The Middle Class in Russia: Agent of Democracy or Bastion of the Status Quo Cameron Ross University of Dundee c.z.ross@dundee.ac.uk
Defining Criteria of the Middle Class (1) Income and Property - indicators of average monthly income per person not lower than average figures for given types of settlement or the quantity of available durable goods not lower than median value for the population in general; (2) Occupation - non-manual labour; (3) Education - specialized secondary education or higher; (4) Self-Identification - integral self-appraisal by the individual of his/her status in the society not lower than four points inclusive based on 10-points scale. Source: M. K. Gorshkov and N. E. Tikhonova, Srednii Klass v Sovremennoi Rossii 10 Let Spustya (Moscow Institute of Sociology, 2014), p. 12.
Table 1 Variations in the size of the Russian middle class: 2003-2015 (% of Russian Population) Core of Middle Class Periphery of Middle Class 2003 11 18 2008 14 20 2009 11 15 2011 15 18 2013 18 24 2015 18 26 Source: M. K. Gorshkov and N. E. Tikhonova, Srednii Klass v Sovremennoi Rossii 10 Let Spustya (Moscow Institute of Sociology), p. 12.N. E. Tikhinova, Vliyanie Krizisa na Zhizn Rossiiskovo Srednovo Klassa, forthcoming in, Obshchestvennye Nauki i Sovremennost, No. 4, 2016, p. 4. (1,900 respondents)
Spatial variations across Russia s 8 Federal Districts - the smallest share of the middle class is to be found in the Far Eastern, Siberian and North Caucasian districts whilst the highest share can be found in the Central, Volga and North- Western federal districts. Zubarevich has demonstrated that Russian cities with populations over 500 thousand are socially and economically distinct from those with lower populations. Larger cities are on average wealthier, and citizens here are better educated, younger and more mobile than citizens from smaller cities. According to a 2006 survey, an average of 22% of the adult population of Russian cities were members of the middle class. For cities with populations of between 250,000 and one million, the figure was 24% and for cities with over one million citizens it was 28%. In St Petersburg and Moscow the figures were 40% and 50% respectively.
Smaller cities have retained a strong Soviet ethos. They have a larger number of blue-collar workers and public sector employees, mostly engaged in lowlevel jobs. In cities with less than 250,000 inhabitants, members of the middle class comprise an average of 13% of the adult population. The size of the middle class will also be higher in regional capitals and administrative centres. Generally, the further a city or urban settlement is from the regional centre, the smaller will be its share of the middle class. Finally, it should be noted that workers in public sector jobs such as education, health, social security, utilities, services, tend to have lower than average salaries. The percentage of state and private companies will also vary across the regions and this will feed into the number of member who belong to the different strata of the middle class.
Modernisation theory suggests a set of unilinear causal relationships whereby socioeconomic development gives rise to the middle class, which in turn spearheads democratization. This can be contrasted by a second and more nuanced theory, the contingent approach which argues that the relationship between economic development and democratization can at best be characterized as a dynamic one. Whilst the unilinear approach posits the almost inevitable pro-democracy stance of the middle class as the causal effect of modernization, the contingent approach suggests that the orientation of the middle class toward democracy will be dependent upon the specific socio-political and socioeconomic conditions pertaining in a country. Such conditions include, the degree to which the middle class is dependent on the state, its perceived socio-economic wellbeing, its political alliance with other classes, its own class cohesiveness, and its fear of political instability.
Three different channels power-based executive access (which includes members of the ruling party, government officials and members of the civil service); market driven access (which includes private entrepreneurs and managers); social network access (which include professionals, and cultural elites). Four social groups: 1) private entrepreneurs (the capitalist class), 2) professionals, managers and government officials (the new middle class), 3) small employers, small business owners, and the self-employed (the old middle class), 4) low-wage white collar and other workers (the marginal middle class).
Table 2: Percentage of Managers in the State Sector who are Members of the Middle Class Occupation 2007 (%) Managers in state sector/civil service Managers in military and security sectors 2011 (%) 33.0 76.6 24.9 44.0 Source: Ovcharova, L. N. (2013), Sotsial no-ekonomicheskaya Stratifikatsiya i Grazhdanskoe Obshechestvo (Moscow, Tsentr analiza dokhodv urovenya zhini, NIU VSHE), p. 10.
Table 3: Participation of Middle Class in Protest Demonstrations and Pro-Putin Rallies 2011-12 (% of respondents) Middle Class General Population Participated in Opposition Demonstrations Participated in Pro-Putin Rallies 15.9 2.1 8.4 0.9 Source: Eurobarometer Russia Survey 2012. Ten regions, 6000 respondents.
Table 4: Which of the Following Scenarios do you Prefer? (2014 survey). More than one answer permitted. (ranked according to choice of middle class respondents) Scenarios Middle Class General Population 1. Social justice, a strong state, which takes care of its citizens 49 56 2. The return of Russia to great power status 35 31 3. Return to national traditions, and time tested moral values 34 32 4. Human rights, democracy, freedom of self-expression 33 27 5. The stable development of society without upheavals 27 29 6. Russia primarily for the Russians 16 20 7. A free market, private property, minimum state intervention in the economy 14 10 Source: Mareeva in M. K. Gorshkov and N.E. Tikhonova, Srednii Klass v Sovremennoi Rossii 10 Let Spustya (Moscow Institute of Sociology, 2014), p. 187.
Table 5: Middle Class Support for the Regime, Democracy and Stability 2014 (%) Middle Middle Middle Class Class Class Age -30 Age 40+ 1) Despite its shortcomings the current regime deserves support 75 68 77 73 2) The current regime must be replaced at any cost 24 31 23 27 3) Russia needs a strong hand to bring order to the country 52 51 55 59 4) Political freedom and democracy must be protected under all circumstances 48 49 44 405 5) The country needs stability: it is more important than reforms. 69 55 73 70 General Population Source: Petukhov in M. K. Gorshkov and N.E. Tikhonova, Srednii Klass v Sovremennoi Rossii 10 Let Spustya (Moscow Institute of Sociology, 2014), p. 187.
Table 6: Do you agree that Russians should live by the same rules and laws as found in western countries? 2014 (%) Middle Class MC Core General Population MC Age -30 2003 37 43 23 - - 2014 32 33 24 42 25 MC Age +40 Source: Svetlana Mareeva, in M. K. Gorshkov and N. E. Tikhonova, Srednii Klass v Sovremennoi Rossii 10 Let Spustya (Moscow Institute of Sociology, 2014), p. 98.
Table 7: Middle Class Support for Political Parties in the 2011 Duma Elections (% of respondents) Lower Middle Middle Upper Middle General Population Did not vote 34.6 31.5 18.1 33.5 United Russia 38.7 40.1 48.6 39.2 CPRF 10.2 7.8 4.2 9.4 LDPR 6.2 4.1 8.3 5.6 Just Russia 4.0 5.1 8.3 4.4 Patriots of Russia 0.3 0.2 4.2 0.3 Right Cause 0.4 2.9 2.8 1.1 YABLOKO 0.7 1.2 4.2 0.8 Spoilt Ballots 0.6 1.0 1.4 0.8 No Answer 4.3 6.2 0.0 4.8 Source: Eurobarometer Russia, 2012. 6000 respondents in ten regions.
Table 8: Middle Class Support for Candidates in 2012 Presidential Elections (% respondents) Lower Middle Middle Upper Middle General Population Did not vote 31.0 27.5 15.3 29.8 Putin 46.1 47.7 56.9 46.7 Zhirinovskii 4.6 3.5 5.6 4.3 Zyuganov 8.3 6.0 1.4 7.6 Mironov 2.6 4.2 8.3 3.1 Prokhorov 2.8 6.8 9.7 4.0 Spoilt Ballots 1.0 0.8 2.8 0.9 No Answer 3.7 3.4 0.0 3.6 Source: Eurobarometer Russia, 2012. 6000 respondents in ten regions.
The Makarenko study found that the demand for democracy was more pronounced among the intelligentsia and managers of large companies whilst members of small businesses demonstrated lower interest in democratization, as did government employees (especially in Moscow) where support was the lowest. Middle class opponents of democratisation were largely to be found amongst senior members of the state bureaucracy and some high ranking officials in the most lucrative and innovative enterprises. Members of the middle class in these occupations perceive democracy as a threat to their privileged positions. Moreover, the more affluent members of the middle class were torn between their need for democratization, which they see as an instrument to restrain bureaucracy, corruption and lawlessness, and their fear of instability and the absence of control, if the Kremlin s power vertical is weakened
Russia is currently facing a deep economic recession and the middle class is beginning to feel the pinch. The number of members of the core who assessed that their economic situation had worsened rose by a factor of 7: from 6% in 2014 to 41% in 2015. Currently the Ukrainian factor is keeping support for Putin very high. Surveys show that the percentage of citizens who would be willing to participate in demonstrations to defend their economic rights fell from 35% in February 2012 to 12% in August 2016 and the figures for participating in political protests declined from 33% to 10%.