F A S T Update Early warning program India/Kashmir Semi-annual Risk Assessment June to November 2005 F T A S
India/Kashmir June to NovemberNovember 2005 Page 2 Contents Country Stability and Forceful Events (relative) 3 Forceful Government and Non-Government Events (relative) 4 Conflictive and Cooperative Domestic Events (average weighted) 5 Conflictive and Cooperative International Events (average weighted) 7 Appendix: Description of indicators used 8 The FAST International Early Warning Program 9 FAST Update Subscription: www.swisspeace.org/fast/subscription_form.asp Contact FAST International: Phone: +41 31 330 12 19 Fax: +41 31 330 12 13 mailto:fast@swisspeace.ch www.swisspeace.org/fast Country Expert: Dr. Bettina Robotka
India/Kashmir June to NovemberNovember 2005 Page 3 Country Stability and Forceful Events (relative) Average number of reported events per month: 241 Indicator description: see appendix Risk Assessment: Starting from July 2005, the Kashmir graph shows a steady improvement of the Country Stability indicator. In November, the curve almost reaches the level of the January 2005 peak. During the last six months, major initiatives were launched for a solution of the ongoing conflict in Indian held Kashmir. Accordingly, the Forceful Events curve depicts a steady decline during the same period, though in July a significant rise of the curve can be observed. The political situation in Kashmir has relaxed substantially during the period under review. The surprising outcome of the Indian elections in May and the change of government had at first led to certain pessimism about the attitude the new Indian government was likely to take towards Kashmir. Therefore, Pakistan s overtures and the maintenance of international pressure were especially significant. After the launching of the bus service between Srinagar and Muzaffarabad in April, the visit of a high ranking delegation of the All Parties Huriyat Conference (APHC) under the leadership of the moderate Mirwais Umar Faruq to Pakistan and Azad Kashmir in June was a landmark in the process of searching for a solution to the Kashmir conflict. For the first time the Kashmiris on the Pakistani side and the Pakistanis themselves were able to meet the Indian Kashmiri leaders and talk to them directly. This had a positive impact on the whole political process. Until that time, Pakistan was favoring the radical faction of the APHC under the lead of Syed Ali Gilani. Since the visit, Pakistani governmental support appears to have switched from Gilani to the Mirwais. However, parallel to these political developments, the level of violence in Indian held Kashmir remained rather high. The presence of the Indian army remained strong, and the militant Kashmiri groups reorganized their forces. So far, the Indian government has not changed its attitude substantially towards Kashmir in general and a Kashmir solution in particular. The trend towards an easing of tensions in Kashmir and the ongoing search for an acceptable solution for all three sides is likely to persist for the next months. However, the level of violence will mainly depend on the presence of the Indian army in Kashmir. Should India agree to the demilitarization proposal made by Pakistan, violence could be reduced considerably.
India/Kashmir June to NovemberNovember 2005 Page 4 Forceful Government and Non-Government Events (relative) Average number of reported events per month: 241 Indicator description: see appendix Risk Assessment: Changing political conditions and heavy losses on the side of the militants during the last months, which gave way to a re-grouping, are largely responsible for the fluctuations in Forceful Non- Government Events. Meanwhile, Forceful Government Events fell considerably in November, a trend that appears closely linked to the change in government in Indian held Kashmir. The main concern of the militants has been the high losses of men, especially on the commanding levels, which made it necessary to bring in new forces and re-arrange the structures. In August alone, several important commanders were killed alone in August. In June, 13 militants were killed within three days only. So the need to reorganize was quite strong. However, the temporary slowdown in violence does not reflect changing political positions of the militants. Regardless of the political developments, of which they were not part, militant leaders continue to insist on the independence of Kashmir. Thus, they have rejected any ceasefires offered so far. If sustainable peace in Kashmir is to be achieved, the militants will have to be included into the political process. This is neither an easy nor an impossible task. One possible way would be the reduction of Indian troops in Kashmir as proposed by Pakistan. The presence of the Indian army and their behavior towards the Kashmiri civilian population and the people in custody has been a continuous source of violence. Thus, troop reduction could be a step that might change the attitude of the militants. Another would include real progress in confidence building measures, such as an opening in the Line of Control. After the earthquake in October, militant organizations on the Pakistani side of Kashmir have reportedly done relief work amongst the Kashmiri population, reaching out to areas where the Pakistan army and NGOs came much later. This could be the beginning of a peaceful involvement of these forces in the reconstruction of Kashmir, and of their reintegration into the civil society. It is quite clear that militancy in Kashmir will not disappear in the near future without any real changes in the political landscape. Some ways for a possible reduction and re-integration of the militants into the political mainstream were indicated above. Even India (South Asia Intelligence Report of 26 th September) has acknowledged that Pakistan has begun to seriously withdraw its support for militants. Now it s the turn of the Indian government to prove sincerity in finding a Kashmir solution. A positive response of India to the demilitarization proposal of Pakistan for both Indian and Pakistani Kashmir would be major step.
India/Kashmir June to NovemberNovember 2005 Page 5 Conflictive and Cooperative Domestic Events (average weighted) Average number of reported events per month: 241 Indicator description: see appendix Risk Assessment: On a domestic level, Cooperative and Conflictive Events remained largely on their previous levels small fluctuations only. As before, the level of Conflictive Domestic Events remained twice as high as the Cooperative Domestic Events curve during the last six months. During the period under review, important developments have been taking place in Indian held Kashmir. On the positive side, the Indian government and the APHC returned to the negotiation table in September. The last round of negotiations had taken place under the previous government, and had remained without any substantial impact on the situation in Kashmir. The resumption of talks under the new government of Premier Minister Manmohan Singh in early September was welcomed as a positive sign in Kashmir. Moreover, by returning to talks with the Kashmiris, the APHC s initial demand of trilateral talks was finally met. A second positive development was a new round of talks between the Kashmiri leadership and the Kashmiri Pandits about a possible return to their ancestral places in July. As a follow-up to these talks in September, Brahmins celebrated one of their festivals in Kashmir for the first time in 15 years. The terrible earthquake on October 8, which hit Kashmir on both sides of the Line of Control, had several consequences. In November, 5 crossing points were symbolically opened in order to facilitate family reunions. The handling of the earthquake on the Indian side by the Kashmiri and Indian governments, however, has been met with a lot of criticism: they were delaying support to the victims, banned the entrance of international relief organizations to Kashmir and tried to play down the amount of destruction which was caused. The Indian president visited Kashmir in November, almost two months after the disaster. In the same month, a new Congress member Ghulam Nabi Azad (Indian National Congress) took over the Chief Ministership of Kashmir and promised to lighten the burden of the Kashmiri population. At the same time, several militant attacks have undermined law and order in Kashmir. Among these are the attacks on a cinema and the assassination of the education minister in October. Besides, the Indian army had to admit that some of their claims regarding killed militants were false and that the dead had been civilians. Furthermore, massive protests took place against the rising number of human rights abuses in Kashmir and, not least, the response of India to the demilitarization proposal of General Musharraf is still missing.
India/Kashmir June to NovemberNovember 2005 Page 6 India s flexibility and its ability to go beyond stated positions are crucial with regard to the solution of the Kashmir conflict. The new Congress government in Kashmir and the government in India will need some courage to make use of the new options, as outlined by President Musharraf. His demilitarization proposal as a first step and self-government as a further step could, if accepted by India, be a roadmap for further negotiations. The APHC under Mirwais Umar Faruq as well as other political groups in Kashmir have already indicated their approval for such a possibility.
India/Kashmir June to NovemberNovember 2005 Page 7 Conflictive and Cooperative International Events (average weighted) Average number of reported events per month: 241 Indicator description: see appendix Risk Assessment: During the period under review, the Cooperative International Events curve is only visible in October and November. The reason for this has to be sought in a temporary slowdown of the negotiation process that set in after the change of the Indian government. Since mid-september, after the meeting of President Musharraf and Prime Minister Manmohan Singh in New York, and in relation to the earthquake of October, International Cooperative Events became more prominent again. The peaks that mark International Conflictive Events in July and September are related to the re-activation of militant activities. The main observation with regard to the international context of the Kashmir conflict is that the international pressure on India and Pakistan for a solution continued. Since last year the EU parliament has taken an interest in the Kashmir conflict and followed up its initiatives with a conference conducted in Brussels in October, on which a reduction of Indian troops in Kashmir and tripartite talks were demanded. A planned visit of EU parliamentarians could not materialize due to the earthquake. Alike, the American interest in the region in general and a Kashmir solution in particular continued. In June, Pakistan s Foreign Minister Kasuri visited the US and held talks with Condoleezza Rice on possible Kashmir solutions. A two-day conference was held in Washington in July, discussing options for a solution of the Kashmir conflict. In September, the leader of the moderate faction of the APHC, Mirwais Umar Faruq met with General Musharraf in New York on verge of the UN conference, and a certain understanding regarding further procedures seems to have been achieved. Two main proposals were launched by Musharraf and supported by the Mirwais with regard to Kashmir: (1) a demilitarization of Indian held Kashmir and Azad Kashmir on the Pakistani side and (2) the establishment of selfgovernance as a possible solution, though without disclosing any details. India s response to both proposals is still pending. As a matter of fact, it has was noted during the meeting of Musharraf and Manmohan Singh in New York in September, that an independent Kashmir was neither in India s nor in Pakistan s interest. Therefore, a major change seems to have taken place in the attitude of the APHC and the Mirwais, the latter having confirmed that both proposals were launched with his approval. In November, a delegation of US members of Congress visited Kashmir and Delhi to further discuss the matter. The leader of the delegation, Dan Burton, assured Pakistan of full support for both proposals and declared the willingness of the US to play an active part in the search for an agreement. With the ongoing engagement of the international players in place, and the extension of a certain pressure on the negotiation process, some progress is likely to be achieved in the near future.
Appendix: Description of indicators used Page 8 Country Stability Conflictive International Events (Average Weighted) Cooperative International Events (Average Weighted) Conflictive Domestic Events (Average Weighted) Cooperative Domestic Events (Average Weighted) Forceful Events (Relative) Forceful Government Events (Relative) Forceful Events (Relative) The Country Stability index reflects three independent factors: (i) challenges by non-government actors to the state's monopoly of force; (ii) state repression; and (iii) violence entailing physical force against persons or property. The index is scaled between 0 and 1, where 1 means high and 0 low stability. Based on the IDEA cooperation-conflict scale: Average weight of Events (i) that have a negative value on the IDEA conflict-cooperation scale* and (ii) where at least one actor comes from outside the country. The Indicator has a range between -13 and 8. Based on the IDEA cooperation-conflict scale: Average weight of Events (i) that have a positive value on the IDEA conflict-cooperation scale* and (ii) where at least one actor comes from outside the country. The Indicator has a range between -13 and 8. Based on the IDEA cooperation-conflict scale: Average weight of Events (i) that have a negative value on the IDEA conflict-cooperation scale* and (ii) where all actors come from inside the country. The Indicator has a range between -13 and 8. Based on the IDEA cooperation-conflict scale: Average weight of Events (i) that have a positive value on the IDEA conflict-cooperation scale* and (ii) where all actors come from inside the country. The Indicator has a range between -13 and 8. Number of Events (i) that entail the use of physical force against persons or property and (ii) where at least one Initiator is a non-government actor divided by the number of all reported events. The Indicator has a range between 0 and 1. Number of Events (i) that entail the use of physical force against persons or property and (ii) where at least one Initiator is a government actor divided by the number of all reported events. The Indicator has a range between 0 and 1. Number of Events (i) that entail the use of physical force against persons or property divided by the number of all reported events. The Indicator has a range between 0 and 1.
The FAST International Early Warning Program Page 9 Who are we? FAST International is the early warning program of swisspeace, based in Bern, Switzerland. The program is funded and utilized by an international consortium of development agencies consisting of the Austrian Development Agency (ADA), Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA), Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (Sida), Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation (SDC), and the United States Agency for International Development (USAID). What do we want to achieve? FAST International aims at enhancing political decision makers and their offices ability to identify critical developments in a timely manner so that coherent political strategies can be formulated to either prevent or limit destructive effects of violent conflict or identify windows of opportunity for peacebuilding. How do we work? FAST International uses both qualitative and quantitative methods, with the combination of methods being determined in each case by customer needs. The centerpiece of FAST International is the collection of single cooperative and conflictive events by means of a web-based software, applied by local staff using a coding scheme called IDEA (Integrated Data for Event Analysis), which is based on the WEIS (World Interaction Survey) coding scheme. The monitoring by FAST International is done independently from Western media coverage, thus providing for a constant influx of information. This information is collected by FAST International s own Local Information Networks (LINs). The quantitative empirical analysis is based on composed indicators developed within the IDEA framework. Since even the most profound quantitative analysis requires interpretation, FAST International cooperates with renowned country/area experts. What are our products? FAST International offers different early warning products tailored to customer needs. The only standard product available to the general public is the FAST Update, which provides the reader with an overview of developments on a semi-annual basis. It consists of three to five tension barometers (graphs), displaying cooperative and conflictive developments, which are analyzed by FAST s country/area experts on the basis of specific indicators. Whenever major changes occur in one of the countries or regions under scrutiny, FAST releases Special Updates, which follow the structure of the regular FAST Updates. FAST Updates are available in either hard copy, in electronic form on the respective country page or by subscription. Which countries do we currently monitor? Africa: Asia: Europe: Angola, Burundi, DRC/Kivu region, Ethiopia, Madagascar, Mozambique, Rwanda, Somalia Afghanistan, India/Kashmir, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Nepal, Pakistan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan Georgia, Kosovo, Macedonia, Russian Federation/North Caucasus region