2016-2017 Drought: Contributing Factors RESILIENCE WORKING GROUP Dustin Caniglia January, 2017
The Resilience Perspective Consider the situation as experienced by those affected over a long period of time Consider multiple driving factors, unique by area, place and time Consider aid as a small piece of a big picture With this in mind the RWG came up with a list people to follow up with:
We have been gathering perspectives on the drought: Red Cross Climate Centre/Colombia University Somalia security expert Somalia livestock insiders Researchers on informal donors and clan dynamics Somali Government Officials Old Hats from 2011 Famine And Resilience Working Group Members
The dynamics differ in each district This presentation highlights some of the things to consider during your analysis
Factors Considered Uncertain Aid Pipeline and Coordination Seasonal Performance Underlying Vulnerabilities of Specific Clans Impacts of Insecurity Inconsistent Informal Donor/Support Networks Livelihood and Gender Specific Coping Issues
Seasonal Performance Step one, of many.
Seasonal Performance Use 2 subsequent seasonal performances during analysis of vulnerability Be cautious of rain frequency and its effect Princeton s African Flood and Drought Monitor is one great tool, especially for point data : http://stream.princeton.edu/awcm/webpage/interface.php?locale=en Don t use seasonal performance alone, overlay key characteristics Low-bais examples: Vulnerable sub-clans Hardest hit livelihood groups Trends of Violent Conflict
Take two-season perspective on seasonal performance Gu Rain Performance Mar-May Deyr Rain Performance Oct-Dec CHIRPS 90 Day Mar to May & Oct to Dec 2016
Shabelle River Historic Low January 11 th 2017 Shabelle River at Afgoye Town
Shabelle River Water Levels Historical coping mechanism for vast areas Normally absorbs huge amounts of people during drought, it s current levels will leave many without back-up options: Provides last-resort access to water Majority source of Somalia food production (deyr harvest 75% below normal) Provides casual labor on commercial farms Pastoralists access to water and extended grazing Home to some of the most marginalized clans
Impacts of Insecurity Access and Functioning Markets
Working on Islands of Access June 2011 vs. Feb 2016 SOMALIA - Humanitarian Access Map as of June 2011 SOMALIA - Humanitarian Access Map as of February 2016 *Please contract for sources
Violent Incidents Violent Incidents 2016-Q3 Total Number of Violent Incidents per District [1 Jul 2016 to 30 Sep 2015] Change in Incidents Violent Incident Changes 2016-Q2-Q3 Violent Incidents comparison previous quarterly [1 Jul 2016 to 30 Sep 2015] *Be sure to analyze changes by both % and total number!
Insecurity Considerations Don t underestimate how many villages are actually inaccessible Conflict increases the cost of doing business, sudden flare-ups are likely to disrupt markets in addition to steady high frequencies of conflict Sometimes isolated government controlled areas have increased market disruption and the availability of aid attracts IDPs to these locations In some areas, check-point costs are higher when government controlled than Shabab controlled Changes in territorial control greatly disrupts regular travel, trade and markets
Livelihood and Gender Specific Coping Issues Woman s Workloads Southern (Rain-fed) Agropastoralist Livestock Market Struggling
Women will be affected differently than men: Evidence shows that increased workloads of women during drought is a central factor in diminished household nutrition (Lessons from 2011) Increasing Women s decision making during shocks leads to more resilient households in Somalia (Mercy Corps) Journey mapping phases of drought by livelihood group quickly shows different patterns of vulnerability and displacement: Pastoralists Gravity Irrigation Farmers Urban Casual Laborers Rain-fed farmers Riverine Casual Laborers Peri-urban IDPs. Capacity to migrate differs by group Map last remaining water points and include them in emergency plans Drought affects livelihood groups and Gender differently
Southern Rain-fed Farmers Households are primarily reliant on eating the food they produce themselves Normal lean season April through June When rains fail, so does their income, their savings, and their food supply Own less livestock and therefore have lower milk access to sustain them when crops fail These livelihood groups (predominantly Bay, Bakool and Lower Shabelle) were the worst hit in the 1992 and 2011 famines. Most at risk of Famine in 2017
Livestock: Saudi Arabia banned exports on Dec 9 th 2016 KII: Expect ban to be lifted in February 2017 Black market to SA is still likely to be functioning at low capacity Affects North much more, overall affects on South unknown February sales only possible if livestock remains Export Quality Livestock consists of 40% of GDP 65% of it goes to Saudi Arabia
Market Capacity to Cope Diminishing Drought across East Africa reduces transregional migration/sales Low fodder supply across horn hampering shipping Window to sell-off herds is closing/closed as body conditions fall Local meat prices crashing across Somalia signals negative coping Livestock trade routes in the horn Source: Map adapted by Lind et al. 2016 from Gertel and Heron 2011, ICPALD 2015, Majid 2010, McPeak and Little 2006, and Simpkin 2005.
Livestock Recommendations For NGOs NGOs will have little impact on big herds, instead they should invest in HH milk animals Do not do destocking (ever) or restocking KII: Saudi Arabia/Hajj and the Middle East in general is a much more important market for northern and central areas of Somalia, whereas Kenya is much more important for the south. Again, while of course disruptions to this trade along with a severe dry spell is going to cause stress in the north, the north is not going to fall into famine. The south and particular clans and areas can fall into widespread famine.
Informal Support Informal Donors, Remittances and Business Community Networks
Remittances, Informal Donors and Business Community Remittance networks already being lobbied Informal donors can have access where we don t however Islamic charities/oic often wait to respond until they see it in the news Business community and support networks vary widely by sub-clans: Example: Specific Rahanweyn sub-clans hit hardest in past two famines, likely to be most vulnerable again Example: Specific Hawiye sub-clans in Galgaduud ties to business and diaspora communities arguably helped turn them around in 2011
Underlying Vulnerabilities of Specific Clans Utilizing Historical Lessons
Consider sub-clan histories and capacity to call on external support KII: contact elders of some of these groups to find out what is happening how much intra-clan resources are being stretched, where they are able to reach for other resources. Information is difficult to get from some of these groups because they are poorly represented within the aid community, and everyone is trying to make their situation look bad to attract resources, but with the right Somalis, the information networks are there.
Highest Famine-risk Clans The last 2 famines happened primarily to the same clan in the same general areas of the country. This was driven not only by drought, but also by politics and conflict, and the lack of ability of the people affected to influence those drivers when it mattered most Particular sub-clans of Rahanweyn (Digil and Mirifle) are among the most vulnerable and still recovering from 2011 Most of these clans are in Bay, Bakool and Lower Shabelle, and primarily (but not all) rain-fed agro-pastoralists Landless Somali Bantus are also among most vulnerable, and this year, those with land on the river will also be at risk due to the low water levels Talking about clan is complicated especially for non- Somalis but it is essential to consider clan dynamics and histories when assessing risks of famine in Somalia
Aid Pipeline and Coordination Unanswered questions
Pipeline and Coordination Government/Political Actions: State-level and National-level Drought Committees created and producing plans Displacement to Dadaab/Kenya may be obstructed by Kenya/KDF UN Agencies: JHNP ended in 2016, extension to April, how nutrition supplies will be accessed/distributed uncertain WFP Pipelines and response plan largely unknown UNOCHA and clusters largely focused on internal funding mechanisms (CERF/SHF) with regards to coordination gap in useful coordination exists and solutions are extremely complicated
Closing Analytical Question Should be considered differently in each area based on the unique dynamics!
Closing Analytical Question: In which areas will limited access, capacity and finite resources result in large-scale displacements despite efforts to support rural areas? For these areas should agencies begin now in shifting limited time and resources to preparing for an inevitable IDP influx? If stabilizing the rural areas fails, and the worst occurs, will we be prepared to respond to a famine? For example: http://www.aljazeera.com/programmes/rewind/2017/01/crisis-horn-africa-somalia-famine-170117081319175.html
RWG Next Steps Production of following products: Bi-monthly target area monitoring form: to be adapted by organizations wishing to monitor specific areas Recommended actions for adding value to standard drought response Recommended actions for preparing for IDP influx during pre-famine Final version of this power-point for wider adaptation Advocacy Products and Points: SNC produced and circulated December Press Release and separate Call to Action focused on realigning funds already available Nairobi based donors now need support in advocating for more funds from their countries USG funding is currently uncertain due to political changes, this is an advocacy point for other donors to contribute more To be added to RWG mailing list please email: info@somaliangoconsortium.org Dustin.Caniglia@concern.net