Scientists, Clerics, and Nuclear Decision Making in Iran

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Transcription:

Scientists, Clerics, and Nuclear Decision Making in Iran Kai-Henrik Barth Georgetown University June 22, 2007

Roadmap Introduction Iranian Nuclear Decision Making History: Iranian Nuclear Program Conclusion

Introduction

Motivation why do states build nuclear weapons? various models of proliferation Scott Sagan scientists as drivers: e.g., US, India, Pakistan

Relevance nuclear tipping point understanding proliferation can help prevent further spread not enough attention payed to understanding proliferation

Common Wisdom Iran develops nuclear weapons as a deterrent (US, Israel) for international prestige for domestic politics (unity, popular cause, nationalism) scientists: blackboxed

Core Question To what extent have scientists driven Iran s nuclear effort? to what extent have Iranian scientists made decisions independent of clerics on nuclear matters? to what extent have scientists pushed for nuclear program in bureaucratic self-interest? (jobs, employment, pride)

Argument scientists: significant role: pushed for nuclear program at critical points motivation: prestige, jobs, curiosity not simply enablers, but drivers

No doubt that: strategic decisions: Supreme Leader and leading clerics but: what about decisions about technical paths technical momentum

Sources newspapers, primarily Iranian (BBC Monitoring), FBIS industry newsletters (Nucleonics Week, Nuclear Fuel) open sources: IAEA, IISS, NTI, Carnegie, FAS, GlobalSecurity.org some interviews with Iran experts

Sources: Limitations nuclear decision making: extremely secretive little information about scientists inferences, but no causal links

Nuclear Decision Making

Decision Making in Iran chaotic, but not anarchic weak bureaucracies informal networks (family, religious instructors, military experience): key to decision making in Iran [Abbas William Samii, Naval War College Review, Winter 2006]

Nuclear Decision Making Western analysts agree: only small number of people (10-15) involved: decision by consensus

Decision Makers Supreme Leader President (?) Senior clerics, formal institutions Supreme Nat. Security Council (2003-) Revolutionary Guards, intelligence Scientists associated with AEOI

Context of Nuclear Decisions new factor since 2000: public nationalism, anti-colonialist, inalienable right public opinion now strongly pro nuclear: complete fuel cycle official line: for peaceful nuclear technology, against weapons

History

History of the Program Four phases 1. 1957-1979: Shah 2. 1979-1989: Khomeini and Amrollahi 3. 1989-1997: Khamenei and Amrollahi 4. 1997- today: Khamenei and Aqazadeh

Phase 1: 1957-1979, Shah 1957: US-Iran nuclear cooperation (Atoms for Peace) 1967: 5 MW reactor at TNRC 1974: Shah, ambitious program: 23,000 MW in 20 y, fuel cycle Founding of AEOI 1978: program crashes

Phase 2: 1979-1989, Khomeini 1979: revolution 1980-1983: Cultural Revolution massive brain drain: AEOI only 800 1979-1982: major AEOI projects shut down: Bushehr (75% complete) proposal: Bushehr into grain silos

http://www.digitalglobe.com/images/iran/bushehr_feb2_28_2004_dg.jpg

Phase 2 (cont.) anti-nuclear sentiment: against foreign interference, dependency AEOI: tries to survive 1982 new AEOI head: Amrollahi supported by speaker of parliament, Ali Akbar Rafsanjani

Amrollahi had studied at U Texas AEOI director 1982-1997: driver for resumption of Bushehr for U exploration, buying U for enrichment, reprocessing R&D for nuclear cooperation with Argentina, Pakistan (Khan!), South Africa, China

Amrollahi convinced Rafsanjani and Khomeini some: Amrollahi behind nuclear weapon efforts, revitalization others: neither outstanding scientist nor competent manager but: relative of Rafsanjani

Rafsanjani well known in the West

Rafsanjani very influential cleric and politician close connection with Khomeini speaker of parliament 1980-1989 commander in chief in Iraq war President 1989-1997 Chairman of the Expediency Council conservative, but pragmatist

Rafsanjani strong interest in S&T for development, energy, nuclear matters key role in cooperative agreements with India, China, Russia since 1985 appealed to Iranian scientists in exile to return to Iran

Sum Phase 2: Revitalization revolution, brain drain, Iraq war But: AEOI scientists active: work on fuel production: UF6, centrifuges Rafsanjani, AEOI keep project alive 1990: AEOI back to 200 scientists and 2,000 personnel

Phase 3: 1989-1997, Khamenei and Amrollahi 1989: death of Khomeini new Supreme Leader: Ayatollah Sayyid Ali Khamenei new president: Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani

Khamenei personal interest in S&T, nuclear pushes for nuclear energy program: self-sufficiency: fossil fuels will run out nuclear: key to development S&T central to developing power inalienable right irreversible path

Khamenei publicly opposed to WMD; secret fatwa against nuclear weapons however: supports enrichment and reprocessing efforts representatives in policy bodies: unlikely that he does not know

Phase 3 (cont.) secret research: conversion, enrichment, Pu separation foreign assistance (Russia, China): fuel cycle facilities Khan network, centrifuge design construction of enrichment facilities at Natanz around 2000

Gas Centrifuges

Natanz 2002, 2004

Phase 3: Sum 1990s: no evidence for dedicated nuclear weapons program systematic effort to develop options: procurement effort, front companies

Phase 4: 1997 to present 1997: new president: Khatami new head of AEOI: Aqazadeh

Phase 4 (cont.) August 2002: Iranian opposition group reveals Natanz and Arak Oct. 2003 and Nov. 2004: agreement with EU-3, includes suspension of enrichment and reprocessing activities but: Iran resumes these activities repeatedly: crisis

Aghazadeh 1997-present: Pres. AEOI, Vice President, no nuclear background 1985-1997: Minister of Oil technocrat, well connected, in firm control of AEOI not closely associated with political networks

Aghazadeh reluctant to accept EU-3 nuclear deal: long delay will inflict huge econ. damage (ISNA 12 Dec 03) represents scientists, fights to protect nuclear program, jobs concerned that experts leave Iran, asks Majlis for job guarantees

AEOI Organizational Momentum AEOI s bureaucratic interests: finding new projects and tasks to ensure their preservation and expansion... They are very concerned that Iran, in dealing with the IAEA, would accept a concession that prevents these organizations from achieving their goals of survival and logical expansion. Nasser Hadian, professor at Tehran U

AEOI President Research Div Nuclear Power Planning Int. Affairs Regulatory Nuclear Fuel source: M. Ghannadi-Maragheh, Atomic Energy Organization of Iran, 2002

Research Div Laser Fusion Ag&Med Renewable others Research Ctr Nuclear Physics Engineering Chemistry Electronics Theory Reactors

AEOI Organizational Momentum many AEOI scientists angry that Iran agreed to stop enrichment Aug. 2003: 500 students (Sharif Technical U), 240 faculty members wrote two open letters, warning gov. not to make promises to IAEA

AEOI Organizational Momentum Any lack of steadfastness with regard to finding alternate sources of energy would be considered by Iranians of future generations as treason... We are concerned that due to foreign pressure that many years of hard work which has led to a lot of advancement in the field of nuclear technology and science may be wasted. We the signors of this letter, urge the government of the Islamic Republic of Iran to, under no circumstances, sign any letter which would create an impediment to our legitimate right to acquire knowledge and technology. [Hadian, pp. 58-59]

human chains in support of AEOI, November 2004

Conclusion

Conclusion to what extent have scientists pushed for nuclear program in bureaucratic selfinterest? (jobs, employment, pride) to a very significant extent: major driver vocal advocates for fuel cycle

Conclusion to what extent have Iranian scientists made decisions independent of clerics on nuclear matters? AEOI scientists pushed for experiments that violated IAEA safeguards, apparently without consent of clerics they have monopoly on technical expertise

Conclusion To what extent have scientists driven Iran s nuclear effort? scientists have actively shaped Iran s program: more than just enablers: drivers bureaucratic self-interests professional pride leads to momentum

Finally coalition between bureaucratic actors: AEOI (nuclear establishment) pro-nuclear populists (president) public momentum, difficult to stop nonproliferation policy: break coalition

Questions?

Backup Slides

Foreign Ministry vs. AEOI Foreign Ministry: avoid more isolation AEOI: move forward with nuclear fuel cycle

source: BBC http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/shared/spl/hi/ middle_east/03/iran_power/html/default.stm

Scientists in Iran (cont.) Institute for Studies in Theoretical Physics and Mathematics in Tehran (IPM) string theory and particle physics director: Mohammad Javad Larijani (brother of Ali Larijani) other centers on biotech, astronomy