Section Voting Methods. Copyright 2013, 2010, 2007, Pearson, Education, Inc.

Similar documents
Section Voting Methods. Copyright 2013, 2010, 2007, Pearson, Education, Inc.

Section Voting Methods. Copyright 2013, 2010, 2007, Pearson, Education, Inc.

Arrow s Impossibility Theorem

The Impossibilities of Voting

12.2 Defects in Voting Methods

1.6 Arrow s Impossibility Theorem

The Mathematics of Voting. The Mathematics of Voting

Voting Criteria: Majority Criterion Condorcet Criterion Monotonicity Criterion Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives Criterion

Fairness Criteria. Review: Election Methods

Fairness Criteria. Majority Criterion: If a candidate receives a majority of the first place votes, that candidate should win the election.

Write all responses on separate paper. Use complete sentences, charts and diagrams, as appropriate.

Chapter 1 Practice Test Questions

Sect 13.2 Flaws of Voting Methods

Head-to-Head Winner. To decide if a Head-to-Head winner exists: Every candidate is matched on a one-on-one basis with every other candidate.

Today s plan: Section : Plurality with Elimination Method and a second Fairness Criterion: The Monotocity Criterion.

Social Choice: The Impossible Dream. Check off these skills when you feel that you have mastered them.

Math116Chap1VotingPart2.notebook January 12, Part II. Other Methods of Voting and Other "Fairness Criteria"

Voting: Issues, Problems, and Systems, Continued

The Mathematics of Voting

Section 3: The Borda Count Method. Example 4: Using the preference schedule from Example 3, identify the Borda candidate.

Make the Math Club Great Again! The Mathematics of Democratic Voting

Elections with Only 2 Alternatives

Measuring Fairness. Paul Koester () MA 111, Voting Theory September 7, / 25

Chapter 9: Social Choice: The Impossible Dream Lesson Plan

Voting: Issues, Problems, and Systems, Continued. Voting II 1/27

Introduction: The Mathematics of Voting

Intro to Contemporary Math

Exercises For DATA AND DECISIONS. Part I Voting

Desirable properties of social choice procedures. We now outline a number of properties that are desirable for these social choice procedures:

The Mathematics of Voting

MULTIPLE CHOICE. Choose the one alternative that best completes the statement or answers the question.

In this lecture we will cover the following voting methods and fairness criterion.

Recall: Properties of ranking rules. Recall: Properties of ranking rules. Kenneth Arrow. Recall: Properties of ranking rules. Strategically vulnerable

Mathematical Thinking. Chapter 9 Voting Systems

The Mathematics of Elections

Voting Definitions and Theorems Spring Dr. Martin Montgomery Office: POT 761

Syllabus update: Now keeping best 3 of 4 tests

9.3 Other Voting Systems for Three or More Candidates

Voting Criteria April

The search for a perfect voting system. MATH 105: Contemporary Mathematics. University of Louisville. October 31, 2017

Practice TEST: Chapter 14

n(n 1) 2 C = total population total number of seats amount of increase original amount

The actual midterm will probably not be multiple choice. You should also study your notes, the textbook, and the homework.

Grade 6 Math Circles Winter February 27/28 The Mathematics of Voting - Solutions

Chapter 10. The Manipulability of Voting Systems. For All Practical Purposes: Effective Teaching. Chapter Briefing

Voting rules: (Dixit and Skeath, ch 14) Recall parkland provision decision:

Many Social Choice Rules

answers to some of the sample exercises : Public Choice

In deciding upon a winner, there is always one main goal: to reflect the preferences of the people in the most fair way possible.

Math for Liberal Arts MAT 110: Chapter 12 Notes

Social welfare functions

SOCIAL CHOICES (Voting Methods) THE PROBLEM. Social Choice and Voting. Terminologies

Grade 7/8 Math Circles Winter March 6/7/8 The Mathematics of Voting

(67686) Mathematical Foundations of AI June 18, Lecture 6

Name Date I. Consider the preference schedule in an election with 5 candidates.

The Manipulability of Voting Systems. Check off these skills when you feel that you have mastered them.

(c) 2013 Janice L. Epstein Voting Methods 1

Josh Engwer (TTU) Voting Methods 15 July / 49

Economics 470 Some Notes on Simple Alternatives to Majority Rule

Social Choice & Mechanism Design

: It is mathematically impossible for a democratic voting method to satisfy all of the fairness criteria was proven in 1949.

Majority- more than half of the votes Plurality- the most first place votes. The Majority Criterion

Math for Liberal Studies

Voting Methods

MATH4999 Capstone Projects in Mathematics and Economics Topic 3 Voting methods and social choice theory

VOTING SYSTEMS AND ARROW S THEOREM

2-Candidate Voting Method: Majority Rule

Presidential Election Democrat Grover Cleveland versus Benjamin Harrison. ************************************ Difference of 100,456

How should we count the votes?

Homework 7 Answers PS 30 November 2013

Notes for Session 7 Basic Voting Theory and Arrow s Theorem

Public Choice. Slide 1

Computational Social Choice: Spring 2007

Section 7.1: Voting Systems. Plurality Method The candidate who receives the greatest number of votes is the winner.

Rock the Vote or Vote The Rock

In deciding upon a winner, there is always one main goal: to reflect the preferences of the people in the most fair way possible.

Mathematics and Social Choice Theory. Topic 4 Voting methods with more than 2 alternatives. 4.1 Social choice procedures

Voting Lecture 3: 2-Candidate Voting Spring Morgan Schreffler Office: POT Teaching.

Chapter 9: Social Choice: The Impossible Dream Lesson Plan

MATH 1340 Mathematics & Politics

Voting: Issues, Problems, and Systems. Voting I 1/36

Mathematics of Voting Systems. Tanya Leise Mathematics & Statistics Amherst College

Voting Protocols. Introduction. Social choice: preference aggregation Our settings. Voting protocols are examples of social choice mechanisms

Voting and Markov Processes

that changes needed to be made when electing their Presidential nominee. Iowa, at the time had a

Introduction to Theory of Voting. Chapter 2 of Computational Social Choice by William Zwicker

The Math of Rational Choice - Math 100 Spring 2015

Simple methods for single winner elections

The Plurality and Borda Count Methods

1.1 The Basic Elements of an Election 1.2 The Plurality Method

CS 886: Multiagent Systems. Fall 2016 Kate Larson

Main idea: Voting systems matter.

Math for Liberal Studies

The Plurality and Borda Count Methods

The mathematics of voting, power, and sharing Part 1

Social Choice. CSC304 Lecture 21 November 28, Allan Borodin Adapted from Craig Boutilier s slides

Voting Systems. High School Circle I. June 4, 2017

Math Circle Voting Methods Practice. March 31, 2013

Lecture 11. Voting. Outline

CSC304 Lecture 16. Voting 3: Axiomatic, Statistical, and Utilitarian Approaches to Voting. CSC304 - Nisarg Shah 1

Transcription:

Section 15.1 Voting Methods

What You Will Learn Plurality Method Borda Count Method Plurality with Elimination Pairwise Comparison Method Tie Breaking 15.1-2

Example 2: Voting for the Honor Society President Four students are running for president of the Honor Society: Antoine (A), Betty (B), Camille (C), and Don (D). The club members were asked to rank all candidates. The resulting preference table for this election is given in the table on the next slide. 15.1-3

Example 2: Voting for the Honor Society President 15.1-4

Example 2: Voting for the Honor Society President a) How many students voted in the election? b) How many students selected the candidates in this order: C, A, D, B? c) How many students selected A as their first choice? 15.1-5

Example 2: Voting for the Honor Society President Solution a) Add numbers in row labeled Number of Votes 19 + 15 + 11 + 7 + 2 = 54 15.1-6

Example 2: Voting for the Honor Society President Solution b) From the 2 nd column, 15 voted in the given order. 15.1-7

Example 2: Voting for the Honor Society President Solution c) Read across row that says First, find C, and read number above it. Add those: 15 + 2 = 17. 15.1-8

Plurality Method This is the most commonly used method, and it is the easiest method to use when there are more than two candidates. Each voter votes for one candidate. The candidate receiving the most votes is declared the winner. 15.1-9

Example 4: Electing the Honor Society President by the Plurality Method Consider the Honor Society election given in Example 2. Who is elected president using the plurality method? 15.1-10

Example 4: Electing the Honor Society President by the Plurality Method Solution Antoine: 7; Betty: 19; Don: 11; Camille: 15 + 2 = 17 Betty is elected president. She received 19/54 = 35% of the 1 st place votes; not a majority. 15.1-11

Borda Count Method Voters rank candidates from the most favorable to the least favorable. Each last-place vote is awarded one point, each next-to-last-place vote is awarded two points, each third-fromlast-place vote is awarded three points, and so forth. The candidate receiving the most points is the winner of the election. 15.1-12

Example 6: Electing the Honor Society President Using the Borda Count Method Use the Borda count method to determine the winner of the election for president of the Honor Society discussed in Example 2. Recall that the candidates are Antoine (A), Betty (B), Camille (C), and Don (D). For convenience, the preference table is reproduced on the next slide. 15.1-13

Example 6: Electing the Honor Society President Using the Borda Count Method 1 st place worth 4, 2 nd place worth 3, 3 rd place worth 2, 4 th place worth 1 15.1-14

Example 6: Electing the Honor Society President Using the Borda Count Method Solution Antoine: 7-1 st ; 7 4 = 28 34-2 nd ; 34 3 = 102 13-3 rd ; 13 2 = 26 Total 156 15.1-15

Example 6: Electing the Honor Society President Using the Borda Count Method Solution Betty: 19-1 st ; 19 4 = 76 35-4 th ; 35 1 = 35 Total 111 15.1-16

Example 6: Electing the Honor Society President Using the Borda Count Method Solution Camille: 17-1 st ; 17 4 = 68 11-2 nd ; 11 3 = 33 26-3 rd ; 26 2 = 52 Total 153 15.1-17

Example 6: Electing the Honor Society President Using the Borda Count Method Solution Don: 11-1 st ; 11 4 = 44 9-2 nd ; 9 3 = 27 15-3 rd ; 15 2 = 30 19-3 rd ; 19 1 = 19 Total 120 15.1-18

Example 6: Electing the Honor Society President Using the Borda Count Method Solution Antoine, with 156 points, receives the most points using the Borda count method and is declared the winner. 15.1-19

Plurality with Elimination Each voter votes for one candidate. If a candidate receives a majority of votes, that candidate is declared the winner. 15.1-20

Plurality with Elimination If no candidate receives a majority, eliminate the candidate with the fewest votes and hold another election. (If there is a tie for the fewest votes, eliminate all candidates tied for the fewest votes.) Repeat this process until a candidate receives a majority. 15.1-21

Example 8: Electing the Honor Society President Using the Plurality with Elimination Method Use the plurality with elimination method to determine the winner of the election for president of the Honor Society from Example 2. The preference table is shown on the next slide. Recall that A represents Antoine, B represents Betty, C represents Camille, and D represents Don. 15.1-22

Example 8: Electing the Honor Society President Using the Plurality with Elimination Method 15.1-23

Example 8: Electing the Honor Society President Using the Plurality with Elimination Method Solution 1 st place votes: Antoine: 7, Betty:19, Camille: 17, Don: 11 15.1-24

Example 8: Electing the Honor Society President Using the Plurality with Elimination Method Solution Total of 54 votes. No one has majority. Antoine is eliminated. We assume all voters rank their preferences the same. Column 1, 19 voters ranked the four as B, A, C, D; now it is B, C, D. Column 2 was C, A, D, B; now it is C, D, B. 15.1-25

Example 8: Electing the Honor Society President Using the Plurality with Elimination Method Solution Column 3 was D, C, A, B; now it is D, C, B. Column 4 was A, D, C, B; now it is D, C, B. Column 5 was C, D, A, B; now it is C, D, B. 15.1-26

Example 8: Electing the Honor Society President Using the Plurality with Elimination Method Solution The new preference table is: 15.1-27

Example 8: Electing the Honor Society President Using the Plurality with Elimination Method Solution 1 st place votes: Betty: 19, Camille: 17, Don: 18 15.1-28

Example 8: Electing the Honor Society President Using the Plurality with Elimination Method Solution No one has majority. Camille is eliminated. New preference table is: 15.1-29

Example 8: Electing the Honor Society President Using the Plurality with Elimination Method Solution 1 st place votes: Betty: 19, Don: 35 15.1-30

Example 8: Electing the Honor Society President Using the Plurality with Elimination Method Solution Don has a majority of first-place votes and is declared the winner using the plurality with elimination method. 15.1-31

Pairwise Comparison Method Voters rank the candidates. A series of comparisons in which each candidate is compared with each of the other candidates follows. If candidate A is preferred to candidate B, A receives one point. If candidate B is preferred to candidate A, B receives 1 point. If the candidates tie, each receives ½ point. 15.1-32

Pairwise Comparison Method After making all comparisons among the candidates, the candidate receiving the most points is declared the winner. 15.1-33

Number of Comparison The number of comparisons, c, needed when using the pairwise comparison method when there are n candidates is c n(n 1) 2 15.1-34

Example 10: Electing the Honor Society President Using the Pairwise Comparison Method Use the pairwise comparison method to determine the winner of the election for president of the Honor Society that was originally discussed in Example 2. 15.1-35

Example 10: Electing the Honor Society President Using the Pairwise Comparison Method Solution Antoine, Betty, Camille, Don 15.1-36

Example 10: Electing the Honor Society President Using the Pairwise Comparison Method Solution 4 candidates, n = 4, the number of comparisons needed is n n 1 c 4 3 6 2 2 The 6 comparisons are A versus B, A versus C, A versus D, B versus C, B versus D, and C versus D. 15.1-37

Example 10: Electing the Honor Society President Using the Pairwise Comparison Method Solution 1. The pairwise comparison of Antoine versus Betty is Antoine: 15 + 11 + 7 + 2 = 35 votes Betty: 19 votes Antoine wins this comparison and is awarded 1 point. 15.1-38

Example 10: Electing the Honor Society President Using the Pairwise Comparison Method Solution 2. The pairwise comparison of Antoine versus Camille is Antoine: 19 + 7 = 26 votes Camille: 15 + 11 + 2 = 28 votes Camille wins this comparison and is awarded 1 point. 15.1-39

Example 10: Electing the Honor Society President Using the Pairwise Comparison Method Solution 3. The pairwise comparison of Antoine versus Don is Antoine: 19 + 15 + 7 = 41 votes Don: 11 + 2 = 13 votes Antoine wins this comparison and is awarded a second point. 15.1-40

Example 10: Electing the Honor Society President Using the Pairwise Comparison Method Solution 4. The pairwise comparison of Betty versus Camille is Betty: 19 votes Camille: 15 + 11 + 7 + 2 = 35 votes Camille wins this comparison and is awarded a second point. 15.1-41

Example 10: Electing the Honor Society President Using the Pairwise Comparison Method Solution 5. The pairwise comparison of Betty versus Don is Betty: 19 votes Don: 15 + 11 + 7 + 2 = 35 votes Don wins this comparison and is awarded 1 point. 15.1-42

Example 10: Electing the Honor Society President Using the Pairwise Comparison Method Solution 6. The pairwise comparison of Camille versus Don is Camille: 19 + 15 + 2 = 36 votes Don: 11 + 7 = 18 votes Camille wins this comparison and is awarded a third point. 15.1-43

Example 10: Electing the Honor Society President Using the Pairwise Comparison Method Solution Antoine received 2 points, Betty received 0 points, Camille received 3 points, and Don received 1 point. Since Camille received 3 points, the most points from the pairwise comparison method, Camille wins the election. 15.1-44

Tie Breaking Breaking a tie can be achieved by either making an arbitrary choice, such as flipping a coin, or by bringing in an additional voter. Robert s Rule of Order: president of group votes only to break a tie or create a tie. Borda method: could choose person with most 1 st place votes. 15.1-45

Tie Breaking Pairwise comparison method: could choose the winner of a one-to-one comparison between the two candidates involved in the tie. Different tie-breaking methods could produce different winners. To remain fair, the method should be chosen in advance. 15.1-46

Section 15.2 Flaws of Voting

What You Will Learn Fairness Criteria Majority Criterion Head-to-Head Criterion Monotonicity Criterion Irrelevant Alternative Criterion 15.2-48

Fairness Criteria Mathematicians and political scientists have agreed that a voting method should meet the following four criteria in order for the voting method to be considered fair. Majority Criterion Head-to-head Criterion Monotonicity Criterion Irrelevant Alternatives Criterion 15.2-49

Majority Criterion If a candidate receives a majority (more than 50%) of the first-place votes, that candidate should be declared the winner. 15.2-50

Head-to-Head Criterion If a candidate is favored when compared head-to-head with every other candidate, that candidate should be declared the winner. 15.2-51

Monotonicity Criterion A candidate who wins a first election and then gains additional support without losing any of the original support should also win a second election. 15.2-52

Irrelevant Alternatives Criterion If a candidate is declared the winner of an election and in a second election one or more of the other candidates is removed, the previous winner should still be declared the winner. 15.2-53

Summary of the Voting Methods and Whether They Satisfy the Fairness Criteria Criteria Method Plurality Borda count Plurality with elimination Pairwise comparison Majority Always satisfies May not satisfy Always satisfies Always satisfies Head-tohead May not satisfy May not satisfy May not satisfy Always satisfies Monotonicity Always satisfies May not satisfy May not satisfy May not satisfy Irrelevant alternatives May not satisfy May not satisfy May not satisfy May not satisfy 15.2-54

Arrow s Impossibility Theorem It is mathematically impossible for any democratic voting method to simultaneously satisfy each of the fairness criteria: The majority criterion The head-to-head criterion The monotonicity criterion The irrevelant alternative criterion 15.2-55