Report Nuclear non-proliferation: preparing for the 2015 NPT Review Conference Monday 15 Friday 19 December 2014 WP1343

Image: UN Photo/Eskinder Debebe Report Nuclear non-proliferation: preparing for the 2015 NPT Review Conference Monday 15 Friday 19 December 2014 WP1343

Report Nuclear non-proliferation: preparing for the 2015 NPT Review Conference Monday 15 Friday 19 December 2015 WP1343 Nuclear risk is a pervasive theme going into the 2015 NPT Review Conference (RevCon). These risks include nuclear accidents and strategic miscalculation, captured by the humanitarian impacts initiative, along with broader questions of the credibility of the NPT. Distrust and polarization continue to grow between nuclear weapon states (NWS) and non-nuclear weapon states (NNWS), the latter calling for faster and more substantive progress towards disarmament. Events since 2010 have cast further doubt over the likely success of the upcoming RevCon and prospects for the future of the Treaty more broadly. Despite this criticism however, the NPT remains a crucial component of the international non-proliferation regime. This report provides a summary of discussions including the influence of a changing geopolitical environment on the NPT, new dynamics and initiatives, the status of items from the 2010 Action Plan (including a Weapons of Mass Destruction Free Zone in the Middle East) and recommendations for measures to strengthen the NPT in the lead-up to the RevCon. Several questions were raised in the course of discussions: What will define success and failure at the RevCon? Will the Action Plan continue to serve as a guiding metric for the 2015-2020 review cycle, as it did previously? Is the initiative to highlight humanitarian impacts of nuclear weapons undermining the NPT? And is there a consensus among States Parties about the utility and strength of the NPT? Introduction 1. The 2015 NPT RevCon occurs alongside several important milestones: the 100th anniversary of the use of chemical weapons in Ypres in World War I; the 70th anniversary of the nuclear bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki; and the 20th anniversary of the indefinite extension of the NPT. These events serve as a reminder not only of the legacy of WMD, but also the importance of international regimes to control them and prevent their spread and use. 2. The context of NPT discussions have changed significantly over the past year since the third Preparatory Committee (PrepCom) meeting. Even more dramatic have been the shifts in the geopolitical climate since the 2010 RevCon; international efforts to slow Iran s nuclear programme and increasing pressure on NWS to disarm, as manifested in various groupings and new initiatives such as the humanitarian impacts of nuclear weapons conference in Vienna in December 2014, have emerged as dominant issues. 3. The Action Plan resulting from the 2010 RevCon identified 64 points for States Parties to pursue. Many of these remain outstanding and will present a challenge at the 2015 RevCon, including progress in the P5 process, disarmament, and a WMD Free Zone in the Middle East, in addition to procedural and structural questions about the RevCon. Page 1 of 8

4. Expectations are low for the 2015 RevCon and there are competing definitions as to what will constitute success in New York. Review cycles are often portrayed as a pendulum, alternating between success and failure, with the NPT currently swinging towards the latter. Questions therefore focus on developments in the nuclear regime over the past five years and whether the RevCon should focus on preserving the regime s status quo or be more ambitious in attempting to make tangible progress in achieving the NPT s objectives. The humanitarian impacts initiative is but one grouping of its kind manifesting the frustration of NNWS and civil society in the lack of progress by NWS towards disarmament The context of the Review Conference Changing security environment 5. Tensions in US-Russia and NATO-Russia relations are undeniable. Disagreement over events in Ukraine has also been accompanied by shifts in nuclear dynamics. For example, US-Russia cooperation in nuclear security has come to a halt and in July 2014 the US State Department released a report alleging Russian violation of the 1987 Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces Treaty. In addition, given Russia s violation of the Budapest Memorandum, the status and credibility of security assurances to US allies have come under increased scrutiny. 6. The Middle East of 2015 looks starkly different to that of 2010. The Arab Spring brought a change in numerous governments and continued instability in the region, particularly in Egypt which has historically played a leadership role among NNWS and is a key player in discussions for a WMD Free Zone in the region. A change of government in Tehran also shifted relations between the Islamic Republic and its negotiating partners (the E3+3) in attempts to rein in, and increase transparency of, Iran s nuclear programme. The deadline for the next round of negotiations is July 2015, and therefore Iran may be less the centre of attention at the RevCon. 7. Nuclear weapons are peripheral to many of these geopolitical shifts, but situations may emerge in which they could play a more central role. In addition, new technologies such as cyber and advanced conventional capabilities raise questions about strategic stability and the role of nuclear weapons in deterrence strategies. Vienna Conference on the Humanitarian Impact of Nuclear Weapons 8. On 8-9 December 2014 the Austrian government hosted the third conference on the humanitarian impacts of nuclear weapons, attended by 158 countries, including India, Pakistan, the United Kingdom, and United States. It was the first time members of the P5 attended. Many of the conference participants spoke of the need to uphold the NPT and for the initiative to contribute to a successful RevCon. 9. The Vienna Conference resulted in a pledge by the Austrian government to share the findings of the initiative, to encourage States Parties to the NPT to restate their commitment to the treaty in particular, Article VI and for all states to work to reduce the risks associated with nuclear weapons. Other states were invited to offer their own pledges, which could contribute to a successful RevCon. 10. The initiative strives to change the discourse on nuclear weapons by drawing on moral arguments and raising awareness about the risks associated with nuclear weapons and lack of response options. To date the initiative has focused on a facts-based discussion of the medical and environmental consequences of nuclear weapons detonations, including nuclear testing, the risks associated with nuclear weapons due to accidents and miscalculation, and the lack of response options and capacity in the event of nuclear weapons use. 11. The humanitarian impacts initiative is but one grouping of its kind manifesting the frustration of NNWS and civil society in the lack of progress by NWS towards disarmament and stagnation in the Conference on Disarmament (CD). Given that the CD is moribund and has not produced anything in 19 years, alternative routes are being explored to establish a forum for discussing disarmament in a procedural and Page 2 of 8

multilateral way. 12. While the initiative provides an additional forum for discussing disarmament, the NPT remains the only legally-binding commitment on NWS to disarm, and the CD remains the primary forum for negotiating disarmament. The initiative is not intended to challenge or undermine the NPT, but rather provides an additional forum for buttressing one of the pillars of the NPT along with an outlet for NNWS to participate in disarmament dialogues on an equal footing with NWS, whilst also incorporating India and Pakistan. Frustration with the CD and slow progress towards Article VI raises questions about the best forum for discussing disarmament, which could also include the Open-Ended Working Group. P5 process and dynamics 13. The P5 process is used as a counter to criticism about the slow pace of disarmament among the NWS. There are, however, differing interests at play which greatly diminish potential for progress to be made quickly. The opinions voiced within the P5 process are frequently contrasting. Disagreements among China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and United States are often more stark than among non-p5 members. The P5 should not, therefore, be viewed as a monolith with a single voice. Although Russia and the United States have nearly 50 years of experience negotiating such issues, this is not shared among all five states. Nor is it as advantageous in the current security context. 14. Such internal differences need to be overcome, through an incremental and measured approach, to provide any realistic progress toward nuclear disarmament on the part of the P5. Although movement is often criticised for being protracted, there is a broad sense of obligation to the process among the NWS, which are gradually establishing common understandings about definitions, conditions and the likely way forward. China, for example, is enhancing its level of transparency as a result of its engagement with the process. The development of a glossary of terms is an admittedly soft way to achieve progress on the disarmament agenda, but it has encouraged discussion about nuclear disarmament among civil society in China. Despite such small successes, the lack of transparency invites external criticism about demonstrable progress and the political will of all participants. More work could be done within the P5 in communicating to NNWS what the process has achieved and what it hopes to accomplish. 15. Although the P5 is unable to match the urgency expressed by NNWS, developing mutual trust and transparency between NWS is crucial for future steps toward multilateral disarmament. To keep the process moving forward and prevent fragmentation, it is necessary to proceed at a seemingly slower pace. 16. The next meeting of the P5 process, in London in February 2015, was set against a challenging backdrop in terms of both the NPT and the wider international environment. The agenda covered all three pillars of the NPT and emphasised commitment to greater transparency, at least on the part of the United Kingdom, through outreach activities with NNWS and civil society. NWS continue to believe that the P5 process can make a major contribution to the success of the RevCon by signalling a readiness to deepen and broaden engagement. Middle East: WMD Free Zone and Iran 17. Developments in the Middle East have produced mixed results in advance of the RevCon. The extension of the timeline for negotiations with Iran has largely removed this issue from the agenda, although the diminishing prospects of a Weapons of Mass Destruction Free Zone in the Middle East has the potential to undermine discussions in New York. 18. There are a variety of obstacles that stand in the way of a Zone Conference. The primary area of disagreement is a conceptual one. Competing visions of the path to disarmament between Egypt and Israel limit any tangible progress. Specifically, Egypt Page 3 of 8

preconditions any advance on the creation of a Zone on Israeli accession to the NPT. Israel, for its part, prioritises regional security ahead of such commitments to disarmament. 19. The issue also lacks leadership. While there appears to be interest among Arab League representatives, greater support and assistance is required. This would traditionally have been the role assumed by Egypt, but the recent domestic political changes have undermined its willingness to drive the process forward for fear of losing regional leverage. Instead Egypt appears to be blocking potential for any progress. 20. Given the difficulty in agreeing to an agenda for a conference in Helsinki, the facilitators considered drafting an initial document in an effort to identify common ground. However, it was agreed that any solutions or new initiatives must come from regional actors and not be externally implemented. While a glimmer of hope for possible progress still remains a final round of consultations are scheduled to take place before the RevCon there is no presumption that such talks will be successful in producing a breakthrough. 21. While there has been much focus on Iran in the last two years since the Geneva deal, engagement in consultations about the Zone has been limited. Understandably, resources have been channelled towards negotiations with the E3+3, but this has added to the lack of communication and trust that currently exist in the region. Depending on the nature of an agreement between Iran and the E3+3, it could be portrayed as a success for the non-proliferation regime. The issue of compliance, a prominent area of discussion at the 2010 RevCon, will likely receive less attention in 2015, but the shortcomings that have allowed Iran to develop nuclear latency whilst remaining within the NPT are still expected to be discussed. 22. Three central issues govern the likelihood of a successful deal: the lifting of sanctions; the parameters of Iran s enrichment activity; and the levels of existing stockpiles of nuclear material. There is a sense of guarded optimism that an agreement can be reached because of the amount of time and energy invested thus far. However, aside from the security concerns, regional actors are concerned that a deal deemed conciliatory toward Iran would challenge existing non-proliferation norms and could set a dangerous precedent for future regional nuclear programmes. Despite the current security environment and the traditional pessimism associated with any RevCon that follows a successful review cycle, there is cause for positivity and optimism with regard to achievements of the 2010-2015 period Areas of Progress and Success Going into the RevCon 23. Despite the current security environment and the traditional pessimism associated with any RevCon that follows a successful review cycle, there is cause for positivity and optimism with regard to achievements of the 2010-2015 period. NWS were keen to emphasise meaningful accomplishments that have occurred over the preceding 5 years, despite the challenges the upcoming meeting may encounter. Less progress may have been made than wanted since 1995 and the indefinite extension of the NPT; however, it would be a mistake to belittle the progress made thus far. The NPT, with the norm and obligations it created, has contributed in a massive way to preventing the spread of nuclear weapons, thus remaining one of the most successful treaties in the world. 24. Furthermore, New START has been implemented fully and the United States remains ready to pursue further discussions despite tense bilateral relations between Washington and Moscow. The P5 process has bought NWS together for substantive dialogue on transparency, confidence building, and common challenges for the future of multilateral disarmament. Nuclear weapon free zones have also advanced in Central Asia and Southeast Asia and despite the continuing debates between regional actors, a huge amount of work has been invested in trying to get states together for the Helsinki process. This has not happened for 20 years and still represents progress, even if the Zone remains a chimera. 25. In other regions of the world, eight years after the first North Korean nuclear test, Japan Page 4 of 8

and South Korea have refrained from developing nuclear weapons despite possessing the capability to do so. The crisis in Ukraine was also assessed to have devalued the nuclear issue: NATO has reacted in a measured and non-nuclear way, thereby avoiding possible escalation. Advances in nuclear safety following Fukushima and continued improvements to physical protection and nuclear security are further areas to applaud. The RevCon can enhance the accountability and implementation of past commitments. Defining Success and Desired Outcomes at the RevCon Indicators of success 26. Despite the positive developments since 2010 the current outlook remains pessimistic. What, then, would a successful RevCon look like? This question should be heavily caveated: defining success or failure is dependent on perspective. The NNWS want to see traction on disarmament efforts. The humanitarian impacts initiative has reinforced that anything less could threaten the non-proliferation regime more broadly. In contrast, the NWS do not want to focus purely on disarmament and prefer to cover all three pillars of the NPT. These opposing postures suggest that success will not only be hard to achieve, but also difficult to assess. 27. Although 22 days will not resolve all issues, engagement and compromises can be made and, from a P5 perspective, a shared commitment to advance the NPT needs to be prioritised over narrow issue areas in order to achieve success. Although a consensus document like the Action Plan agreed in 2010 is neither necessary nor expected, the previous RevCon saw States Parties take a constructive approach in strengthening the treaty across all three pillars, breaking free of traditional groupings and challenging those who would take diplomatic hostages over a single issue. The NWS are keen to diversify discussions and cover a range of topics in addition to disarmament, such as the universalization of the Additional Protocol, optimising implementation of safeguards, issues of noncompliance, the abuse of Article X and right to withdrawal, and providing support to advancements in peaceful uses, safety and security. 28. From the NNWS standpoint however, it will be essential for the success of the RevCon, as well as the health of the non-proliferation regime more broadly, that they can believe P5 efforts and commitment to disarmament. Suggestions for achieving this included increased transparency, the de-alerting of nuclear weapons or reduced reliance on such weapons in security doctrines. NNWS seek a plausible road map and although a formal timetable is not required, some prospect of success and demonstration of political will would be welcomed. 29. Practically speaking, disarmament is likely to remain the major issue. In order to prevent both sides talking past each other, the procedural details could play an important role. In 2000 and 2010 the work of subsidiary bodies within the main committees was crucial in enabling work to start early in the process. While decisions on the establishment of such bodies for the 2015 RevCon are still to be decided, they have the potential to improve the likelihood of consensus. 30. The role of diplomatic bridge builders will also be an important one. There appears to be a poor understanding of, and lack of respect for, the two dominant positions. Bloc or group politics could therefore play a crucial role in bridging divides or blocking attempts to undermine the process. In this regard, the New Agenda Coalition (NAC), Non- Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative (NPDI), and Vienna Group of 10 could all have key roles. However, there are practical limits to the extent to which the review process can paper over differences. Desired outcomes 31. Based on the gloomy picture painted thus far, what can we hope for at the 2015 RevCon? Will consensus be achieved? Will future efforts be based on the 2010 Action Page 5 of 8

Plan? 32. Interaction between the P5 and NNWS is characterised by set piece exchanges in different fora, as well as continuing disagreements about how to address nuclear use and further disarmament. While this is unlikely to change, the RevCon can enhance the accountability and implementation of past commitments. Furthermore, a shift in how the NPT is perceived and how it is working could be emphasised. Reinforcing its achievements and its proper role might sustain greater political support among all States Parties. 33. With regard to the Action Plan, the NNWS want to see evidence of implementation. There are, however, many points that cannot be fulfilled and require updating; additions are similarly required. The NAM has recognised this and will be submitting a paper outlining its vision for the Action Plan at the RevCon. Failure to convene a conference on the WMD Free Zone in the Middle East has the potential to derail the 2015 RevCon. Support from the highest political levels would be welcomed in order to drive the process forward. Although unlikely, it was also recommended that Russia should take up the offer of the US further bilateral reductions of nuclear weapons. Competing pathways towards disarmament 34. NNWS remain distrustful of NWS commitment to nuclear disarmament and are frustrated with the lack of progress and a sense that they have not lived up to the bargains made in 1995 for indefinite extension of the NPT. In addition to the commitment to make substantive progress towards disarmament, another component of this bargain was a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), which was successfully negotiated and completed in 1997 but still has not entered into force. This distrust is exacerbated by modernization of nuclear arsenals in many NWS, particularly Russia and the United States, with the United Kingdom approaching a main gate decision in 2016 as to whether or not to renew its Trident nuclear-delivery platform. 35. The existing disarmament machinery is not working with the CD failing to make progress towards an FMCT. While the United States and Russia have reduced the size of their arsenals by 90% from the height of the Cold War, further progress has stalled. This is partially due to lack of political will among some NWS and a continued reliance on nuclear deterrence, as alleged by many NNWS, but is also due to geopolitical shifts and a volatile strategic environment, and technical challenges in verifying disarmament. RevCons, however, are not meant to be the forum for negotiating disarmament, which is the responsibility of the CD, again raising questions about the appropriate forum for discussions about the competing pathways towards disarmament. 36. States Parties are divided and increasingly polarized as to the best path towards disarmament: the NWS continue to promote a step-by-step process, rooted in the NPT and including a succession of mutually reinforcing instruments such as further US- Russia arms control and an FMCT; whereas an increasing number of NNWS and civil society groups are calling for a legally-binding ban, similar to that developed for land mines and cluster munitions. Much of this polarization is also due to slow progress and the aforementioned distrust, but there is also a tendency among NNWS to treat NWS as a monolith rather than disaggregate the challenges of disarmament, many of which are unique to each NWS. The humanitarian impacts initiative, in particular, has given new momentum and voice to the latter perspective, and the step-by-step approach is likely to be heavily scrutinized at the RevCon, to include legal interpretations of Article VI. Could the Action Plan be used as an assessor of success over the past five years and should it NPT Success Beyond the Review Conference Preparing for the RevCon 37. A key question going into the RevCon will be how to handle the Action Plan; could it be used as an assessor of success over the past five years and should it continue to serve as a metric in its current form, be updated, or be discarded for the next review cycle. Page 6 of 8

continue to serve as a metric in its current form, be updated, or be discarded for the next review cycle? States Parties could start planning for this beforehand and identify their own progress in relation to the Action Plan and be prepared to report at the RevCon. 38. Groupings such as the NAC and NPDI can work to build bridges and find common ground before the RevCon, similar to the role of the NAC in 2000. The groupings can lay the groundwork for addressing issues such as Article VI, defining success, and discussing how to handle the Action Plan as a metric. 39. Leadership of the main committees has been allocated, but the organizers can also work to identify subsidiary bodies, such as one on the Middle East, and to nominate respective chairpersons well in advance to facilitate preliminary discussions and relationship-building. During the RevCon 40. All States Parties should restate their commitment to uphold the NPT. This seemingly small gesture will set a positive and productive tone for the RevCon, reassure NWS of NNWS commitment to the treaty and its indefinite extension, and reassure NNWS of NWS continued commitment to the treaty despite stalled progress towards disarmament. The statements can also be in the format of the Austrian pledge at the Vienna Conference and tailored to suit the needs and interests of each state. 41. Given that the 2010 Action Plan will serve as a point of reference at the RevCon in some capacity, States Parties can put forward specific proposals building on the Action Plan. First among these is the P5 process, which can become more transparent by inviting select NNWS to observe some sessions of the group s meetings, expand verification cooperation, explain safety and security practices to NNWS, set a more ambitious agenda, and explicitly address nuclear risks and crisis scenarios, along with scenarios when nuclear weapons could potentially be used to include India and Pakistan. Discussion of nuclear security will be particularly important in light of the Russian decision to cease cooperation with the United States on securing its nuclear materials. 42. Another item from the Action Plan was with regard to the WMD Free Zone in the Middle East. It is highly unlikely a meeting will be convened before May; however, the RevCon offers a timely opportunity to announce a date for a future meeting, even if it comes with prerequisites. This would generate a high level of support and set a good tone for discussions. In addition, there should be a side event at the RevCon specifically to review progress made to date on the Zone meeting, outstanding issues, and planning for the meeting. 43. A group of scientific experts should be established to focus on the practical challenges of verification within the P5 process, but also to serve as a point of transparency for NNWS and to make a substantive contribution to the step-by-step process towards disarmament. Many of these recommendations can be initiated in May to contribute to a productive RevCon but will require commitment and implementation throughout the 2015-2020 review cycle, particularly in the lead-up to the 25-year anniversary of indefinite extension and concerns about its credibility. Beyond the RevCon 44. Education about disarmament and non-proliferation needs to be a priority for all States Parties to the NPT. This can entail academic-based programmes, such as those at the Monterey Institute; technical programmes about nuclear security, such as those led by King s College London; along with professional education programmes for government officials about the mechanisms of the NPT and challenges to disarmament and nonproliferation. 45. With regard to the Zone, states in the region can commit to joining the Biological Weapons Convention, Chemical Weapons Convention, NPT, and CTBT at a future date, which would create the political space for discussions about these issues to take Page 7 of 8

place in an open and different dynamic. 46. Another priority of the Zone initiative needs to be increasing visibility and consensus around the issue at higher levels of government across the region. By incorporating other aspects of the non-proliferation regime, such as the CTBT Organization and Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), will increase visibility and buy-in. NPT States Parties outside the region can contribute to the effort by bringing it up with government officials in various diplomatic settings and making it an overarching priority. 47. States Parties can take advantage of the Open-Ended Working Group as a multilateral forum for discussing the substantive issues of disarmament, building trust and transparency between NWS and NNWS, and avoiding the political challenges of the CD. 48. An ongoing challenge with the step-by-step process towards disarmament is the technicalities of verification. Some of the P5 have launched programmes to begin to tackle the issue, such as a recent US proposal to explore verification and the UK- Norway Initiative, which can be built on to include a broader membership. In addition, a verification group of scientific experts, as suggested earlier as a recommendation for the RevCon, similar to that developed and successfully implemented for the CTBT, would focus on the practical verification issues among NWS and provide transparency. Matthew Cottee and Heather Williams Wilton Park March 2015 Wilton Park reports are brief summaries of the main points and conclusions of a conference. The reports reflect rapporteurs personal interpretations of the proceedings as such they do not constitute any institutional policy of Wilton Park nor do they necessarily represent the views of the rapporteur. Should you wish to read other Wilton Park reports, or participate in upcoming Wilton Park conferences, please consult our website www.wiltonpark.org.uk To receive our e-newsletter and latest updates on conferences subscribe to https://www.wiltonpark.org.uk/newsletter/ Page 8 of 8