Syllabus The nuclear test as a bargaining chip - 58372 Last update 11-08-2015 HU Credits: 2 Degree/Cycle: 1st degree (Bachelor) Responsible Department: international relations Academic year: 0 Semester: 1st Semester Teaching Languages: Hebrew Campus: Mt. Scopus Course/Module Coordinator: Or Rabinowitz Coordinator Email: or.rabinowitz-batz@huji.ac.il Coordinator Office Hours: Monday, 1100-1200, 5309. Teaching Staff: Dr. Or Rabinowitz page 1 / 5
Course/Module description: The aim of the course is to expose students to various issues in nuclear proliferation related to the Cold War period and the Post-Cold War period while focusing on the development of the nuclear test as a bargaining chip in the international arena. The course will explore the main themes which characterized nuclear proliferation over different periods of the Cold War and after it as well as different theoretical approaches which explain them. The role of nuclear tests in the international system and in the construction of the NPT regime will be examined, as well as the development of the legal norm against testing. Course/Module aims: - Review the main trends related to nuclear proliferation from the 1940s and to this day. - Examine the development of the nuclear test into a bargaining chip in the international arena. - examine the relevant theoretical approaches. Learning outcomes - On successful completion of this module, students should be able to: - Compare and categorize the different nuclear case studies. - Define the central, relevant terms in the academic discourse on nuclear proliferation. - Critically analyse various theoretical approaches. - analyse the development of the nuclear test into a bargaining chip. Attendance requirements(%): Students are allowed to miss no more than three lectures to complete this course. Teaching arrangement and method of instruction: Lectures. Course/Module Content: 1. The Manhattan Project, the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, and the birth of the nuclear age. 2. The legal context: the NPT, the status of the norm against testing, NWS. page 2 / 5
3. Why do states build nuclear weapons? [And what does that tell us about why they conduct nuclear tests?] 4. Nuclear reversal, nuclear hedging, nuclear roll-back the U.S. unique role. 5. The Veto players approach and the Coercive Alliance approach. 6. The Nuclear Dominoes approach and the competing approaches. 7. Israel: the early years, developments in 67 ad 69. 8. Israel: from that Seventies show and to this day. 9. The Reagan administrations nuclear bargains with Pakistan and South Africa and the Paradox of hegemony. 10. The nuclear test as a Costly Signal: NK, Pakistan and India in the CTBT era. 11. Iraq, Libya, Syria, the technical maturity approach and the effectivity of preventive attacks. 12. Nuclear alarmism. 13. Conclusion and current trends. Required Reading: 1. The Manhattan Project, the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, and the birth of the nuclear age. - Meir Pail, the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, Zmanim 19, 1985, 144-151. Avner Cohen, humanity un the shadow of the atom, Zmanim 19, 1985, 158-166. 2. The legal context: the NPT, the status of the norm against testing, NWS: The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, and especially article IX: http://www.un.org/en/conf/npt/2005/npttreaty.html Jacques E C Hymans, "When does a state become a 'nuclear weapon state'? An exercise in Measurement Validation," Nonproliferation Review 17, no. 1 (2010); George Bunn, The Status of Norms against Nuclear Testing, Nonproliferation Review, 6/2 (1999), 21 [One more item in Hebrew]. 3. Why do states build nuclear weapons? [And what does that tell us about why they conduct nuclear tests?] page 3 / 5
Scott D. Sagan. Why Do States Build Nuclear Weapons?: Three Models in Search of a Bomb, International Security, Vol. 21, No. 3 (Winter, 1996-1997), pp. 54-86 Jacques E. C. Hymans, Theories of Nuclear Proliferation: The State of the Field, The Nonproliferation Review Vol. 13, No. 3 (November 2006), pp. 455-465 4. Nuclear reversal, nuclear hedging, nuclear roll-back the U.S. unique role. Levite, Ariel E. "Never Say Never Again: Nuclear Reversal Revisited." International Security 27, no. 3 (Winter 2002/03): 59-88. 5. The Veto players approach and the Coercive Alliance approach. Jacques E.C. Hymans. Veto Players, Nuclear Energy, and Nonproliferation, International Security, Vol. 36, No. 2 (Fall 2011), pp. 154189 Gene Gerzhoy, Alliance Coercion and Nuclear Restraint, International Security, Vol. 39, No. 4 (Spring 2015), pp. 91129 6. The Nuclear Dominoes approach and the competing approaches. Nicholas L. Miller (2014) Nuclear Dominoes: A Self-Defeating Prophecy, Security Studies, 23:1, 33-73 7. Israel: the early years, developments in 67 ad 69. Cohen, Avner, and William Burr. "Israel Crosses the Threshold." Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 62, no. 3 (2006): 22-33. Avner Cohen and William Burr. Don't Like That Israel Has the Bomb? Blame Nixon. 12 Sep 2014, in Foreign Policy 8. Israel: from that Seventies show and to this day. [Items in Hebrew] 9. The Reagan administrations nuclear bargains with Pakistan and South Africa and the Paradox of hegemony. Or Rabinowitz and Nicholas L. Miller, "Keeping the bombs in the basement, International Security, summer 2015 (Vol. 40, No. 1) Bruce Cronin, "The Paradox of Hegemony; Americas Ambiguous Relationship with the UN." European Journal of International Relations 7, no. 103 (2001). 10. The nuclear test as a Costly Signal: NK, Pakistan and India in the CTBT era. Or Rabinowitz; Deterrence and the handicap principle: how nuclear tests have evolved into effective costly signals. Tel-Aviv University, 2010. 11. Iraq, Libya, Syria, the technical maturity approach and the effectivity of preventive attacks. Revisiting Osirak: Preventive Attacks and Nuclear Proliferation Risks, Mוlfrid Braut- Hegghammer, International Security, Vol. 36, No. 1 (SUMMER 2011), pp. 101-132 12. Nuclear alarmism: page 4 / 5
Powered by TCPDF (www.tcpdf.org) Francis J. Gavin, Same as It Ever Was: Nuclear Alarmism, Proliferation, and the Cold War, International Security, Vol. 34, No. 3 (Winter, 2009/2010), pp. 7-37 13. Conclusion and current trends. Reading items TBC. Additional Reading Material: Deadly Arsenals: Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Threats (second edition), Joseph Cirincione, Jon B. Wolfsthal, Miriam Rajkumar, Carnegie Endowment, New- York, 2005. Country Profiles in the Nuclear Threat Initiative website: Course/Module evaluation: End of year written/oral examination 0 % Presentation 0 % Participation in Tutorials 0 % Project work 100 % Assignments 0 % Reports 0 % Research project 0 % Quizzes 0 % Other 0 % Additional information: Additional reading items will be detailed during the course. page 5 / 5