Improvement of Corporate Insolvency Law Legislative Proposals Consultation Document

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Improvement of Corporate Insolvency Law Legislative Proposals Consultation Document 15 July 2013 By email: corporate_insolvency_law@fstb.gov.hk Division 4 Financial Services and the Treasury Bureau 15/F, Queensway Government Offices 66 Queensway Hong Kong Re: Comments on Consultation Document The Hong Kong Institute of Chartered Secretaries (the Institute ) is pleased to have contributed to the reform relating to improving corporate insolvency law. Specifically, our representative, Mr. Stephen Liu, partner of Ernst & Young, was part of the Advisory Group that contributed to the legislative proposals as referred under Appendix B of the Consultation Document. Insolvency law provides a regime for orderly distribution of assets when things go wrong, and is part of the risk analysis for rational investment decisions, including by international investors. However, a comprehensive insolvency law regime must also provide an opportunity for workout under a moratorium or supervision prior to insolvency. As recognized under the Consultation Paper, this is lacking in Hong Kong as compared to other jurisdictions like the UK and US. We look forward to contributing to further reform in this important area to bring Hong Kong s insolvency law regime in line with international practices. In relation to the questions raised under the Consultation Document, the following are our comments: Questions for Consultation Our response Chapter 2 Commencement of Winding Up (A) Providing for a prescribed form for a statutory demand by a creditor Question 1 Do you support the proposal to adopt a prescribed form of statutory In principle a debtor should be aware of the key information and consequences of

demand, which would contain key information as described in paragraph 2.7 as well as a statement of the consequences of ignoring the demand? being served a statutory demand, and to determine the appropriate course of conduct, including, to either pay or dispute the statutory demand, including where appropriate, to seek to set aside the statutory demand. However, the form of the statutory demand must not be unduly rigid and invalidated because of some flexibility in the language to facilitate settlement. (B) Improving the section 228A procedure to reduce the risk of abuse Question 2 Do you think that the section 228A procedure, whereby the directors of a company may commence a voluntary winding-up of the company without first having the members of the company resolve to do so, should be maintained or repealed? Question 3 If the section 228A procedure is to be maintained, do you agree to the proposed improvement measures as set out in paragraph 2.14 to reduce the risk of abuse of the procedure? We submit that section 228A is a provision that is unique to Hong Kong and there may be appropriate cases, where as a last resort, this method for a speedy winding-up may be resorted to. We agree with the retention of the provision subject to further safeguards. We agree with the proposed improvement measures. Additionally, we observe that unscrupulous directors may simply state that the company cannot by reason of its liabilities continue its business as the only reason for winding up the company in the winding-up statement. Accordingly, to protect the interest of the creditors, we also suggest to impose the requirements of providing further details as to the affairs of the company and explanation as to why any other modes of winding up under the CO is impracticable if not impossible. Further, it could be considered whether the winding-up statement should be subject to review and acceptance for filing by the Registrar of Companies. The winding up of the company and appointment of provisional liquidator could, under such proposal, take effect only at the time of the acceptance of the winding-up statement by the Registrar of Companies, rather than at the time of the

delivery of the winding-up statement to the Companies Registry. Also, aggrieved creditors, who are dissatisfied with the provisional liquidator or liquidator s acts and dealings in the course of the liquidation under S.228A, should be expressly given a right to apply to the court for an order to place the company into compulsory liquidation and appoint another liquidator. S.228A(8)(b) should also be aligned to allow all the insolvency practitioners registered under Panel A Scheme operated by the Official Receiver to be appointed provisional liquidators under S.228A. (C) Improving efficiency and enhancing the protection of creditors in a creditors voluntary winding-up Question 4 Do you agree to replacing the existing requirement of holding the first creditors meeting on the same or the next following day of the members meeting with the requirement of holding the first creditors meeting on a day not later than the fourteenth day after the day on which the members meeting is held in a creditors voluntary winding-up case? We agree with legislative proposals modelled upon UK legislations. These could avoid the situation where the meetings of the members and of the creditors are held by short notice, without allowing the creditors sufficient time to assess the position and nominate liquidators before the first creditors meeting. At the same time, the decision of whether to wind up would not be delayed which is important as where a company is in serious financial difficulty, a delay in the passage of the winding-up resolution may subject the company, its management and its creditors including employees to various risks. Further, it could also minimize the risk where the company calls the members meeting first to pass a winding-up resolution, deliberately puts off the holding of the first creditors meeting and, with the aid of a member-appointed liquidator, engages in conduct detriment to creditors interests, e.g. by selling the

assets at an undervalue to directors or connected parties. Question 5 Do you support the proposal on prescribing a minimum notice period for calling the first creditors meeting in a creditors voluntary winding-up case? If so, do you consider a period of seven days appropriate? Question 6 Do you agree to the proposal on limiting the powers of the liquidator appointed by the company during the period before the holding of the first creditors meeting in a creditors voluntary winding-up case? Question 7 Do you agree to the proposed restrictions on the exercise of the directors power before a liquidator is appointed in a creditors voluntary winding-up case? Question 8 Do you agree with the proposed technical amendments relating to the commencement of winding-up as set out in Annex C? We support the proposal. Please also see our answers to Question 4 generally. We agree with the proposal on limiting the powers of the liquidator. We agree with the proposed restrictions on the power of the directors. We agree with the proposed technical amendments. Chapter 3 - Appointment, Powers, Vacation of Office and Release of Provisional Liquidators and Liquidators (A) Expanding the list of persons disqualified for appointment as liquidator or provisional liquidator Question 9 (a) Do you agree to the expansion of the list of disqualified persons from being appointed as a provisional liquidator or a liquidator? If so, do you agree with disqualifying the types of persons as proposed in paragraphs 3.13, 3.15 and 3.16? (b) Do you agree to provide clearly that the appointment of a disqualified person as a provisional liquidator or liquidator We agree with the proposals and view it as important that there are disqualifications of the listed persons and related consequences. Further, the disqualification of auditor as proposed in paragraph 3.13 (d) should be extended to six years prior to the commencement of winding up as this is the general limitation period for civil proceedings. This will avoid the conflict from a lack of recourse against auditors appointed as provisional

shall be void and that he shall be liable to a fine if he acts as a provisional liquidator or liquidator? liquidators or liquidators during the limitation period. (c) Do you agree that the disqualification proposals should also apply to the appointment of a receiver or a receiver and manager of the property of a company with suitable modifications? (B) Disclosure of relevant relationships in relation to the appointment of provisional liquidators and liquidators Question 10 (a) Do you agree that a new statutory disclosure system should be introduced for the appointment of provisional liquidators and liquidators? (b) If yes, do you agree with the details of information required to be disclosed as set out in paragraph 3.21? (c) Do you agree that a statutory defence as proposed in paragraph 3.24 should be provided for a failure in disclosure? We agree with the new statutory disclosure system subject to the relevant period listed in paragraph 3.21 being six years prior to the appointment. Please also refer to our answer to Question 9. The proposed statement of relevant relationships will enable the court, the directors, the creditors or the company to make an informed decision as to whether a person should be appointed to act as provisional liquidator or liquidator. The perceived conflict of interest should also be considered with reference to HKICPA s Code of Ethics for Professional Accountants Part E Section 500 Professional Ethics in Liquidation and Insolvency. (C) Expanding the existing prohibition on inducement affecting appointment as liquidator Question 11 (a) Do you agree that the existing prohibition on inducement being offered to members or creditors in relation to the appointment of liquidators should be extended to cover inducement being offered to any person? We agree with the extension of the existing prohibition which would enhance the integrity of the winding up process. (b) Do you agree that the prohibition should also be extended to inducement

offered in relation to the appointment of provisional liquidators, receivers, and receivers and managers? (D) Clarifying the nature of provisional liquidators in a court winding-up Question 12 Do you agree with the proposal to designate all provisional liquidators who take office upon and after the making of a winding-up order (i.e. section 194 PL) as liquidators such that they will be subject to the provisions in the CO which apply to liquidators? Question 13 Do you agree with the proposal to clearly stipulate that it is up to the court to determine the powers, duties, remuneration and termination of appointment of provisional liquidators who were appointed by the court before the making of a winding-up order (i.e. section 193 PL)? We agree with the proposal which is consistent with the powers vested with a section 194 PL. We agree with the proposal. (E) Modernising the provisions on the powers of liquidators Question 14 Do you agree with the proposal of setting out the powers of liquidators now found in section 199(1) and (2) of the CO in a Schedule to improve the clarity of the provisions? Question 15 Do you agree that the requirement for the liquidator to apply to the court or the COI for exercising the power to appoint a solicitor in a court winding-up should be removed, provided that prior notification is given to the COI or, where there is no COI, the creditors when the liquidator exercises such power? We agree with the proposal. We agree with the proposals. The current procedures are prone to delays and cumbersome. Question 16 (a) Do you agree that, We agree with the proposals and the

notwithstanding the release of a liquidator by the court, the liquidator should not be absolved from the provisions of section 276 of the CO? potential claw back of cases with the leave of the court. (b) Do you agree that, where the court has granted a release to a liquidator, the power to make an application under section 276 should only be exercisable with the leave of the court? Question 17 Do you agree with the proposed technical amendments relating to the appointment, powers, vacation of office and release of provisional liquidators and liquidators as set out in Annex C? We agree with the technical amendments Chapter 4 - Conduct of Winding-Up (A) Stipulating the maximum and minimum number of members of the COI Question 18 Do you agree that a maximum and a minimum number of members should be set for the COI appointed in both a court winding-up and a creditors voluntary winding-up? If so, are the proposed maximum number (seven) and minimum numbers (three) appropriate? Do you agree that the court should have the discretion to vary the maximum and minimum numbers on application by the liquidator? Question 19 Do you agree to allow the COI not to fill a vacancy if the liquidator and a majority of the remaining members of the COI so agree, provided that the total number of members does not fall below the proposed minimum number? We agree with the proposal which retains the discretion of the court. We agree with the proposal. (B) Streamlining and rationalizing the proceedings of the COI Question 20 Do you agree to the We agree with the proposal.

proposals as set out in paragraphs 4.12 and 4.13 for streamlining and rationalising the proceedings of the COI? Question 21 Do you support the proposal to enable the COI to function through written resolutions sent by post or using other electronic means (such as using emails or through websites)? We agree with the proposal. (C) Simplifying the process for the determination of costs or charges of the liquidators agents in a court winding-up Question 22 (a) Do you agree with allowing the costs and charges of the agents employed by the liquidators to be determined by agreement between the liquidator and the COI? (b) Do you agree that if such agreement cannot be reached, the costs and charges of the agents shall be delivered up for taxation by the court? We agree with the proposals. The current situation is that the agents, is financing the insolvency process in view of the time required for taxation. Thus, where the liquidator and COI agree, the costs and charges of agents should be settled without delay. Where there are disputes, the costs and charges should be subject to taxation by the court. (D) Allowing communication by liquidators with creditors, contributories, members of COI and other interested parties by electronic means Question 23 Do you support the proposal to allow liquidators and provisional liquidators to communicate with creditors, contributories or other parties by electronic means, subject to the conditions as set out in paragraph 4.21? Question 24 Do you agree with the proposed technical amendments relating to the conduct of winding-up as set out in Annex C? We agree with the proposal. We agree with the proposal. Chapter 5 - Voidable Transactions

(A) Introducing new provisions on transactions at an undervalue Question 25 (a) Do you agree that new provisions should be introduced to empower the court to make orders for restoring the position of a company to what it would have been if the company has not entered into a transaction at an undervalue? (b) Do you agree to the proposal regarding relevant time as proposed in paragraph 5.10? (c) Do you agree that transactions at an undervalue entered into by the company with a person who is connected with the company should be subject to a more stringent control as proposed in paragraph 5.11? We agree with the proposals largely modelled upon the UK legislations and the Bankruptcy Ordinance. The onus should be on the person who resists the order to prove the requirements of the defence being fulfilled. Also, in relation to every transaction made by directors, this should be after due consideration. The directors should have board resolutions and valuation report, etc. to demonstrate that the directors entered into the transaction in good faith and for the benefit of the company. (d) Do you agree that statutory protection should be provided for the party seeking to resist an application made by the liquidator of a company in respect of the undervalue transaction? If so, do you agree with the statutory protection as proposed in paragraph 5.12? (B) Rectifying the anomalies in the application of existing provisions on unfair preferences Question 26 (a) Do you agree that the current provisions in the CO incorporating the provisions in the BO on unfair preference should be replaced by new standalone provisions which apply to winding-up cases as proposed in paragraph 5.17 to rectify the existing anomalies which limit the application and effectiveness of such provisions? (b) Do you agree with the definitions of person who is connected with a company and associate as proposed in paragraphs 5.19 and 5.20? We submit that the relevant time with respect to an associate case should be five years, being the same as that for a transaction at an undervalue. This is because in practice, most of the purported preference was well-planned and occurred prior to two years before the commencement of the winding-up. With respect to an associate case, the onus should be on the preferred person to show that the company was not influenced by a desire to prefer. With respect to a non-associate case, the onus should be on the liquidator to show

(c) Do you agree that the existing protection for persons who have received benefits or acquired or derived interest in property in good faith and for value from unfair preference should be maintained, and that the same protection should also be applicable to the proposed new provisions on transactions at an undervalue? that the company was influenced by a desire to prefer. Please also refer to Re Sweetmart Garment Works Ltd (In Liquidation) [2008] 2 HKC 252 and Trustees of the Property of Hau Po Man Stanley (In Bankruptcy) v Hau Po Fun Ivy [2005] 2 HKC 227 in relation to comments on:- desire to prefer any real commercial pressure placed by the creditor want of good faith benefit to the company in any tangible way Also, in relation to every transaction made by directors, this should be after due consideration. The directors should have board resolutions and valuation report, etc. to demonstrate that the directors entered into this transaction in good faith and for the benefit of the company. (C) Improving the effectiveness and flexibility of the provisions for invalidating floating charges created before the winding-up of the company Question 27 Do you agree to the proposed special provisions in relation to floating charges created by a company in favour of a person who is connected with the company as detailed in paragraph 5.26? Question 28 Do you support the expansion of the scope of the exemption of a floating charge from invalidation catered for genuine credit transactions to cover property and services supplied to the company and money paid at the direction of the company as detailed in paragraph 5.28? We agree with the proposal to extend the timing for invalidation from 12 months to two years. We submit that it is difficult to ascertain the value of the property and services supplied to the company, especially in relation to services which could lead to abuse, and the expansion of scope may not be appropriate. The expansion of the scope should also include new money for working capital facilities as the company can benefit from the sales generated by the working capital facilities and pay off its debts.

Please also consider validating floating charge created in good faith, but also setting out a rebuttable presumption of want of good faith where the chargee:- had notice of the circumstances which amounted to the giving of a preference by the company and of the fact that the petition for winding up has been presented, etc., or was connected with the company. Chapter 6 - Investigating during winding-up, offences antecedent to or in the course of winding-up, and powers of the court (A) Enhancing the effectiveness of the private and public examination procedures by providing for the express abrogation of the privilege against self-incrimination Question 29 (a) Do you agree to expressly set out in the legislation the common law position that a person summoned for either a private or a public examination cannot invoke the privilege against selfincrimination during the examination? We agree with the proposals. In a number of cases, the liquidation investigation is frustrated by the summoned persons claiming the privilege against selfincrimination. (b) If so, do you agree that we should introduce provisions to prohibit the subsequent use of answers given and statements made during the examination in subsequent criminal proceedings if certain conditions are satisfied, subject to certain exceptions such as offences relating to perjury and provision of false statement and offences under the future Companies (Winding Up and Miscellaneous Provisions) Ordinance? (B) Widening the scope of application of the public examination procedure Question 30 (a) Do you agree to the We agree with the proposals. These will

removal of the requirement that the OR or the liquidator must have alleged in his further report that fraud has been committed for initiating the public examination procedure, and to provide that a public examination may be ordered by the court upon the application by either the liquidator or the OR? (b) Do you agree with the proposed new categories of person that may be examined under the public examination procedure, namely (i) any person who has acted as liquidator of the company or receiver or receiver and manager of the property of the company; and (ii) any person who is or has been concerned, or has taken part, in the management of the company? allow for the examination of persons who are not officers of the company but who have taken part in its affairs of management, e.g. a CFO or a manager of the company. However, it is necessary to carefully guard the extension of the scope of section 222 of CO by confining the categories of person that may be examined to persons who have actually been responsible for or involved in the conduct of the affairs of the company and the scope of the examinable matters. (C) Providing for liability of past directors and members in connection with a redemption or buy-back of shares out of capital Question 31 (a) Do you agree that if a company is wound up insolvent within one year of its shares being redeemed or bought back by payment out of capital, certain categories of persons should be required to contribute to the assets of the company for an amount not exceeding the payment made by the company in respect of the shares redeemed or bought back by the company so as to meet the deficiency in the company s assets? We agree with the proposals. The directors should be jointly and severally liable with the recipient, and they should not make such solvency statement without full inquiry into the affairs and prospects of the company such that they can form the opinion that the company is able to pay its debts after the proposed date of payment and also has the ability to continue to carry on business as a going concern during the following year. (b) If so, should the members from whom the shares were redeemed or bought back and the directors who made the solvency statement which supported the redemption or buy-back without having reasonable grounds for the opinion expressed in the statement be jointly and severally liable to contribute to such assets?

(c) Should such persons be allowed to apply for winding-up of the company under the specific grounds as set out in paragraph 6.22? Question 32 Do you agree with the proposed technical amendments relating to the investigation during winding-up, offences antecedent to or in the course of winding-up and powers of the court as set out in Annex C? In relation to Technical Amendment 15, directors are usually required by the provisional liquidator or liquidator to submit a statement of affairs. Under the proposed new provisions, they may tend to simply sign a statement of concurrence regardless of the contents of the statement. The provisional liquidator or liquidator may find that the first statement being erroneous or the director making such statement is without direct knowledge. The provisional liquidator or liquidator may therefore prefer more than one director to complete a full statement. In most circumstances, the provisional liquidator or liquidator will not disclose the first statement to other directors who are also required to submit a statement. Thus, the provisional liquidator or liquidator could compare the statements prepared by different persons in order to obtain requisite financial information and form the basis of investigation into the affairs of the company. In relation to Technical Amendment 18, it is not appropriate to widen the scope of the eligible applicants to include the creditors or contributories. In relation to Technical Amendment 21, this should be subject to judicial application. In relation to Technical Amendments 22 and 23, the liquidator may either use, or threaten to use section 221 to apply for an order to require the person summoned to appear before the court. These may be more effective than the requirement of the submission of an affidavit and should be retained.

Should you have any questions on the above submissions, please contact Mohan Datwani, Director, Technical and Research at 2881 6177 or mohan@hkics.org.hk Yours faithfully, Ms. Edith Shih President The Hong Kong Institute of Chartered Secretaries