efficiency (integration of more instruments) and democracy (containing the corrosive effects of standing armies ). Today, much critical work criticizes the overemphasis of military matters in early security studies, which easily gets the story backwards and takes for granted that something like security studies should exist. This civilianness is in the book (Buzan & Hansen, 2009: 2, 66 67, 88 89), but with a waning sense of contingency. It should never be taken for granted that a field or discipline exists just because it now appears to us that it corresponds to an object of knowledge (Foucault, [1966] 1970). 2 An opening for this new kind of knowledge happened first on the political side as a new form of expertise, and only secondarily as academic specialty. Notably, one of the few programmatic statements in an international relations context (Brodie, 1949) was not an argument against an international relations mainstream for accepting a new subfield, but directed against traditional military strategy carving out space for a kind of social science-based theory of strategy. 3 How was it decided during this period what counted? There was no strong sense of discipline, either of security studies as a field of its own or of a mother discipline for instance, no distinct journals. Some work was published in journals within political science (Brodie, 1949; Schelling, 1958) or economics (Schelling, 1956), but most that mattered within the community took the form of papers/reports (from RAND in particular; e.g. Wohlstetter et al., 1954; Kahn & Mann, 1957) and books (Brodie, 1946; Kahn, 1961). Irrespective of format, they circulated among participants, because it was a small, closely knit community. Ideas were judged on relevance and intellectual merit, often face-to-face, not primarily through institutionalized systems like journals and awards. Books and articles about the relations and rivalries among these people show they were forged in ways peculiar to the academic world, so even in the absence of the normally dominant institutions like own journals and competition for chairs, internal regulation was scholarly while 2 The book s increasing naturalization of international security studies is reinforced by the problematic status of the four central questions (see Buzan & Hansen, 2009: 9 13). It is probably correct that all security theories have to provide answers to these four questions, and therefore they serve well to compare theories, but the field is not constituted by these four questions. That is too static a view. The stabilization of object and field is a constantly evolving process with no fixed centre. 3 See Schelling (1960), which argues for a more strategic concept of strategy within game theory.

Ole Wæver Towards a Political Sociology of Security Studies 653 the struggle for policy influence was crucial, both in itself and as part of the academic prestige. At the time, the political system did not yet have clear political strategies for usage of experts or an extensive competitive arena of think-tanks. Nor was international security studies shaped by a mother discipline. Ideas, concepts, calculations and even new forms of theory (systems analysis, developments within game theory, deterrence theory) were developed that both found their way into policymaking and evolved as a collective, intellectual process. However, little work has so far investigated the exact nature of the interaction between policy relevance and intra-academic valuation. Biographies, individual and collective, of the early strategists exist, as well as histories of, for example, game theory and deterrence and nuclear strategy (too numerous to cite here), but these typically focus on either one side or the other. At least three kinds of analysis need to be developed and connected: interaction of scholars with policymakers (how the latter chose among different analyses and institutions, and the former chose to frame their advice); interactions within the circle of specialists and the production of hierarchies, alliances and conflicts; and finally the relationship, mostly at the level of individuals, to different university disciplines (e.g. Schelling and the economists). Policymakers International security studies Mother disciplines Figure 1: Early international security studies with unclear demands from policymakers, weak links to academic disciplines and a compact internal structure Bases for Knowledge Claims: The Many Inbetweennesses of Security Studies In the 1970s, international security studies obtained own formalized institutions like journals and associations (Wæver & Buzan, 2007; Buzan & Hansen, 2009: 97 98), policy advice simultaneously became competitive, and international security studies became largely monodisciplinary. Institutional constraints tightened on both the advisory and the academic side. A more clearly dualistic agenda emerged, where the production of accepted knowledge was strung between the two pillars of academic authority (publications, refereeing, etc.) and expert status in policy. The two are interconnected, because what counts as publishable in, for example, International Security (or, for that

654 Security Dialogue vol. 41, no. 6, December 2010 matter, Journal of Peace Research, at least back in the days) is partly defined by being knowledge relevant to important issues (see Steve Miller s [2010] article in this issue), and expert advice needs to cover its scientific back. However, connections do not erase difference but create particular structuring forces, a dual demand from political and academic rationality. How this intersection evolved over time and between countries should be focal for a sociology of international security studies. International security studies as a sui generis proto-discipline got sucked into international relations in the 1970s during its phase of institutionalization. Strangely, the discipline of political science usually seen as a weak one, importing not exporting ideas and theories vis-à-vis other disciplines has absorbed three previously interdisciplinary fields: international relations, security studies and peace research. The book potentially gets an international relations bias by internalizing this, rather than de-naturalizing it. Hard as it is, avoiding a sense of historical inevitability about the political scientification of security studies is necessary in order to explain it. Policymakers International security studies International relations discipline Figure 2: Late international security studies with tight constraints from policymakers, strong links to one academic discipline and an internal chain structure and tension Buzan & Hansen pay special attention to security theory, and sensibly so. However, the place and function of security theory must be conceptualized. International security studies as a whole stretches all the way from universitybased, disciplinary-anchored theorizing over more policy-oriented publications from both universities and think-tanks to non-publication advice. The different institutions along the axis evolved over time, and the ties that bind the most policy-oriented scholars to theory differ between, for example, the USA and Europe (Wæver, forthcoming). Following the emergence of security theory as a subset, it is tempting to study it more or less in isolation, but international security studies still derives much of its legitimacy from relevance, and theory has some relationship to much of the policy work, even if increasingly complex. Simultaneously, the mother discipline of international relations is dominated by theorists and relatively high on reputational autonomy, 4 so policy influence does not automatically 4 As defined in Whitley ([1984] 2000): intradisciplinary control in contrast to, for example, prestige via public profile.

Ole Wæver Towards a Political Sociology of Security Studies 655 correlate with disciplinary status. Therefore, security theory is placed at the intersection of two arenas not automatically aligned. The sociology of international security studies clearly differs from the sociology of international relations (Wæver, 1998; Wæver & Tickner, 2009). Yet, the latter must be one pole in a structure of two poles of attraction, where the other is a sociology of expertise and policy advice (see, for example, Maasen & Weingart, 2005). This tension enables what could be labeled a form analysis of contemporary security knowledge. The intersection demands the kind of knowledge that seems politically useful and simultaneously scores well within academic rules. This is more about form than content, and explains why mainstream security studies did not jump the international relations bandwagon of rational choice (Walt, 1999), but typically favours historical case studies testing generalizing causal international relations theories (Wæver, forthcoming). In contrast, Europeans cultivated theorizing of a reflexive and politicizing manner to mediate European academic rules with European policy demands. This sketchy explanation needs to be unfolded with full utilization of both sociology of science and theories of expertise. The tightening grip of institutions might be reason for worry. The history of international security studies conforms to the theory of optimal marginality, which posits that academic innovation and productivity typically happens away from the (cognitive and social) centre of a discipline. The case of international security studies displays a double duality of distance/connection in relation to both disciplinary hierarchies and policy (Wæver & Buzan, 2007). The so-called Golden Age of game theory and deterrence emerged in an interdisciplinary, non-university setting, and the new European theories (Guzzini & Jung, 2004; Huysmans, 2006) emerged in the 1980s and 1990s partly in peace research and police studies, and geographically at the margins (Wæver, forthcoming). Has international security studies today still space for innovation at appropriate distance from disciplinary and political elites? Or is it too tightly controlled by politicians, International Security and Security Dialogue? The Future Evolution of International Security Studies Compared to the story in The Evolution of International Security Studies, my proposed analysis would centre attention on the networks and hierarchies among scholars (in universities and think-tanks) as regulated and mediated through institutions like journal editing, hirings and citations (see Russett & Arnold [2010], elsewhere in this issue). Around this centre, powerful factors will be policymakers, media and foundations. Political agendas, the nature of political processes and dominant conceptions of relevance will influence who

656 Security Dialogue vol. 41, no. 6, December 2010 gets to play a role in various policy contexts, but the challenge is to conceptualize how all this coheres as a social system of scholars. The analysis will be complex, because the whole sociology of international relations that is only beginning to take shape will be one pillar, while international security studies adds dynamics that often deviate strongly from those of the university discipline international relations. Given the vastness of the task, I should hint that it might be worth the effort. A sociology of science-based understanding of international security studies adds counter-intuitive insights into the prospects and thereby the strategic counsel for the field itself. Generally, security studies looks vigorous. Since 11 September 2001, it has received additional funding and attention. Widening of security continues, for instance, with climate security readily accepted (in marked contrast with 1990s resistance to environmental security ), so the domain of security grows. It is stocked with theories and vibrant debates (even if in two relatively disconnected streams on either side of the Atlantic). Many of the brightest students find the field attractive, so good PhD students pour in. However, sociology of science warns that this situation might not be unconditionally favourable. Surges of funding (and other resources from society) often have the ironic effect of diluting integrated fields of scientific knowledge (the classical case being biomedicine), as easier access to funding weakens the need to fight for disciplinary commanding heights, thus weakening theoretical integration (Whitley, [1984] 2000). The risk is real that the present security boom will lead to a multiplication of uncoordinated theories, atheoretical policy analysis and theory disconnected from practice (and from other theorists). However, increasing synergy is possible under very specific conditions. Security studies experienced in the 1950s and early 1960s its so-called Golden Age, where especially game theory and nuclear deterrence theory provided a rare moment of extreme policy relevance simultaneously forming a highly productive research programme making major strides in basic science. The think-tank RAND, founded by the US Air Force, was one of the main centres for developing game theory, which has had a lasting impact in mathematics, economics and other social sciences. Thus, public relevance and intrascientific productivity can stimulate each other at crucial moments of history, but to ensure this would today demand a high degree of self-reflective research planning and design of disciplinary institutions informed by sociology of science and a solid understanding of the scientific field of security studies at large. Current stakes are high, and the possibilities of both fragmentation and a second golden age are real. * Ole Wæver is Professor of International Relations at the University of Copenhagen and Director of the Centre for Advanced Security Theory (CAST). Internationally, he is mostly known for coining the concept of securitization within security theory and

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