Refugees in Syria s Neighbours: Exploring Policy Responses

Middle East and North Africa Programme Workshop Summary Refugees in Syria s Neighbours: Exploring Policy Responses 4 December 2015 The views expressed in this document are the sole responsibility of the speaker(s) and participants, and do not necessarily reflect the view of Chatham House, its staff, associates or Council. Chatham House is independent and owes no allegiance to any government or to any political body. It does not take institutional positions on policy issues. This document is issued on the understanding that if any extract is used, the author(s)/speaker(s) and Chatham House should be credited, preferably with the date of the publication or details of the event. Where this document refers to or reports statements made by speakers at an event, every effort has been made to provide a fair representation of their views and opinions. The published text of speeches and presentations may differ from delivery. The Royal Institute of International Affairs, 2016. 10 St James s Square, London SW1Y 4LE T +44 (0)20 7957 5700 F +44 (0)20 7957 5710 www.chathamhouse.org Patron: Her Majesty The Queen Chairman: Stuart Popham QC Director: Dr Robin Niblett Charity Registration Number: 208223

2 Refugees in Syria s Neighbours: Exploring Policy Responses Introduction This is a summary of a workshop hosted in London by the Chatham House Middle East and North Africa (MENA) Programme on 4 December 2015, focusing on the challenges in supporting refugees and host communities in Syria s neighbours. The workshop convened representatives from European governments, multilateral organizations, civil society and experts from Syria, Jordan, Lebanon and Turkey, as well as academics and practitioners from international organizations and institutes. Although time constraints did not allow for a discussion of the drivers of displacement from Syria, a number of participants emphasized that a long-term solution to the refugee crisis will not be achieved without an end to the conflict in Syria. The meeting was held under the Chatham House Rule, 1 and the views expressed are those of the participants. This summary is intended to serve as an aide-memoire for those who took part, and to provide a general summary of discussions for those who did not. Key points that emerged from the discussion were: Flows of refugees attempting to reach Europe are likely to continue. A survey conducted in October 2015 found that 25 per cent of Syrian refugees in Jordan were planning to go to Europe and were making preparations for the journey. The conditions and loss of hope that have been motivating Syrians to leave Turkey and Lebanon for Europe have not changed for the better. Donors and international organizations should be more open to working with informal institutions and actors. This is an essential part of having a sustainable response, and can mean that things get done more quickly. However, it remains very difficult for Western governments to work with such arrangements because governments are required to account to their taxpayers for all money spent. The EU could play a positive role by leading the formation of a global compact with Syria s neighbours, which would present these countries with the offer of a deal in exchange for their facilitating a move towards more sustainable solutions for refugees. In some ways this would extend the recent EU Turkey deal to Lebanon and Jordan, but an international compact with Syria s neighbours should come from beyond just the EU. In Jordan there have been positive indications of a shift in some policy-makers attitudes concerning labour rights for Syrians. Livelihoods solutions for Syrians must have the maximum positive impact for host country nationals. These solutions should be targeted at existing skills gaps in the labour market (which are currently difficult to determine because of a lack of data). Turkey and Jordan were highlighted in terms of the political difficulty in receiving permission to collect data on refugees and their impact, even if a request to do so is put in by donor governments. This lack of data prevents the neighbouring countries from being able to capitalize on refugees skills; limits the ability of donors and organizations to conduct needs assessments, measure progress and understand failures; and prevents analysts from understanding the nuances of the political and social response to refugees. In both Turkey and Lebanon many male refugees are either going on to Europe or returning to fight in Syria, leaving behind a refugee population of mainly women and children. This has the potential to have a long-term impact on the social dynamics of the Syrian refugee population, as well as on future Syrian society. The way the refugee crisis and response are framed has a significant impact for actors working on the ground. Short-term approaches are inadequate because of the protracted nature of the crisis, but long-term approaches can lead to less flexible funding and trigger political backlash from host countries. 1 When a meeting, or part thereof, is held under the Chatham House Rule, participants are free to use the information received, but neither the identity nor the affiliation of the speaker(s), nor that of any other participant, may be revealed.

3 Refugees in Syria s Neighbours: Exploring Policy Responses Drivers of flows to Europe: Syrian refugees loss of hope; and the stress on Syria s neighbours After almost five years of conflict, Syrian refugees who have left neighbouring countries, or who plan to do so, have reached a point of despair; they believe they can restore lost hope by going to Europe. They are becoming poorer, partly because the World Food Programme (WFP) has repeatedly run out of funding for assistance. Furthermore, it has become increasingly difficult for refugees to attain legal residency in the countries neighbouring Syria. Some refugees are returning temporarily to Syria in order to sell their property to raise money to travel to Europe. Participants considered that the governments of Syria s neighbours have mixed intentions: they want to avoid a humanitarian and security crisis linked to the refugees, but they do not want to facilitate conditions that could incentivize refugees to stay for the long term. A scarcity of aid funding is also lowering these governments political willingness to facilitate support for refugees. Lebanon Participants gave a bleak picture of the refugee flows from Lebanon to Europe, which sometimes occur via Turkey and even Syria. One participant spoke of how a Lebanese war economy has developed that includes human-trafficking, with some refugees reported to have sold organs in order to raise funds to leave the country. Another mentioned unconfirmed reports that the actors facilitating refugees journeys to Europe may include Hezbollah and the Lebanese government in coordination with offices in Damascus. The overall situation for refugees remaining in Lebanon, as for other poor populations, is becoming worse. Aid recipients, including Syrians, Lebanese, Palestinians and Iraqis, feel that assistance is not being evenly distributed, a participant said. NGOs assisting these populations are very frustrated with donor constraints, lack of coordination and the unsustainability of projects. Furthermore, there is a demographic shift in terms of the population of male Syrian refugees: they are either being killed fighting in Syria, arrested by Lebanese security forces or escaping to Europe. Meanwhile, more women, particularly the elderly, are returning to Syria because of the high costs and insufficient resources in Lebanon. Some participants emphasized the positive side of Syrian Lebanese social relations in order to explain why Lebanon has not collapsed despite the impact of the Syrian war. At the local level, there is largely peaceful coexistence, one participant argued. Research by a Lebanese NGO has demonstrated that grievances between the two communities are less likely to be framed in racist terms. This is partly due to the fact that many Syrian refugees moved into areas in Lebanon where they had preexisting social networks. Lebanon has also benefited at a national level from the refugee influx: as many as 80 per cent of Syrians are renting property, one participant noted. Even though the property is substandard, this has injected billions of dollars into the property market, and most of this money has come from international donors and other organizations. The same research demonstrates that Lebanese grievances about Syrian refugees are more likely to be socio-economic. Such grievances predate the Syrian crisis, one participant argued, and stem from the fact that since the civil war the Lebanese state has placed little emphasis on service provision to its citizens. In the context of the Syrian war, socio-economic grievances have become magnified in Lebanon because of the war s consequences for Lebanese security, tourism and markets, rather than because of the refugees. Others pointed to the negative dimension of Syrian Lebanese social relations. Most Syrians have settled in the most impoverished parts of Lebanon; one participant noted that 86 per cent of Syrians have moved to areas where 66 per cent of the most deprived Lebanese live. Participants also argued that Syrians come under negative scrutiny by Lebanese authorities. One referenced a survey in which most Lebanese respondents agreed that Syrians are victims of crime, adding that the treatment of Syrians by Lebanese authorities tends to be better in areas where those authorities are accustomed to dealing with Palestinian refugees. Another responded that unfair treatment by Lebanese authorities is not a problem exclusively facing Syrians, and that the Lebanese state targets poor Lebanese as well. It was also mentioned that, in the long term, sectarian tensions that are currently relatively contained could increase as the number of Syrians in Lebanon grows and international aid falls.

4 Refugees in Syria s Neighbours: Exploring Policy Responses Turkey More and more Syrian refugees have been leaving for Europe from or via Turkey. Although Turkey is the only one of Syria s neighbours to have passed a refugee law, the 2014 Temporary Protection Regulation applying to Syrians does not give them the right to submit individual applications for asylum in Turkey, according to one participant. This has contributed to Syrians seeking asylum in Europe instead. Another stated that although the refugee camps (temporary protection centres) in Turkey are known for their relatively high quality, the conditions in camps are not conducive to longterm occupancy, and only around 20 percent of Syrians live in these camps. There is also a demographic shift among Syrian refugees in Turkey: with many men leaving for Europe or returning to fight in Syria, a high proportion of the refugees remaining in the country perhaps up to 80 per cent are women and children, one participant noted. In a survey of women Syrian refugees in Turkey, according to one participant, all respondents said that they would not move their family to a third country if education and healthcare were provided in Turkey. Participants argued that there has not been much progress in integrating Syrian children into Turkish schools; education for Syrians is often of low quality, or is of a very conservative nature with which many Syrians do not agree. Future trends for Syrian refugees in Turkey are uncertain: there are some positive indicators but also reasons for concern. Some participants stated that the EU Turkey joint action plan could provide some improvement in the situation of Syrians provided enough pressure is put on the Turkish government to implement the plan. Such pressure is likely to come from Syrian refugees themselves. Obstacles to the plan s implementation are more organizational than financial, it was argued. Moreover, there has not been much progress in issuing work permits to Syrians. One participant noted that international banks will be unable to deploy meaningful levels of financing for Turkey s refugee response until greater numbers of Syrians are able to access work permits. In the view of some participants, the consolidation of President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan s position at the November 2015 legislative elections will create opportunities for Syrian refugees, given that the government s generally pro-refugees policies are unlikely to change for the remainder of his term of office. However, Turkey will also continue to be faced with challenges arising from events in the region: refugees, including non-syrians, are still arriving in Turkey from Lebanon and Iraq. A deteriorating security situation in Syria will present challenges for Turkey, although the wall being built on its eastern border to cut off access to Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) could impede refugee flows. Russian sanctions on Turkey could also have a negative impact on the economy, which will have implications for the welfare of refugees and for the political environment regarding their status. Jordan The discussion concerning Jordan focused mainly on Syrian livelihoods in Jordan and is therefore covered in the relevant section below. Participants otherwise emphasized the growing trend of Syrian refugees leaving Jordan. According to one participant, Syrians in Jordan are looking for more sustainable solutions that the country does not currently provide. A survey conducted in October 2015 found that 25 per cent of Syrian refugees in Jordan plan to travel to Europe and are making preparations for the journey. Another participant noted that refugees leaving for Europe are being required to sign a statement that they will not return to Jordan. There are also returns to Syria, primarily departures from Zaatari camp for villages or opposition-controlled areas in Deraa in southern Syria. How European countries could improve the situation for Syrian refugees in the region Resettlement Since the focus of the workshop was the situation in Syria s neighbours, discussions touched only briefly on resettlement in Europe. It was generally agreed that Europe will need to do more to share the responsibility of hosting refugees if it intends to request that Syria s neighbouring countries do

5 Refugees in Syria s Neighbours: Exploring Policy Responses more to improve the situation for refugees still in the region. One participant noted the challenges facing European countries in being able to house Syrian refugees adequately, and argued that there is a need to manage the expectations among those making the journey of what conditions will be like for them when they arrive. Others said that it will not be possible to manage refugees expectations, especially not via newspaper advertisements. Smugglers have made a great investment in creating an image of a European paradise in order to incentivize refugees to make the journey. One participant offered a more positive assessment of the EU response to the refugee influx: although the response has been slow to get started and the numbers are very small, a legal precedent for this action has now been established and recognized by all member states, he argued. Mobilizing additional funds A number of participants with significant experience in European governments agreed that a much greater level of funding for refugees in Syria s neighbours could be made available if there were the political will to do so. One made the case that it is public opinion that is likely to change European policy-makers attitudes about how much funding to give, and therefore there needs to be greater engagement with the public concerning the negative effects in Syria s neighbours of downsizing humanitarian aid. It will also be necessary to convince European citizens that Syria has become a more protracted conflict in order to alter the level of the response for refugees, in the view of one participant. Being more flexible and innovative about funding It was generally agreed that donors and international organizations should be more open to working with informal institutions and actors. This is an essential part of having a sustainable response, and can mean that things get done more quickly. However, it is usually not the case that the international community is willing to work with informal institutions. For example, one participant with experience in Lebanon said that UNRWA 2 is now focusing more on the Lebanese state and withdrawing from the role the agency previously played in providing services to Palestinians there. One participant with significant experience in a European government agreed that informal arrangements have been very beneficial in countries like Lebanon, but he emphasized that it is very difficult for Western governments to work with such arrangements because governments are required to account to their taxpayers for all money spent. Many potentially beneficial projects do not get approved because of bureaucratic obstacles like these, he added. It was agreed that donors must bridge the divide between humanitarian and development funding, although some emphasized the political challenges in doing so. The Resilience Development Forum, convened by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) in Jordan in November 2015, committed to this principle, 3 and workshop participants emphasized the importance of implementation. Many participants focused on the need to transition to longer-term funding both for refugees and to mitigate the impact on Syria s neighbours, including in areas such as Beirut not traditionally seen as vulnerable. However, one participant with experience working with Syrian civil society in Lebanon argued that funding must above all be flexible: too great a share of current funding focuses on long-term development, which is not always useful given the constantly changing situation on the ground. Another participant made the case that the development response linked to refugees has to be framed as medium term rather than long term because the political sensitivities emerging from the Palestinian experience lead many locals to fear that Syrians could stay in the neighbouring countries for the long term. A number of participants considered that donors and international organizations should engage more with the private sector in order to find innovative ways of supporting refugees. One argued that the private sector is way ahead of international agencies in working with refugees. According to another, micro-financing for displaced people the majority of whom do not have access to loans could potentially be a huge market; the World Bank and other financial institutions that are beginning to think about longer-term financing for the Syrian refugee crisis should be considering giving money to displaced people directly, rather than to the countries they are in. There is one organization in 2 The United Nations Relief Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East. 3 The text of the Dead Sea Resilience Agenda, adopted by the forum, is available at: http://www.undp.org/content/dam/rbas/doc/syriaresponse/rdf/deadsearesilience%20agenda_05nov2015.pdf.

6 Refugees in Syria s Neighbours: Exploring Policy Responses Lebanon that is providing loans to displaced people, but globally this is a rare occurrence. One participant noted that there are political barriers to this kind of solution; banks in Gaziantep, for example, do not currently allow anyone who is not Turkish to open an account. Promoting a global compact with Syria s neighbours One participant with significant experience in a European government suggested that the EU can play a positive role by leading the formation of a global compact with Syria s neighbours, involving all affected actors. Such a compact, taking into account the legitimate concerns of the governments of these countries, would present Syria s neighbours with the offer of a deal in exchange for their facilitating more sustainable solutions for refugees. This would in some ways extend the recent EU Turkey deal to Lebanon and Jordan, but participants agreed that any compact should include more than just the EU on the international side and bring in funding from global sources. This is partly because trust in the EU in the Middle East is low, and partly because certain EU member states would be more reluctant to engage in this type of initiative. One participant noted that displacement is a very sensitive issue even at a global level: for example, lack of agreement meant that the language of displacement had to be taken out of the draft Sustainable Development Goals. A number of participants from European governments noted that taking a regional approach to Syrian refugees presents its own set of challenges. One argued that the situation in the region demands disaggregated policies at the national, local and municipal levels. The political implications of certain policies are different in each country, and this is another barrier to change. How Syria s neighbours could improve the situation for Syrian refugees Opening up opportunities for Syrians to work legally The discussion concerning Syrian livelihoods focused primarily on Jordan, where recent positive developments could lead to a significant improvement in labour rights for Syrians provided the right solutions are found and sufficient political leverage is engaged. Hitherto, the public and political narrative about Syrians in Jordan has been quite negative, and this has been one of the principal barriers to improving Syrians access to work. In the view of one participant, this has to some extent been a deliberate stance for the Jordanian government: refugees are an easy scapegoat for high prices and other economic troubles facing the country, and the blame for such problems, which had been levelled at the government during the Arab Spring, has now shifted to the refugees. Now, anyone attempting to present a positive portrayal of Syrian refugee issues immediately comes under attack. For a period, there were some obvious local benefits in the form of jobs that became available for Jordanians to work with aid organizations, but these opportunities have run out and no longer have a positive effect on Jordanians perceptions of refugees. It could be possible to change the public s perceptions about Syrians, but the change has to occur first at the government level. Such change might already be starting to take place. According to one participant, the government in Jordan has now implemented certain reforms, and this has calmed the overall political environment and caused some of the negative rhetoric about refugees to subside. In recent months a Jordanian minister (as well as one from Lebanon) spoke publicly in favour of increasing Syrians access to work; and latterly some high-level individuals in the Jordanian government responded positively to an NGO report calling for the same. One participant said that the government would like to allow Syrians to apply for work permits in the four sectors that are currently open to migrant labourers, provided Jordan receives bilateral support in return. The Jordanian parliament is the main opponent of this, and is not yet willing to work with other government institutions on livelihood responses for Syrians. It was noted that obtaining political backing from the interior ministry will also be crucial. Participants considered that the Jordanian security sector, which research has found is one of the most trusted institutions in the country, should in theory be a strong supporter of Syrian livelihoods given the likely positive impact on security. Participants emphasized that livelihoods solutions for Syrians must have the maximum positive impact for Jordanians. These solutions should be targeted at existing skills gaps in the labour market

7 Refugees in Syria s Neighbours: Exploring Policy Responses (which are currently difficult to determine because of a lack of data). Livelihoods interventions must also maintain the demographic economic balance in Jordan and not undermine the monarchy, one participant argued. Participants noted an existing recommendation to create jobs for Syrian refugees from Zaatari camp in factories in nearby Qualified Industrial Zones. Others argued that the international community should support jobs for Syrians in the informal sector, in which the vast majority of Syrians are currently working. A participant also argued that temporary work schemes beyond the region, such as in Europe, should be considered for Syrian refugees living in Syria s neighbours. Amending the legal status of refugees One of the primary drivers of Syrian refugee flows to Europe has been that they do not have sufficient legal status in Syria s neighbours. Jordan and Lebanon are not signatories to the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, and Turkey places a geographic limitation granting asylum only to refugees coming from Europe. One participant argued that the office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) does not accept Turkey as a safe return country for Syrians because they are not able to apply for individual asylum. Another participant argued that the EU has been in dialogue with Turkey for a long time to lift its geographic limitation, but Turkey has been delaying any action in order to retain a bargaining chip. This lack of legal status not only impacts refugees access to work as discussed above, but can also bar access to other state and financial services. Changing the approach to data and regulation The scarcity of data on Syrian refugees and what kind of impact they are having on Syria s neighbours was mentioned repeatedly. Turkey and Jordan were highlighted in terms of the political difficulty of receiving permission to collect such data, even if the request to do so is submitted by donor governments. Lack of data prevents Syria s neighbours being able to capitalize on refugees skills; limits the ability of donors and organizations to conduct assessments of needs, to measure progress and to understand failures; and prevents analysts from understanding the nuances of the political and social response to refugees such as whether East Banker and West Banker attitudes concerning Syrians in Jordan differ. One participant made the case that there may be a need to cooperate with Syrian authorities in order to collect some types of data. Participants also argued that in certain areas, less regulation from the governments of Syria s neighbours would be beneficial and help the response be more effective. One referred to a study on the humanitarian response to Hurricane Katrina, which found that reducing the amount of government regulation can allow for the development of improved assistance by means of market mechanisms. Informal networks can at times also provide funding for services such as education, in addition to resources from the state.

8 Refugees in Syria s Neighbours: Exploring Policy Responses The Syria and its Neighbours Policy Initiative Chatham House s Syria and its Neighbours Policy Initiative is a multi-year research and convening project that aims to support a coordinated and holistic policy response to the conflict in Syria and its long-term regional implications, with a particular focus on the country s immediate neighbours. http://www.chathamhouse.org/syriaandneighbours About the MENA Programme at Chatham House The Middle East and North Africa (MENA) Programme undertakes high-profile research and projects on political, economic and security issues affecting the Middle East and North Africa. To complement our research, the MENA Programme runs a variety of discussion groups, roundtable meetings, workshops and public events which seek to inform and broaden current debates about the region and about UK and international policy. We also produce a range of publicly available reports, books and papers. http://www.chathamhouse.org/mena