Comparing headscarf regimes in Europe: The Netherlands, Germany and France Doutje Lettinga & Sawitri Saharso VU Amsterdam/University of Twente Enschede Contact: doutjelettinga@gmail.com; s.saharso@utwente.nl VERY MUCH STILL A DRAFT. PLEASE DO NOT QUOTE OR CIRCULATE. Abstract All over Europe the wearing of the Islamic headscarf, or more generally Islamic head and body covering for women (hijab), has become contested and governments have felt the necessity to develop policies to regulate the wearing of this apparel. France, Germany and the Netherlands have developed different policies in this regard. In order to understand how this fundamentally contested issue became regulated through laws and policies in each of the three countries this paper discusses the ways in which in French, Dutch and German politicians have deliberated the issue of the hijab. The paper is based on a content analysis of parliamentary debates on the hijab in France (1989-2007), Germany (1997-2007) and the Netherlands (1985-2007). We found national differences in how the debate was framed. We argue that the national differences in how the debate was framed, and eventually led to different regulations, are informed by national differences in the institutional, historical and political context of each of the three countries. We studied in particular national statechurch relations, migrant integration policies and gender machineries and policies. We found a convergence over time in the gendering of policy debates in restrictive ways, which can be explained by the strength of the populist right-wing parties and by transnational developments. However, striking national differences continue to exist in actual hijab policies. We argue that different national state-church traditions continue to account for the different ways in which the hijab is regulated, despite convergences in the three countries' gender or immigration regimes. Introduction The Islamic headscarf or more generally the head and body covering of Islamic women, hijab, has become a contested issue in Europe. Yet this has not led to uniform regulation of hijab: while some
countries have issued bans, others have formulated rules that explicitly grant women the right to wear a headscarf and still others have no regulation at all. In this paper we discuss the regulation of the headscarf in three countries: The Netherlands, Germany and France. Our reason for choosing these countries, is because they are considered as representing different citizenship and integration regimes. France would represent a republican model, Germany an ethnic model and the Netherlands a multicultural model. 1 The models are assumed to differ in the extent to which they are open to accommodate cultural difference. We initially expected that differences in the regulation of the headscarf could be attributed to these countries representing different integration models. The idea of national integration models explaining other phenomena has become contested however. This changed our research aim; we wanted not only to establish whether national citizenship models can explain national particularities, but also, if they cannot, what then can explain national differences in regulating hijab. We followed an inductive approach: assuming that laws are made in parliament we made a content analysis of parliamentary debates on hijab in France (1989-2007), Germany (1997-2007) and the Netherlands (1985-2007). What justifications were given by actors in Parliament for the regulation or non-regulation that was installed? Do these refer back to the national conceptions of nationhood? And if not, by what ideas are these justifications then informed and how can we explain the reference to these ideas? We will first explain the notion of national integration models. Then we present for each country the way hijab is regulated and how this was argued in Parliament. In the conclusion and debate section we come back to the question whether national models of citizenship explain the regulation of the hijab in the three countries and if not how then we can account for the differences (and similarities) in regulation. National models of citizenship The idea of national citizenship models can be traced back to Rogers Brubaker s study on citizenship and nationhood in France and Germany (1992). The thrust of his argument is that when in the 19 th century the French and German state was formed there evolved in both countries a nation-specific understanding of nationhood and citizenship. While the development of these understandings of nationhood and citizenship was a rather contingent process, once established they showed to be relatively stable models that informed these countries immigration and integration policies. Comment [D1]: Wil je hier beginnen met alleen de models of citizenship en pas in de discussie ingaan op alternatieve models/verklaringen? Kritiek opzcitizenship models: a. too deterministic (met name Brubaker). b. too static (cannot explain changes over time within a country or convergences between countries) c. too simplistic (ignore role of religion and gender in integration debates and/or variations local/national levels). Several authors (e.g. Castles 1995, Rex 1997, Koopmans et al. 2005) followed up this idea and suggested that it is these traditions of citizenship that explain why European countries have responded differently to the presence of migrants. France, Germany and the Netherlands would represent respectively a republican, an ethnic and multicultural model. In the republican model the nation is 1 We follow here the typology from Castles & Miller (2011)
conceived of as an undivided community of citizens that share common political principles. In order to secure common citizenship, citizens are asked to abstract from their particularistic identities and exist in the public sphere as citizens only. Anyone who is willing to subscribe to the nation s principles can in theory become a citizen. This model is therefore open to accept immigrants as citizens, but they are expected to assimilate in one uniform nation that is understood as a political community transcending the cultural differences of its members. An ethnic model conceives of the nation as a culturally homogeneous community. The nation is considered as the political extension of an already existing ethnic community based on a common history, culture and language. Because of its cultural monism, it has difficulty both in accepting cultural aliens as citizens and in allowing other than the dominant majority s culture in public life. In a multicultural model, lastly, the nation is united by a thin core of common values, which goes together with the co-existence of groups that have their distinctive group identities. A multicultural model is open to accept immigrants as citizens and open to cultural diversity. From these models one would expect France and Germany for different reasons to restrict the wearing of hijab, and the Netherlands have accommodative regulation. The critique on the citizenship models is that they lack explanatory power. Christian Joppke (2007) for instance contends that Western European states policies on immigrant integration are increasingly converging. France, Germany and the Netherlands have all introduced obligatory civic integration courses and tests for newly arriving immigrants. The impetus for this policy convergence is that they are all confronted with the socio-economic marginalization of immigrant communities and formation of an ethnic underclass. To curb this trend admission policies are required, policymakers in all three countries believe, that select immigrants with the right background characteristics. As admission to the country and residence is dependent on passing the test, civic integration tests are a tool of migration control. Joppke did find national differences in the implementation of the tests, but this variation did not correspond with the national models. Comment [DL2]: Prima, maar schrijft Joppke in dat artikel niet over convergences tussen regimes al verklarende factor? Ines Michalowski (2011) compared the content of citizenship tests in five countries, including our three countries. She too found national differences that could not however be explained by the national citizenship models. Michalowski: Countries renowned for having an ethno-cultural understanding of citizenship (e.g. Germany, DL/SS) implemented citizenship tests conveying a political liberal idea of a community of citizens, ( ) By contrast, the Netherlands a country with a liberal and multicultural reputation also requires immigrants to be aware of and accept certain sociocultural norms. (2011: 749). Castles and Miller notice a widespread backlash against multiculturalism that caused formerly multicultural countries to change their integration policies which now have greater emphasis on integration, social cohesion and core national values. They contend that the Netherlands has had perhaps the most dramatic turnaround and seems to be on the way to a new assimilationism (Castles
& Miller 2011: 274). Duyvendak and Scholten (2010) even dispute the idea that there has been a dominant Dutch multicultural model of integration. According to them multiculturalism was one of several discourses and the policy that came closest to a form of multiculturalism, the Dutch Ethnic Minority Policy, was already abandoned in the early 1990s. They suggest even that Dutch multiculturalism was invented retrospectively by politicians who wanted to disqualify policies with which they disagreed (Duyvendak & Scholten 2010: 39). In sum, the critics maintain that citizenship models are but a theoretical construct, no longer, if ever they did, corresponding with an empirical reality of the countries under study. They are too deterministic, too static (as they cannot explain changes over time within a country or convergences between countries) and too simplistic (because they ignore internal variation between the local and the national level). Are national models indeed passé? We now turn to the regulation of hijab and the debates that accompanied the introduction of the rules. The Netherlands In the Netherlands, veiling did not become a major political issue until 2000. Some minor political debates on the issue can be traced in the 1980s and 90s. The issue became particularly salient after 2003, with the rise of populist right-wing parties that politicised the issue and whose frames started to resonate. In 1985, a national controversy arose when a local public school prohibited the headscarf in order to relieve young girls from religious pressure to cover. Members of Parliament from different parties challenged this decision, and the Christian Democratic Minister of Education, Deetman, publicly announced that headscarves are allowed at public schools in the Netherlands (TK 700, 8-2-1985). More than a decade later, in 1998, the issue re-emerged on the political agenda, this time because a teacher trainee was prohibited from covering in a public primary school. Again, this decision was successfully challenged by members of Parliament: the government endorsed the legal advice of the Committee of Equal Treatment (ETC 1999-18) that a ban on religious dress for public school teachers constitutes a form of discrimination on grounds of religion. The Committee had argued that expressing one s religion did not conflict with public neutrality per se, as the headscarf did not preclude a school teacher from having the required neutral and open attitude towards pupils different beliefs. In 2001, two MP s of the Green Party brought up the issue of a woman who was not allowed to wear her headscarf while working as the clerk of a court. According to these MP s Muslim women with headscarves faced discrimination on the Dutch labour market. From their perspective the headscarf should become more accepted to enable the participation of Muslim women in society and hence their emancipation. The Green party also disputed the idea that headscarves in court were at odds with
public neutrality. The Dutch understanding of the separation between church and state, according to the Greens did not emerge to exclude clergy men and religious traditions or signs from public life. ( ) It means exactly the opposite: the state has no right to interfere with the religion of its subjects (TK 59, 17-3-2004, pp. 3887). The Liberal Minister of Justice Korthals disagreed with this position and argued that religious symbols should be forbidden in court to preserve the neutrality and impartiality of the judiciary (Verhaar and Saharso, 2006). His position was supported by a wide spectrum of the political arena. All parties agreed that civil servants should have a right to express their personal religious affiliation, except (uniformed) public officers in the judiciary and lawenforcement. Their particular function required a neutral and impartial appearance. This position was institutionalized in a policy report in 2004 (TK 29614, no. 2, 1-6-2004) and re-emphasized in 2008 when a new debate about headscarves in the police force flared up (TK 29628, no. 109, 14-11-2008). After 2003, veiling became a more prominent political issue. The new populist party List Pim Fortuyn (Lijst Pim Fortuyn, LPF) that had won 26 out of 150 parliamentary seats in the elections of 2002 started a campaign against the Islamization of Dutch society. Their Islam as a threat frame started resonating, particularly when the debate shifted to face covers. This issue was raised by right-wing politician Geert Wilders during a debate about terrorism in 2005 when he introduced a motion to ban the burqa in public space (TK 29754, no. 53, 13-10-2005). A majority in parliament consisting of the conservative Liberal VVD, Christian Democrat CDA, the Christian Orthodox party SGP, and various right-wing deputies adopted Wilders motion (TK 36, 10-12-2005; TK 16, 24-10-2006). Face covering was mainly framed as a security and integration issue and less as a religious issue. VVD MP Weekers argued, for instance,: when people cover their face in public, whether this is with a burqa or with a balaclava, this seriously affects other people s feelings of safety, and the care for a civil public order involves that we do not tolerate such face covers (TK 15, 19-10-2006, pp. 1073). Parallel to this new emphasis on public order and security, a shift in the use of the gender equality frame occurred. Both conservative Liberal and populist right-wing deputies argued that the burqa is a symbol of submission. This does not fit into our value-system (VVD, pp. 1073) or it is the worst kind of women-unfriendly clothing (Groep Eerdmans, TK 15, 19-10-2006, p. 1074). Left-wing parties and the Liberal Democrats (D 66) agreed that face covers are incompatible with an open and emancipated society (TK 31 700 VII, 25-12-2008). Yet, they continued to oppose a ban as a means to target women s oppression, and rather opted to emancipate the burqa away (TK 16, 24-10-2006). So far, however, no burqa ban has come into effect. This was mostly because of the premature fall of the coalition government (VVD, CDA, D 66) which had been internally divided about this and other issues. Also the latest minority cabinet, consisting of the VVD and CDA, fell apart too early to introduce a law banning all types of face-covering in public space, which had been negotiated by Geert Wilders Freedom Party in its coalition agreement. The Council of State has responded negatively to
legislation against both burqas (No. 03.07.0219/II, 2-9-2007) and all kinds of face-covering in public space (No. 04.11.0379/I, 28-11-2011). France Political contention over the headscarf started earlier in France than in the Netherlands, and has been a recurring political issue since 1989, with two clear periods of heightened contestation in 1989 and 2003. The debate has mostly focused on pupils headscarves but recently shifted to the face-cover as well. As widely reported elsewhere (Rocheford 2002; Kastoryano 2006; Scott 2007; Bowen 2007), the debate in France started in 1989 when three schoolgirls in the Northern city of Creil were not allowed to wear a headscarf at school. Similar to the Dutch case, the school principal argued that the headscarf could yield pressure on others to cover against their will. After seeking advice of the State Council, the highest administrative court of France (the Conseil d Etat : no. 346 893, 27-11-1989), the Socialist Minister of Education, Lionel Jospin, ruled that wearing signs of religious affiliation by students in public schools was not necessarily in conflict with public neutrality (laïcité) as long as they did not disturb the educational order in schools or seek to proselytize their religion. Three weeks later, the Socialist government issued a Directive to schools encouraging them to take a case to case approach to decide whether pupils transgressed their freedom rights, and to discuss the issue before expelling pupils (no. 15577, Journal Officiel, 15-11-1989). A number of political parties, across the political spectrum, challenged the Minister s decision and framed the headscarf as an expression of a religious group identity that conflicted with French universalism and principles of laicité. Deputies of the Rassemblement pour la République (RPR) framed the headscarf as an act of provocation to the French Republican pact, signifying a collective or individual segregation from the rest of society (a repli communitaire ) and a politicized symbol of religious fundamentalism ( intégrism ) challenging the secular and democratic state. Multicultural policies were seen as detrimental for social cohesion by emphasizing distinctive collective identities. The veil was linked much earlier to gender-inequality. From the onset of the debate, both the Left and the Right agreed that the headscarf conflicted with principles of gender equality. Both viewed the Republican school as a motor for girls emancipation by providing them with the tools to break with their patriarchal community and to integrate in French society. As RPR-member Michèlle Barzach argued: The integration of the Muslim population passes through its women, and the integration of women passes through schools (8-11-1989: 4756-4757). Yet, while the RPR concluded that headscarves should therefore be banned from public schools, some prominent members of the Socialist party argued that a ban was counterproductive. Prime-minister Michel Rocard (PS) explained: (...) The aim of our public and laic school is to welcome, to persuade, to integrate, that
means, to realize the goals of education in another way than through a politics of a priori exclusion (JO, 8-11-1989: 4751-4752). After the turn of the millennium, however, the Socialist party changed position. In 2003, some PS members submitted a proposal to ban all religious, political and philosophic symbols from school, framing the headscarf as a contestation of French values and culture, and a rejection, often imposed on young girls, of the Republican and laic model of integration (no. 2096, see also no. 1227). Also the Right submitted several proposals to ban religious dress in public schools. On February 10, 2004, a large majority in parliament voted in favour of a government s law-proposal to ban on ostensible religious symbols in the public school (494 to 36, with 31 abstentions). Only some members of the Communist party opposed the ban, because it would only fuel fundamentalism and communalism and exclude those who were mostly in need of integration. On March 15 2004 the French government passed the law that came into effect the subsequent school year. The Ministry of Educations sent a Directive to all public schools that explained that headscarves, kippahs and large Christian crosses could be interpreted as conspicuous signs of religious affiliation that could be prohibited, while necklaces with small crucifixes, David stars or hands of Fatima were tolerated. Hereafter, the debate shifted to the Islamic face-veil. On June 22, 2009, President Nicolas Sarkozy said: The burqa is not a sign of religion, it is a sign of subservience. It will not be welcome on the territory of the French republic. 2 One day later, he installed a parliamentary inquiry commission to study the possibilities of a law banning public burqa-wearing (No. 1725, 9-6-2009). On January 26, 2010, the Commission published its report. It proposed restrictions on face-covers in certain public institutions and in public transportation, but a full ban was considered legally untenable (No. 2262). The State Council, asked for its advice by Prime-Minister François Fillon, reached the same conclusion. 3 Nevertheless, the government launched a law-project to forbid all types of face-covering in all public spaces (including the street), which was adopted by a majority in the lower house on July, 13, 2010 and in the senate on September 14, 2010. One month later, on 8 October the Constitutional Council concluded that the law was in line with the national constitution and international jurisprudence. Germany Compared to the other two countries, the German headscarf debate started late. The first parliamentary debates occurred in the Southern federal state of Baden-Württemberg in 1997 about a teacher trainee with a headscarf. But only in 2003, the headscarf controversy became a national affair when it spread to other federal states (which have the responsibility over education). The debate has primarily focused
on teacher s rights to cover. In contrast to France and similar to the Netherlands, pupils headscarves have never been controversial. The case that triggered the first policy debate concerned Fereshta Ludin, a German teacher of Afghani origin who had already worn a headscarf during her traineeship without any complaints from parents. After Ludin had finished her education in 1998, she was rejected for a job in a public elementary school in the city of Stuttgart in Baden-Württemberg. The Upper School Authority supported its decision with the reasoning that the headscarf was not only a religious symbol but also a sign of cultural limitation and therefore that she lacked the personal qualifications ( Eignung ) for the status of civil servant who need to respect state neutrality (Altinordu, 2004). The Minister of Education of Baden-Württemberg, Anette Schavan, backed the decision of the Upper School Authority. To the parliament she explained that as a teacher, Ludin was expected to distance herself from political ideologies that are in conflict with the state s constitutional values. Ludin s insistence on her right to cover would also undermine the school s pedagogic mission to promote integration, as the headscarf functioned as a sign of cultural and civilizational segregation and thus worked disintegrating. 2 Her Ministry s press release also illustrates that the headscarf was not considered a religious practice. It was written that the wearing of the headscarf is not part of the religious duties of a Muslim woman. This is recognisable, for example, in that a majority of Muslim women worldwide do not wear the headscarf. 3 Most parties in the Land s legislature, including the oppositional Greens and Social Democrat party, supported the Minister s decision. Only the Rightwing party Die Republikaner tried, in vain, to push for a more extensive ban that would also prohibit pupils to cover. Five years later, on 24th September 2003, the Federal Constitutional Court ruled over Ludin s case after a long and tardy legal battle through various lower courts and the Federal Administrative Court. The constitutional judges declared that Ludin had been denied placement without sufficient legal grounds and concluded that the School Authority of Baden-Württemberg had violated her constitutional rights to religious freedom and non-discrimination, that is, under the existing Civil Service Law of federal state. Allowing teachers to wear headscarves did not contradict Germany s tradition of neutrality, seen as an open and comprehensive neutrality ( offene und übergreifende Neutralität) and therefore that the law did not contain sufficient provisions to justify the restriction (Henkes & Kneip, 2008: 13). Nonetheless, the court also noticed that legislators in the federal states would be entitled to adjust their law by interpreting the duty of public neutrality in a stricter and more distanced way (Saharso, 2008). 2 BW 12/51(July 15, 1998): 3984. 3 Pressemitteilung no. 119/98 of Ministry of Culture, Sports and Youth (July 13, 1998)
The court took into account the meaning that the headscarf may have for third persons ( objektiver Empfängerhorizont ) and argued that - unlike the Christian cross the headscarf was not only a religious sign but could also be interpreted as a sign of proselytism or women s suppression. It acknowledged the abstract danger that pupils may be confronted with religious arguments contrary to their will, thereby endangering their negative right to freedom of religion (Berghahn, 2008). Given the religious diversity of present-day society, a teacher s headscarf could yield conflicts that endangered educational peace. The court therefore allowed legislators to amend their legislation in a way they deemed most fit with the school traditions, confessional composition of the population, and the more or less rootedness of religion in their respective state, as long as all faiths were treated equally, both de jure and de facto (Fogel, 2007). Since then, eight of Germany s 16 federal states have passed laws banning public school teachers from wearing religious symbols and clothing in school (table x). Even though the laws do not explicitly mention the Muslim headscarf, the parliamentary debates illustrate that they were clearly intended to target this type of religious dress. In two states, the ban was extended to other public servants in the field of justice, police and law-enforcement (Berlin and Hesse). In Baden-Württemberg and Berlin, legislation exists for kindergarten personnel too. Following Rostock & Berghahn (2009), we differentiate between three types of policy regimes that now exist in Germany: the laic model, the Christian-occidental model and the case-to-case model. Neutrally formulated ban Bremen (2005) Lower- Saxony (2004) Berlin*,** *** (2005) Governmen t CDU-SPD CDU-FDP SPD- PDS/Die Linke Specific ban: Specific ban exemption for rejected: Christianoccidental government context government specific cultural values approach and traditions Baden- Rhineland Württemberg*,* CDU-FDP Palatinate SPD-FDP *, *** (2005) (2004) Bavaria (2004) Hesse*,** (2004) CSU CDU North Rhine- Westphalia CDU-FDP (2006) Saarland CDU (2004) Schleswig- Holstein (2004) Hamburg (2004) Brandenburg (2003) SPD- Greens CDU-FDP- PRO SPD-CDU No law proposal introduced: context specific approach Saxony Mecklenburg- Vorpommern Thuringia Saxony- Anhalt
* The neutrality law of Hessen concerns both teachers and regular civil servants. The neutrality law of Berlin concerns teachers and civil servants, as well as other public functions in the judiciary and the police. ** These laws make an exemption for teacher-trainees (except the law of Bremen); teacher-trainees may, in principle, express personal religious affiliations. *** The law of Baden-Württemberg also forbids the wearing of hijabs for personnel working in kindergartens. The law of Berlin allows this in principle, until parents complain. Then the rights of parents take precedence over the rights of the kindergarten governesses Christian Occidental model Baden-Württemberg was the first state to enact legislation of the Christian-occidental type on April 1, 2004. Saarland, Hesse, Bavaria and North Rhine-Westphalia followed suit. These states laws do not ban religious symbols for teachers per se, but symbols or clothing that endanger the peace at school or the neutrality of the state, or else conflict with the basic rights of parents and/or pupils, or with the free, democratic order (or a combination of these). All five laws have formulated exception clauses stating that the display of Christian-Occidental values and traditions corresponds to the educational mandate of the state or its constitution. All attempts to dispute the Christian Occidental legislation of the five federal states have failed (Henkes & Kneip, 2009). The effect is that only headscarf-wearing teachers are fired or not hired for teaching jobs, while nuns are still allowed to teach. Federal courts have argued that the few remaining teacher-nuns should be considered historical exceptions that do not comprise a systematic discrimination for Islamic religious communities (Berghahn, 2008). The teacher s headscarf was framed as a symbol of an Islamic fundamentalism which conflicted with German values and with public neutrality. When in February 2004 Annette Schavan presented her government s bill to the parliament, she found support from the Liberal coalition partner (FDP) and the Social Democrat opposition (SPD). Even though some SPD members wondered whether exempting nuns habits would pass the scrutiny of the Constitutional Court, they also voted in favour of the bill. 4 SPD fraction leader Peter Wintruff explained: Different from the headscarf, the crucifix belongs to our Western culture, to our tradition and has here a high standing as a religious evidence of brotherly love, tolerance and human dignity [ ]. We acknowledge the mandate of our federal constitution to educate our children according to Christian and Western cultural values. The state neutrality in our public schools 4 BW 13/67 (April 1, 2004): 4715. SPD member Freider Birzele, for instance, declares here that even though the SPD supports the idea of a ban it is anxious to know whether the Federal Administrative Court considers its current wording constitutionally sound.
may unlike a Laic state recognise religious expression, but only those that don t contravene the embedded human rights. 5 Deputy Dieter Kleinman of the FDP confirmed: We prohibit the headscarf and simultaneously affirm symbols that have shaped our Occident. 6 Only the Greens objected the bill for its discrimination between religions and argued that veiled teachers could also transmit constitutional values. Deputy member Winfried Kretschmann (Bündniss 90/Die Grünen) argued: Your law actually says, in the vocabulary of sports: it is not allowed to play ball sports in the school yard. But then comes the second phrase: football is not a ball sport. 7 Laic model Berlin is taken as a paradigmatic example of the laic legislation, which has also been passed in Lower Saxony and Bremen. Their laws ban all personal expressions of political, religious and philosophical beliefs for reasons of public neutrality (Bremen and Berlin) or in light of the state s educational mandate (Lower Saxony). In Berlin, deputies of the governing parties SPD and PDS/Die Linke as well as the oppositional parties the FDP and Greens objected the CDU s law-proposal that would exempt Christian and Jewish expressions, pointing at the multi-religious character of the city and the equal treatment principle. Nonetheless, they all argued that the privatisation of all personal religious affiliations by teachers was the best guarantee to safeguard religious freedom rights and religious peace. Concerns about Islamic radicalism also shaped the debate. Senator of Interior Affairs, Ehrhart Körting (SPD), considered legislation necessary to prevent aggressive and ostensible religious expressions in public services. The headscarf was not only a religious expression but also a statement of a political attitude against certain values of fundamentalist Muslims. The SPD, Greens and FDP agreed that the state had to prevent the intrusion of Islamism in public institutions by banning politicized signs and symbols. Most parties also considered a ban necessary to liberate young Muslim girls from patriarchal pressure by their religious peers, but in contrast to France they only favoured a ban on religious signs for teachers. Deputies of PDS/Die Linke objected to this argument, arguing in vain that the law would deprive migrant women of free spaces ( Freiräume ) where they could work and gain (more) autonomy, thereby confirming the idea that Muslim women are restricted in their communities. Non-regulation 5 BW 13/62 (February 4, 2004). 6 BW 13/67 (April 1, 2004): 4704. In the debates of 1997/8, the FDP had still objected the differentiation between kippahs, crucifixes and headscarves, representing all as religious expressions that deserved an equal recognition. 7 BW 13/62 (February 4, 2004): 4408.
Finally, eight states continue a case-by-case approach to public neutrality. Teachers are allowed to express their personal religious beliefs unless there is evidence that they disrespect the religious views of pupils or parents, or if the school s peace is endangered. In that case, and in contrast to the Netherlands, children and their parents negative rights to religious freedom outweigh the positive rights of teachers. Six of these states are former Eastern German states where headscarf conflicts have been rare. Unlike their peers in Berlin, the Social Democrat fraction in Rhine-land Palatinate objected any redefinition of German neutrality in more secular terms. Jochen Hartloff of the SPD faction argued: We have a separation between state and church. This is traditionally regulated differently than in France. We have also a separation. But the boundaries are much more blurred in light of our Occidental-Christian background. 8 But unlike their counterparts in Baden-Württemberg, where the SPD and FDP had voted in favour of a partial ban, they rejected the CDU s proposal. The FDP echoed the concerns of the churches that a partial ban would ultimately also lead to an unwanted privatization of Christianity in the public realm. The Left added that discriminatory bans would drive moderate Muslim minorities into the hands of fundamentalists by marginalising and stigmatising them, thereby contributing to a further withdrawal in parallel societies. 9 In the words of Deputy Nils Wiechmann (Bündniss 90/ Die Grünen): Your law proposal does not serve social peace, but rather encourages fundamentalist groups in their rejection of our Constitution. It can lead to a withdrawal of minorities and serve as a breeding ground for fundamentalist organisations and their convictions. 10 They also argued that allowing women to teach with their headscarves would emancipate Muslim women s, thereby juxtaposing a secularized liberating German society with an oppressive Muslim culture and ignoring structural gender discrimination. Conclusion and debate 1. Increasing similarities in framing (Islamic fundamentalism, gender inequality). How to explain this convergence? We see three alternative explanations. A. Diffusion through policylearning B. Convergence because of European regulation C. The problem itself, broadly understood as polarisation around Islam because of (inter)national events, structures the solution. 2. But also clear national differences in regulating. Do these differences correspond with national models of citizenship? a. At first sight: yes. 8 RP 14/91 (March 17, 2005): 6094. 9 B15/45 (February 19, 2004): 3647. 10 RP 14/103 (November 30, 2005): 6889.
Netherlands = tolerates all religious symbols in public schools and public institutions, apart from police/judiciary. Not (yet) ban on face-veils. Expectation that migrants may live their (religious) culture on equal foot with other secular/religious groups in society in public space is right, although increasingly contested. France Republican model = bans all religious symbols in public schools and public institutions, and now also face-veil in public space. Expectation that migrants assimilate to French national laic culture is right, as well as the expectation of (dejure) equal treatment of different religious groups by state. Germany = some states tolerate only religious (framed as cultural) expressions of dominant native groups (Jewish/Christian groups) and ban those of immigrants. This fits the expectations of the ethno-cultural citizenship model. b. But closer look at framing and policy formation process suggests differently: 1. Differences within countries: Germany: also tolerant policies (8 federal stats) and restrictive policies a la France (3), which does not fit ethno-cultural model. 2. Changes over time: France: initially tolerated pupils headscarves, only later deemed unfit in (reinvented) Republican model (while citizenship model increasingly open for recognition of cultural differences). Netherlands ibidem: now contemplates ban on burqas but still largely tolerant (despite restrictive citizenship practices). 3. Convergences in framing (Islam as a threat frame, gendering of policy debates). 3. Does this mean that we can throw away citizenship regime theory? And how to explain these similarities between countries and changes (both within countries and across time)? a. no, citizenship theory still valid. But debate is not only about integration of migrants/ethnic minority but also about equality of women and place of religion, so different categories of citizens. We must therefore also take into account regimes/policy pasts of state-church and gender machineries to understand framing of the debate. These different regimes intersect and influence each other, creating different opportunities for actors to plea for bans/accommodation in each country. b. To understand policy outcomes: We must also take into account political and legal institutional context in which policy making processes take place (Bonjour & Lettinga): shifts in framing can be related to shifts in power constellations and alliances between parties. Influence of right-wing or conservative nationalistic politicians in each country visible, and the influence this has on the framing of established parties when they form political threat. Plus: No direct relationship between framing and policy outcome: political interests and rapid government shifts may explain why ban on burqa in
NL has still not been passed. Role of constitutional court in Germany: created political avenues to pass legislation. c. To explain convergences in framing: international context. Diffusion of policy debates across borders (Islam as a theat) and of framing of (inter)national events (apart from September 11, also murder Theo van Gogh had resonance in Germany, Ayaan was quoted in French debate).