Why Dominant Parties Decline: Evidence from India s Green Revolution Aditya Dasgupta Abstract How does economic growth impact dominant party regimes? This paper draws lessons from a historical natural experiment: the impact of agricultural economic growth due to the green revolution on single-party dominance in India. Fixed effects and instrumental variable analyses exploiting sub-national variation in the local adoption of high-yielding variety (HYV) crops together with data on 22,000 state assembly and 3,000 parliamentary election races between 1957 and 1987 show that the green revolution accounted for half of the dominant Congress party s long-run decline. Tests of competing channels utilizing rainfall shocks and digitized legislator biographies show that, contrary to modernization theory, income increases on their own strengthened the dominant party and that the green revolution did not cause a shift in the caste, education, or occupation of elected politicians. Instead, the democratizing effect of the green revolution was due to the rise of opposition parties representing the interests of agricultural producers and motivated by the increasing value of state-controlled agricultural subsidies. The findings provide within country evidence that economic growth can contribute to democratization, not by raising incomes or eroding traditional social hierarchies, but by providing economic incentives for regime outsiders to mobilize politically in order to capture valuable state resources. For sharing data, I thank Robert Evanson and James McKinsey and their co-authors, Lakshmi Iyer, Christophe Jaffrelot, Seema Jayachandran, and Francesca Jensenius. For valuable feedback, I thank Sam Asher, Rikhil Bhavnani, Dipak Dasgupta, Daniel Esser, Devesh Kapur, John Marshall, Nathan Nunn, James Robinson, Prerna Singh, Steven Wilkinson, George Yin, Daniel Ziblatt, Adam Ziegfeld and seminar participants at Harvard, Yale, and the American Political Science Association Annual Meeting, 2013. For financial support I thank the US-India Fulbright Scholar Program and IQSS. All errors are my own. PhD Candidate, Department of Government, Harvard University. 1737 Cambridge Street, Cambridge, MA, 02138. Website: http://scholar.harvard.edu/adasgupta. Email: dasgupta@fas.harvard.edu. 1
1 Tables and Figures Figure 1: Decline of Congress Party Dominance Across States ANDHRA PRADESH ASSAM BIHAR 0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0 GUJARAT HARYANA KARNATAKA 0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0 Congress In Power at State Level 0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0 KERALA MADHYA PRADESH MAHARASHTRA ORISSA PUNJAB RAJASTHAN 0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0 TAMIL NADU UTTAR PRADESH WEST BENGAL 0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0 1950 1970 1990 2010 1950 1970 1990 2010 1950 1970 1990 2010 Year Notes: Points represent state-years between 1951 and 2015 across India s major states. Each point indicates whether the state was controlled by a Congress state-level government. Vertical dashed lines represent estimated structural break points, and horizontal solid lines represent estimated average Congress control probability for a segment of time. Minimum segment size is fixed at 15 years and structural breaks are estimated via the method of Bai and Perron (2003) adapted to binary outcome data (see Dasgupta (2016) for details). 2
Figure 2: Mean HYV Crop Adoption Across Districts, 1967-1987 Notes: Districts shaded according to quintile of mean share of agricultural land under HYV crop cultivation between 1967-1987. HYV crops were first widely adopted in 1967. Darker shades indicate greater HYV crop adoption. Districts defined by 1961 boundaries. Un-shaded districts are missing data. 3
Figure 3: Change in Congress State Assembly Seat Share by District, Pre-Post 1967 Notes: Districts shaded according to quintile of percentage point difference in share of assembly constituencies with a Congress legislator, subtracting the the pre-1967 period average from the post-1967 (inclusive) period average. HYV crops were first widely adopted in 1967. Darker shades indicate a larger loss of Congress seat share. Districts defined by 1961 boundaries. Un-shaded districts are missing data. 4
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics for Major Variables in Analysis Variable 1957-66 Mean 1967-76 Mean 1977-87 Mean SD Within-SD Panel A: State Assembly Constituency-level Congress Win 63.77 51.77 42.77 49.99 47.85 Congress Vote % 43.30 37.54 37.45 16.26 14.70 Agrarian Win 0.87 7.70 32.53 36.88 33.99 Agrarian Vote % 1.00 5.59 26.80 21.68 18.96 Non-Agrarian Win 27.31 34.48 22.04 44.72 42.60 Non-Agrarian Vote % 42.62 44.30 29.44 22.59 21.09 Panel B: Parliamentary Constituency-level Congress Win 74.89 61.70 58.16 48.58 42.01 Congress Vote % 45.82 44.26 43.99 16.48 13.59 Agrarian Win 1.36 4.41 31.68 38.39 35.16 Agrarian Vote % 1.72 2.97 34.15 26.39 23.53 Non-Agrarian Win 17.87 30.39 8.62 37.84 31.17 Non-Agrarian Vote % 40.80 46.54 17.53 24.32 21.10 OBC caste 0.10 0.13 0.21 0.37 0.31 Lower caste 0.29 0.31 0.35 0.47 0.37 Agriculturist 0.28 0.34 0.49 0.49 0.42 University 0.70 0.72 0.74 0.44 0.40 Panel C: District-level HYV 0.00 0.14 0.33 0.20 0.17 Rainfall 6.79 6.82 6.86 0.52 0.29 Yield 1060.39 1320.37 1347.93 777.00 367.23 Wage 4.04 4.09 5.11 1.90 1.13 Crop Price 121.20 127.67 101.08 31.49 24.10 Fertilizer 1.92 10.17 28.23 21.35 17.14 Tractors 0.22 0.90 3.15 3.65 2.92 1966 Irrigation 0.21 0.21 0.21 0.20 0.00 Aquifer 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.27 0.00 Notes: Within-SD is within-district standard deviation after partialing out district fixed effects. Panel A and B: Win is a binary indicator of winning the seat, multiplied by 100. Vote % is vote share, multiplied by 100. See text and appendix for coding of agrarian vs. non-agrarian opposition parties. See text for definitions of OBC caste, lower caste, agriculturist occupation, and university education based on legislator biographies. Panel C: HYV is share of agricultural land under HYV crops. Yield is agricultural productivity measured in terms of Rs./Ha for the top 6 major crops: rice, wheat, sorghum, millet, maize, sugarcane. Wage is the daily wage of a male agricultural laborer in Rs./day. Crop Price is a revenue weighted average of the price in Rs./quintal of the top 6 crops. All monetary amounts are deflated by state-specific consumer price indices to obtain real prices, base year 1973. Fertilizer usage is measured in terms of Kg./Ha. Tractors is number of tractors per 1000 hectares of agricultural land. Rainfall is measured in ln(annual mm). 1966 Irrigation is share of agricultural land with irrigation access in 1966. Aquifer is an indicator for the presence of a naturally occurring thick aquifer. 5
Figure 4: HYV Crop Adoption vs. Change in Congress Seat Share by District 0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 100 50 0 50 100 State Assembly Elections Mean HYV Adoption, 1967 1987 Percentage Point Change in INC Seat Share 0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 100 50 0 50 100 Parliamentary Elections Mean HYV Adoption, 1967 1987 Percentage Point Change in INC Seat Share Notes: Points represent districts. Horizontal axis measures mean share of agricultural land under HYV crop cultivation between 1967-1987. Vertical axis measures percentage point difference in share of assembly constituencies with a Congress legislator, subtracting the the pre-1967 period average from the post-1967 (inclusive) period average. HYV crops were first widely adopted in 1967. Line represents fitted bivariate OLS regression line. For state assembly elections, slope of line is -50.3 (standard error: 9.8). For parliamentary elections, slope of line is -28.5 (standard error: 19.4). 6
Table 2: OLS Estimates: Effects of HYV Crop Adoption on Congress Performance in State Elections Dependent variable: Congress Win Congress Vote % (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) HYV 32.334 26.848 19.192 11.654 9.691 5.854 (6.124) (5.854) (5.039) (2.298) (2.439) (1.818) Opposition Fractionalization 39.927 13.058 (2.040) (0.917) INC Presence 49.858 36.500 (1.458) (0.550) Hindi Belt Year FE Y Y Y Y Direct Rule Year FE Y Y Y Y Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y District FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Observations 21,907 21,907 21,906 21,907 21,907 21,906 Adjusted R 2 0.18 0.19 0.24 0.32 0.33 0.50 Clusters 270 270 270 270 270 270 Notes: Unit of observation assembly constituency-year for election years between 1957-1987. Outcomes: Congress Win indicates whether Congress won seat and Congress Vote % indicates Congress vote share, both multiplied by 100 so that coefficients have a percentage point interpretation. Explanatory variables: HYV crop adoption is district-level share of agricultural land with HYV crops (0-1). Opposition Fractionalization is one minus the Herfindahl index of opposition party vote shares (0-1). INC Presence is an indicator variable for the presence of a Congress party candidate. Hindi Belt is an indicator variable for location in a Hindi-speaking state. Direct Rule is an indicator variable for historical exposure to direct British colonial rule. Analysis estimated by OLS. Standard errors adjusted for clustering within districts. p<0.1; p<0.05; p<0.01 7
Table 3: OLS Estimates: Effects of HYV Crop Adoption on Congress Performance in Parliamentary Elections Dependent variable: Congress Win Congress Vote % (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) HYV 37.145 35.532 20.829 15.176 14.957 6.847 (12.385) (12.333) (10.991) (4.036) (3.891) (2.683) Opposition Fractionalization 70.014 3.990 (5.292) (1.658) INC Presence 84.738 49.199 (4.712) (1.435) Hindi Belt Year FE Y Y Y Y Direct Rule Year FE Y Y Y Y Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y District FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Observations 2,953 2,953 2,953 2,953 2,953 2,953 Adjusted R 2 0.26 0.33 0.44 0.32 0.37 0.70 Clusters 260 260 260 260 260 260 Notes: Unit of observation parliamentary constituency-year for election years between 1962-1985. Outcomes: Congress Win indicates whether Congress won seat and Congress Vote % indicates Congress vote share, both multiplied by 100 so that coefficients have a percentage point interpretation. Explanatory variables: HYV crop adoption is district-level share of agricultural land with HYV crops (0-1). Opposition Fractionalization is one minus the Herfindahl index of opposition party vote shares (0-1). INC Presence is an indicator variable for the presence of a Congress party candidate. Hindi Belt is an indicator variable for location in a Hindi-speaking state. Direct Rule is an indicator variable for historical exposure to direct British colonial rule. Analysis estimated by OLS. Standard errors adjusted for clustering within districts. p<0.1; p<0.05; p<0.01 8
Table 4: OLS Estimates: Pre-treatment Determinants of HYV Crop Adoption Dependent variable: HYV IADP (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) State Assembly INC Seat Share (%) 0.001 0.00003 (0.0004) (0.001) Parliamentary INC Seat Share (%) 0.0001 0.00000 (0.0002) (0.0004) 1966 Irrigation 0.516 0.238 (0.032) (0.065) Aquifer 0.195 0.046 (0.030) (0.048) Constant 0.203 0.237 0.129 0.223 0.046 0.052 0.003 0.045 (0.030) (0.018) (0.009) (0.009) (0.044) (0.029) (0.019) (0.014) Observations 270 247 270 269 270 247 270 269 Adjusted R 2 0.002 0.002 0.492 0.133 0.004 0.004 0.044 0.0002 Notes: Unit of observation is district. Outcomes: HYV Intensity is mean district-level HYV crop adoption, 1967-1987 (0-1). IADP is an indicator for whether a district was selected for the Intensive Agricultural Districts Program. Explanatory variables: INC Seat % is percentage point Congress seat share before 1967, for state assembly and parliamentary elections, respectively. 1966 irrigation is pre-treatment share of agricultural land with access to irrigation in 1966 (0-1). Aquifer is an indicator for the presence of a naturally occurring thick aquifer. Analysis estimated by OLS. p<0.1; p<0.05; p<0.01 9
Table 5: IV Estimates: Effects of HYV Crop Adoption on Congress Performance in State Elections Dependent variable: Congress Win Congress Vote % (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) HYV 76.174 77.589 49.679 23.272 21.982 11.052 (16.629) (19.831) (17.791) (5.650) (6.423) (5.151) Opposition Fractionalization 39.604 13.113 (2.030) (0.919) INC Presence 48.852 36.329 (1.531) (0.570) Hindi Belt Year FE Y Y Y Y Direct Rule Year FE Y Y Y Y Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y District FE Y Y Y Y Y Y First-stage 1966 Irrigation Post 0.433 0.402 0.400 0.433 0.402 0.400 (0.051) (0.051) (0.051) (0.051) (0.051) (0.051) F-statistic 71.6 61.7 61.5 71.6 61.7 61.5 Observations 21,907 21,907 21,906 21,907 21,907 21,906 Adjusted R 2 0.17 0.18 0.24 0.31 0.33 0.50 Clusters 270 270 270 270 270 270 Notes: Unit of observation assembly constituency-year for election years between 1957-1987. Outcomes: Congress Win indicates whether Congress won seat and Congress Vote % indicates Congress vote share, both multiplied by 100 so that coefficients have a percentage point interpretation. Explanatory variables: HYV crop adoption is district-level share of agricultural land with HYV crops (0-1). Instrument for HYV crop adoption is an interaction term between a time variable indicating the introduction of HYV crops in 1967 and a cross-sectional variable indicating the share of agricultural land with access to irrigation in 1966. Opposition Fractionalization is one minus the Herfindahl index of opposition party vote shares (0-1). INC Presence is an indicator variable for the presence of a Congress party candidate. Hindi Belt is an indicator variable for location in Hindispeaking state. Direct Rule is an indicator variable for historical exposure to direct British colonial rule. Analysis estimated by 2SLS. Standard errors adjusted for clustering within districts. p<0.1; p<0.05; p<0.01 10
Table 6: IV Estimates: Effects of HYV Crop Adoption on Congress Performance in Parliamentary Elections Dependent variable: Congress Win Congress Vote % (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) HYV 80.733 95.825 35.216 26.846 27.745 1.416 (31.551) (36.024) (33.339) (9.252) (10.760) (7.700) Opposition Fractionalization 69.753 3.840 (5.197) (1.659) INC Presence 84.156 49.533 (4.805) (1.489) Hindi Belt Year FE Y Y Y Y Direct Rule Year FE Y Y Y Y Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y District FE Y Y Y Y Y Y First-stage 1966 Irrigation Post 0.412 0.380 0.375 0.412 0.380 0.375 (0.055) (0.057) (0.056) (0.055) (0.057) (0.056) F-statistic 55.2 44.5 44.8 55.2 44.5 44.8 Observations 2,953 2,953 2,953 2,953 2,953 2,953 Adjusted R 2 0.25 0.32 0.44 0.32 0.37 0.70 Clusters 260 260 260 260 260 260 Notes: Unit of observation parliamentary constituency-year for election years between 1962-1985. Outcomes: Congress Win indicates whether Congress won seat and Congress Vote % indicates Congress vote share, both multiplied by 100 so that coefficients have a percentage point interpretation. Explanatory variables: HYV crop adoption is district-level share of agricultural land with HYV crops (0-1). Instrument for HYV crop adoption is an interaction term between a time variable indicating the introduction of HYV crops in 1967 and a cross-sectional variable indicating the share of agricultural land with access to irrigation in 1966. Opposition Fractionalization is one minus the Herfindahl index of opposition party vote shares (0-1). INC Presence is an indicator variable for the presence of a Congress party candidate. Hindi Belt is an indicator variable for location in Hindispeaking state. Direct Rule is an indicator variable for historical exposure to direct British colonial rule. Analysis estimated by 2SLS. Standard errors adjusted for clustering within districts. p<0.1; p<0.05; p<0.01 11
Figure 5: Correlation between Pre-existing Irrigation and Congress Performance Over Time Outcome: Congress Win Coefficient on Pre existing Irrigation 40 20 0 20 40 T 2: 1957 1961 T 1: 1962 1966 T: 1967 1971 T+1: 1972 1976 T+2: 1977 1981 T+3: 1982 1987 Time Period Outcome: Congress Vote Share Coefficient on Pre existing Irrigation 15 10 5 0 5 10 15 T 2: 1957 1961 T 1: 1962 1966 T: 1967 1971 T+1: 1972 1976 T+2: 1977 1981 T+3: 1982 1987 Time Period Notes: Unit of analysis assembly constituency-year for election years between 1957-1987. Outcome is either Congress win or Congress vote share in percentage points. Vertical axis range represents zero plus and minus an in-sample standard deviation of the outcome variable. Points represent estimates of coefficient on time period dummy variables interacted with the cross sectional measure of suitability for HYV crop adoption based on pre-existing irrigation coverage in 1966. HYV crops first widely adopted in 1967. Regression also controls for year fixed effects. Analysis estimated by OLS. Standard errors adjusted for clustering within districts. Dashed bands represent 95% confidence interval. 12
Table 7: OLS and IV Estimates: Effects of HYV Crop Adoption by Opposition Party Type Dependent variable: State Assembly Elections Parliamentary Elections Agrarian Opposition Parties Non-Agrarian Opposition Agrarian Opposition Parties Non-Agrarian Opposition Win Vote % Win Vote % Win Vote % Win Vote % (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) Panel A: OLS HYV 30.203 19.355 0.729 5.509 24.904 11.699 16.173 2.842 (5.801) (3.425) (5.048) (3.306) (9.182) (4.963) (8.969) (6.013) Panel B: 2SLS HYV 73.479 53.486 2.844 24.963 50.213 31.596 32.948 12.803 (12.361) (8.288) (14.306) (7.834) (12.993) (7.711) (25.761) (14.803) Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y District FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Observations 21,907 21,907 21,907 21,907 2,953 2,953 2,953 2,953 Clusters 279 270 270 270 260 260 260 260 Notes: Panel A is OLS specification. Panel B instruments for HYV crop adoption with interaction term between a time dummy variable indicating the introduction of HYV crops in 1967 and measure of pre-existing irrigation coverage in 1966. See text and appendix for coding of the top 20 opposition parties as agrarian or non-agrarian. Win is binary indicator of winning the seat and Vote % is vote share, both multiplied by 100 so that coefficients have a percentage point interpretation. HYV crop adoption is district-level share of agricultural land planted with HYV crops (0-1). Standard errors adjusted for clustering within districts. p<0.1; p<0.05; p<0.01. 13
Table 8: OLS and IV Estimates of Economic Effects of HYV Crop Adoption Dependent variable: Yield Wage Crop Price Fertilizer Tractors (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) Panel A: OLS HYV 431.145 0.886 31.931 65.732 5.659 (109.941) (0.288) (5.210) (5.444) (1.566) Panel B: 2SLS HYV 1,288.654 3.666 26.655 115.612 11.738 (200.820) (0.655) (9.897) (6.785) (2.108) Year FE Y Y Y Y Y District FE Y Y Y Y Y Observations 8,364 8,370 8,364 8,370 8,370 Clusters 270 270 270 270 270 Notes: Unit of observation district-year for years 1957-1987. Panel A is OLS specification. Panel B instruments for HYV crop adoption with interaction term between a time dummy variable indicating the introduction of HYV crops in 1967 and measure of pre-existing irrigation coverage in 1966. Outcomes: Yield is measured in terms of rs./ha for the top 6 major crops. Wage is the daily wage of a male agricultural laborer in rs./day. Crop Price Index is a revenue weighted average of the market price in rs./quintal of the top 6 crops. Fertilizer usage is measured in terms of kg/ha. Tractor usage is measured in terms of tractors/1000 ha. All monetary amounts are deflated by state-specific consumer price indices to obtain real prices, base year 1973. Explanatory variable: HYV crop adoption is district-level share of agricultural land planted with HYV crops (0-1). Standard errors adjusted for clustering within districts. p<0.1; p<0.05; p<0.01. 14
Table 9: OLS Estimates: Effects of Rainfall Shocks on Congress and Opposition Party Seat Shares Dependent variable: State Assembly Win Parliamentary Win Congress Agrarian Opposition Non-Agrarian Congress Agrarian Opposition Non-Agrarian (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) Rainfall (ln mm) 11.516 15.351 2.796 21.596 16.685 0.707 (2.506) (2.208) (1.845) (4.456) (3.045) (3.588) Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y District FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Observations 21,907 21,907 21,907 2,953 2,953 2,953 Clusters 270 270 270 260 260 260 Notes: Unit of observation constituency-year for state and parliamentary elections, respectively. Outcomes: Vote % indicates vote share and Win indicates whether or not party won the seat, both multiplied by 100 so that coefficients have a percentage point interpretation. See text and table A2 for coding of opposition parties as agrarian or non-agrarian. Explanatory variable: Rainfall is measured in ln(annual mm). The inclusion of district fixed effects means that the effects of rainfall are identified from within-district deviations from long-run mean i.e. rainfall shocks. Analysis estimated by OLS. Standard errors adjusted for clustering within districts. p<0.1; p<0.05; p<0.01. 15
Table 10: OLS Estimates: Economic Effects of Rainfall Shocks Dependent variable: Yield Wage Crop Price Fertilizer Tractors (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) Rainfall 96.528 0.221 1.896 0.771 0.227 (24.678) (0.062) (1.258) (0.795) (0.371) Year FE Y Y Y Y Y District FE Y Y Y Y Y Observations 8,332 8,337 8,332 8,337 8,337 Adjusted R 2 0.81 0.77 0.58 0.66 0.50 Clusters 269 269 269 269 269 Notes: Unit of observation district-year for years 1957-1987. Outcomes: Yield is measured in terms of rs./ha for the top 6 major crops. Wage is the daily wage of a male agricultural laborer in rs./day. Crop Price Index is a revenue weighted average of the price in rs./quintal of the top 6 crops. Fertilizer usage is measured in terms of kg/ha. Tractor usage is measured in terms of tractors/1000 ha. All monetary amounts are deflated by statespecific consumer price indices to obtain real prices, base year 1973. Explanatory variable: Rainfall is measured in ln(annual mm). The inclusion of district fixed effects means that the effects of rainfall are identified from within-district deviations from long-run mean i.e. rainfall shocks. Analysis estimated by OLS. Standard errors adjusted for clustering within districts. p<0.1; p<0.05; p<0.01. 16
Table 11: OLS Estimates: Impact of HYV Crops on MP Caste, Education, and Occupation Dependent variable: Caste Socioeconomic Lower caste OBC caste University Agriculturist (1) (2) (3) (4) Panel A: OLS HYV 0.124 0.257 0.116 0.062 (0.135) (0.134) (0.115) (0.118) Panel B: 2SLS HYV 0.400 0.548 0.224 0.067 (0.801) (0.569) (0.270) (0.311) Year FE Y Y Y Y District FE Y Y Y Y Observations 1,330 1,330 2,384 2,2384 Adjusted R 2 0.33 0.23 0.10 0.24 Clusters 133 133 245 245 Notes: Unit of observation parliamentary constituency-year for years 1962-1985. Outcomes: Indicator for intermediate or other backward class caste and for lower caste and/or religious/ethnic minority. Caste data from Jaffrelot (2003) dataset. Agriculturist indicates whether MP self-reports as an "agriculturist". University indicates whether MP self-reports a university degree. Socieconomic variables coded through natural language processing of digitized Who s Who MP biographies. Explanatory variable: HYV crop adoption is district-level share of agricultural land planted with HYV crops (0-1). Analysis estimated by OLS. Standard errors adjusted for clustering within districts. p<0.1; p<0.05; p<0.01. 17
Appendix State Table A1: States and Election Years in Analysis Election Year Panel A: State Assembly Elections Andhra Pradesh 1957, 1962, 1967, 1972, 1978, 1983, 1985 Bihar 1957, 1962, 1967, 1969, 1972, 1977, 1980, 1985 Gujarat 1957, 1962, 1967, 1972, 1975, 1980, 1985 Haryana 1957, 1962, 1967, 1968, 1972, 1977, 1982, 1987 Karnataka 1957, 1962, 1967, 1972, 1978, 1983, 1985 Madhya Pradesh 1957, 1962, 1967, 1972, 1977, 1980, 1985 Maharashtra 1957, 1962, 1967, 1972, 1978, 1980, 1985 Orissa 1957, 1961, 1967, 1971, 1974, 1977, 1980, 1985 Punjab 1957, 1962, 1967, 1969, 1972, 1977, 1980, 1985 Rajasthan 1957, 1962, 1967, 1972, 1977, 1980, 1985 Tamil Nadu 1957, 1962, 1967, 1971, 1977, 1980, 1984 Uttar Pradesh 1957, 1962, 1967, 1969, 1974, 1977, 1980, 1985 West Bengal 1957, 1962, 1967, 1969, 1971, 1972, 1977, 1982, 1987 Panel B: Parliamentary Elections All States Above 1962, 1967, 1971, 1977, 1980, 1984 (Punjab in 1985) Notes: Karnataka and Tamil Nadu are the states of Mysore and Madras before 1967. The districts that comprise Haryana were a part of Punjab before the 1967 elections. In the 1957 elections, the districts that comprise the states of Maharashtra and Gujarat were part of Bombay state. Districts in all major states except Assam and Kerala are included in the analysis, covering 85% of India s land area. 18
Table A2: Coding of Top 20 Opposition Parties Party AC/PC Agrarian Notes Sources Seats TPS 0/12 No Telangana Praja Samiti: Telangana separatist party. Weiner, 1971 RSP 77/12 No Revolutionary Socialist Party: socialist party. Sinha, 1965 NCU 82/7 No Congress (Urs): split from Congress in 1978. Manor, 1980 GP 87/4 No Ganatrantra Parishad: conservative party supported by Bailey, 1959 landlords. Joined SWP in 1962. PWP 109/8 No Peasants and Workers Party of India: left-wing party formed Srinivas, 1957 in 1947. FBL 127/12 No Forward Block: left-wing nationalist party, formed in 1939 by Sinha, 1965 Subhas Chandra Bose. NCO 166/21 No Congress (Organisation): conservative wing which split from Hardgrave, 1970 the Indira-Gandhi led faction of the Congress party in 1969. TDP 203/31 Yes Telugu Desam Party: regional party founded in 1982. Leadership Kohli, 1988 and support drawn considerably from the Kammas, a prosperous farming caste. BKD 212/1 Yes Bharatiya Kranti Dal: pro-rural, anti-urban party founded in 1967 by INC dissident Charan Singh Duncan, 1988 SAD 235/19 Yes Shiromani Akali Dal: Sikh-Punjabi sub-nationalist party Kumar, 2004 founded in 1920. Leadership drawn significantly from prosperous farming communities. LKD 247/289 Yes Bharatiya Lok Dal: founded in 1974, descended from BKD. Brass, 1981 SSP 249/26 No Samyukta Socialist Party: split from PSP in 1964. Fickett, 1973 BJP 357/2 No Bharatiya Janata Party: Hindu nationalist party founded in Jaffrelot, 1999 1980, descended from BJS. ADK 385/35 Yes All India Anna Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam: split from DMK in 1972. Wyatt, 2009 DMK 400/66 Yes Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam: Dravidian sub-nationalist Wyatt, 2009 party. Populist platforms consisted significantly of subsidies for farmers. PSP 460/24 No Praja Socialist Party: socialist party formed in 1952. Fickett, 1973 SWA 505/78 No Swatantra Party: conservative party founded in 1959. Erdman, 2007 BJS 569/70 No Bharatiya Jana Sangh: Hindu nationalist party founded in 1951 by Syama Prasad Mookherjee. Jaffrelot, 1999 CPI 691/75 No Communist Party of India: India s first communist party, founded in 1920. CPM 885/103 No Communist Party of India (Marxist): split from CPI in 1964. Kohli, 1983 JNP 1716/79 Yes Janata Party: merger of several opposition parties in 1977, Rudolph and Rudolph, 1980 with large support base amongst farmers. IND 1780/83 No Independent: independent candidates were typically local notables without organized party ties. Chhibber and Kollman, 2009 Notes: Table contains top 20 opposition parties by seats won. Party is classified as agrarian if it received significant political support from and/or advocated programs oriented around interests of agricultural producers. 19
Figure A3: Matching Assembly and Parliamentary Constituencies to 1961 Districts Panel A: Split of 1961 Shahabad District Panel B: Assembly Constituencies Panel C: Parliamentary Constituencies BRAHMPUR SHAHPUR BARHARA ARRAH BHOJPUR BUXAR JAGDISHPUR DUMRAON SANDESH BUXAR ARRAH RAJPUR PIRO RAMGARH SAHAR BIKRAMGANJ DINARA MOHANIA KARAKAT BIKRAMGANJ ROHTAS CHAINPUR NOKHA CHENARI DEHRI SASARAM BHABHUA SASARAM Notes: Panel A: The 1961 District Shahabad subsequently split into two constituent districts, Rohtas and Bhojpur. Panel B: Post-1976 delimitation assembly constituencies comprising Rohtas and Bhojpur. Assembly constituencies fit contiguously within district boundaries. Panel C: Post-1976 delimitation parliamentary constituencies matched to Rohtas and Bhojpur districts. Note that Bikramganj was matched to Rohtas district and Arrah to Bhojpur district, despite partially intersecting with adjoining districts, because the majority of their constituent assembly constituencies fell in those districts. All matching of 1961 districts to assembly and parliamentary constituencies was done on the basis of tables in the Administrative Atlas of India and the 1956, 1961, 1967, and 1976 Delimitation Commission Reports. 20
Figure A4: Example of Automated Coding of Digitized Legislator Biography Notes: Who s Who biography of Chaudhury Charan Singh Member of Parliament, kisan (farmer) mobilizer, and leader of the Janata party scraped from http://164.100.47.132/lssnew/biodata_1_12/2336.htm. Occupation coded as Professional and Career Politician based on detected keywords lawyer" and "political worker". Coded as possessing a university education based on keywords "b.sc.", "m.a.", and "ll.b.". Caste coded as OBC/Intermediate based on Jaffrelot (2003) dataset. 21
Table A5: IV Estimates: Effects of HYV Crop Adoption on Congress Performance in State Assembly Elections using Aquifer Instrument Dependent variable: Congress Win Congress Vote % (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) HYV 86.200 89.187 65.074 11.730 8.580 17.046 (37.283) (47.444) (43.745) (10.037) (12.141) (11.828) Opposition Fractionalization 39.560 13.133 (2.114) (0.929) INC Presence 48.344 36.131 (2.145) (0.724) Hindi Belt Year FE Y Y Y Y Direct Rule Year FE Y Y Y Y Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y District FE Y Y Y Y Y Y First-stage Aquifer Post 0.133 0.113 0.113 0.133 0.113 0.113 (0.034) (0.034) (0.034) (0.034) (0.034) (0.034) F-statistic 14.9 11.0 11.0 14.8 11.0 11.0 Observations 21,843 21,843 21,842 21,843 21,843 21,842 Adjusted R 2 0.17 0.18 0.23 0.32 0.33 0.50 Clusters 268 268 268 268 268 268 Notes: Unit of observation assembly constituency-year for election years between 1957-1987. Outcomes: Win indicates whether Congress won seat and Vote % indicates Congress vote share, both multiplied by 100 so that coefficients have a percentage point interpretation. Explanatory variables: HYV crop adoption is district-level share of agricultural land with HYV crops (0-1). Instrument for HYV crop adoption is an interaction term between a time dummy variable indicating the introduction of HYV crops in 1967 and a cross-sectional variable indicating presence of a naturally occurring thick aquifer. Opposition Fractionalization is one minus the Herfindahl index of opposition party vote shares (0-1). INC Presence is an indicator variable for the presence of a Congress party candidate. Hindi Belt is an indicator variable for location in a Hindi-speaking state. Direct Rule is an indicator variable for historical exposure to direct British colonial rule. Analysis estimated by 2SLS. Standard errors adjusted for clustering within districts. p<0.1; p<0.05; p<0.01 22
Table A6: IV Estimates: Effects of HYV Crop Adoption on Congress Performance in Parliamentary Elections using Aquifer Instrument Dependent variable: Congress Win Congress Vote % (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) HYV 85.457 91.420 64.047 15.031 12.655 21.120 (38.147) (48.588) (44.619) (10.016) (11.729) (11.568) Opposition Fractionalization 41.561 16.664 (2.185) (0.704) INC Presence 42.887 34.523 (2.458) (0.669) Hindi Belt Year FE Y Y Y Y Direct Rule Year FE Y Y Y Y Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y District FE Y Y Y Y Y Y First-stage Aquifer Post 0.106 0.091 0.090 0.106 0.091 0.090 (0.029) (0.030) (0.030) (0.029) (0.030) (0.030) F-statistic 13.3 9.0 8.9 13.3 9.0 8.9 Observations 2,940 2,940 2,940 2,940 2,940 2,940 Adjusted R 2 0.26 0.33 0.44 0.32 0.37 0.70 Clusters 259 259 259 259 259 259 Notes: Unit of observation parliamentary constituency-year for election years between 1962-1985. Outcomes: Win indicates whether Congress won seat and Vote % indicates Congress vote share, both multiplied by 100 so that coefficients have a percentage point interpretation. Explanatory variables: HYV crop adoption is district-level share of agricultural land with HYV crops (0-1). Instrument for HYV crop adoption is an interaction term between a time dummy variable indicating the introduction of HYV crops in 1967 and a cross-sectional variable indicating presence of a naturally occurring thick aquifer. Opposition Fractionalization is one minus the Herfindahl index of opposition party vote shares (0-1). INC Presence is an indicator variable for the presence of a Congress party candidate. Hindi Belt is an indicator variable for location in a Hindi-speaking state. Direct Rule is an indicator variable for historical exposure to direct British colonial rule. Analysis estimated by 2SLS. Standard errors adjusted for clustering within districts. p<0.1; p<0.05; p<0.01 23
References Bai, Jushan and Pierre Perron. 2003. Computation and Analysis of Multiple Structural Change Models. Journal of Applied Econometrics 18(1):1 22. Bailey, Frederick G. 1959. The Ganatantra Parishad. Economic Weekly 24:1469 1476. Brass, Paul R. 1981. Congress, the Lok Dal, and the Middle-peasant Castes: An Analysis of the 1977 and 1980 Parliamentary Elections in Uttar Pradesh. Pacific Affairs pp. 5 41. Chhibber, Pradeep and Ken Kollman. 2009. The formation of national party systems: Federalism and party competition in Canada, Great Britain, India, and the United States. Princeton University Press. Dasgupta, Aditya. 2016. How Dominant Parties Survive, Decline, and Shape Democracy: Lessons from India PhD thesis Harvard University. Duncan, Ian. 1988. Party Politics and the North Indian Peasantry: The Rise of the Bharatiya Kranti Dal in Uttar Pradesh. The Journal of Peasant Studies 16(1):40 76. Erdman, Howard L. 2007. The Swatantra Party and Indian Conservatism. Vol. 5 Cambridge University Press. Fickett, Lewis P. 1973. The Praja Socialist Party of India 1952-1972: A Final Assessment. Asian Survey pp. 826 832. Hardgrave, Robert L. 1970. The Congress in India Crisis and Split. Asian Survey pp. 256 262. Jaffrelot, Christophe. 1999. The Hindu Nationalist Movement and Indian Politics, 1925 to the 1990s: Strategies of Identity-building, Implantation and Mobilisation. Penguin Books India. Jaffrelot, Christophe. 2003. India s silent revolution: the rise of the lower castes in North India. Orient Blackswan. Kohli, Atul. 1983. Parliamentary Communism and Agrarian Reform: The Evidence from India s Bengal. Asian Survey pp. 783 809. Kohli, Atul. 1988. The NTR phenomenon in Andhra Pradesh: Political change in a South Indian state. Asian Survey pp. 991 1017. Kumar, Ashutosh. 2004. Electoral Politics in Punjab: Study of Akali Dal. Economic and Political Weekly pp. 1515 1520. Manor, James. 1980. Pragmatic Progressives in Regional Politics: The Case of Devaraj Urs. Economic and Political Weekly pp. 201 213. Rudolph, Susanne Hoeber and Lloyd I Rudolph. 1980. The centrist future of Indian politics. Asian Survey pp. 575 594. 24
Sinha, Lalan Prasad. 1965. The Left-Wing in India, 1919-47. Vol. 1 New Publishers. Srinivas, Mysore Narasimhachar. 1957. Caste in Modern India. The Journal of Asian Studies pp. 529 548. Weiner, Myron. 1971. The 1971 Elections and the Indian Party System. Asian Survey pp. 1153 1166. Wyatt, Andrew. 2009. Party System Change in South India: Political Entrepreneurs, Patterns and Processes. Routledge. 25