INSIGHTS ON THE ADMM AND ADMM-PLUS: THE ROAD TO REALISATION, AND WHAT LIES AHEAD

INSIGHTS ON THE ADMM AND ADMM-PLUS: THE ROAD TO REALISATION, AND WHAT LIES AHEAD Mr Chiang Chie Foo Senior Advisor Ministry of Defence 1. This paper presents a Singapore perspective on defence diplomacy in the Asia Pacific, centring on the ADMM and the ADMM-Plus as the key defence forums within ASEAN. This paper will explain the geo-political backdrop, considerations, processes and challenges behind the establishment of the ADMM and the ADMM-Plus. In particular, the paper will offer insights on the parameters that were necessary to ensure a smooth start for the ADMM-Plus, including the importance of securing the participation and support of key extra-regional countries. It also explains the rationale for the deliberate focus on practical cooperation for the ADMM-Plus. 2. This paper then analyses how the ADMM-Plus could evolve as part of the regional security architecture in view of the current geopolitical terrain, such as developments in the East and South China Seas, and China s growing presence vis-à-vis the US presence and engagement of regional countries. It will discuss whether the ADMM-Plus should move beyond practical cooperation to issue resolution in order to remain strategically relevant. ASEAN The Beginning of Multilateralism in Southeast Asia 3. Singapore, only a little red dot on the world map, is the smallest country in Southeast Asia. As independence was thrust upon the fledgling city-state in 1965, it was clear that Singapore not only needed to play to its strengths to stand a chance of surviving in its early days of independence, but also to leverage a larger and united framework the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) mooted by Thailand as a vehicle to ensure regional peace and security. 4. ASEAN was founded on 8 Aug 1967 when the foreign ministers of five nations Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand signed the ASEAN Declaration in Bangkok, Thailand. 1 Although ASEAN s explicit aim was to encourage cooperation in realms including economic, social, and educational, and to promote regional peace and stability, the framework was born out of fear rather than idealistic 1 History, ASEAN, accessed 19 Aug, 2014, http://www.asean.org/asean/about-asean/history. 1

convictions about regionalism. 2 This should not be a surprise as ASEAN was founded at a time when the Cold War was raging and the noncommunist countries in Southeast Asia faced strong communist threats backed by China which they had difficulty dealing with alone. 3 At that time, Thailand was also mediating disputes between Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines. Although it was founded with five members, the association emphasised that it welcomed participation from all States in Southeast Asia who subscribed to its purpose. Interestingly, however, the initial plan for ASEAN was planned to comprise only Malaysia, the Philippines, Indonesia and Thailand. Singapore, being aware of the potential of ASEAN, successfully requested to join the new institution. 4 5. Since its establishment, ASEAN has benefited Southeast Asian nations in many ways. ASEAN today has a combined market of 600 million people the size of the European Union, a GDP of almost $1.8 trillion the third largest in Asia (on par with India and after China and Japan). ASEAN s aims have expanded beyond economic integration to include accelerating economic growth and enhancing socio-cultural development to integrate the economies of ASEAN member states. Barriers to trade and investment have been lowered through initiatives such as the ASEAN Free Trade Area, under which 99% of tariff lines have been brought down to the 0-5% range. ASEAN has also promoted people-topeople linkages, greater cross-cultural understanding and the development of a stronger sense of common identity among the ASEAN peoples. ASEAN is now central in a regional architecture that includes groupings such as ASEAN+3, ASEAN Regional Forum, East Asia Summit and the ADMM-Plus. ASEAN is also working towards establishing an ASEAN Community by 2015 and has called for acceleration of efforts to implement the Blueprints of the three Community Pillars. 5 All these were possible only because ASEAN has strived to be a neutral platform and treated all members as sovereign equals, evident from one of its cardinal principles of decision-making by consensus. The ADMM as a Regional Security Framework 6. While cooperation on the economic and diplomatic fronts, amongst others, were well underway under the ASEAN framework, the potential for collaboration in the security realm remained largely untapped until the 2 ASEAN The Way Ahead, ASEAN, accessed 19 Aug, 2014, http://www.asean.org/news/item/aseanthe-way-ahead-by-s-rajaratnam. 3 The Fundamentals of Singapore s Foreign Policy: Then and Now, Singapore Government Media Release, http://www.news.gov.sg/public/sgpc/en/media_releases/agencies/pmo/speech/s-20090409-1.html. 4 Brunei joined ASEAN in 1984, Vietnam in 1995, Laos and Myanmar in 1997 and Cambodia in 1999. 5 The three pillars of the ASEAN Community are Political-Security, Economic and Socio-Cultural. 2

adoption of the Bali Concord II in Oct 2003. The Bali Concord II framework comprises three pillars the ASEAN Political-Security Community (APSC) [renamed from the original ASEAN Security Community (ASC) in 2007], ASEAN Economic Community and ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community. 6 Subsequently, the ASC Plan of Action (PoA) adopted by the 10 th ASEAN Summit in 2004 laid the foundation for the convening of an annual ASEAN Defence Ministers Meeting (ADMM), interestingly under the header of conflict prevention. Up till the ASC PoA, there had been a conspicuous absence of a ministerial sectoral body on defence presumably because it was deemed to be sensitive. 7. The inaugural ADMM convened on 9 May 2006 in Kuala Lumpur was therefore a historic milestone in ASEAN s evolution as defence was one of the last ministerial sectoral bodies to be added to the ASEAN family. The ADMM was to be the highest ministerial defence and security consultative and cooperative mechanism in ASEAN, and comprised all ASEAN Member States which took turns to chair and host ADMM meetings. 7 8. The ADMM has had a number of achievements since its establishment. Cooperation on humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HADR) has been expanded through the ADMM, with the adoption of the concept paper on the use of ASEAN military assets and capacities for HADR at the 3 rd ADMM in 2009. 8 Workshops on cooperation between ASEAN defence establishments and civil society organisations on nontraditional security issues have been conducted. More recently, the 8 th ADMM in 2014 adopted Brunei s concept paper on establishing hotlines for ASEAN defence ministers to communicate in times of crises and emergencies. Brunei is working on the technicalities and hopes to implement the hotlines by 2015. 9. Complementing the ADMM is a Track II Network of ASEAN Defence and Security Institutions (NADI). NADI was inaugurated in 2007 to bring together academics, policy analysts and defence officials of ASEAN countries to discuss security matters and ideas that may be deemed too sensitive to be tabled at an official Track I meeting. 9 The appropriate proposals can then be recommended to the ADMM through the ASEAN Defence Senior Officials Meeting (ADSOM). Since 2007, NADI 6 Declaration of ASEAN Concord II (Bali Concord II), ASEAN, accessed 19 Aug, 2014, http://www.asean.org/news/item/declaration-of-asean-concord-ii-bali-concord-ii. 7 Concept Paper for the Establishment of an ASEAN Defence Ministers Meeting (paper adopted at the inaugural ADMM, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, 9 May 2006). 8 Concept paper on the Use of ASEAN Military Assets and Capacities in HADR (paper adopted at the 3 rd ADMM, Pattaya, Thailand, 25-27 Feb 2009). 9 Purpose and Objectives of NADI, NADI, accessed 20 Aug 2014, http://www.rsis.edu.sg/nadi/. 3

has looked into areas such as the ADMM s external engagement as well as possible ADMM cooperation in maritime security and cyber security, amongst others. Engaging Extra-Regional Countries through the ADMM-Plus 10. Even as the ADMM was established, it was apparent that some ASEAN defence officials had set their sights on establishing an open and inclusive security architecture to complement the ADMM right from the start. The concept paper for the Establishment of an ADMM adopted at the inaugural ADMM in 2006 had underscored the need for the ADMM to be open, flexible and outward-looking in respect of actively engaging ASEAN s friends and Dialogue Partners. This requirement was pertinent considering how threats and challenges were increasingly complex and tend to cut across borders. Singapore supported the concept of engaging extra-regional countries as it would assist ASEAN to become more relevant to the world. Such an open platform would also give Singapore additional opportunities to engage extra-regional countries and make its voice heard beyond the region. 11. The term ADMM-Plus was coined by Malaysia s then-deputy Prime Minister and Defence Minister Dato Sri Najib Razak when he chaired the inaugural ADMM in 2006. 10 However, the idea of engaging extra-regional players did not immediately gain traction with all ASEAN countries some welcomed the idea while others were more cautious and preferred to first consolidate the ADMM before engaging countries outside the region. The breakthrough came about at the 2 nd ADMM hosted by Singapore in 2007 when it adopted the concept paper on ADMM-Plus which outlined the key objectives, principles and modalities for the ADMM-Plus. While recognising the need for an open and inclusive regional security framework, the concept paper also recognised that the ADMM-Plus had to be founded on key principles, such as (a) ASEAN centrality; (b) non-interference, consensus-based decision making; and that (c) cooperation is to be based on mutual respect and be in accordance with international law. The 2007 ADMM-Plus Concept Paper formed the DNA of the ADMM-Plus and laid a strong foundation for the ADMM to start evolving the concept of the ADMM-Plus in a step-by-step manner. This was important to ensure buy-in for the ADMM-Plus in view of the reservations expressed. 10 Speech by Minister for Defence Teo Chee Hean at The Malaysian Armed Forces Defence College, MINDEF, accessed 19 Aug, 2014, http://www.mindef.gov.sg/imindef/press_room/official_releases/sp/2008/30jan08_speech.print.img.html. 4

12. Singapore played an active role in evolving the ADMM-Plus. Following the ADMM-Plus concept paper, Singapore worked with Thailand as the next ADMM Chair to develop the principles for membership in the ADMM-Plus. The 3 rd ADMM in Pattaya in Feb 2009 agreed that non-asean countries that wanted to join the ADMM-Plus had to meet three criteria: (a) it shall be a full-fledged Dialogue Partner of ASEAN, where Dialogue Partners status is in accordance with the ASEAN Charter; (b) it shall have significant interactions and relations with ASEAN defence establishments; and (c) the country must be able to work with the ADMM to build capacity so as to enhance regional security in a substantive manner. 11 Of note, the criteria for membership in the ADMM-Plus did not require the extra-regional country to be party to the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation. 13. With the principles for membership resolved, the modalities and procedures for implementing the ADMM-Plus had to be laid out. This included issues such as the frequency of ADMM-Plus meetings, the structure and working mechanisms, as well as the agenda of the ADMM- Plus. The ADMM-Plus: Modalities and Procedures concept paper, coauthored by Singapore and Vietnam was adopted at the 4 th ADMM in Hanoi in 2010. It was agreed that ADMM-Plus meetings were to be held once in three years to avoid over-taxing the Plus countries which could deter them from joining. The ADSOM-Plus, however, would convene annually to implement the decisions of the ADMM-Plus. 12 14. The most difficult and contentious piece in conceptualising the ADMM-Plus was in its configuration and composition the number of Plus countries to invite, whether the ADMM-Plus should follow ASEAN s existing template for external engagement, and which Plus countries to bring in to the ADMM-Plus. The ADMM had an extensive discussion on these issues at the ADMM Retreat hosted by Thailand in Nov 2009. Specially, the ASEAN defence ministers discussed the merits of various configuration, namely: (a) ADMM+1 which involves ASEAN s external relations with individual Dialogue Partners; (b) ADMM+3 which brings together ASEAN, China, Japan and the Republic of Korea (ROK); and (c) ADMM+X where X refers to the countries that are able to fulfil the membership criteria. At the Retreat, the ministers made the critical decision for the ADMM-Plus to be established with an ADMM+X configuration. They found the ADMM+1 and ADMM+3 configurations unsuitable for the region. Multiple ADMM+1s would lead to a proliferation of meetings with 11 Concept paper on ADMM-Plus: Principles for Membership (paper adopted at the 3 rd ADMM, Pattaya, Thailand, 25-27 Feb 2009) 12 Attachment paper to the Paper ADMM-Plus: Modalities and Procedures (adopted at the ADMM Retreat, Ha Noi, Vietnam, 11Oct 2010) 5

separate agendas and reduced the overall transparency of the ADMM-Plus. The ADMM+3 configuration, on the other hand, only provided for the ADMM s engagement with Northeast Asia and omitted the other major players who could also contribute positively to the peace and stability of the Southeast Asian region. While not articulated openly, the ministers were cognisant that the US and China, among other major players, had to be involved in the ADMM-Plus as they were key to the stability of the region. 15. The ministers found the ADMM+X configuration to be the most appropriate for ASEAN and the region. The broad-based configuration of the ADMM+X would facilitate greater openness and transparency as well as a balanced representation of views, which were necessary to effectively address the range of complex and transnational security issues. The ADMM-Plus should also start right and be inaugurated with the right configuration and composition of countries, and in one step, from the outset, rather than in a series of small incremental steps. 16. The discussions of the defence ministers at the ADMM Retreat formed the basis for Singapore and Thailand to formalise their discussions into a concept paper on ADMM-Plus: Configuration and Composition that was adopted at the 4 th ADMM in Hanoi in May 2010. At the 4 th ADMM, the ministers made two other important decisions. First, the ADMM decided that ADMM-Plus will have an ADMM+8 format and the eight countries to be invited to join the ADMM-Plus were Australia, China, India, Japan, New Zealand, ROK, Russia and the US. Second, the ADMM agreed to inaugurate the ADMM-Plus in Hanoi in Oct 2010. 13 Vietnam s enthusiasm as Chair of ASEAN and ADMM in 2010 sewed the final pieces of the ADMM-Plus concept and accelerated its establishment. Such swift progress did not come naturally and must also be credited to the efforts of the ADMM defence officials. 17. At the same time, the extra-regional countries were ready and keen to join the ADMM-Plus. This excitement was articulated when then-us Secretary of Defense Robert Gates announced during the 9 th Shangri-La Dialogue in early Jun 2010 that he would attend the inaugural ADMM-Plus in Hanoi. 14 Gates announcement gave the ADMM-Plus the final push and 13 Concept paper on ADMM-Plus Configuration and Composition (adopted at the 4 th ADMM, Ha Noi, Vietnam, 11 May 2010) 14 Strengthening Security Partnerships in the Asia-Pacific: Dr Robert M Gates, IISS, accessed 20 Aug, 2014, https://www.iiss.org/en/events/shangri%20la%20dialogue/archive/shangri-la-dialogue-2010-0a26/first-plenary-session-722b/dr-robert-m-gates-5086. 6

the meeting in Oct 2010 was attended by the defence ministers from all member countries except for Russia. 15 18. The 4 th ADMM also decided that the ADMM-Plus will have two key thrusts. First, the ADMM-Plus will provide a platform for defence ministers to come together for strategic conversations. Second, the ADMM-Plus will emphasise practical cooperation between militaries through the establishment of Experts Working Groups (EWGs) to address security issues of common concern affecting the region. At the inaugural ADMM-Plus, members agreed to cooperate in five areas: (a) maritime security; (b) counter-terrorism; (c) HADR; (d) peacekeeping operations (PKO); and (e) military medicine. The EWGs were to be co-chaired by an ASEAN country and a non-asean nation to ensure ownership and responsibility. The focus on practical cooperation was to be an important decision that would set the ADMM-Plus apart from other regional platforms. The ADSOM-Plus to be led by permanent secretaries would have oversight over the EWGs and approve the workplans of the EWGs. 16 19. As a testament of the political will of the ADMM-Plus to move quickly to engender practical cooperation, the five EWGs were formally set up by Apr 2011 with (a) the EWG on Maritime Security co-chaired by Malaysia and Australia; (b) the EWG on Counter-Terrorism co-chaired by Indonesia and the US; (c) the EWG on HADR co-chaired by Vietnam and China; (d) the EWG on PKO co-chaired by the Philippines and New Zealand; and (e) the EWG on Military Medicine co-chaired by Singapore and Japan. Six field and table-top exercises have been conducted in all five domains during the first cycle of the EWGs from 2011 to 2014. The ADMM-Plus HADR and Military Medicine Exercise held in Brunei in 2013 was a significant milestone for the ADMM-Plus and involved approximately 3,200 personnel, seven ships and 15 helicopters and is the largest-scale event in ADMM-Plus history thus far. 17 US Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel called the series of exercises a major accomplishment and said that they reflected the action-oriented objective of the ADMM-Plus. 18 It is worthy to note that Japan and China were both part of the exercise steering committee and contributed to the 15 Russia was represented by General Nikolai Makarov, Chief of the General Staff, First Deputy Minister of Defence. 16 Attachment Paper to the Paper ADMM-Plus: Modalities and Procedures (adopted at the ADMM Retreat, Ha Noi, Vietnam, 11 Oct 2010) 17 SAF and Other Militaries Conclude the ADMM-Plus HADR/MM Exercise, MINDEF, accessed 20 Aug 2014, http://www.mindef.gov.sg/imindef/press_room/official_releases/nr/2013/jun/20jun13_nr.html#.u_dkxp SSxSI. 18 Cheryl Pellerin, Defense Ministers End Brunei Meeting with Joint Declaration, IIP Digital, 29 Aug 2013, accessed 20 Aug 2014, http://iipdigital.usembassy.gov/st/english/article/2013/08/20130829281966.html#axzz3afhj3ups. 7

success of the event despite existing bilateral political tensions. That the ADMM-Plus moved from genesis to practical cooperation within just a year demonstrates the political will and appetite of ASEAN and non- ASEAN members to differentiate the framework from existing security forums in the region. 20. There are other indicators of the ADMM-Plus progress. In 2012, the ADMM agreed to convene the ADMM-Plus once every two years instead of three, demonstrating members increased priority for the process and the desire to foster greater momentum for security cooperation. 19 To expand the existing domains for cooperation, a sixth EWG on Humanitarian Mine Action was established in 2013 to deal with the remnants of undetonated explosives of war. The EWG is co-chaired by Vietnam and India and held its inaugural meeting in June this year. Separately, other countries such as Canada and France have begun knocking on the doors to join the ADMM- Plus. Navigating the Current Geopolitical Terrain 21. The ADMM and ADMM-Plus clearly have enjoyed early success, especially in the area of practical cooperation. Yet, the continued success of the ADMM-Plus cannot be divorced from the geopolitical and geostrategic landscape. Key to regional peace and stability is the power dynamics between China and the US. The South China Sea, in this regard, is where regional politics play out. 20 China has been increasingly assertive in the region and lays claims to 90% of the South China Sea, with the territorial claims overlapping with those of ASEAN countries, namely: Brunei, Malaysia, the Philippines and Vietnam. 21 Not only has China adopted a firm position on its claims, it has taken assertive measures to enforce its claims by deploying an oil rig in waters near the Paracel Islands which are also claimed by Vietnam. This act sparked deadly riots in Vietnam and tense encounters between Chinese and Vietnamese naval vessels. Although China has moved the oil rig out of the disputed waters, tensions remain as the Chinese asserts that the oil rig had been deployed within China s inherent territory. 22 Relations between China and the Philippines are also strained because of competing claims over the Spratly Islands and Scarborough Shoal, which have resulted in a lengthy maritime stand-off 19 Concept paper on Review of Frequency of ADMM-Plus Meetings (adopted at the 6 th ADMM, Phnom Penh, Cambodia, 29 May 2012) 20 Beina Xu, South China Sea Tensions, Council on Foreign Relations, 14 May 2014, accessed 20 Aug 2014, http://www.cfr.org/china/south-china-sea-tensions/p29790. 21 Ben Blanchard, China tells US to stay out of South China Seas dispute, Reuters, 15 Jul 2014, accessed 20 Aug 2014, http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/07/15/us-china-usa-aseaniduskbn0fk0cm20140715. 22 China moves oil rig out of waters claimed by Vietnam, Channel Newsasia, 17 Jul 2014, accessed 20 Aug 2014, http://www.channelnewsasia.com/news/asiapacific/china-moves-oil-rig-out/1268080.html. 8

between both countries. 23 In the East China Sea, China and Japan are disputing over claims to the Diaoyu or Senkaku islands. The relations have been aggravated by the Chinese unilaterally establishing an air defence identification zone over the disputed territory. 24 22. Contributing to the complex geopolitical texture in the region are questions about how the US, which has arguably enjoyed pre-eminence globally for the past six decades 25, will evolve its role in the international arena in the face of budget cuts and war-weary American voters being more concerned with domestic issues than its foreign policies 26. The US has continued to emphasise its rebalance towards Asia, visibly through the Trans-Pacific Partnership agreement that is being negotiated as well as its reallocation of military assets in the region. On the South and East China Seas disputes, the US has described the Chinese behaviour as provocative and unilateral. 27 Russia s actions over Ukraine and the US reactions can also cast a cloud over the ADMM-Plus. This serves as a reminder that bilateral disputes, even those outside the region, can upset multilateral cooperation. ASEAN states will have to continue to navigate the shifting geopolitical contours with care while positioning themselves to seize the strategic opportunities that the major powers present to the region. The Way Ahead for the ADMM and ADMM-Plus 23. The ADMM and ADMM-Plus have done well so far. The EWGs have successfully completed their first 3-year workplans and have now entered the next cycle of 3-year workplans. While the ADMM and ADMM-Plus look set to continue on the steady trajectory of stronger practical cooperation, the key question is whether they can and should do even more. The litmus test for the ADMM and ADMM-Plus relevance in the long term is their ability to tackle hard security challenges and make a concrete contribution to regional peace and stability. Will they be able to translate the lessons learnt and experiences gained from field training exercises to respond to crises such as natural disasters and acts of terrorism, or perhaps even facilitate issue resolution such as that of the South China Sea? What are some of the conditions that are necessary for the ADMM- Plus to go beyond practical cooperation to undertake issue resolution? 23 Q&A: South China Sea dispute, BBC, 8 May 2014, accessed 20 Aug 2014, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-pacific-13748349. 24 Viewpoints: China air zone tensions, BBC, 28 Nov 2013, accessed 20 Aug 2014, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-25116119. 25 Michael J. Green, Rethinking US Military Presence in Asia and the Pacific, CSIS, accessed 20 Aug 2014, http://csis.org/files/publication/120413_gf_green.pdf. 26 Carrie Dann, Americans say domestic challenges trump problems abroad, 18 Jul 2014, accessed 20 Aug 2014, http://www.nbcnews.com/politics/first-read/americans-say-domestic-challenges-trumpproblems-abroad-n158396. 27 Ibid. 9

While the subsequent paragraphs in this section refer to the ADMM-Plus, they also apply to the ADMM as the workings of both frameworks are intertwined. 24. There are at least two inter-linked conditions that are necessary for the ADMM-Plus to move beyond practical cooperation. First, the ADMM- Plus needs to reach a certain level of maturity as an institution. Members need to recognise and accept the international rules of the road that form the basis for world order and not seek to invent new rules. Only a rulesbased community can guarantee peace, stability and security throughout the region. 25. Second, there must be sufficient trust amongst member countries and the militaries for the ADMM-Plus to progress to the next level. Members must recognise that there are significant commonalities of interest for cooperation and that it is in their collective interest to cooperate with each other even as they compete or disagree on other fronts. This will not come easy given that national interests are disparate and will always take precedence over the collective interest of the institution and the region. The level of trust also largely hinges on Sino-US relations and how it impacts cooperation within the ADMM-Plus. Being the two most influential members in the ADMM-Plus architecture, no issue resolution mechanisms would be effective, or indeed even established, without the support of the US and China. It is also not desirable if ADMM-Plus members find themselves in a position where they have to choose sides between US or China. 26. It will be naïve to think that the ADMM-Plus is able to move beyond practical cooperation in the immediate future. It takes time at least the next 3 to 5 years for the ADMM-Plus to mature as an institution and for strategic trust amongst the members to be built. Issue resolution is also potentially sensitive and could break the ADMM-Plus if it moves into this phase when it is not ready. 27. In the meantime, the 18 countries need to continually work on the ADMM-Plus. The defence ministers need to engage in strategic dialogue on all security issues, including sensitive ones on the East and South China Seas. This is important for the credibility of the ADMM-Plus. Efforts in practical cooperation also need to be sustained to foster stable military-tomilitary relations amongst the armed forces. Major powers such as the US and China need to be actively and constructively engaged in the activities of the ADMM-Plus. ASEAN must persist in strengthening ASEAN centrality and must never be put in a position where it has to favour a particular country. In this regard, the ASEAN Chair must be fair in guiding 10

and facilitating the decision-making processes of the ADMM-Plus. Trustbuilding and cooperation cannot just take place at the ministerial level, but must percolate down to the officials and militaries. Trust-building and cooperation should also be pursued at the bilateral level between ADMM- Plus members, as strengthening the web of bilateral relationships can also reinforce the multilateral framework, and vice versa. 28. When these conditions are met, there is a better chance for the ADMM-Plus to progress beyond practical cooperation to issue resolution. It will not just happen overnight. Perhaps a more realistic roadmap is to target for an interim step of cementing concrete operational cooperation in areas such as HADR and even in maritime security. 29. The Southeast Asia region is prone to devastating natural disasters and the ADMM-Plus countries could provide a more robust HADR response. The ADMM-Plus militaries already have a strong network amongst themselves which is a key asset by itself. However, it could work with the Changi Regional HADR Coordination Centre for a quicker and more coordinated military response during a disaster as well as leverage the worldwide information-sharing linkages established by the Information Fusion Centre at the Changi Command and Control Centre. There is also potential for the ADMM-Plus navies to undertake multilateral patrols of regional waterways akin to the Malacca Strait Patrols. The ADMM-Plus can also play a role in helping to create more favourable conditions even as the political conversation is taking place on the South China Sea. Adopting practical measures to mitigate tensions and to reduce miscalculations at sea, for instance, would complement the ongoing dialogue on the implementation of the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea and conclusion of a Code of Conduct in the South China Sea. The ADMM-Plus could consider adopting a similar arrangement like the Code for Unplanned Encounters at Sea which was endorsed at the Western Pacific Naval Symposium in China earlier this year to mitigate the risk of miscalculation and misunderstanding at sea. 30. To facilitate a successful journey through concrete operational cooperation to issue resolution, a body outside the ADMM-Plus should provide a useful sounding board for its smooth navigation. NADI is wellplaced to take on this task. Indeed, NADI should grow a NADI-Plus chapter for this purpose. Conclusion 31. Singapore understands intimately how important regional peace and stability are, and how difficult it is to achieve them. As a small country 11

without any strategic weight, the success of cooperative regional frameworks is critical to its survival, lest regional geopolitics degenerate and disputes arise. Specific to the ADMM and ADMM-Plus, there are hopes that they too can progress beyond confidence-building measures in non-sensitive areas to operational cooperation and to complement the foreign affairs track in resolving issues. It could be early days yet for any mechanism to materialise since both frameworks are relatively young, but the ideas need to be seeded soon for there to be harvest...... 12