The Forgotten Ingredient in Classical Chinese Governance: The Art of Persuasion by Dr R. James Ferguson Bond University s Associate Professor of International Relations, Dr R. James Ferguson poses that persuasion, the offer of opinion and loyal criticism to rulers, a value of traditional Confucian Governance has become a forgotten element in nowadays politics. Professor R. James Ferguson, assistant Professor of International Relations, and Director of the Centre for East- West Cultural and Economic Studies, Faculty of Society & Design, Bond University. The general features of ideal Confucian patterns of governance are well known: the central role of sage-kings and cultivated persons (the junzi) in governing the state in a humane way, based on the principles of benevolence (ren) and proper ritual and social conduct (li). Thus governments would be aligned to heaven and provide for the well-being of the people, the touch stones of good government. This came to involve the rectification of social roles, responsibilities and titles, as well as the central idea of the harmonization of persons to ensure a balanced but diverse society. Mencius, the second most influential Confucian writer, would argue that the three crucial factors for a state included natural resources and good climate, but most importantly the need for human harmony (ren-he). 1 These values, activated through the cultivated and committed person, could become the basis of a pragmatic and humanitarian system of government (renzheng). 2 In this view of government, correction of erroneous conduct, exemplary action by officials, and progressive education were all linked. When asked about government, as stated in Analects 12.17, Confucius answered, To govern (cheng) is to correct (cheng). If you set an 1 Mencius Mencius, trans. D.C. Lau. Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1988, IIB.1. 2 Renzheng is emphasized in the Confucian political philosophy of Mencius (Mengzi) and Xunzi and is related to the idea of Wangdao (the Kingly Way).
example by being correct, who would dare to remain incorrect? 3 Humane government (renzheng) therefore equates with good government. However, this would also require government to achieve harmony through balancing lenience and harshness when dealing with the people, thereby creating a system of both incentives and disincentives in a co-operative human harmony. 4 Generally, Confucianism placed the arts of government within the wider context of the way of humanity and benevolence (rendao). The downside of this approach is well known; a corrupt ruler can lead to the downfall of an entire dynasty (losing the Mandate of Heaven), as occurred repeatedly in Chinese history, and venial officials can undermine an otherwise benevolent system. The choice of proper officials becomes crucial for all patterns of Chinese thought that emphasise the role of government, whether Confucian, Legalist or those following the thought of Mo Zi (who flourished in the late fifth century BCE, his followers being called Mohists). 5 In the end, however, such systems remained highly hierarchical with a tendency towards authoritarianism. However, what is underestimated in these standard accounts is the role of persuasion (jian, offering opinions to rulers, or jianjie as persuasion), remonstrance and loyal criticism in the Chinese political tradition, though some good recent work has been done on ancient Chinese political rhetoric, showing its metaphorical and narrative methods. 6 The historical and philosophical record pays considerable attention to persuasion, though usually positioned in debates on giving advice to rulers and the limits of loyalty. Mo Zi, for example, states quite directly that when the superior is at fault there shall be good counsel. 7 Officials felt that they had the right to criticize each other, as can be seen in the following verses from the Book of Odes, directed to someone in position of authority: Oh, how distant is God on high, The folk below all suffer. Your words bear no truth in them. The plans you make are not farsighted. Helpless are we without a sage to lead us, Insubstantial is your honesty. Since your plans are not farsighted Thus I offer this dire warning. Heaven has brought on this hardship; Do not be so complacent. Heaven has brought on this turmoil; Do not be so garrulous. If your words were harmonious, Our people would join together; 3 As noted in the Lau translation, these two different words sounded alike, indicating a deeper connection between the concepts, Confucius. The Analects, trans. D.C. Lau. Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1979, p115. 4 Bodde, Derk Harmony and Conflict in Chinese Philosophy, in Studies in Chinese Thought, edited by Arthur F. Wright, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1953, p69. 5 See his Chapters on 'Exaltation of the Virtuous', translated in Motse The Ethical and Political Works of Motse, trans. Yi-Pao Mei, Westport: Hyperion Press, 1973, pp30-54. 6 Goldin, Paul R. Appeals to History in Early Chinese Philosophy and Rhetoric, Journal of Chinese Philosophy, Vol.35 no. 1, 2008, pp79-96 and Indraccolo, Lisa (2014). What is rhetoric anyway? Briared in words in Early China, Asiatische Studien, 68 no. 1, 2014, pp331-341; Ling Chen Persuasion in Chinese Culture: A Glimpse of the Ancient Practice in Contrast to the West, Intercultural Communication Studies, 14 no. 1, 2005, pp28-40. 7 Motse The Ethical and Political Works of Motse, trans. Yi-Pao Mei, Westport, Hyperion Press, 1973, Chapter 11, p56.
If your words were uplifting, Our people would be tranquil. Though the positions we hold are different, Still we are both in the same office. When I come to you with advice, You listen only with arrogance. My words could be of service, Do not treat them as a trifle. In the former times was the adage, Always ask the wood-cutter. 8 The last line indicates that advice should be taken even from the lowest strata since they might have useful information. Nor was this just an abstract saying. Technical manuals on medicine and agriculture clearly indicate that a large mass of folk practices and practical peasant knowledge was acquired and systematised by the scholars who compiled these treatises. 9 Indeed, several sections of the classic collection known as the Book of Odes seem to be collections of grass-roots opinions that reflect the people s views on government. 10 Later books such as Lu's Spring and Autumn Annals (probably compiled during the third century BCE) indicate the importance of loyal criticism, i.e. the need for a ruler to have trustworthy ministers who are willing to tell him unpleasant things, as well as the ability to listen carefully and judge persuasions. 11 This theme of loyal criticism is also emphasised in the Intrigues of the Warring States (thought to be compiled during third to first centuries BCE but referring to earlier periods). In a section of this text where King of Chao discusses the advantages of barbarian dress, we find the argument: That country is blessed in which ministers have no hidden loyalties and the ruler hides no loyal words to which the king replied: Concern is never mistaken for rebellion nor is loyalty ever a transgression. 12 This theme is even more strongly formulated in the following words: Chao Tsao remonstrated and said: 'To suppress loyal opposition is a form of disloyalty; but to malign state policy for one's private gain is traitorous. Disloyalty is punishable by death, and treason by death and the extirpation of the clan. These were the wise punishments devised by former sages for what are still the greatest crimes that ministers can commit. Though I am ignorant, I wish to see loyal opposition carried to its fullest measure though it may mean my death.' 'To make every effort to be understood and to yield nowhere is loyalty,' replied the king, 'and when a ruler openly receives other opinions it is simply good sense. The loyal minister does not flee danger any more than the sensible ruler drives men away. What have you to say, sir?' 13 Indeed, many of the situations found in the Intrigues of the Warring States are based directly on the distinction between a disloyal criticism, and a persuasion designed to influence the 8 Book of Odes, No. 254, translated in The Book of Songs: The Ancient Chinese Classic of Poetry, trans. by Arthur Waley and Joseph. R. Allen, New York: Grove Press, 1996, pp258-259 9 Bai Shouyi (ed.) An Outline History of China, Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 1982, pp246-7, p308; Elvin, Mark The Pattern of the Chinese Past, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1973, p116. 10 Nylan, Michael The Five Confucian Classics, New Haven: Yale University Press, 2001, pp79-80. 11 The Annals of Lu Bei, trans. by John Knoblock & Jeffrey Riegel, Standford, Standford University Press, 200o, 25.1.4; 13.4-5. 12 Chan-kuo ts'e: Intrigues of the Warring States, 474-221 B.C., translated by J.I. Crump, London: Oxford University Press, 1970, p300. 13 Ibid., p301.
ruler to take a wise course of action. We can see this clearly when Duke Ling of Wei was offended by one of his advisers and remarked: If this is a persuasion, I shall allow it; if not, you will die. 14 It is precisely the main ministers of states and other key advisers who were expected to take on the heavy, and at times dangerous, task of persuading the ruler to follow the best policies. Indeed, the art of persuasion is central to the Intrigues of the Warring States, a mixed collection of historical, fictive and rhetorical works. 15 The most extreme case is a section of the work which discusses the wrath of commoners, ordinary men who are willing to die or kill for their principles. 16 The crucial role of criticism is acknowledged by Mencius when he argues that in the case of ministers of non-royal blood: If the prince made mistakes, they would remonstrate with him, but if repeated remonstrations fell on deaf ears, they would leave him. 17 Furthermore, in the same situation if the ministers were of royal blood they might be actually obliged to depose the prince. Elsewhere in the Mencius a governor and a King are forced to admit faults in their administration of the realm. 18 For Mo Zi the overconfidence, arrogance or naiveté of a lord could threaten the continued welfare of a state, but equally dangerous are subordinates who dare not remonstrate against the laws the ruler has made. 19 High officials have a duty beyond merely executing orders and drawing their salary. Yet by the imperial period this task of frank counsel became extremely difficult. Under Emperor Wu an official was accused of disloyalty due to a slight curl of his lip when hearing of a new government policy. 20 Generally, the manoeuvring of court factions and outright intrigue made any overt criticism of royal authority and policies extremely dangerous. Successful generals could be viewed as rivals of imperial authority and demoted or degraded, e.g. the Han emperor Liu Bang had some of his commanders and subordinate kings executed for real or alleged conspiracies. 21 Even a historian as great as Sima Qian came under suspicion for covert criticism of imperial favourites in his support of a failed military commander. 22 Sima Qian ended up suffering the shame of castration, a penalty which he chose rather than death so that he could continue his writing. Nonetheless, criticism from below remained essential for the viable running of centralized, imperial governments. Another way to describe this situation is to view information as flowing in both directions up and down the hierarchy, from subordinate to superior, from superior to subordinate. However, flows of control-information, i.e. commands and orders, only flow from the superior down to the subordinate. If information is lacking or faulty, the commands will in turn be erroneous or perilous. It was precisely variants on this system which helped maintain imperial Chinese control over its huge territory, populations and diverse regions for more than two thousand years. This trend has been accurately summarised in its ideal form by Mark Elvin: - 14 Ibid., p567. 15 Ibid., pp21-22. 16 Ibid., pp453-4. 17 Mencius VB: 9. 18 Mencius IIB: 4. 19 Motse The Ethical and Political Works of Motse, trans. Yi-Pao Mei, Westport: Hyperion Press, 1973, p17. 20 Watson, Burton Ssu-ma Ch'ien: Grand Historian of China, N.Y.: Columbia University Press, 1958, p33, following Shih Chih 30/31. 21 Fitzgerald, C.P. China: A Short Cultural History, London: Cresset Press, 1965, p154. 22 Ibid., p212.
... the overall leadership of a superior person based on his acceptance by senior persons who are in turn accepted by their communities, a precisely delineated hierarchy infused with a pervading sense of moral order, and equity in the allocation of resources and responsibilities. 23 Therefore, the tendency towards the acceptance of hierarchical structures in the Chinese tradition should not be over-emphasised. Though there is a stress on authority and patterns of loyalty in early Chinese cultures, this should not be taken to mean that the Chinese of any class were culturally unable to organize self-interested action in an open, competitive public sphere. 24 That Chinese dared to critically and competitively debate public policy even at considerable personal risk is clear from the historical and philosophical record. The same remains true today. 23 Elvin, Mark The Pattern of the Chinese Past, Stanford, Stanford University Press, 1973, p43. 24 Nathan, Andrew J. "Chinese Democracy: The Lessons of Failure", Journal of Contemporary China, No 4, Fall 1993, p8.