MIN! THE OFFICIAL REPORT SIXTH SERIES VOLUME 390. House of Commons. Tuesday 24 September 2002 PRAYERS. [Mr. Speaker in the Chair]

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House of Commons Hansard Debates for "24 Sept 2002 (pt 1) Page 2 of 8 MIN! Searchl Advanced S Home Glossarv Index Contact Us Parliament Live section.... ~ Go 24 Sept 2002 : Column 1 PARLIAMENTARY DEBATES THE OFFICIAL REPORT IN THE FIRST SESSION OF THE FIFTY-THIRD PARLIAMENT OF THE UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND [WHICH OPENED 13 JUNE 2001] HER MAJESTY QUEEN ELIZABETH II 24 Sept 2002 : Column 1 FIFTY-FIRST YEAR OF THE REIGN OF SIXTH SERIES VOLUME 390 TWENTY-FIRST VOLUME OF SESSION 2001-2002 House of Commons Tuesday 24 September 2002 The House met at half-past Eleven o'clock, notice having been given by Mr. Speaker, pursuant to Standing Order No. 13 (Earlier meeting of the House in certain circumstances). PRAYERS [Mr. Speaker in the Chair] Iraq and Weapons of -Mass Destruction Mr. Speaker : Statement by the Prime Minister. Mr. Tam Dalyell (Lintithgow) : On a point of order on procedure, Mr. Speaker- Mr. Speaker : Order. I will take points of order after the statement. The Prime Minister (Mr. Tony Blair) : Mr. Speaker, thank you for recalling PJ C3 cr I ~- i oog.3 11 http ://wwtiv.publications parliament uk/pa/cm200l02/cmhansrd/vo020924/debtext/20. 06/08/2003

House of Commons Hansard Debates for 24 Sept 2002 (pt 1) - Page 3 of 8 Parliament to debate the best way to deal with the issue of the present leadership of Iraq and weapons of mass destruction. Today we published a 50-page dossier, detailing the history of Iraq's weapons of mass destruction programme, its breach of United Nations resolutions, and its attempts to rebuild that illegal programme. I have placed a copy in the Library. At the end of the Gulf war, the full extent of Saddam's chemical, biological and nuclear weapons programmes became clear. As a result, the United Nations passed a series of resolutions, demanding that Iraq disarm itself of such weapons and establishing a regime of weapons inspections and monitoring to do the task. The inspectors were to be given unconditional and unrestricted access to all and any Iraqi sites. 24 Sept 2002 : Column 2 All this is accepted fact. In addition, it is fact, documented by UN inspectors, that Iraq almost immediately began to obstruct the inspections. Visits were delayed ; on occasions, inspectors threatened ; mat6riel was moved ; special sites, shut to the inspectors, were unilaterally designated by Iraq. The work of the inspectors continued, but against a background of increasing obstruction and non-compliance. Indeed, Iraq denied that its biological weapons programme existed until forced to acknowledge it after high-ranking defectors disclosed its existence in 1995. Eventually, in 1997, the UN inspectors declared that they were unable to fulfil their task. A year of negotiation and further obstruction occurred until finally, in late 1998, the UN team was forced to withdraw. As the dossier sets out, we estimate on the basis of the UN's work that there were up to 360 tonnes of bulk chemical warfare agents, including 1.5 tonnes of VX nerve agent ; up to 3,000 tonnes of precursor chemicals ; growth media sufficient to produce 26,000 litres of anthrax spores ; and over 30,000 special munitions for delivery of chemical and biological agents. All of this was missing and unaccounted for. Military action by the United States and United Kingdom followed and a certain amount of infrastructure for Iraq's weapons of mass destruction and missile capability was destroyed, setting the Iraqi programme back, but not ending it. From late 1998 onwards, therefore, the sole inhibition on Saddam's WMD programme was the sanctions regime. Iraq was forbidden to use the revenue from its oil except for certain specified non-military purposes. The sanctions regime, however, was also subject to illegal trading and abuse. Because of concerns about its inadequacy-and the impact on the Iraqi people-we made several attempts to refine it, culminating in a new UN resolution in May of this year. But it was only partially effective. Around $3 billion of money is illegally taken by Saddam every year now, double the figure for the year 2000. Selfevidently, there is no proper accounting for this money. CSgGl4-j OogLt http.//www.pubhcatons parliament.uk/pa/cm200102/cmhansrcl'vo020924/debtext/20. 06/08/2003

House of Commons Hansard Debates for 24 Sept 2002 (pt 1) - Page 4 of 8 24 Sept 2002 : Column 3 Because of concerns that a containment policy based on sanctions alone could not sufficiently inhibit Saddam's weapons programme, negotiations continued, even after 1998, to gain readmission for the UN inspectors. In 1999, a new UN resolution demanding their re-entry was passed and ignored. Further negotiations continued. Finally, after several months of discussion with Saddam's regime, in July this year, Kofi Annan, the UN Secretary-General, concluded that Saddam was not serious about readmitting the inspectors and ended the negotiations. All this is established fact. I set out the history in some detail because occasionally debate on this issue seems to treat it almost as if it had suddenly arisen, coming out of nowhere on a whim in the last few months of 2002. It is actually an 11-year history : a history of UN will flouted, of lies told by Saddam about the existence of his chemical, biological and nuclear weapons programmes, and of obstruction, defiance and denial. There is one common, consistent theme, however : the total determination of Saddam to maintain that programme ; to risk war, international ostracism, sanctions and the isolation of the Iraqi economy to keep it. At any time, he could have let the inspectors back in and put the world to proof. At any time, he could have co-operated with the United Nations. Ten days ago, he made the offer unconditionally under threat of war. He could have done it at any time in the last 11 years, but he did not. Why? The dossier that we publish gives the answer. The reason is that his chemical, biological and nuclear weapons programme is not an historic left-over from 1998. The inspectors are not needed to clean up the old remains. His weapons of mass destruction programme is active, detailed and growing. The policy of containment is not working. The weapons of mass destruction programme is not shut down ; it is up and running now. The dossier is based on the work of the British Joint Intelligence Committee. For over 60 years, beginning just before world war two, the JIC has provided intelligence assessments to British Prime Ministers. Normally, its work is obviously secret. Unusually, because it is important that we explain our concerns about Saddam to the British people, we have decided to disclose its assessments. I am aware, of course, that people will have to take elements of this on the good faith of our intelligence services, but this is what they are telling me, the British Prime Minister, and my senior colleagues. The intelligence picture that they paint is one accumulated over the last four years. It is extensive, detailed and authoritative. It concludes that Iraq has chemical and biological weapons, that Saddam has continued to produce them, that he has existing and active military plans for the use of chemical and biological weapons, which could be activated within 45 minutes, including against his own Shia population, and that he is actively trying to acquire nuclear weapons capability. al t; c-14-1 o a gs 73 http ://wwvv.pubiications parliament.uk/pa/cm200102/cmhansrd/vo020924/debtext/20... 06/08/2003

House of Commons Hansard Debates for 24 Sept 2002 (pt 1) Page 5 of 8 On chemical weapons, the dossier shows that Iraq continues to produce chemical agents for chemical weapons ; has rebuilt previously destroyed production plants across Iraq ; has bought dual-use chemical facilities ; has retained the key personnel formerly engaged in the chemical weapons programme ; and has a serious ongoing research programme into weapons production, all of it well funded. 24 Sept 2002 : Column 4 In respect of biological weapons ; again, production of biological agents has continued ; facilities formerly used for biological weapons have been rebuilt ; equipment has been purchased for such a programme ; and again, Saddam has retained the personnel who-worked on it prior to 1991. In particular, the UN inspection regime discovered that Iraq was trying to acquire mobile biological weapons facilities, which of course are easier to conceal. Present intelligence confirms that it has now got such facilities. The biological agents that we believe Iraq can produce include anthrax, botulinum, toxin, aflatoxin and ricinall eventually result in excruciatingly painful death. As for nuclear weapons, Saddam's previous nuclear weapons programme was shut down by the inspectors, following disclosure by defectors of the full, but hidden, nature of it. That programme was based on gas centrifuge uranium enrichment. The known remaining stocks of uranium are now held under supervision by the International Atomic Energy Agency. But we now know the following : since the departure of the inspectors in 1998, Saddam has bought or attempted to buy specialised vacuum pumps of the design needed for the gas centrifuge cascade to enrich uranium ; an entire magnet production line of the specification for use in the motors and top bearings of gas centrifuges ; dual-use products, such as anhydrous hydrogen fluoride and fluoride gas, which can be used both in petrochemicals but also in gas centrifuge cascades ; a filament winding machine, which can be used to manufacture carbon fibre gas centrifuge rotors ; and he has attempted, covertly, to acquire 60,000 or more specialised aluminium tubes, which are subject to strict controls owing to their potential use in the construction of gas centrifuges. In addition, we know that Saddam has been trying to buy significant quantities of uranium from Africa, although we do not know whether he has been successful. Again, key personnel who used to work on the nuclear weapons programme are back in harness. Iraq may claim that that is for a civil nuclear power programme, but I would point out that it has no nuclear power plants. So that is the position in respect of the weapons-but of course, the weapons require ballistic missile capability. That, again, is subject to UN resolutions. Iraq is supposed only to have missile capability up to 150 km for conventional weaponry. Pages 27 to 31 of the dossier detail the evidence on that issue. It is clear that a significant number of longer-range missiles were effectively concealed from the previous inspectors and remain, including up to 20 extended-range Scud missiles ; that in mid-2001 there was a step change in the programme and, by this year, Iraq's development of weapons with a range of Gac-1 zi- l oic)g(, *714 http.//wwv~~ publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200102/cmhansrd/vo020924/debtextl20... 06/08/2003

House of Commons Hansard Debates for 24 Sept 2002 (pt 1 ) Page 6 of 8 more than 1,000 km was well under way ; and that hundreds of people are employed in that programme, facilities are being built and equipment procured-usually clandestinely. Sanctions and import controls have hindered the programme, but only slowed its progress. The capability being developed, incidentally, is for multi-purpose use, including with WMD warheads, That is the assessment, given to me, of the Joint Intelligence Committee. In addition, we have well founded intelligence to tell us that Saddam sees his WMD programme as vital to his survival and as a demonstration of his power and influence in the region. There will be some who will dismiss all this. Intelligence is not always right. For some of the material, there-might be innocent explanations. There will be others 24 Sept 2002 : Column 5 who say rightly that, for example, on present going, it could be several years before Saddam acquires a usable nuclear weapon-though if he were able to purchase fissile materiel illegally, it would be only a year or two. But let me put it at its simplest : on this 11-year history ; with this man Saddam ; with this accumulated, detailed intelligence available ; with what we know and what we can reasonably speculate, would the world be wise to leave the present situation undisturbed-to say that, despite 14 separate LN demands on the issue, all of which Saddam is m breach of, we should do nothing, and to conclude that we should trust, not to the good faith of the UN weapons inspectors, but to the good faith of the current Iraqi regime? I do not believe that that would be a responsible course to follow. Our case is simply this : not that we take military action come what may, but that the case for ensuring Iraqi disarmamp-nt, as the UN itself has stipulated, is overwhelming. I defy anyone, on the basis of this evidence, to say that that is an unreasonable demand for the international community to make when, after all, it is only the same demand that we have made for 11 years and that Saddam has rejected. People say, "But why Saddam?" I do not in the least dispute that there are other causes of concern on weapons of mass destruction. I said as much in this House on 14 September last year. However, two things about Saddam stand out. He has used these weapons in Iraq itself-thousands dying in those chemical weapons attacks-and in the Iran-Iraq war;started by him, in which 1 million people died ; and his is a regime with no moderate elements to appeal to. Read the chapter on Saddam and human rights in this dossier. Read not just about the 1 million dead in the war with Iran, not just about the 100,000 Kurds brutally murdered in northern Iraq, not just about the 200,000 Shia Muslims driven from the marshlands in southern Iraq, and not just about the attempt to subjugate and brutalise the Kuwaitis in 1990 that led to the Gulf war. I say, "Read also about the routine butchering of political opponents, the prison 'cleansing' regimes in which thousands die, the torture chambers and the hideous penalties supervised by him and his family and detailed by Amnesty International." Read it all and, again, I defy anyone to say that this cruel and a' g ci 4,( o~8~ '7S http~llwww.publicat:ons.parliament.uk/palcm200102/cmhansrdlvo020924/debtextl20.. 06/08/2003

House of Commons Hansard Debates for 24 Sept 2002 (pt 1) _ Page i or u sadistic dictator should be allowed any possibility of getting his hands on chemical, biological and nuclear weapons of mass destruction. "Why now?", people ask. I agree that I cannot say that this month or next, even this year or next, Saddam will use his weapons. But I can say that if the international community, having made the call for disarmament, now, at this moment, at the point of decision, shrugs its shoulders and walks away, he will draw the conclusion that dictators faced with a weakening will always draw : that the international community will talk but not act, will use diplomacy but not force. We know, again from our history, that diplomacy not backed by the threat of force has never worked with dictators and never will. If we take this course and if we refuse to implement the will of the international community, Saddam will carry on, his efforts will intensify, his confidence will grow and, at some point in a future not too distant, the threat will turn into reality. The threat therefore is not imagined. The history of Saddam and weapons of mass destruction is not American or British propaganda. The history and the present threat are real. 24 Sept 2002 : Column 6 If people say, "Why should Britain care?", I answer, "Because there is no way this man, in this region above all regions, could begin a conflict using such weapons and the consequences not engulf the whole world, including this country." That, after all, is the reason the UN passed its resolutions. That is why it is right that the UN Security Council again makes its will and its unity clear and lays down a strong new UN resolution and mandate. Then Saddam will have the choice : comply willingly or be forced to comply. That is why, alongside the diplomacy, there must be genuine preparedness and planning to take action if diplomacy fails. Let me be plain about our purpose. Of course there is no doubt that Iraq, the region and the whole world would be better off without Saddam. Iraq deserves to be led by someone who can abide by international law, not a murderous dictator ; by someone who can bring Iraq back into the international community where it belongs, not leave it languishing as a pariah ; by someone who can make the country rich and successful, not impoverished by Saddam's personal greed ; and by someone who can lead a Government more representative of the country as a whole while maintaining absolutely Iraq~s territorial integrity. We have no quarrel with the Iraqi people. Indeed, liberated from Saddam, they could make Iraq prosperous and a force for good in the middle east. So the ending of this regime would be the cause of regret for no one other than Saddam. But our purpose is disarmament. No one wants military conflict. The whole purpose of putting this before the UN is to demonstrate the united determination of the international community to resolve this in the way it should have been resolved years ago : through a proper process of disarmament under the UN. Disarmament of all weapons of mass destruction is the demand. One way or another, it must be acceded to. t)ac-lld of,8?6 http.//v,nw,~.publications parliament uk/pa/cm200102/cmhansrd/vo020924/debtext/20... 06/08/2003

House of Commons Hansard Debates for 24 Sept 2002 (pt 1) _ Page 6 or Z5 There are two other issues with a bearing on this question which I will deal with. First, Afghanistan is a country now freed from the Taliban but still suffering. This is a regime we chariged, rightly-1 waht to make it clear; once again, that we are entirely committed to its reconstruction. We will not desert the Afghan people. We will stick with them until the job bf reconstruction is done. Secondly, I have no doubt that the Arab world knows that it would be better off without Saddam. Equally, I know that there is genuine resentment at the state of the middle east peace process,-which people want to see the international community pursue with the same vigour. Israel will defend its people against these savage acts of terrorism, but the very purpose of this terrorism is to prevent any chance for peace. Meanwhile, the Palestinians are suffering in the most appalling and unacceptable way. We need therefore urgent action to build a security infrastructure that gives both Israelis and Palestinians confidence and stops the next suicide bomb closing down the prospects of progress. We need political reform for the Palestinian Authority, and we need a new conference on the middle east peace process, based on the twin principles of a secure Israel and a viable Palestinian state. We can condemn the terrorism and the reaction to it. As I have said many times in the House, frankly, that gets us nowhere. What we need is a firm commitment to action 24 Sept 2002 : Column 7 and a massive mobilisation of energy to get the peace process moving again, and we m Britain will play our part m that in any way we can. Finally, there are many acts of this drama still to be played out. I have always said that Parliament should be kept in touch with all developments, in particular those that would lead us to military action. That remains the case, and to those who doubt it I say : look at Kosovo and Afghanistan. We proceeded with care, with full debate in this House, and when we took military action, we did so as a last resort. We shall act in the same way now, but I hope we can do so secure in the knowledge that should Saddam continue to defy the will of the international community, this House, as it has in our history so many times before, will not shrink from doing what is necessary and what is right. Next Section Index Home Page 2)gG141 C)Og1! 1 http ://wvrw.publications.parliament uldpa/cm200l02/cmhansrd/vo020924,ldebtext/20.. 06/08/2003