The Irony of Human Rights in the Vietnam War. Andrew Curley

The Irony of Human Rights in the Vietnam War Andrew Curley

Curley 2 The decades-long conflict in Indochina, the most violent and destructive stage in Cold War history, represents a major misstep in the development global human rights. Following World War II, the French colonial empire in Asia was challenged by the rise of nationalists led by Ho Chi Minh, a revolutionary inspired by the ideas of independence found in the rhetoric of American presidents Thomas Jefferson and Woodrow Wilson. Simultaneously, American foreign policy and political ideology shifted to match the climate of the Cold War, and as such the United States involved itself in Indochina under the banner of anti-communism. The United States political agenda was given a strong moral dimension during the Johnson administration, which sought to assert America s position as the leader of the Free World by acting in defense of the South Vietnamese government. Johnson s success in domestic human rights progression created an impetus for the implementation of his Great Society abroad, especially to those nations under the threat of Communism. Ironically, America and North Vietnam were fighting against each other for the same essential human rights goals, the establishment of freedom and self-determination put forth by Presidents Jefferson and Wilson. The outset of the Indochinese conflict was clearly defined by colonialism; or rather the breakdown of said system. Vietnam, a longstanding French colonial territory, came under the control of the Japanese Empire following the fall of France in World War II. The power shift did not last, and the eventual defeat of the Japanese Imperial Army created a power vacuum in which France and several domestic nationalist groups vied for sovereignty in Vietnam 1. The Vietminh, headed by Ho Chi Minh, led the strongest resistance among the nationalist groups, forcing the French to appeal to its allies in order to reinforce its colonial foothold. It was critical for France to receive additional aid from the United States, the most powerful Western nation to emerge out 1 Frederik Logevall The Indochinese wars and the Cold War, 1945-1975. in The Cambridge History of the Cold War: Volume II: Crises and Détante, ed. Melvyn P. Leffler and Odd Arne Westad (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010) 281.

Curley 3 of World War II, and so French diplomats used Ho Chi Minh s communist affiliations to make the Indochinese conflict a Cold War issue 2. Following the deterioration of American-Soviet relations in the aftermath of World War II, leaders in Washington were keen to offer aid to France following claims such as those by Admiral Thierry d Argenlieu that Ho and the Vietminh were mere pawns in Stalin s struggle for world supremacy, and that Indochina was where the West must take a stand. 3 The loss of Indochina to Communism proved too great a threat for the global balance of power for the United States to ignore. In reality, Cold War ideology factored little into the motivations of the Vietminh war effort. Though Ho Chi Minh and his chief lieutenants were dedicated Marxists, they were far more interested in the pursuit of independence and the total repudiation of colonialism than furthering the global spread of Communism. 4 Ho first asserted these nationalist principles in a speech on the founding of the Indochinese Communist Party, delivered on February 18, 1930 in Hong Kong. Largely containing anti-french and anti-imperialist rhetoric, the speech introduces human rights principles that would later be more extensively developed in the Democratic Republic of Vietnam s Declaration of Independence. Ho asserts [The Indochinese Communist Party] will help the proletariat lead the revolution waged for the sake of all oppressed and exploited people before introducing ten Party slogans, including several of note such as: 2. To make Indochina completely independent; 7. To abolish the forced buying of government bonds, the poll-tax and all unjust taxes hitting the poor; 8. To bring democratic freedoms to the masses; 2 Frederik Logevall, 282. 3 Ibid., 282. 4 Ibid., 281.

Curley 4 9. To dispense education to all the people; 10. To realize equality between man and woman. 5 These slogans gain further importance when considering the impact of Woodrow Wilson s 1918 speech on the Fourteen Points, which led to the president s veneration among the colonies of the world due in part to the Fifth Point, which stipulates: A free, open-minded and absolutely impartial adjustment of all colonial claims based upon a strict observance of the principle that in determining all such questions of sovereignty, the interests of the populations concerned must have equal weight with the equitable claims of the government whose title is to be determined. 6 In his fourteenth and final point, Wilson outlines his plan for lasting peace assured by a league of nations that would provide mutual guarantees of political independence and territorial integrity to great and small states alike. 7 This reveals the contradiction in American foreign policy, that Ho Chi Minh s appeal on behalf of the Indochinese Communist Party would be deemed a threat to global freedom despite being a direct execution of the right to political independence argued for by Woodrow Wilson. In fact, in the early stages of the Indochinese colonial conflict between France and the Vietminh, before it became a Cold War issue, Ho Chi Minh pleaded for US aid several times in 1945-46 to no reply. 8 Further hypocrisy of the United States steadfast disregard for the Vietminh can be found when considering the nature and content of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam s Declaration of Independence, written and announced by Ho in 1945. The document s opening statement suggests a clear alignment with Western rights values: All men are created 5 Ho Chi Minh. Appeal Made on the Occasion of the Founding of the Indochinese Communist Party Ho Chi Minh Internet Archive, Marxists Internet Archive, http://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/ho-chi-minh/works/1930/ 02/18.htm 6 Wilson, Woodrow. Fourteen Points: Delivered in Joint Session by President Woodrow Wilson, January 8, 1918. Exodus Books. http://www.exodusbooks.com/samples/vp/o3fourteenpoints.pdf 7 Ibid. 8 Frederick Logevall, 283.

Curley 5 equal; they are endowed by their Creator with certain inalienable Rights; among these are Life, Liberty, and the pursuit of Happiness. This immortal statement was made in the Declaration of Independence of the United States of America in 1776. In a broader sense, this means: All the peoples on the earth are equal from birth, all the peoples have a right to live, to be happy and free. 9 Ho strengthens his rhetoric by juxtaposing France s own revolutionary history of Liberty, Equality, and Fraternity with their current colonial ventures in Vietnam, which he cites as [acting] contrary to the ideals of humanity and justice. 10 Mirroring the American Declaration, what follows is an indictment of the injustices and rights abuses committed by the French colonial system, namely social, territorial, and economic manipulation, for example: they have set up three distinct political regimes in the North, the Center, and the South of Viet- Nam in order to wreck our national unity... they have practiced obscurantism against our people... To weaken our race they have forced us to use opium and alcohol... They have robbed us of our rice fields, our mines, our forests, and our raw materials. They have monopolized the issuing of bank notes and the export trade... They have invented numerous unjustifiable taxes and reduced our people, especially our peasantry, to a state of extreme poverty. 11 Ho concludes his declaration by affirming the Vietminh s commitment to resist the French and pursue freedom and self-determination at any cost. 12 Contained in this single document is a synthesis of Woodrow Wilson and Thomas Jefferson s political rhetoric, for the 1945 Vietnamese declaration is simultaneously a statement of war aims and an edict on the establishment a government based on the principles of democratic liberty. 9 Ho Chi Minh. Declaration of Independence of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam. Vincent Ferraro, Resources for the Study of International Relations and Foreign Policy. Mount Holyoke College. https://www.mtholyoke.edu/ acad/intrel/vietdec.htm 10 Ibid. 11 Ibid. 12 Ibid.

Curley 6 In his Declaration of Independence, Ho Chi Minh predicted that the Allied nations, which at Teheran and San Francisco [acknowledged] the principles of self-determination and equality of nations, [would] not refuse to acknowledge the independence of Viet-Nam. 13 This statement would prove to be ironically prophetic, and it speaks to the larger and more complicated ideological contradiction of American foreign policy in Indochina, which is at the crux of this essay s argument. Though the United States certainly advocated Vietnamese independence, Ho Chi Minh s Democratic Republic was excluded from this particular conception of Vietnamese independence. Instead, in early 1950, the Truman administration officially recognized the legitimacy of a French-sponsored rival government led by former Vietnamese emperor Bo Dai. 14 Almost simultaneously, the Democratic Republic of Vietnam was granted diplomatic recognition by the Soviet Union and the People s Republic of China, with Mao Zedong providing the Vietminh with arms and military training. 15 Thus, the entrance of the Cold War s major players forced an arbitrary ideological division onto a colonial struggle, seemingly moving France away from the foreground of the essential conflict and ignoring the Western origins of Ho Chi Minh s campaign for independence. As the Indochinese conflict escalated, the ideological divide fostered by the presence of the major Cold War powers eventually manifested in the borders and boundaries of Vietnam itself. The French army failed to make military progress against the Vietminh despite receiving approximately $3 billion in aid from the United States between 1950 and 1954. 16 In order to extricate itself from Indochina, France called for a conference in Geneva with the aims of reaching a settlement, with representatives from the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union, the 13 Ho Chi Minh. Declaration of Independence of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam. 14 Frederik Logevall, 286. 15 Ibid., 284 16 Ibid., 288.

Curley 7 People s Republic of China, and the United States also in attendance. Despite pleas from French officials, President Eisenhower refused to provide military aid, and as a result, after a protracted stalemate, the French garrison at Dienbienphu fell to the Vietminh on May 7, 1954. 17 Weeks later in Geneva, French, Soviet, and Chinese diplomats developed a settlement which would divide Vietnam at the 17 th parallel, among other Indochinese developments. The seventh clause of the Geneva Accords states, The Conference declares that, so far as Viet-Nam is concerned, the settlement of political problems, effected on the basis of respect for the principles of independence, unity and territorial integrity, shall permit the Viet-Namese people to enjoy the fundamental freedoms, guaranteed by democratic institutions established as a result of free general elections by secret ballot. In order to ensure that sufficient progress in the restoration of peace has been made, and that all the necessary conditions obtain for free expression of the national will, general elections shall be held in July 1956. 18 This clause reflects the continued influence of President Wilson s Fourteen Points on international affairs; also, the values of independence, unity and territorial integrity can be found in the aforementioned writings of Ho Chi Minh. However, the Vietminh were reluctant to agree to the Geneva Accords given their victory over France at Dienbienphu maintaining the war effort would earn them total control of the nation, rather than the northern half that was guaranteed by the diplomatic actions of the Conference but they had little choice following the concessions made by their more powerful Chinese and Soviet allies. 19 Though the Vietnamese right to self-determination was at least formally recognized for the first time in the Indochinese conflict, Cold War politics once again took precedence and subverted Ho Chi Minh s campaign for independence. 17 Edward H. Judge, and John W. Langdon, The Cold War: A Global History with Documents. 2nd ed. (Upper Saddle River: Prentice Hall, 1999), 161. 18 Ibid., 330. 19 Frederik Logevall, 290.

Curley 8 The United States participation in the 1954 Geneva Conference also warrants specific attention, as it reveals the first development in the ideological hypocrisy and human rights violations that would come to fruition in the Johnson administration. The entirety of America s involvement in Vietnam can be summarized as a breach of Geneva Accords twelfth clause, which states each member of the Geneva Conference undertakes to respect the sovereignty, the independence, the unity and the territorial integrity of [Cambodia, Laos, and Viet-Nam], and to refrain from any interference in their internal affairs. 20 In 1954, American officials recognized the likelihood of a swift Communist victory in the reunification elections; Ho Chi Minh s popularity was undeniable, as President Eisenhower remarked, I have never talked or corresponded with a person knowledgeable in Indochinese affairs who did not agree that had elections been held as of the time of the fighting, possibly 80 per cent of the population would have voted for the Communist Ho Chi Minh as their leader rather than Chief of State Bao Dai. 21 Thus, seemingly in conjunction with an unwillingness to abide by the aforementioned twelfth clause, the United States and South Vietnam refused to sign the Geneva Accords. Furthermore, the Eisenhower administration furthered their support by providing supplies, advisors, and financial aid to Ngo Dinh Diem, the new Catholic nationalist leader of South Vietnam. 22 They also supported Diem s refusal to hold the 1956 elections or even enter into any sort of negotiations with the Vietminh, which had been stipulated in the Accords. The extent of the United States involvement deterred the other Geneva Convention nations from taking action to uphold the elections, and soon American aid to South Vietnam created something of a dependent 20 Edward H. Judge, and John W. Langdon, 331. 21 Dwight D. Eisenhower. Eisenhower's Views on the Popularity of Ho Chi Minh. Vincent Ferraro, Resources for the Study of International Relations and Foreign Policy. Mount Holyoke College. https://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/ intrel/vietnam/ddeho.htm 22 Frederik Logevall, 291.

Curley 9 relationship. This was the catalyst for the creation of the political climate that would eventually lead to America s participation in the Vietnam War. Soon after the fallout of the non-existent 1956 elections, Diem s rule, characterized by paternalism and religious alienation, gave rise to much dissent throughout Vietnam, most notably including a contingent of ex-vietminh fighters who remained below the 17 th parallel following the Geneva Conference. Initially, the anti-diem insurgency existed and acted independent of Ho Chi Minh s government in Hanoi, which had insisted on a political struggle over a military one, but eventually the Politburo of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam stated in January 1961 that the revolution in the South is moving along the path toward a general insurrection with new characteristics, and the possibility of a peaceful development of the revolution is now almost nonexistent. 23 Simultaneously, President John F. Kennedy took office, and thus the Indochinese conflict would become one of the defining issues of his presidency. As anti-communist sentiment grew stronger in the United States by the end of the 1950 s, Kennedy found himself walking a thin line between employing peaceful diplomacy and reassuring both the American public and government officials of his commitment to repelling Communism, especially following the failed Bay of Pigs Invasion in April 1961. As a result, aid to South Vietnam increased, as did the American military presence, which included more than 16, 000 advisors by 1963. 24 By then, Diem s unpopularity was too great to ignore, and so Kennedy approved measures to oust him from power, ultimately ending in Diem s death on November 1, 1963. The removal of an unpopular and ineffective ruler could have been the first step in the movement towards a true allowance of Vietnamese self-determination, one without American influence. In fact, on October 11, Kennedy secretly planned for US military advisors to be slowly withdrawn 23 Frederik Logevall, 292. 24 Ibid., 293.

Curley 10 from South Vietnam by the end of the year. 25 But Diem was not the only leader to die in November 1963; President Kennedy was assassinated three weeks later in Dallas, leaving the Indochinese conflict in the hands of Lyndon Johnson. The Johnson administration is largely characterized by an idealism that brought him enormous success domestically but ultimately defeated him in the realm of foreign affairs. Johnson had a long civil service career prior to his presidential appointment, serving as a Representative of Texas from 1937-1949, as Senator from 1949-1961, and as Vice President from 1961 until President Kennedy s assassination in 1963. As such, he suddenly had the executive power to more easily enact the domestic reform legislation that did not occur during his tenure in Congress, such as education, poverty reduction, health insurance, and civil rights. 26 Thanks to the support of the Democratic Party, the Johnson administration saw the passing of sweeping domestic reforms that would become part of his famous Great Society, which resulted from the deep-set morality that reflected not only the President s personal character but also the growing Judeo-Christian value system that was pervading American society following the conclusion of World War II. 27 Perhaps the most important legacy of the Great Society is the passing of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which outlawed all major forms of discrimination and enforced voting rights. In a broadcast to the American people, Johnson remarked on the historical importance of the Act in reference to the principles put forth by the Founding Fathers, employing rhetoric and advocating rights not unlike those found in Wilson s Fourteen Points speech, Ho Chi Minh s DRV Declaration of Independence, and the 1954 Geneva Accords: One hundred and eighty-eight 25 Edward H. Judge, and John W. Langdon, 166. 26 Randall B. Woods. The Politics of Idealism: Lyndon Johnson, Civil Rights, and Vietnam. Diplomatic History 31, no. 1 (2007): 2, http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&an=23407393&site=ehostlive&scope=site. 27 Ibid., 1.

Curley 11 years ago a small band of valiant men began a long struggle for freedom. They pledged their lives, their fortunes, and their sacred honor not only to found a nation, but to forge an ideal of freedom--not only for political independence, but for personal liberty--not only to eliminate foreign rule, but to establish the rule of justice in the affairs of men... Today in far corners of distant continents, the ideals of those American patriots still shape the struggles of men who hunger for freedom. 28 Johnson advocated for the American people the very same principles on which Ho Chi Minh based his government and subsequent wars for independence, yet despite these crucial similarities, Johnson still operated within the Cold War atmosphere that dominated global affairs. Indeed, following the success of his Great Society, Johnson hoped to apply his moral idealism to the realm of foreign policy. Compared to his predecessor, historian Randall B. Woods writes, The great difference between Kennedy and Johnson was that the Texan believed that idealism ought to be the driving force behind U.S. foreign policy; LBJ and his advisers thought JFK had been too transparent in wielding social justice and democracy as tools with which to defeat Sino-Soviet imperialism. 29 In regards to Vietnam during the initial years of his presidency, he neither undertook Kennedy s withdrawal measures nor did he opt for a military escalation. Most importantly for Johnson, a settlement of any kind was tantamount to a Communist victory, and thus he left America s commitment to Southeast Asia unchanged, until American destroyers stationed in the Gulf of Tonkin reportedly came under attack in August 1964, one month after his speech on the landmark Civil Rights Act. 30 What followed was the 28 Johnson, Lyndon B. Radio and Television Remarks Upon Signing the Civil Rights Bill, July 2, 1964. LBJ Presidential Library, LBJ Presidential Library, http://www.lbjlib.utexas.edu/johnson/archives.hom/speeches.hom/ 640702.asp 29 Randall B. Woods, 7. 30 Frederik Logevall, 294.

Curley 12 highly controversial Tonkin Gulf Resolution, which gave Johnson the executive power to take military action in Vietnam without making a formal declaration of war. Johnson s message to the United States Congress on the Tonkin Gulf Resolution is highly problematic, especially when considering the grievous human rights implications of waging an undeclared war against a nation who s government was formed on principles established in the American Declaration of Independence. In his address, he asserts We seek the full and effective restoration of the international agreements signed in Geneva in 1954 despite the fact that the United States refused to sign the Geneva Accords and therefore have no legitimate claim to enforce it. 31 The address is also notably devoid of the rhetoric present in his Civil Rights Act speech; the word independence is only mentioned twice throughout the entire address, and only in reference to resistance of Communism. 32 Incidentally, the Tonkin Gulf Incident and Johnson s subsequent resolution occurred only three months before the 1964 presidential election, effectively silencing criticisms from Republican candidate Barry Goldwater that the Johnson administration sacrificed an anti-communist stance for the sake of domestic policy. In this regard, there is a clear divide between Johnson s actions and the Tonkin Gulf Resolution s assertion that the United States is assisting the peoples of southeast Asia to protect their freedom and has no territorial, military, or political ambitions in that area, but desires only that these peoples should be left in peace to work out their own destinies in their own way. 33 Johnson earned a landslide victory in the 1964 election, and using his newfound military authority, war escalation soon followed. 31 Johnson, Lyndon B. President s Message to Congress, August 5, 1964. Vincent Ferraro, Resources for the Study of International Relations and Foreign Policy. Mount Holyoke College. https://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/ intrel/tonkinsp.htm 32 Ibid. 33 Edward H. Judge, and John W. Langdon, 380.

Curley 13 In February 1965, Johnson ordered Operation Rolling Thunder, an extensive bombing campaign that targeted North Vietnamese supply routes into the South. The following month, the first American ground troops were deployed in Danang. North Vietnam responded to this escalation in equal measure by increasing their guerilla tactics, successfully moving shipments of Soviet and Chinese arms through the Ho Chi Minh Trail, and encroaching further into South Vietnamese territory. These early developments alarmed and confused both the American and international communities, and Johnson found himself with the task of justifying the escalation the American military presence in Vietnam. On April 7, 1965, Johnson delivered a televised speech at Johns Hopkins University, in which he discusses the importance of resisting Communism, establishing the United States as the altruistic leader of the free world: There are those who wonder why we have a responsibility there. World War II was fought in both Europe and Asia, and when it ended we found ourselves with continued responsibility for the defense of freedom. 34 Echoes of the containment policy, a legacy of the Eisenhower administration, as well as Johnson s Christian values can be found in the rhetoric of the speech, for example: We are also there because there are great stakes in the balance. Let no one think for a moment that retreat from Viet-Nam would bring an end to conflict. The battle would be renewed in one country and then another. The central lesson of our time is that the appetite of aggression is never satisfied. To withdraw from one battlefield means only to prepare for the next. We must say in Southeast Asia-as we did in Europe-in the words of the Bible: Hitherto shalt thou come, but no further. 35 34 Johnson, Lyndon B. Address at Johns Hopkins University: Peace Without Conquest April 7, 1965. LBJ Presidential Library, LBJ Presidential Library. http://www.lbjlib.utexas.edu/johnson/archives.hom/ speeches.hom/650407.asp 35 Ibid.

Curley 14 In his Johns Hopkins speech, Johnson speaks of an irony in the Vietnamese conflict: For what do the people of North Viet-Nam want? They want what their neighbors also desire: food for their hunger; health for their bodies; a chance to learn; progress for their country; and an end to the bondage of material misery. And they would find all these things far more readily in peaceful association with others than in the endless course of battle. 36 Indeed, there is an irony in the nature of the Vietnam War, but this is not it. Johnson s dichotomous conception of the North and South amounts to a rhetorical strategy stemming from his famous idealism many of the North Vietnamese s wants were addressed in his Great Society it reads more as an emotional appeal rather than a factual account. The main goal of North Vietnam, as outlined by its Declaration of Independence, was self-determination, free from outside influence. Their right to complete Vietnamese self-determination was first denied by colonial France, the creators of the Geneva Accords, President Diem, and lastly the combined forces of the United States and South Vietnam. This was the true irony of the conflict, that the United States, a nation formed on the principles of universal human rights, supported a conditional Vietnamese independence that fit the ideology and geopolitics of the Cold War. But the Johns Hopkins speech was nonetheless well received, fulfilling its purpose in the short term, and so Johnson continued the escalation of the American war effort. Over 180,000 ground troops were stationed in South Vietnam by the end of 1965, more than doubling itself in the next year. 37 But as the near constant flow of bombings and troop deployments continued over the years proved insufficient to defeat Ho Chi Minh s forces, the Johnson administration quickly began to lose credibility in the eyes of American citizens and government officials, and Johnson 36 Johnson, Lyndon B. Address at Johns Hopkins University: Peace Without Conquest April 7, 1965. 37 Frederik Logevall, 296.

Curley 15 gradually found himself in a hopeless situation. Even the moral idealist legitimacy of the struggle was thrown into question when prominent civil rights leaders joined the growing antiwar movement, with Martin Luther King s observing in 1967 that Ho Chi Minh s brand of Marxism-Leninism was a more suitable vehicle for the forces of social and economic justice than liberal capitalism. 38 With international and domestic credibility at stake, and over 500,000 troops in place by 1968, America was far too implicated in the war to withdraw, but there was also no indication that a victory was realistically attainable. 39 The United States thus found itself in a situation very similar to the French in the years prior to the Geneva Conference. On January 30, 1968, North Vietnamese forces coordinated a massive attack against American and South Vietnamese troop in what is known as the Tet Offensive. The attack failed militarily, but the North Vietnamese delivered a crucial blow to the wavering American confidence in the war. The economic, political, and moral implications of preserving South Vietnam through a destructive and inconclusive war had shattered Johnson s credibility, even affecting support of his Great Society. 40 He did not seek reelection in the 1968 election, and the burden of the war fell to Richard Nixon. In order to extricate America from Vietnam without losing its global credibility, Nixon and national security advisor Henry Kissinger developed the policy of Vietnamization, which essentially entailed the buildup of South Vietnamese troops in order to replace withdrawn American troops. 41 Vietnamization would eventually be part of a larger policy on Asia called the Nixon Doctrine. In an address to the nation on the Doctrine in November 1969, Nixon declared in cases involving [non-nuclear] aggression, we shall furnish military and economic assistance when requested... But we shall look to the nation directly 38 Randall B. Woods, 14. 39 Frederik Logevall, 296-297. 40 Randall B. Woods, 10. 41 Edward H. Judge, and John W. Langdon, 392.

Curley 16 threatened to assume the primary responsibility of providing the manpower for its defense. 42 Over the next four years, a combination of Vietnamization, Congress repeal of the Tonkin Gulf Resolution, extensive airstrikes, and secret negotiations between Kissinger and North Vietnamese diplomat Le Duc Tho contributed to the end of America s military involvement in Vietnam. In 1975, thirty years after Ho Chi Minh began his struggle for independence against colonialism, Vietnam was reunified under Communist North Vietnamese control. America s participation in the Vietnam War constitutes one of the most unfortunate human rights transgressions in post-world War II history. The North Vietnamese independence movement found itself at the threshold between two major 20 th century historical developments: anticolonialism and the outbreak of the Cold War. In both cases, the territorial interests of more powerful nations whether physical, ideological, or geopolitical dominated the political developments of the time, discarding legitimate claims to self-determination in the process. President Eisenhower supported a war against North Vietnam largely because of its Communist affiliations, seemingly blind to the fact that Ho Chi Minh s Declaration of Independence explicitly argues for universal human rights of life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness first advocated in Thomas Jefferson s declaration. The Indochinese conflict thus proved the difficulty of upholding universal human rights in the modern world, a world where political affiliations caused two nations to engage in a brutal war in order to uphold identical values. 42 Edward H. Judge, and John W. Langdon, 393.

Curley 17 Bibliography Eisenhower, Dwight D. Eisenhower's Views on the Popularity of Ho Chi Minh. Vincent Ferraro, Resources for the Study of International Relations and Foreign Policy. Mount Holyoke College. https://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/vietnam/ddeho.htm Ho Chi Minh. Appeal Made on the Occasion of the Founding of the Indochinese Communist Party Ho Chi Minh Internet Archive. Marxists Internet Archive. http://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/ho-chi-minh/works/1930/02/18.htm ---. Declaration of Independence of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam. Vincent Ferraro, Resources for the Study of International Relations and Foreign Policy. Mount Holyoke College. https://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/vietdec.htm Johnson, Lyndon B. Address at Johns Hopkins University: Peace Without Conquest April 7, 1965. LBJ Presidential Library. LBJ Presidential Library. http://www.lbjlib.utexas.edu/johnson/archives.hom/speeches.hom/650407.asp ---. President s Message to Congress, August 5, 1964. Vincent Ferraro, Resources for the Study of International Relations and Foreign Policy. Mount Holyoke College. https://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/tonkinsp.htm ---. Radio and Television Remarks Upon Signing the Civil Rights Bill, July 2, 1964. LBJ Presidential Library. LBJ Presidential Library. http://www.lbjlib.utexas.edu/johnson/ archives.hom/speeches.hom/640702.asp Judge, Edward H., and John W. Langdon. The Cold War: A Global History with Documents. 2 nd ed. Upper Saddle River: Prentice Hall, 1999. Logevall, Fredrik. The Indochinese wars and the Cold War, 1945-1975. In The Cambridge History of the Cold War: Volume II: Crises and Détante, edited by Melvyn P. Leffler and Odd Arne Westad, 281-304. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010. Wilson, Woodrow. Fourteen Points: Delivered in Joint Session by President Woodrow Wilson, January 8, 1918. Exodus Books. http://www.exodusbooks.com/samples/vp/ O3FourteenPoints.pdf Woods, Randall B. The Politics of Idealism: Lyndon Johnson, Civil Rights, and Vietnam. Diplomatic History 31, no. 1 (2007): 1-18, http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx? direct=true&db=hlh&an=23407393&site=ehost-live&scope=site.