Case 2:16-cv-00289-MWF-E Document 16 Filed 04/13/16 Page 1 of 10 Page ID #:232 Present: The Honorable MICHAEL W. FITZGERALD, U.S. District Judge Relief Deputy Clerk: Cheryl Wynn Attorneys Present for Plaintiff: None Present Court Reporter: Not Reported Attorneys Present for Defendants: None Present Proceedings (In Chambers): ORDER DENYING MOTION TO DISMISS [12] Before the Court is Defendants Motion to Dismiss Declaratory Relief and Injunctive Relief Claims and to Stay Remaining Claims (the Motion ), filed on February 25, 2016. (Docket No. 12). Plaintiff Michael Spangler filed an Opposition to the Motion on March 21, 2016, followed by Defendants Reply on March 28, 2016. (Docket Nos. 13, 14). The Court reviewed and considered the papers filed on the Motion, and held a hearing on April 11, 2016. The Motion is DENIED. Plaintiff does not appear to be challenging the constitutionally of Defendant City of Pismo Beach s (the City ) ordinances or resolutions; rather, he alleges only that Defendants engaged in specific conduct that violated his individual rights. Consequently, Defendants have not met their burden in showing that this action implicates important state interests warranting Younger abstention. Should it later become clear that the validity of the City s ordinances or resolutions is a foundational issue in this action, the Court will reconsider Defendants arguments. 1
Case 2:16-cv-00289-MWF-E Document 16 Filed 04/13/16 Page 2 of 10 Page ID #:233 I. BACKGROUND The Complaint makes the following allegations, which the Court must accept as true for purposes of ruling on the Motion: Plaintiff owns 2.5 acres of land in Pismo Beach (the Property ). (Complaint 9 (Docket No. 1)). The Property is zoned Open Space-1, authorizing the building of one residence and requiring the remaining area to be dedicated as undeveloped open space. (Id.). Despite this zoning restriction, the City represented to Plaintiff that its intent was to authorize multiple homes on the Property in order to promote beautification of the land. (Id. 9-10). The City thus recommended that Plaintiff first obtain approval to build his own residence and then apply to change the zoning of the Property to low-density residential development. (Id. 11). Plaintiff agreed with the City s recommendation and requested a permit to build his home. (Id. 13). In October 2003, the City s Planning Commission adopted Resolution No. 03-0027 (the Resolution ), authorizing construction of a single residence on the Property. (Id.) The Resolution contained a number of routine conditions, including one entitled, OPEN SPACE DEDICATION. (Id. 14). The condition read as follows: (Id.). The applicant shall record a permanent open space easement over any portion of the development not occupied by a structure or driveway or other developed area. The form of easement shall be reviewed and approved by the Planning Division prior to recordation. Said document shall contain a clause stating that the easement cannot be altered without approval of the City of Pismo Beach. 2
Case 2:16-cv-00289-MWF-E Document 16 Filed 04/13/16 Page 3 of 10 Page ID #:234 Plaintiff did not dedicate the open-space easement, relying on the City s express representations that it would cooperate in pursuing further development of the Property. (Id. 15). The City did not attempt to enforce the condition or demand that Plaintiff record the easement. (Id. 18). Instead, the City simply authorized Plaintiff to construct his residence. (Id. 16). Believing that he was in compliance with the City s Resolution, Plaintiff finished the construction, recorded a notice of completion with the City, and began living in his new home. (Id. 17). At the City s suggestion, Plaintiff then applied for an amendment to the General Plan in order to build three additional residences on the Property. (Id. 20). Over the course of several years, the application made its way through the Planning Commission to the City Council, and then back to the Planning Commission, with no final resolution to date. (Id. 21). The City s prolonged consideration of the application affirmed Plaintiff s understanding that no one expected him to record an open-space easement. (Id. 21-22). But political winds began to change in June 2015. Inexplicably, Defendant James Lewis, the City Manager, demanded compliance with the open-space condition, withdrawal of the application to amend the General Plan, and a promise that Plaintiff would never seek another amendment. (Id. 24.). Plaintiff refused the demands, and the City initiated its enforcement action. (Id. 25). The City began with issuing a series of citations for Plaintiff s failure to record the easement. (Id.). The citations initially imposed fines of $100, but escalated to $500 per day. (Id.). On July 29, 2015, Plaintiff filed an unsuccessful administrative appeal in an attempt to invalidate those fines. (Id. 26). On the same day the appeal was denied, the City purported to revoke Plaintiff s temporary certificate of occupancy. (Id. 28). On August 19, 2015, the City cut off water and electricity to Plaintiff s residence without providing him with notice of his right to a hearing. (Id. 29). Two days later, the City ordered Plaintiff to immediately cease the occupancy 3
Case 2:16-cv-00289-MWF-E Document 16 Filed 04/13/16 Page 4 of 10 Page ID #:235 and use of his home, threatening criminal enforcement. (Id. 30). On August 28, 2015, the City discontinued gas service to Plaintiff s home, rendering it without heat or hot water. (Id. 33). On that same day, Plaintiff filed a petition for a writ of mandate (the Petition ) in the San Luis Obispo County Superior Court. (See Plaintiff s Request for Judicial Notice, Ex. A ( Petition ) (Docket No. 13-1)). The Petition challenges the open-space condition in the Resolution on various grounds, including that it violates the Fifth Amendment. (Id. 8-16). Plaintiff requests the Superior Court to set aside and declare void the citation, along with all related fines and orders interrupting the peaceful and quiet occupation and enjoyment of [Plaintiff s] residence. (Id., Prayer for Relief at 13). The Petition is currently pending. On January 13, 2016, Plaintiff initiated this action, asserting four claims for relief under 42 U.S.C. 1983: (1) violation of procedural due process under the Fourteenth Amendment; (2) violation of substantive due process under Fourteenth Amendment; (3) violation of the Fourth Amendment; and (4) violation of the First Amendment. (Complaint 43-68). Plaintiff seeks monetary damages as well as injunctive and declaratory relief. (Id. 36-42). II. LEGAL STANDARD In ruling on a motion under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), the Court follows Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007), and Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009). To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter... to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citation omitted). All allegations of material fact in the complaint are taken as true and construed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Williams v. Gerber Prods. Co., 552 F.3d 934, 937 (9th Cir. 2008) (holding that a plaintiff had plausibly stated that a label referring to a product containing no fruit juice 4
Case 2:16-cv-00289-MWF-E Document 16 Filed 04/13/16 Page 5 of 10 Page ID #:236 as fruit juice snacks may be misleading to a reasonable consumer). The Court need not accept as true, however, [t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements.... Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. The Court, based on judicial experience and common-sense, must determine whether a complaint plausibly states a claim for relief. Id. at 679. Both parties request the Court to take judicial notice of the Petition. (Docket Nos. 12-1, 13-1). The Court may take judicial notice of matters of public record that are not subject to reasonable dispute. Fed. R. Evid. 201(b); see W. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass n v. Heflin Corp., 797 F. Supp. 790, 792 (N.D. Cal. 1992) (taking judicial notice of documents in a county public record, including deeds of trust). Because the Petition is in the public record and not subject to reasonable dispute, the requests are GRANTED. III. DISCUSSION A. Overview of Younger Abstention Defendants request the Court to abstain from moving forward with this action under the doctrine enunciated in Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971). The Younger abstention doctrine, as originally articulated by the Supreme Court, prohibits federal courts from enjoining state proceedings when important state interests are stake. Younger, 401 U.S. at 43-45 (reversing a district court injunction of state criminal proceedings). The doctrine is based primarily on principles of comity, which require a federal plaintiff to assert his constitutional contentions as defenses in state court rather than affirmative claims in federal court. See New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc. v. Council of New Orleans, 491 U.S. 350, 364 (1989) (noting that Younger rested primarily on the even more vital consideration of comity ). Although Younger itself involved a request for an injunction of a state criminal prosecution, the abstention principles were soon extended to requests for declaratory relief and certain types of civil actions. See Samuels v. Mackell, 401 U.S. 66, 91 (1971) (holding that Younger applies to requests 5
Case 2:16-cv-00289-MWF-E Document 16 Filed 04/13/16 Page 6 of 10 Page ID #:237 for declaratory relief because ordinarily a declaratory judgment will result in precisely the same interference with and disruption of state proceedings that the longstanding policy limiting injunctions was designed to avoid ); Sprint Commc'ns, Inc. v. Jacobs, 134 S. Ct. 584, 588 (2013) ( This Court has extended Younger abstention to particular state civil proceedings that are akin to criminal prosecutions. ). But even with these expansions, the Younger doctrine applies in only exceptional circumstances. Id. Before Younger analysis is even triggered, the state action in question must be (1) a criminal prosecution; (2) a civil enforcement action; or (3) a civil proceeding involving certain orders that are uniquely in furtherance of the state court[ s] ability to perform [its] functions. Id. (citation omitted). Provided that the state proceedings fall into one of those three categories, the federal court must determine whether granting relief would enjoin or have the practical effect of enjoining the state court action. See AmerisourceBergen Corp. v. Roden, 495 F.3d 1143, 1152 (9th Cir. 2007) (holding that an order requiring an individual to pay breach of contract damages would not enjoin or have the practical effect of enjoining the ongoing state court proceedings but would instead only collaterally estop the defendant from raising certain issues in state court). If so, the federal court must then decide whether the state court action implicates important state interests and affords the plaintiff an adequate opportunity to raise his constitutional claims. See Middlesex Cty. Ethics Comm. v. Garden State Bar Ass'n, 457 U.S. 423, 432 (1982) (applying Younger to state bar disciplinary hearings because they were extremely important to the state s regulation of the legal profession). Only if these requirements are satisfied should the federal court dismiss the plaintiff s request for injunctive and declaratory relief. The federal court should not, however, dismiss any claims seeking monetary damages. Instead, the court should simply stay its docket until the state proceedings are no longer pending. The Ninth Circuit has noted the distinction, and has ruled that a stay is appropriate when damages are sought. Gilbertson v. Albright, 381 F.3d 965, 981 (9th Cir. 2004). 6
Case 2:16-cv-00289-MWF-E Document 16 Filed 04/13/16 Page 7 of 10 Page ID #:238 B. Whether Younger Abstention is Applicable to This Action It is well-settled that enforcement actions intended to effect compliance with zoning regulations, such as the one instituted against Plaintiff, are subject to the Younger doctrine. See, e.g., San Remo Hotel v. City & Cty. of San Francisco, 145 F.3d 1095, 1103 (9th Cir. 1998) (applying Younger to a state mandamus proceeding challenging a city s ordinance that placed restrictions on the plaintiff s hotel); Night Clubs, Inc. v. City of Fort Smith, Ark., 163 F.3d 475, 479 (8th Cir. 1998) (holding that Younger precludes a federal action seeking to enjoin a state proceeding that challenged a planning commission s restrictive interpretation of a zoning ordinance); Addiction Specialists, Inc. v. Twp. of Hampton, 411 F.3d 399, 408 (3d Cir. 2005) (holding that a state court appeal from a city s zoning decision was subject to Younger); New Horizon Inv. Corp. v. Mayor & Mun. Council of Belleville, No. CIV.A. 04-3973 (KSH), 2005 WL 2237776, at *4 (D.N.J. Sept. 14, 2005) (same). The question then becomes whether granting Plaintiff s request for injunctive and declaratory relief would effectively enjoin the pending state court proceedings. This issue is more complicated than one would expect because it is not clear precisely what conduct Plaintiff attempts to enjoin in the two actions. Defendants point to broad language in the Petition and the Complaint indicating that Plaintiff seeks identical injunctive relief in both courts. (See, e.g., Petition 44 ( The City s administrative enforcement decision, including all punitive measures taken against [Plaintiff], is invalid as an abuse of discretion. ); Complaint 36 (alleging that Defendants committed constitutional violations by imposing fines and constructively evicting Plaintiff )). Plaintiff, on other hand, argues that these allegations were inartfully drafted, and that he seeks to enjoin only Defendants monetary citations in the state court action, and Defendants nonmonetary penalties in the federal action. (Opposition at 11). Plaintiff s argument has some merit, given that the administrative decision that he 7
Case 2:16-cv-00289-MWF-E Document 16 Filed 04/13/16 Page 8 of 10 Page ID #:239 appealed to the Superior Court involved only monetary fines. (See Petition, Ex. E); see also Cal. Gov't Code 53069.4 (requiring exhaustion of administrative remedies before any challenges to the imposition of administrative penalties in the Superior Court). Nonetheless, the Petition also alleges that exhaustion of the administrative remedies as to the nonmonetary penalties would have been futile, indicating that Plaintiff does, in fact, seek to enjoin Defendants from enforcing those penalties in the Superior Court. (Id. 41). The Motion, however, does not turn on that dispute, because the real issue is whether Defendants have met their burden in showing that this action implicates important state interests. The Ninth Circuit has emphasized that the importance of the state s interest is measured by considering its significance broadly, rather than by focusing on the state s interest in the resolution of an individual case. AmerisourceBergen, 495 F.3d at 1150 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); Champion Int'l Corp. v. Brown, 731 F.2d 1406, 1408 (9th Cir. 1984) ( Here the appellant challenges only one Commission order, not the whole procedure. This is not a substantial enough interference with Montana s administrative and judicial processes to justify abstention. ). Consequently, if the federal complaint alleges only that the defendant engaged in wrongful conduct specific to the plaintiff as opposed to alleging that the defendant enacted some unconstitutional policy, procedure, or law the state s interests are not sufficiently great to warrant abstention. See AmerisourceBergen, 495 F.3d at 1150 ( Accordingly, binding precedent prevents the court from finding that California s interest in enforcing this one particular judgment... qualifies as sufficiently important to satisfy Younger s second threshold element. ). The Third Circuit has persuasively applied these principles to analogous facts. In Addiction Specialists, the plaintiff filed a state court action challenging Township of Hampton s interpretation and application of a zoning ordinance. 411 F.3d at 404. The plaintiff then filed a federal action alleging, among other things, that the Township 8
Case 2:16-cv-00289-MWF-E Document 16 Filed 04/13/16 Page 9 of 10 Page ID #:240 engaged in discriminatory application of the land use polices. Id. The Third Circuit held that such claims did not implicate sufficiently important state interests because a federal claim challenging the discriminatory actions of township officials in making land use decisions as opposed to a claim challenging the validity of the state s land use policies and laws [does] not implicate important state interests for Younger abstention purposes. Id. at 409; see also Gwynedd Properties, Inc. v. Lower Gwynedd Twp., 970 F.2d 1195, 1202 (3d Cir. 1992) (holding that the federal action did not implicate significant state interests because the federal complaint [was] based on the appellees allegedly unlawful course of conduct, and [did] not challenge the legality of any ordinance ) (emphasis in original); New Horizon Inv. Corp., 2005 WL 2237776, at *6 ( It does not appear that the federal complaint involves a facial validity challenge to Belleville Ordinances No. 3025 and 2026, nor does the federal complaint challenge Belleville s actions and motions in passing the land use ordinances. Plaintiffs are not asking this Court to invalidate the Redevelopment Plan or other zoning laws. Those issues are raised in plaintiffs state case, where they challenge the open space restrictions and the zoning ordinances under state law.... [T]he Court is persuaded that it may not abstain because the issues in this case do not implicate important state interests for purposes of Younger abstention. ). The same appears to be true here. On its face, the Complaint does not challenge the constitutionality of the Resolution or any of the City s ordinances. Rather, such claims are asserted exclusively in the Superior Court. (Petition 44 (alleging that the open-space condition constitutes unconstitutional takings)). Consistent with these allegations, Plaintiff s counsel explicitly represented to the Court at the hearing that Plaintiff will not challenge the constitutionality of the City s legislation at any point in this action. Although Defendants disagreed, contending that the validity of the openspace condition is at the foundation of Plaintiff s federal claims, the Court is not prepared to invoke the Younger doctrine on such speculation. Indeed, even assuming that the condition is constitutional, it is at least possible that Defendants violated 9
Case 2:16-cv-00289-MWF-E Document 16 Filed 04/13/16 Page 10 of 10 Page ID #:241 Plaintiff s constitutional rights by failing to hold a hearing before discontinuing his utilities; by demanding that Plaintiff withdraw his application to modify the General Plan; or by charging him excessive fines and leaving him without any heat, water, or electricity. In other words, the unconstitutionality of the open-space condition is not necessarily an element of all of Plaintiff s claims. It is important to note that every case Defendants cite in support of their argument involved a facial challenge to constitutionality of some ordinance, statute, or policy in federal court. See, e.g., Remo Hotel, 145 F.3d at 1103 (holding that abstention was warranted where the plaintiff challenged the constitutionality of the defendant s land-use ordinance in state as well as federal court); Night Clubs, Inc., 163 F.3d at 479 (same); Carroll v. City of Mount Clemens, 139 F.3d 1072, 1074 (6th Cir. 1998) (same). In the absence of a similar challenge here, the Court cannot conclude that this action implicates sufficiently significant state interests. The Court would reconsider its conclusion, however, if it becomes clear later in this litigation that the constitutionality of the open-space condition is, in fact, a foundational element of Plaintiff s claims. V. CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, the Motion is DENIED. Defendants shall answer the Complaint on or before April 25, 2016. IT IS SO ORDERED. 10