The theoretical roots of hierarchy in international relations

Australian Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 58, No. 3, pp. 337 352, September 2004 The theoretical roots of hierarchy in international relations DAVID C. KANG Introduction The past fifteen years have seen arguments from all theoretical schools predicting that Asia will very soon be riven with conflict. Indeed, so common has been this pessimistic sentiment that it could properly be called the consensus view on Asian international relations. Whether based on balance of power theories that emphasise differential power in the region, based on a liberal argument about and a lack of institutions such as international organisations and democracy, or based on culturalist notions of historical animosities and unresolved grievances, the conventional wisdom and dominant prediction by both scholars and policymakers has been that post-cold War Asia is an unstable place, and will be into the foreseeable future. Given the wide disparities in economic and military power among nations in the region, political systems that range from democratic to totalitarian, historical animosities, and the lack of international institutions, scholars concluded that Asia was ripe for rivalry. 1 Most significantly, China s dramatic economic modernisation has provoked widespread speculation that it may overturn the current regional order either intentionally or simply because its size provokes fear in its neighbours. Furthermore, these generally pessimistic views predicted a return of power politics, arms-racing, and potentially major conflict among Asian states, almost all of which had rapidly changing internal and external environments. Among the specific predictions were Japanese rearmament, 2 increased Chinese adventurism as a result of its rising power and revisionist intentions,(segal 1996), (Roy 1994a), (Kristof 1993), (Friedman and McCormick 2000), conflict or war over Taiwan, terrorist attacks from a rogue North Korea, 3 conflict over the Spratley islands and other territorial issues, and arms-racing in Southeast Asia (Kupchan 1998). However, in recent years, scholars have begun to criticise the pessimistic prediction. These critiques have focused on pointing out numerous empirical problems with the pessimistic viewpoint. Most importantly, a number of scholars have pointed out that other Asian states do not appear to be ISSN 1035-7718 print/issn 1465-332X online/04/030337-16 2004 Australian Institute of International Affairs DOI: 10.1080/1035771042000260110

338 D. C. Kang balancing against China (Womack 2004). Others have argued that the security dilemma is currently not intense in East Asia. As Haggard writes, the main security dilemma in the region at the moment is caused not by the rise or fall of great powers, but by the rapid deterioration in the capabilities and security environment of a risk-acceptant second-tier power, North Korea (Haggard 2003). Acharya argues that institutional growth in Southeast Asia has been much more extensive than the pessimists have noted, and Acharya also argues that shared norms and values are beginning to unite Asians (Acharya 2003). There has been no major war since 1978-79 and with very few exceptions (Taiwan and North Korea), Asian states do not fear for their survival. Japan although powerful has not rearmed to the extent it could. 4 China seems no more revisionist or adventurous now than previously, and in many ways has begun to appear to be a responsible, status quo power. Conflict, arms racing, and regional tensions have been notably muted in Asia. Alagappa writes that viewed through the ahistorical realist lens, the contemporary security challenges could indeed suggest that Asia is a dangerous place. But a comprehensive historical view would suggest otherwise. Although Asia still faces serious internal and international challenges, there are fewer challenges than before and most of the region s disputes and conflicts have stabilised (Alagappa 2002). My own work has attacked the pessimistic hypothesis by arguing that hierarchy, instead of balancing, is emerging in Asia (Kang 2003; 2004a and 2004b). This debate over the empirical evidence in Asia leads directly to questions about the theoretical models we use to explain Asia. That is, a theoretical model that explains the empirical evidence must guide any competing argument about the empirical evidence in Asia. With this as a background, the purpose of this essay is to adduce a defensible theoretical argument for hierarchy in international relations. At the heart of my essay is a relatively simple theoretical point: power is not the only variable that matters in international relations. The preferences of states, and the manner in which they convey these preferences to other states, will have a profound effect on whether states fear each other or whether they trust each other, and whether they compete with each other or find a way to accommodate each other. The theoretical propositions that I put forth in this essay are universal in nature, but obtain in an area-specific context. That is, this essay does not make a claim for the universal presence of hierarchy, nor does it claim that hierarchy always predominates over balance. Rather, under certain conditions balancing will obtain, and in other contexts hierarchy will obtain. The relative distribution of power in a system is an important variable, but it is not the only important variable. The preferences and intentions of states, expectations, reputation, adaptational mechanisms, and domestic processes are all important in determining the pattern and stability of a system. These are all elements of a larger abstraction of either balancing or hierarchy, but exploring how they exist in a specific context is what is important.

The theoretical roots of hierarchy in international relations 339 The remainder of this essay is composed of three major sections. In the first section I discuss the rationale for viewing Asia as a hierarchic, rather than balancing, international system. The second section incorporates a number of recent findings from the rationalist school of international relations to construct the theoretical foundations for hierarchy in international relations. A final section concludes, pointing to areas for further research. Hierarchy as a contrasting argument to balance of power It might be of little surprise that the pessimistic predictions are under attack, and that Asia is fairly stable. Asian international relations conform more to a pattern of hierarchy than to a pattern of balancing. Hierarchy is more stable than realists have allowed, and in international relations it is often the absence of hierarchy that leads to conflict. Power, interests, and the actions that states take to signal intentions and preferences are all key features of a hierarchic system. Furthermore, Asian international relations have historically been more hierarchic, more peaceful, and more stable than those of the West. 5 After a century of chaos and change, if the Asia of the 21 st century has elements of hierarchy in its international relations, then we should expect to see less conflict than a classical balance of power model would predict, and more stability. By hierarchy, I mean a system of international relations organised around a central, dominant power that involves shared expectations of rights and responsibilities for both the dominant and secondary powers. Nations in this system have a shared set of expectations about state behaviour based on continually updated information about state preferences and intentions, shared experiences, as well as deep history. This set of shared expectations reduces the security dilemma. Furthermore, the dominant power in the system has a different set of rights and obligations from the secondary states. The dominant power is expected to help order the system and to use its power judiciously. Were another state in the system to attempt this role it would be far more destabilising to the system. From this contrasting perspective, until the intrusion of the western powers in the 19 th century, Asian international relations were remarkably stable, punctuated only occasionally by conflict between states. The system was materially based, reinforced through centuries of cultural practice, and consisted of sovereign states defined over geographic areas that functioned under the organising principle of anarchy. Asian international relations emphasised formal hierarchy among nations while allowing considerable informal equality. With China as the dominant state and the peripheral states as secondary states or vassals, as long as hierarchy was observed there was little need for interstate war, and China generally did not interfere in the domestic or foreign policies of the surrounding states. This contrasts with the western tradition of

340 D. C. Kang international relations that consisted of formal equality between nation-states, informal hierarchy, and almost constant interstate conflict. With the intrusion of the western powers in the 19 th century, the old Asian order was demolished as both western and Asian powers (in particular, Japan) scrambled to establish influence. After a century of tumult in Asia, the late 1990s saw the re-emergence of a strong and confident China, continuing Japanese reluctance to assert itself internationally, the increasing stabilisation of Vietnam, the establishment and consolidation of postcolonial states in Southeast Asia, and soon perhaps, a unified Korea. While realists and liberals have tended to view modern Asia as potentially unstable, or American power and its alliance system as the major source of stability in the region, if the system is reverting to a pattern of hierarchy the result may be increased stability. A hierarchic model of international relations can also explain why conflict has been muted in the past 25 years despite rapidly changing power among states in the region. Of particular interest is why Japan has not rearmed to the level it could. A hierarchic perspective sees Japan as a status-quo supporter or secondary state that benefits from a hierarchy dominated by either the US or China. While Japan attempted to organise the system in the late 19 th century when China was weak, it would be surprising if it attempted to do so when China is strong. Korea and Vietnam also do not evince the concern over China that a balance of power perspective would predict. Both nations have a long history of both adjusting to and accommodating China s power, and while relations can occasionally be tense, neither Korea nor Vietnam actively fears Chinese aggrandisement. Far more important than any deep historical or cultural memory are the interactions among states today the interactions through which they communicate preferences and intentions. Indeed, of paramount importance for whether hierarchy can be stable in the current era are the actions of the states today. No one would be so naive as to argue that the pattern of six centuries earlier will simply replicate itself in the 21 st century. The world of 2005 is very different from that of 1400, and the question is whether, and in what way, some modern form of hierarchic relations might obtain. Furthermore, the presence of the United States, globalisation, and increasingly interlinked nations makes the modern international system different from that of six centuries earlier. That different systems do not conform to the classical European balancing model has been empirically validated by research that examines the past 150 years. Bennett and Stam subjected the classical European balancing model to empirical testing across regions and time. Although the balancing model works well in Europe, they find significant differences in preferences for conflict exist across regions, and no support for the argument that [Asian] behaviour will converge on that of Europe. In fact, all of the regions outside of Europe appear

The theoretical roots of hierarchy in international relations 341 to diverge from the European pattern [of classical balance of power] (Bennett and Stam 2003). Indeed, there are sound theoretical reasons to doubt whether either balancing or hierarchic behaviour is homogeneously distributed across regions, and thus no theoretical reason to think that because Europe saw balancing, Asia must as well. Writing about different behaviour across regions, Bennett and Stam note that it is not that the actors are not rational, even though a universal model may fail. Rather, they simply are not playing the same game with the same preferences (Bennett and Stam 2003). Without understanding states interests and the nature of their interactions with other states, it is impossible to explain differential stability across regions (Snyder and Jervis 1993). The issue for the study of Asian international relations is not whether hierarchy could exist, but rather a theoretical question: in the Asian case, does the evidence show balancing or hierarchic behaviour? For example, hierarchy is not unique to Asia it is a common element of international relations both globally and historically. One prime example is the relationship between the United States and Latin America. Latin American states do not balance the United States, but rather accommodate it. As long as the Latin American states rhetorically support basic US goals and intentions such as democracy and capitalism, the United States either provides material benefits or does not interfere in these states affairs. However, if one of the Latin American states moves too far away from US interests or rhetoric, the United States sends punitive expeditions to the region to restore order thirteen times during the 20 th century alone. Yet Latin American states do not attempt to balance the United States, even while they do not necessarily bandwagon. On the whole, these states adjust to the inevitable power and influence of the United States. Theoretical roots of hierarchy in international relations The heart of the matter is whether balancing based on material and situational variables best explains Asia, or whether other theoretical models are more applicable. In recent years, structural and material theories of balancing have been challenged most vigorously by rationalists, who have pointed out in a myriad ways how important are variables and processes other than the distribution of power in the international system. The most sophisticated theoretical treatments of war, deterrence, alliances, and international bargaining have concluded that understanding preferences is vital to being able to draw any conclusions about state behaviour (Powell 1999), (Fearon 1995), (Fearon 1998), (Mesquita and Lalman 1992). Haggard notes that in the absence of information on actors preferences or a clear sense of the nature of the strategic interaction in question, we are unlikely to generate defensible expectations about state behaviour or the propensity for conflict (Haggard 2003).

342 D. C. Kang Asymmetric Information: assessing relative capabilities and preferences Most importantly, rationalists have pointed out the importance of asymmetric information. Information is asymmetric or incomplete when different actors know or believe different things about a situation. The problem of asymmetric information manifests itself in two general areas. The first area is difficulties in assessing the relative power of various states, and the second area is difficulties in discerning the preferences of states. Powell writes that these asymmetries typically take the form of uncertainty about states goals (or, more formally, their preferences) or capabilities (Powell 1999:9). Regarding assessments of relative capabilities, a central puzzle of international relations is that war is costly and risky, so rational states should have incentives to locate negotiated settlements that all would prefer to the gamble of war (Fearon 1995:380). Often states cannot agree on some settlement, because they cannot agree on their relative capabilities. When two nations are in a dispute, and when their relative capabilities are not clear, then occasionally states resort to war in order to sort out which is the more powerful. Were both states to know which was more powerful, there would be no need to fight, as the outcome of the war would be certain. As Blainey argued thirty years ago, wars usually result when the fighting states disagree about their relative strength (Blainey 1973), (Downs and Rocke 1995), (Kydd 1997). Fearon argues that private information about relative capabilities and resolve and incentives to misrepresent this information is one of three defensible answers for why states might rationally choose war (Fearon 1995:381). Asymmetric information affects international relations in another way as well. Although material power is at the base of international relations, the preferences of other states are just as important in determining a state s assessment of threat in the international system. When exploring preferences, Fearon has argued that another major issue in international relations is that the problem is how to convey to other states what are one s vital interests, which are precisely those interests over which a state is willing to fight if challenged (Fearon 1997). International relations theorists have addressed the issue of preferences in a number of ways. Perhaps the most common way to address preferences is found in the extensive literature on status quo and revisionist powers. Definitions of status quo and revisionist powers are varied, but they tend to centre on the satisfaction of a state regarding the current international order. Organski and Kugler emphasise challengers to the existing status quo as those who want a new place for themselves in international society (Organski and Kugler 1980). Other scholars such as Gilpin and Schweller use the concept of a revisionist state as a central analytic component of their writing (Gilpin 1981), (Schweller 1994). Schweller defines a revisionist state as one that values what they covet more than what they currently possess [and] they will

The theoretical roots of hierarchy in international relations 343 employ military force to change the status quo and to extend their values (Schweller 1994). Although these concepts are widely deployed in the literature, Johnston concludes that despite the centrality of the terms [ revisionist and status quo powers] in international relations theorising and in discourse in the policy world, definitions of status quo and revisionist powers are not only vague but also undertheorised (Johnston 2003). Reputations also matter in the world of asymmetric information, as an avenue towards discerning state preferences and intentions (Press n.d.), (Sartori 2002), (Nalebuff 1991), (Alt et al. 1988), (Schultz 1998). There is an extensive literature in the field of economics on the manner in which firms will attempt to build a reputation (Wilson 1985). There is some controversy over whether threats, credibility, and reputation can affect more basic power and interests. 6 However, the point is that both interests and also the resolve of states over issues are relatively hard to discern, and yet remain important to the understanding of international relations. To the extent that reputations give any information about a state s preferences or capabilities, they will have an effect on stability in international relations. Preferences actually manifest themselves in the theoretical literature much more fundamentally, as well. Most game-theoretic models of conflict or bargaining must begin with the assumption that states have something to fight over, often a territorial dispute of some kind. Or the theorist has to assume a dissatisfied state that wishes to overturn the current system of benefits and the international order in some way. 7 As Powell concludes, whether states balance, bandwagon, or stand aside while others fight depends in a complicated way on many different factors when these factors are taken into account, states usually bandwagon (Powell 1999:22). The actions a state takes and the ways in which other states form assessments about its preferences are central to the issue of threat perception and stability. Repeated interactions, and shared cultural norms and history can serve to mitigate the security dilemma and create shared expectations among states in the system, or they can serve to exacerbate fears and instability. Powell concludes with a note of caution the model shows that a large number of important assumptions must be made about the technology of coercion, and about the ways that alliances and war affect the distribution of power.the analysis does not support the claim that states generally balance which of these behaviours occurs depends in a complicated way on the distribution of power and benefits, the technology of coercion, and the states relative resolve (Powell 1999:22). Thus, the most recent international relations theory literature goes well beyond material and situational variables in explaining conflict and alignment. Asymmetric information, preferences, and assessments of relative capabilities all point to the importance of understanding not only what states are, but also what they want and what they do. These are critical variables in determining

344 D. C. Kang why states might fight, why they might align, and how the pattern of the international system will develop. Hierarchy With the previous section in mind, it is a simple step to construct a theoretically defensible model of hierarchy. A hierarchic world is one that involves a dominant power that still operates in anarchy, but does not cause other nations to balance against the largest power in the system, and does not fold them under its wing in empire. In contrast to balance of power, a hierarchic perspective sees equality as most dangerous, because two roughly equal states may need to resort to war to determine which state is dominant. Note that one of the main causes of war that the rationalist literature has identified is a disagreement over assessments of relative capabilities. In hierarchy (i.e. one dominant state) this issue will be much more mitigated. Thus, hypothetically a system with an unequal distribution of power should have more stability, because the relative capabilities will be clearer to all states in the system. The strong will have no need to fight, and the weak will have no desire to fight. That leaves only the question of whether the dominant state will maximise its power or territory. But, as a number of theorists have noted, power maximisation is only one of many possible assumptions about state preferences (Brooks 1999), (Liberman 1993). It is quite possible that a dominant state will not pursue empire even if it has the potential to do so. It is also reasonable to assume that states pursue and satisfy safety, income for their citizens, and perhaps a number of other goals in addition to power. Under these different assumptions, it is quite possible to theorise that if a dominant state does not face any threats and is satisfied with the status quo in the system, it would not feel the need to pursue empire. Furthermore, a satisfied or status quo dominant state would not cause fear and balancing among the secondary states. Indeed, the realist prediction of balancing is based on a number of debatable assumptions. The assumption that states maximise power is simply that: an assumption made for theoretical ease. There is just as extensive a literature that provides a theoretical and empirical basis for assuming that states satisfy their power needs, and for identifying those states as status quo or satisfied powers. In order to hypothesise that a dominant state will fold the rest of the states in the system into empire, one has to take as initial assumptions a number of variables that are poorly or not at all developed in the literature. That is, a dominant power with good relations with its neighbours and no foreseeable threats, is far more likely to be a status quo power than a revisionist power. As noted earlier, theoretical treatments of war must begin with the assumption that states have some already existing conflict, usually a dispute over territory or over the relative share of benefits in the system.

The theoretical roots of hierarchy in international relations 345 Indeed, a status quo dominant state would not pursue empire. Lemke writes: only the very strongest of powers can plausibly threaten to change the status quo wars are most likely when a power transition occurs between the dominant state and a dissatisfied challenger Were all states of the world satisfied with the status quo, power transition theory hypothesises wars would be unlikely to occur (Lemke 2002). That is, whether or not a state pursues empire depends critically on a number of questionable assumptions, including power maximisation and dissatisfaction with the status quo. In the absence of these conditions, we would not hypothesise that a dominant state will pursue empire, even if it has the opportunity. As Fearon argues, it is not even clear that the assumption that states value survival is necessarily correct. Since Fearon s logic is so compelling, it is worth quoting him at length: In neorealist theory, the grounds for the proposition that states in anarchy want to survive as independent entities is unclear. If it is just an assumption, as Waltz initially introduces it (1979, p. 91), parallel to profit maximisation, then this proposition is fine. But if, as Waltz later suggests (e.g. p. 126) and as he is widely interpreted, the argument holds that the structural condition of anarchy forces states to put a high premium on survival, this seems doubtful. Anarchy does not by itself imply that states will value survival. Waltz argues that states in anarchy must value survival because only if survival is assured can states safely seek such other goals as tranquillity, profit, and power (p. 126). But this is incorrect. Imagine two states, each with the goal of maximising the per capita income of its citizens. If this were best served by merger into a single state, they would merge; they need not try to survive as independent entities to achieve this end. Nor is it correct to say that states we observe must value survival, since otherwise they would have disappeared. Neoclassical firms need not put any independent value on survival as such; if there are costs for merging, then profit maximisation could prevent them from merging that states typically desire to survive as independent political units is a reasonable assumption on which to build an IR theory, but it is not a consequence of anarchy or international structure. (Fearon 1998). As noted in the previous section, just as important as material power are the actions that states take to communicate intentions and preferences. Thus the critical question for stability in a hierarchic system is whether the dominant state conveys intentions that allay secondary states concerns, and whether a secondary state has the capacity and the desire to challenge the dominant state. Interaction between states continually updates their assessments of the other states intentions. To the extent that states can communicate well with each other, the system will be more stable. If all states know the rules of the game and the proper means of communicating preferences, they can communicate threats, acceptance of the status quo and other positions more clearly.

346 D. C. Kang Thus, although intentions, preferences, and cultural norms derive from the underlying power structure, they are by no means inconsequential. As Organski writes: everyone comes to know what kind of behaviour to expect from the others, habits and patterns are established, and certain rules as to how these relations ought to be carried on grow to be accepted Trade is conducted along recognised channels diplomatic relations also fall into recognised patterns. Certain nations are even expected to support other nations There are rules of diplomacy; there are even rules of war (Organski 1958). Lemke and Werner (1996) also write in this vein: the status quo of the overall hierarchy is thus the rules, norms, and accepted procedures that govern international relations. Although a hierarchic view of the world differs from the balance of power approach, much of this contrasting hierarchic pattern embodies many of the traits that realists will find familiar. Nation-states are the unit of analysis, and exist as sovereign entities defined over a geographic area. The system is one of anarchy, where the use of force is always a possibility (Mearsheimer 1990), (Walt 1987). Relative position matters in hierarchy: there is one dominant state and many lesser, peripheral states. Rhetoric, contracts, and laws are also regarded as being unenforceable, thus mistrust is high in the international system. Nations are primarily concerned with survival while threats and instability are accepted as a fact of life in international politics. As a result, nation-states are concerned about power and survival first, and economic issues second. The research presented in this essay is not concerned with explaining how states grow and change or how they become the various sizes that they do. 8 Rather, this essay takes as given a certain distribution of power in the system, and theorises about the implications of that distribution. Indeed, there already exists a well-established body of literature that examines various forms of hierarchy (Schweller 1994), (Powell 1999), (Lake 2003) and (Glaser 1997). Hierarchy is a broad concept that can include behaviour such as hegemony and bandwagoning, although hierarchy does not conform precisely to either concept. The hegemonic stability school that emphasises the beneficial impact of a dominant power is a prime example of this literature, as is the preponderance of power school which argues that an unequal distribution of power in the international system is more stable than an equal distribution of power. 9 Other scholars studying unequal relations have explored how the United States can restrain its own overweening power to mitigate fears of domination and abandonment through a combination of benefits and sanctions that it can provide to the secondary states in the system (Ikenberry 2001), (Wohlforth 1999), (Nye 1990). Hierarchy is stable and order is preserved through a combination of benefits and sanctions that the dominant power provides to the lesser powers. Good relations with the dominant state ensures the survival and even the prosperity of the secondary states through a continual flow of goods, trade, and

The theoretical roots of hierarchy in international relations 347 technology. Rejection of the hierarchy brings conflict as the dominant power intervenes to reestablish the hierarchic order. A hierarchic system does not imply that states bandwagon. Often, secondary states will accommodate the dominant power. Balancing is taking active steps to oppose the military or economic might of another country. Bandwagoning is taking active steps to curry favour or benefit from the economic or military might of another country. Accommodation is a strategy between these two extremes a focus on gaining benefits from the dominant state, but also an attempt to retain as much independence as possible. That is, states do not have to bandwagon in a hierarchy; rather, they just have to adjust to the dominant power. In contrast to the realist predictions about state behaviour that emphasise that secondary states will be fearful of and balance against the dominant state s capabilities, in hierarchy the secondary states may attempt to cultivate warm relations with the dominant state in order to gain benefits (Waltz 1979), (Walt 1987), (Schweller 1994), (Labs 1992). Hierarchy, unipolarity, and hegemony Hierarchy is similar to a number of other theoretical concepts, most notably unipolarity and hegemony. However, I do not use the term unipolarity simply because such a term implies a realist, and even structural realist, perspective of the world. Hegemony and hierarchy are also very similar terms, and indeed, these two concepts share a number of attributes. Both describe a system in which one power is dominant, and other states in the system cannot credibly challenge it. Both terms also imply that the system can be relatively stable, even if grudgingly so (Keohane 1984), (Stein 1984), (Snidal 1985), (Gilpin 1981), (Kindleberger 1981). I use the term hierarchy rather than hegemony because the literature on hegemony has focused mainly on trade and the formation of international regimes, and previous work has not explored security or overall system stability in any detail. Hierarchy also ascribes to all states within the system a place and a means of interacting with each other, and also allows for substantial autonomy and freedom among the secondary states. It more accurately describes the interaction and ordering of states up and down the hierarchy. A hierarchic system is also different from informal empire. Informal empire exists when a functionally dependent state remains nominally sovereign. Doyle writes that informal imperialism achieves [control] through the collaboration of a legally independent (but actually subordinate) government in the periphery (Doyle 1986). Wendt and Friedheim (1995) distinguish between an informal empire and the mere concentration of power: material inequality is not a sufficient condition [for informal empire]; however. The vast majority of materially unequal dyads in the states system are not informal empires. Concentration of capabilities is not equivalent to centralisation of control. The contrast with informal empire is important: in informal empire the puppet

348 D. C. Kang governments collaborate with the imperial power against the wishes of the populace. In hierarchy, independent sovereign nations accept the central position of the largest power in the system but are fully functional on their own terms. Conclusions and predictions Hierarchy is a defensible alternative theoretical approach to balance of power. However, the universal concept of hierarchy will obtain in an area-specific context. That is, hierarchy is neither more nor less likely to occur than balancing. In certain contexts balancing will obtain; in others, hierarchy. Geography, technology, ease and benefits of conquest, reputations, expectations, and domestic processes all matter. The point of this essay is only to show that hierarchy has sound theoretical roots. When looking at Asia, the hierarchic approach is less concerned with overall Chinese power, and more concerned with discerning what actions China takes towards its neighbours. Does China make credible reassurances to allay fears? Does China show prudence with the use of force? How does China resolve its conflict with other Asian states? In addition, the empirical work then also needs to focus on the strategies that other nations take to adjust to China s rise. Do they fear China and seek to balance either internally or externally? Do they communicate deference to China? Finally, a hierarchic theoretical approach will focus empirical scrutiny on the domestic aspects of China s rise. Important are the stability of the ruling party, its ability to manage the economy and political challenges, and the soundness of the economy itself. The debate over how best to explain Asian international relations is an important one, and will not be resolved by this one essay. Questions still unresolved are how best to test rival theoretical approaches, what empirical evidence is critical, and what competing predictions arise from competing theoretical viewpoints. However, an initial step towards this goal has been to lay out the theoretical roots of a hierarchic perspective of international relations. Notes 1 For generally pessimistic perspectives, see Friedberg (1993), Betts (1993), Manning and Przystup (1999), Goldstein (1998), Buzan and Segal (1994), Layne (1993), Christensen (2001), Waltz (1993), and Kupchan (1998). 2 On Japan see Segal (1993), Johnson (1989); Whiting (1989); Prestowitz (1989); Vogel (1979); Fingleton (1994); Johnson (1992); Drifte (1998); and Friedman and Lebard (1991). For an example of the hysteria Japan induced in policymaking circles, see CIA (1991); and Far Eastern Economic Review (1991). 3 See Betts (1993) Friedberg (1999), Eberstadt (1999), Ikle (1998), Jordan (1998), The Economist (1997); and Hughes (1997). For counter-arguments, see Kang (1995); Roy (1994b); and Sigal (1997).

The theoretical roots of hierarchy in international relations 349 4 For arguments that Japan will soon become a great power, see Waltz (1993) and Desch (1999). On the US security umbrella restraining Japanese rearmament, see Betts (1993) and Friedberg (1993). For counter-arguments, see the extended discussion in Katzenstein (1996); Soeya (2002); Johnson (1993); Lind (2000); and Berger (1993). 5 The classic statement is Fairbank (1968). See also Johnston (1994), although he concentrates exclusively on China and examines neither the Asian region nor the present. See also Cha s discussion (1998). 6 Daryl Press argues that reputations do not substantially affect the basic power and interests of states. Yet for our purposes, Press takes for granted that interests are well-known, which is not always the case. 7 Powell, (1999:83): the analysis of the bargaining between a satisfied and dissatisfied state would be relatively straightforward were it not for asymmetric information 8 Differential rates of economic growth is probably the most important factor, which leads into domestic politics and economic policy. In addition, external security threats can be a major factor in prompting states to undertake more coherent economic policies. See Kang (2002). 9 On hegemonic stability, see Gilpin (1981), Keohane (1984), and Lake (1988). On preponderance of power, see Organski and Kugler (1980), Lemke (2002), Houweling and Siccama (1988), and Lemke and Werner (1996). 10 Wendt and Friedheim (1995: 697) write that As objects of control, foreign and security policy are almost always regulated from the center another institutional expression [of informal empire] is found in interorganisational linkages. References Acharya, Amitav, 2003. Will Asia s Past Be Its Future? International Security 28, no. 3 (Winter). Alagappa, Muthiah, 2002. Introduction: predictability and stability despite challenges, in M. Alagappa (ed.), Asian Security Order (Stanford: Stanford University Press). Alt, James, Calvert, Randall and Humes, Brian D., 1988. Reputation and Hegemonic Stability: A Game-Theoretic Analysis, American Political Science Review 82, no. 2. Bennett, D. Scott, and Stam, Allan, 2003. The Behavioural Origins of War (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press). Berger, Thomas U., 1993. From Sword to Chrysanthemum: Japan s Culture of Anti-Militarism, International Security 17 (Spring). Betts, Richard K., 1993. Wealth, Power, and Instability: East Asia and the United States after the Cold War, International Security 18, no. 3 (Winter). Blainey, Geoffrey, 1973. The Causes of War (New York : Free Press 1988). Brooks, Stephen, 1999. The Globalization of Production and the Changing Benefits of Conquest, Journal of Conflict Resolution Vol. 43 no. 5 (October). Buzan, Barry, and Segal, Gerald, 1994. Rethinking Asian Security, Survival 36, no. 2 (Summer). Cha, Victor, 1998. Defining Security in East Asia: History, Hotspots, and Horizon-gazing, in Eunmee Kim (ed.), The Four Asian Tigers: Economic Development and the Global Political Economy (San Diego: Academic Press). Christensen, Thomas, 2001. Posing Problems without Catching Up: China s Rise and Challenges for US Security Policy, International Security 25, no. 4 (Spring). CIA, 1991. Japan 2000 (Rochester Institute of Technology). Desch, Michael, 1999. Correspondence, International Security 24, no. 1 (Summer). Downs, George and Rocke, David, 1995. Optimal Imperfection? Domestic Uncertainty and Institutions in International Relations (Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press). Doyle, Michael, 1986. Empires (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press).

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