Impotent and Obsolete: The Case for Nuclear Weapon Diplomacy with Iran. MPP Professional Paper

Impotent and Obsolete: The Case for Nuclear Weapon Diplomacy with Iran MPP Professional Paper In Partial Fulfillment of the Master of Public Policy Degree Requirements The Hubert H. Humphrey School of Public Affairs The University of Minnesota Adam Roberts Dr. Robert Kudrle Dr. Dara Kay Cohen May 2, 2012 Signature below of Dr. Robert Kudrle certifies successful completion of oral presentation and completion of final written version: Dr. Robert Kudrle, Paper Supervisor Date, oral presentation Date, paper completion Dr. Dara Cohen, Second Committee Member Date Signature of Second Committee Member, certifying successful completion of professional paper

Impotent and Obsolete: 1 Introduction The Case for Nuclear Weapon Diplomacy with Iran Adam Roberts Iran s nuclear program has received significant media attention in recent months, and has been a notable talking point on the campaign trail for 2012 presidential candidates. Sharp differences exist between the rhetoric of Republican candidates, and the policies advocated by President Obama. The Democrats and President Obama have been pushing for meaningful dialogue, while Republican candidates, including Mitt Romney, have pushed for a stronger approach more consistent with Israel s drive for a military attack. In this analysis, an airstrike is counter to American interests, but the current diplomatic proposals are insufficient. For diplomacy to succeed the United States cannot simply treat the Iranian nuclear program as a disarmament dispute. A frank assessment of Iran s threat environment and the U.S.-Iranian relationship is necessary to create a comprehensive diplomatic package that addresses Iran s underlying motivations for exploring a military component to its nuclear program. Only by addressing the security threats facing Iran, and levering Iranian political ambitions in a meaningful way, can the United States and Israel achieve a long-term solution. America and Iran once had a positive relationship, but that relationship deteriorated in 1953 when America sponsored a coup that ousted the democratically-elected Mohammad Mossadegh and installed the dictator, and Western puppet, Mohammad Reza Shah. Stephen 1 The title Impotent and Obsolete comes from an address to the nation on national security made by President Ronald Reagan on March 23, 1983. In that speech, President Reagan said, I clearly recognize that defensive systems have limitations and raise certain problems and ambiguities. If paired with offensive systems, they can be viewed as fostering an aggressive policy, and no one wants that. But with these considerations firmly in mind, I call upon the scientific community in our country, those who gave us nuclear weapons, to turn their great talents now to the cause of mankind and world peace, and to give us the means of rendering these nuclear weapons impotent and obsolete. Full text of Pres. Reagan s speech can be found at: http://www.fas.org/spp/starwars/offdocs/rrspch.htm 1

Kinzer wrote that, during a trip through Iran, when he asked what people thought of Mossadegh one woman begged of him Why did you Americans do that terrible thing? and explained We always loved America. To us, America was the great country, the perfect country, the country that helped us while other countries exploited us. But after that moment, no one in Iran ever trusted the United States again. 2 Additionally, Americans quit trusting Iran in 1979 when Mohammad Reza Shah was ousted in a revolution led by Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, and Iranian students stormed the American embassy in Tehran taking hostage the embassy workers for 444 days. These two watershed events in the second half of the 20 th Century laid the groundwork for the dysfunctional relationship the United States presently has with the Islamic Republic of Iran. An integral part of Khomeini s message and foreign policy was anti-americanism which included the West, especially Britain for its imperial role in Iran and the exploitation of oil resources in the early part of the 20 th Century, as well as Israel. A year later, Iran found itself fighting Iraq in September 1980 a war which lasted eight years. For the Iranian regime the lessons were clear: Iran was a Shiite state surrounded by Sunni enemies, and complicating the mix was the ever-present hand of U.S. foreign policy stirring the pot. Looking beyond its borders Iran could only see enemies. Now in 2012, with the effects of this history carrying into the present, Americans wonder if war with Iran is just around the corner. So rampant has been the talk of military strikes that President Obama warned the nation s leaders to not let the talk of war get too carried away. To many, the idea that America could find itself in another engagement in the Middle East is 2 Kinzer, Stephen. All the Shah's Men: An American Coup and the Roots of Middle East Terror. Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 2003. Page ix. 2

disconcerting. However, if this country is willing to fundamentally reassess its relationship with Iran an agreement can be made with Iran on its nuclear program without shedding blood. Why does Iran want the bomb? Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei and President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad are crazy. They are irrational. They want to have nuclear weapons to wipe Israel off the map and attack the United States. Iran wants to take over the Middle East and spread its own brand of Islamic theism around the region. All of these are common answers to the question Why does Iran want the bomb? All of these answers are also half-baked, lack any real depth of analysis, and frame the issue as a kill-or-be-killed conundrum where the only real way to move forward is to attack Iran before they have the ability to attack us. So why does Iran want the bomb? Most scholars and foreign policy analysts agree that is the central question to be answered. Iranian historical identity, an assessment of security threats, and a forecast of strategic gain resulting from a nuclear capability all play a role. Iranian identity Several tomes can be written about how Iranians think of themselves collectively. That being said, though any analysis of this will likely be oversimplified, even an elementary understanding is better than ignoring the subject completely. Also, not all knowledge of Iranian culture is useful in explaining the nuclear question, so the points covered are selective. Ironically, the Persian Empire and the culture which stems from it are comparatively as old as the ancient Western Civilization such as the Greeks. The Persian Empire famously fought the Greeks in Thermopylae, and ruled large tracts of Asia Minor. This Persian heritage is not lost upon the modern Iranian, but pride in this Persian heritage often breeds conflict with Iran s Arab neighbors. Yet, the Islamic Republic of Iran, and the core ideals upon which the nation was 3

founded, only dates back to 1979. When one acknowledges this fact it is easy to see that Iran is still a nation in transition. Iran has many internal conflicts over how the country should relate to the rest of the world, and at the core of many of these debates is a clash between the very old and the modern world. This is especially pertinent to a nuclear weapons program. Ayatollah Khamenei has said repeatedly that nuclear weapons are haram, or forbidden by Islamic theology. 3 However, evidence pointing to the military nature of the Iran s nuclear program suggests that there is, at minimum, a possibility that Khamenei will reconsider this policy given the perceived security guarantee a nuclear arsenal can offer. A noteworthy part of Ayatollah Khomeini s vision for the Islamic Republic was that it stood in sharp opposition to the West, led by America, as well as Israel. This is important to recognize as the U.S. tries to engage Iran diplomatically, especially in terms of managing expectations. Often when people hear diplomacy with Iran they think of attempts to make nice with Iran or become friends. At least in the near-term, this strategy is ill-advised. Iran s anti-american identity is a crucial part of the Islamic Republic regime. A European ambassador in Iran once asked Karim Sadjadpour, a Senior Associate and nuclear weapons expert with the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, If you take away death to America, and you take away the hijab, what will be left of the Islamic Republic? account for this as it creates the goals for a diplomatic package. Importantly, critics of diplomacy are right it is unlikely that the U.S. will have friendly relations with Iran under the current regime, but that does not necessarily need to be the goal. The overall objective of diplomacy is to keep nuclear weapons out of the hands of Iran, and this 4 Diplomacy, then, needs to 3 Tannenwald, Nina. "Using Religion to Restrain Iran's Nuclear Program." Foreign Policy. http://walt.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2012/02/24/guest_post_using_religion_to_restrain_irans_nuclear_progr am. 4 Sadjadpour, Karim. "The Nuclear Players." Journal of International Affairs 60, no. 2 (2007): 125-134. Page 127. 4

is not predicated on cordial, friendly relations. Instead, diplomacy needs to be predicated on a minimization of Iran s threat environment, political and military cooperation where Iran s strategic interests intersect with the United States, and leveraging Iran s political identity in a manner that is consistent with Iranian principles and international goals. Putting forth a diplomatic package that does not account these three elements of the U.S. Iran political relationship is likely to be viewed by Iran as an attempt to engage in regime change, and will result in the failure of the diplomatic process. Iran s security threats A major security threat Iran faces is that the country completely lacks any true allies in the region. As a specifically Shiite state, Iran often finds itself ideologically opposed to Sunni-led states in the region. Also, many other Middle East states have Arab majorities. This lack of common ideology and ethnic background does not result in natural alliances for Iran. To be sure, Iran has friendly relations with other states in the Middle East. Syria is about the closest example of an ally, but the differences between the countries are too stark for a true alliance to exist. In terms of religion, 74 percent of Syrians are Sunni Muslim; the official language of Syria is Arabic, and 90.3 percent of Syrians are of Arab ethnicity. 5 This is in sharp contrast to Iran where 61 percent of Iranians are of Persian ethnicity, the official language is Persian, and 89 percent of the Muslim population in Iran is Shiite. 6 Comparatively, the United States and Britain have a shared language, shared religious history, a long history of cooperation despite a former imperial-colonial relationship, and their values stem largely from the same foundations. Iran is not so fortunate to have that kind of relationship with its neighbors. 5 CIA World Factbook, Syria. https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/sy.html 6 CIA World Factbook, Iran. https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ir.html 5

While there are plenty of examples of cross-cultural alliances in the international community, this lack of cultural ties in the region is exacerbated by the instability of the Middle East. A second threat to Iran s security is the regime change taking place in the Middle East. Robin Wright explains that many young people throughout the Middle East, who are the largest regional demographic, are tired of the oppressive traditional structure present in many of the Arab countries. They are unemployed, cannot envision a prosperous future, and are tired of the dominant message the international community receives about the Islamic world being controlled by extremists. 7 In 2009, Iran experienced this first hand. Following the election of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad to president Iranians took to the streets to protest what they believed was an unjust election. The regime responded with widespread violence and crushed the Green Movement opposition. In the years that followed internet access was controlled and monitored, and the regime kept average citizens under close surveillance. Anything that could have been construed as going against the regime was stopped. If the international community learned anything from the Arab Spring it is that the people of the Middle East are finding their voice, and iron fist of regional dictators may not last forever. Iran s nuclear program is one of the few national issues which unites Iran particularly the civil nuclear program. This only hardens Iran s resolve to relentlessly pursue the power of the atom. A third threat that Iran sees in the region is the presence of the American military. On both its east and west borders the American military had a massive presence. To the east, the United States is still struggling to find a way out of Afghanistan, and to the west a massive military contingent was stationed in Iraq until only recently. The American navy is also the dominant naval power in Persian Gulf, just off the coast of Iran. Wherever Iran looks it can see 7 Wright, Robin. Rock the Casbah: Rage and Rebellion Across the Islamic World. New York: Simon & Schuster, 2011. 6

some contingent of the American military. The United States repeatedly tells the world that it is in the Middle East solely to protect its interests, but America s interests occasionally come in conflict with Iran s. Recently the U.S. overthrew Saddam Hussein s regime, and the Taliban s future is far from certain. This works in Iran s favor, but the Iranian government can t help but wonder if its country is next. To be sure, the U.S. has meddled in Iranian national affairs to the point of regime change in the past, and there indications that many of the covert assassinations and mysterious explosions could potentially be the work of either American or Israeli spy agencies. The strong American presence in the Middle East is the opposite of reassuring from Iran s perspective. Finally, there are eight countries with confirmed nuclear weapons arsenals. The U.S., Russia, the United Kingdom, France, China, India, Pakistan, and North Korea all have nuclear arsenals. Importantly, Israel has a nuclear arsenal, even though the Israelis have never confirmed or denied the fact. Obviously, Israel and Iran view each other as security threats, and Israel tips the balance of power in its favor with a stockpile of nuclear weapons. Russia also has the capability to fire missiles at Tehran, should it choose to do so. While Russia and Iran have largely had a cooperative relationship as of late the two countries do have serious points of disagreement. Also, Pakistan and India are not far away at all. Generally, their weapons are pointed at each other, but in the event that either country had an inkling to point their weapons in Iran s direction they could do so, and many Western nuclear powers support Israel. Of course the U.S. has the ability to strike anywhere in Iran with a nuclear weapon, and could deliver a warhead there in a number of different ways. Again, Iran finds itself outgunned on multiple fronts and without the ability to defend itself. To be sure, strictly from a security perspective, 7

Iran hardly sees itself as a secure nation, and the threat environment facing Iran gets worse when taking into account economic and other domestic factors. Perceived benefits of a nuclear weapon So what could Iran hope to gain from acquiring a nuclear weapon? How could having a nuclear arsenal specifically address the aforementioned issues? With regard to Israel and the other nuclear powers Iran could successfully create a deterrent from nuclear attack. Importantly, the only instance where nuclear weapons were used in a conflict was when Japan did not have a nuclear capability with which to retaliate against the American use of the bomb. Further, knowing that the most likely candidates to attack Iran are the U.S. and Israel, Iran finds solace in the fact that when two states have nuclear weapons the odds of war drop precipitously. 8 While the issue truly is much more complex than more nuclear weapons means less war, this previously mentioned fact is not lost upon Iranian strategists. A nuclear arsenal would also have the benefit of balancing the strategic power between Israel and Iran. Currently, Israel has a strategic advantage over Iran with its nuclear arsenal. If Iran developed its own arsenal this would tip the balance of power between the two countries in Iran s direction and create a more level playing field. From this perspective, the idea that a nuclear arsenal can bolster Iran s security environment is not irrational at all. A nuclear arsenal would have a couple of other benefits for Iran. In the international community, nuclear weapons are a signal to the world that the nuclear armed state is a powerful state that has to be respected. There is a sense that legitimate states that profoundly shape the international community have nuclear arsenals. 9 Many Arab countries fear the potential power 8 Rauchhaus, Robert. "Evaluating the Nuclear Peace Hypothesis: A Quantitative Approach." Journal of Conflict Resolution 53, no. 2 (2009): 258-277. Page 260. 9 Sagan, Scott D. "Why Do States Build Nuclear Weapons? Three Models in Search of the Bomb." International Security 21, no. 3 (1996): 54-86. Page 74. 8

that Iran can project, but not so much that they knuckle under to its every whim. In the mind of the Iranian regime, a nuclear arsenal would be proof positive that Iran is the regional hegemon it believes it should be, and with that in mind its behavior will likely adjust accordingly. Given that none of the other Arab states have nuclear weapons, Iran will be able to throw its weight around politically more than ever. Currently, Iran may have to work more closely with other regional states, but with nuclear weapons Iran will be powerful enough militarily that states might not have much of a choice but to go along with Tehran s desires. Not only would this be beneficial from a practical point of view of achieving one s foreign policy goals, but it would also be the culmination of Khomeini s promise in 1979 to restore Iran to its rightful place as the one true power in the Middle East. Why an Iranian nuclear arsenal would be a strategic threat to the U.S. Some argue that Iranian nuclear arsenal would not necessarily be a threat to U.S. strategic interests, and cite the fact that two nuclear powers have never gone to war. This argument is reminiscent of the classic debate between Scott Sagan and Kenneth Waltz. Proponents of this argument might be inclined to take Waltz s side in the debate that more nuclear weapons in the world can be better because war will be less likely to breakout between nuclear powers. 10 In the case of Iran, an overwhelming majority of observers disagree with this sentiment, however, and would lean in Sagan s direction: more nuclear weapons in the world will be worse. While Sagan s work has a lot to offer in terms of understanding Iran we have to go beyond the black-and-white mentality characteristic of the Sagan-Waltz debate if we are to understand the true impact that an Iranian nuclear weapon will have on the world, and the United States specifically. 10 Sagan, Scott D., and Kenneth N. Waltz. The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: A Debate Renewed. New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2003. Waltz explains his argument more fully throughout Chapter 1 of the book. 9

Scott Sagan takes an organizational approach to explaining why nuclear proliferation will be worse for international security. He has two central arguments: first, military organizations display organizational behaviors that are likely to lead to deterrence failures and deliberate or accidental war; and second, future nuclear-armed states will lack the positive mechanisms of civilian control. 11 To his second point, Sagan explains that organizations which employ nuclear weapons, usually militaries, have a strong and direct influence on policymaking which means the biases, routines, and parochial interests of powerful military organizations, not the objective interests of the state, can determine state behavior. 12 This is especially true in Iran. While Ayatollah Khamenei has supreme authority over the Iranian government, the leadership does not function in a strictly top-down manner. Khamenei does not unilaterally make decisions and demand compliance. 13 The leaders of various government factions have considerable power in influencing the Supreme Leaders opinion, and then are expected to carry out the decision Khamenei makes. Sagan had specific concerns about Iran. During the eight year conflict between Iran and Iraq, Iran developed a chemical weapons program and used those weapons after Iraq attacked Iranian military forces with chemical weapons. Iran has repeatedly said that these capabilities are strictly for defensive and deterrent purposes, but at the same time drill offensive uses of the weapons. 14 This is especially problematic for Sagan because it suggests that if Iran develops nuclear weapons the leaders of the military or revolutionary guards in control of nuclear 11 Sagan, Scott D., and Kenneth N. Waltz. The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: A Debate Renewed. Pages 47 and 48. 12 Sagan, Scott D., and Kenneth N. Waltz. The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: A Debate Renewed. Page 48. 13 More information about foreign policy decision making processes in Iran can be found in Chapter 3 of: Byman, Daniel, Shahram Chubin, Anoushiravan Ehteshami, and Jerrold D. Green. Iran's Security Policy in the Post-Revolutionary Era. RAND, 2009. 14 Sagan, Scott D., and Kenneth N. Waltz. The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: A Debate Renewed. Page 62. 10

weapons may not be fully controlled by central authorities. 15 Countries like Saudi Arabia find this particularly troublesome and may come to the same conclusion. This would be used this as justification to create their own nuclear arsenal to deter Iran. 11 Matthew Kroenig offers a more nuanced analysis than the good or bad nature of the Sagan-Waltz debate. In Kroenig s analysis, nuclear proliferation threatens powerful states more than it does weak states. 16 States with a capability of projecting a conventional military force onto the new nuclear state are more threatened by that state s acquisition of nuclear weapons than a state that is unable to project conventional military power. For example, the United States will be more threatened by Iran acquiring nuclear weapons than will, say, Burundi which does not have a capability to have a strong military presence in Iran. Since non-power projecting states have no capability to wage any significant military campaign in Iran, the deterrent effects of a nuclear arsenal are minimal since the weak state could not really threaten Iran in a significant way. In essence, there was little to actually deter. For the United States, on the other hand, an Iranian nuclear arsenal would be much more of a deterrent. The U.S. has the capacity to maintain a military presence in Iran for an extended time, and an Iranian nuclear arsenal would imply Iran s ability to inflict massive damage on the United States if it invaded Iran. So according to Kroenig s analysis, for the United States, Iran s nuclear weapon program is a strategic threat. Clearly, if Kroenig s theory, as applied to our Iranian example of proliferation, has a differential effect on the United States and Burundi, then it has to apply to Israel as well. According to Kroenig s model, the threat that Israel faces depends on its ability to project power into Iran. Since Israel does have the ability to project power onto Iran, although not to the same 15 Ibid. 16 Kroenig, Matthew. Exporting the Bomb: Technology Transfer and the Spread of Nuclear Weapons. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2010. Page 3.

extent the United States can, we can readily conclude that an Iranian nuclear weapon capability would be a threat to Israel. The threat becomes even greater when we look outside the bounds of what Kroenig s theory describes. First, any country, in assessing the threat Iran poses to their country, would have to look at Iran s capability to deliver a nuclear warhead to their country. The most common way of doing this is through a missile. Iran s missiles have the range and capability to reach Israeli cities. 17 Notably, Iran does not yet have the capability to put a nuclear warhead inside one of those missiles yet, but that is something the IAEA suspects them of researching. On the other hand, Iranian missiles do not have the capability of reaching the U.S. homeland, so one might argue that from this perspective Israel faces a greater threat than the U.S. Additionally, Israel is routinely the subject of Iranian rhetoric espousing to wipe the country off the map, and Iran has never acknowledged Israel s right to exist. This might suggest to some that Israel faces the gravest threat of all, but decisions to wage war are not made on rhetoric alone. Further pursuing the logic described by Kroenig s theory of nuclear proliferation the United States would face the gravest strategic threat of all if Iran develops or acquires a nuclear weapon. Since the U.S. is the strongest military power, and is a global superpower, nuclear proliferation anywhere threatens the U.S. more than any other state with more limited spheres of influence and less capability to project power. 18 While Kroenig s theory is definitely useful in describing how nuclear proliferation will threaten the strategic interests of a state it is not the whole picture. Capability and intent are two very important factors here. Iran is much more capable of developing a nuclear weapon and using it against Israel, and would have greater difficulty using a nuclear weapon against the United States. As far as capability goes, it is 17 For more information about Iranian missile capabilities see: Nuclear Threat Initiative. http://www.nti.org/countryprofiles/iran/delivery-systems/ 18 Kroenig, Matthew. Exporting the Bomb: Technology Transfer and the Spread of Nuclear Weapons. Page 188. 12

unlikely that Iran would use a nuclear weapon for purposes other than deterrence, but were it to hypothetically do so Israel would be a very likely candidate for a first strike. In short, both the U.S. and Israel can readily determine that an Iranian nuclear strike is a threat to its security, but for slightly different reasons. Finally, the U.S. calculates that Iran acquiring a nuclear weapon will be a significant problem for the world because other regional states will seek nuclear weapons. On the surface, this works counter to the foreign policy goal of a successive line of U.S. presidents stopping proliferation and reducing the number of nuclear weapons in the world. Many presidents and key government officials ascribe to the Global Zero goal the elimination of all nuclear weapons around the world. The fear is that not only would Iran work counter to that goal but that Iran becoming a nuclear power would set off a successive chain of nuclear proliferation in other states. Subscribing to the logic that Iran is attempting to deter an external threat, it is likely that other states will respond to this new threat in kind. Thinking back to the Persian-Arab and Sunni- Shiite divide in the Middle East it is apparent which states might be threatened enough by Iran as a nuclear power to develop its own nuclear weapons. Iraq shares a border with Iran and has fought a long and bloody conflict with Iran. The Iran-Iraq relationship has benefited from the U.S. intervention in Iraq, but the two states are not yet allies. Also, Saudi Arabia is another prime candidate for considering nuclear weapons. 19 There is extensive competition and tension between Saudi Arabia and Iran in economic, political, and cultural terms. Saudi Arabia and Iran are almost like a microcosm of the Cold War between America and the Soviet Union. Saudi Arabia, representing the Arab and Sunni way of life, and Iran, representing the Persian and Shiite 19 Jamestown Foundation, Iranian Crisis Spurs Saudi Reconsideration of Nuclear Weapons, 23 February 2012, Terrorism Monitor Volume: 10 Issue: 4, available at: http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4f4b58c92.html 13

way of life, both believe that they are destined to be the legitimate and ultimate regional power. 20 It would not be surprising at all, therefore, if Saudi Arabia responded to an Iranian nuclear weapon program in kind. Scholars speculate how Egypt and Turkey will respond to an Iranian nuclear development as well. One thing is for sure, and it is that a nuclear armed Iran would create great instability and uncertainty in an already volatile region of the world. Current U.S. Assessment of the Iranian nuclear program Key Iranian facilities The term Iranian nuclear program gets thrown around quite a bit without adequately describing what exactly the Iranian nuclear program is. There are several facilities which exist in Iran that comprise the Iranian nuclear program. Bushehr nuclear power plant The Bushehr nuclear power plant is one of the better known facilities making up the Iranian nuclear program. The Bushehr facility is Iran s first commercial nuclear reactor, and is a 1,000 mega-watt light-water reactor used to generate electricity located twelve kilometers south of the city of Bushehr. Originally, the Germans had signed an agreement with Iran to build the nuclear reactor in 1974, but this contract was ended after the 1979 revolution. The reactor was heavily damaged during the Iran-Iraq war from an Iraqi bombing raid. Later, Russia agreed to incorporate Russian technology into the original German design, and by November of 2011 the reactor was completed and fuel installed into the reactor core. 21 Natanz Fuel Enrichment Plant 20 Rubin, Michael. "Iran and Saudi Arabia's "Hate-Hate" Relationship." CNN. http://security.blogs.cnn.com/2011/10/11/iran-and-saudi-arabias-hate-hate-relationship/. 21 For more information see the Nuclear Threat Initiative. http://www.nti.org/facilities/184/. 14

The Natanz Fuel Enrichment plant is an operational facility which is using centrifuges to enrich uranium to the levels necessary for production. Iran is producing nuclear fuel at 3%, for use in power generation facilities like Bushehr, and at 20% for a medical research facility. 22 In order to create fuel for a nuclear weapon, Iran would have to enrich fuel to over 90%. There is no indication that Iran is doing this, however. Natanz is currently the main focus of Iran s enrichment effort. Fordow Uranium Enrichment Plant The Fordo facility is another uranium enrichment facility which is located near the holy city of Qom. The facility at Fordow is buried deep under a mountain and is surrounded by antiaircraft weapons at the surface making it incredibly difficult to destroy by aerial bombardment. Iran s plan is to move fuel enrichment from the more vulnerable facility in Natanz to the highly protected facility at Fordow. Israel views such a move as a significant red line. This transition from Natanz to Fordow is what Israel refers to as the window of opportunity to strike Iran. 23 Currently, Israel calculates that it has the capability of striking the Natanz facility, but knows it cannot strike Fordow. Once production is completely transferred to Fordow, Israel will not be able to stop Iran s nuclear program. This window of opportunity that Israel refers to is the amount of time before uranium enrichment ceases at Natanz and begins at Fordow. Arak Heavy Water Plant The heavy water plant at Arak is used to reprocess spent uranium into plutonium, which could be used in a nuclear bomb. The IAEA says that satellite imagery suggests that the plant seems to be in operation, but has not been able to confirm that with access to the facility. Under 22 Albright, David, Paul Brannan, Andrea Stricker, and Christina Walrond. "Natanz Enrichment Site: Boondoggle or Part of an Atomic Bomb Production Complex?." Institute for Science and International Security. http://isisonline.org/isis-reports/detail/natanz-enrichment-site-boondoggle-or-part-of-an-atomic-bomb-production-comp/. 23 "Iran "Zone of Immunity" Resonating with World." The Jerusalem Post, March 19, 2012. http://www.jpost.com/defense/article.aspx?id=262463. 15

the IAEA Additional Protocol, the IAEA would be allowed access to heavy water production facilities, but Iran has never ratified the Additional Protocol, so access to the facility has not been obtainable. It seems that Iran is not producing plutonium at the facility due to a Chinese contribution of an unknown amount of heavy water which meets the needs of Iran s research reactor. 24 Tehran Research Reactor The Tehran Research Reactor is a combination of multiple facilities where Iran conducts several research projects, many of which are unspecified. Currently, the reactor is producing only about 3 megawatts, due to a shortage of fuel. Iran admitted to having conducted polonium-210 tests at the facility. Polonium-210 is a radioactive material which is used in a berylliumpolonium neutron initiator that starts the chain reaction in a nuclear weapon. 25 Iran claims that this research was used in a non-weapon capacity and was not meant for a nuclear weapon. Gachin Uranium Mine Gachin is a uranium mine which began mining operations in 2004. In December of 2010, Iran said the first batch of domestically produced yellowcake uranium uranium ore concentrate used for enrichment into nuclear fuel had been mined out of Gachin and sent to the enrichment facility at Isfahan. 26 The Gachin uranium mine is important to Iran s security of its own supply of yellowcake, as Iran was believed to be running out of yellowcake imported from other countries. Isfahan Uranium Conversion Plant 24 For more information see the Nuclear Threat Initiative. http://www.nti.org/facilities/175/. 25 Institute for Science and International Security. http://www.isisnucleariran.org/sites/detail/tehran/. 26 BBC News. "Iran's Key Nuclear Sites." http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/mobile/world-middle-east-11927720. 16

The purpose of the Isfahan facility is to take yellowcake uranium and convert it into a form that is usable in various components of the nuclear program. Yellowcake is converted into three forms at Isfahan. First, hexafluoride gas, which is used in the gas centrifuges at facilities like Natanz. Second, Isfahan converts yellowcake into uranium oxide, which is used to fuel reactors but not the type of reactor that Iran has. Finally, Isfahan converts yellowcake into uranium metal. Often uranium metal is used in the core of nuclear bombs, and the IAEA is concerned that Iran s uranium metal will be used in that way because Iran s reactors do not use uranium metal fuel. 27 Parchin military base Parchin is an Iranian military base which specializes in the research, development, and production of ammunition, rockets, and high explosives. 28 Controversy first surrounded the Parchin site when satellite imagery suggested that Iran was conducting research into explosives that were specifically used in nuclear weapons. When IAEA inspectors visited Parchin in 2005 they took environmental samples which did not indicate the presence of nuclear material, and they did not observe anything that suggested nuclear weapon research. 29 Suspicion of the Parchin facility still remains, and Iran has blocked recent IAEA attempts to gain access to the facility. All of these facilities mentioned above play a significant role in the U.S. s threat assessment of the Iranian nuclear program. Each facility represents some kind of link in the chain which constitutes Iran s nuclear program, and therefore each of the facilities is a potential target for an Israeli or American strike. To be sure, some facilities make better targets than others, and some are more important than others. Theoretically, it would make more sense to strike the facilities suspected of having a component related to a weapons program, and leaving the 27 For more information see the BBC. http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-11927720. 28 Institute for Science and International Security. http://www.isisnucleariran.org/sites/detail/parchin/. 29 Ibid. 17

facilities that have strictly a role in the civilian nuclear program alone. Importantly, Iran is allowed to have a peaceful nuclear capacity under the NPT. The treaty does not forbid enrichment of fuel to levels usable strictly for peaceful capacities, and it does not forbid the existence of nuclear power plants. Assuming that intelligence information suggests that Natanz and Fordow are enriching uranium strictly to peaceful levels it would be more difficult to justify having these facilities on the target list. The same applies to Bushehr which only provides electricity. Evidence of plutonium production at Arak would make that facility a viable target just the same as evidence of weapons-related research being conducted at one of the complexes at the Tehran research reactor or at the Parchin military base. The Isfahan uranium conversion facility might be a plausible target as well, depending on the intelligence communities understanding of how the products that can be used for weapons programs are used. In the event that a military strike is launched it would be important for the United States to keep in mind which facilities are used in a civil capacity and which facilities are used in a military capacity. If the U.S. indiscriminately attacks components of Iran s nuclear program it would be difficult to justify our actions under the NPT. It would also send the wrong message to Iran. Importantly, Israel would likely disagree with on this point, and that is a profound difference between the American and Israeli analysis of the situation. The Israeli government does not believe that Iran should be allowed to have enrichment capability and would be more comfortable without the Bushehr power station in operation. Where the U.S. generally advocates drawing the line so as to be consistent with the NPT, meaning that Iran is allowed to maintain a civilian nuclear program that is fully inspected and monitored by the IAEA, the Israelis draw the 18

line at mastery of the fuel cycle. 30 Iran has already mastered the nuclear fuel cycle, as is evidenced by its stockpiling of uranium and the operation of the Bushehr facility. This is an important difference between the U.S. and Israeli analysis of the threat, and is the driving factor behind Israel s incessant talk of striking Iran s nuclear facilities. An analysis of Khomeini s nuclear logic In light of the discussion of what is happening in Iran s nuclear facilities, and the ambiguous implications of a military nature to some of the work happening there, how does the U.S. intelligence community come to the conclusion that Khamenei has not yet decided to develop nuclear weapons? The answer is that Khamenei is pursuing a strategy of nuclear hedging. Many of the other activities which Iran is pursuing, such as it s missile work and the suspected test bunkers and high-explosive test equipment at the military base in Parchin, when considered in tandem with its developments in the nuclear fuel cycle, ultimately constitute nuclear hedging. John Carlson defines nuclear hedging as a national strategy of maintaining a viable option for the relatively rapid acquisition of nuclear weapons, based on an indigenous technical capability to produce them within a relatively short time frame. 31 Nuclear hedging is also known as establishing break-out capacity, and is not permissible under the NPT. While the NPT does not explicitly address nuclear hedging itself, it does require that any enrichment capability be limited to peaceful purposes and fall under Articles I and II on non-proliferation, as 30 CBS News. "GOP Rep.: Israel has Different "Red Line" on Iran." http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-505267_162-57391294/gop-rep.-israel-has-different-red-line-on-iran/. 31 Carlson, John. "Iran Nuclear Issue - Considerations for a Negotiated Outcome." Institute for Science and International Security (2011) http://isis-online.org/isis-reports/detail/iran-nuclear-issue-considerations-fora-negotiated-outcome/8. 19

well as Article III on safeguards. 32 Since nuclear hedging has to do with creating weapon capability one could easily argue that the NPT would not apply to hedging, and any efforts to engage in hedging fly in the face of the NPT. Therefore, Iran could not claim to be protected by the same treaty which it clearly fails to meet the standards of. Why hedge at all? Why not just make an all-out lunge for a nuclear weapon? Doing such a thing would not be in Iran s security interest. A nuclear weapon requires extensive background work to create. Just mastering the fuel manufacturing process is an exhaustive undertaking that can take a long time. Having a half-assembled nuclear weapon (smoking gun evidence of an intent to create a weapon) sitting around waiting for other relevant technologies to develop would not be a wise approach with the IAEA and foreign intelligence agencies looking over Iran s shoulder. Understanding all of the components separately before constructing a bomb allows Iran to minimize the amount of time necessary to construct a weapon. By pursuing the nuclear hedging strategy Iran can claim that all of its work is for nonmilitary purposes because all the background work can occur independent of an actual plan to create a bomb. In fact, there does not even need to be a desire to actually have a bomb to do the research. Acquiring a nuclear arsenal is a dramatic change in a state s policy, and it completely changes its orientation to and relationship with the international community. There is too much regime instability in the Middle East for Iran to have any concrete idea of what its relationship will be like with its neighbors in ten years. By engaging in nuclear hedging, Iran can respond nimbly to any threat environment. If the future looks positive it can quickly back away from the program and if the future looks bleak it can rush the production process and acquire a nuclear arsenal in short order. In brief, Iran can establish the nuclear capability it needs, survey and 32 The text of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) can be found at: http://www.un.org/en/conf/npt/2005/npttreaty.html 20

assess its threat environment when it has the means to actually do something about it, and then decide from there whether or not a nuclear weapon will be useful. Lessons from Other States Other countries have examined the idea of constructing a nuclear weapon arsenal, but not every country has come to the same conclusion. Pakistan, China, and North Korea are examples of countries that successfully developed nuclear weapons programs despite strong international opposition. Brazil and Argentina are examples of countries that decided not to develop nuclear weapons programs once the capability to do so was established. Also, South Africa successfully constructed a nuclear arsenal, but years later decided to abolish its weapons program and become a nuclear weapon free state. What explains the difference in outcomes? Why did some states choose nuclear weapons programs and some did not? More importantly, what can these experiences teach us about Iran s nuclear program? South Africa In 1976 South Africa successfully tested its first gun-type nuclear weapon using natural uranium instead of enriched uranium. By 1982 the country had developed its first bomb a very simple design that was later upgraded. South Africa had developed an arsenal of six nuclear weapons by 1989. 33 However, South Africa s thinking changed in 1989 when President F.W. de Klerk was elected in September. The president wanted to end apartheid and regain the acceptance of the international community, and South Africa s nuclear weapons program was seen as an obstacle to accomplishing that goal. Further, by late in the year Cuban forces had left Angola, the Soviet Union had fallen, and the Namibia had become independent. All of this changed South Africa s 33 All information in this paragraph comes from: Albright, David. Massachusetts Institute of Technology. http://web.mit.edu/ssp/seminars/wed_archives01spring/albright.htm. 21

security environment. 34 In 1991 South Africa joined the NPT and not long thereafter IAEA inspectors were in the country verifying the program was abolished. David Albright, of the Institute for Science and International Security, concluded the international sanctions placed on South Africa in the 1970s slowed but did not stop its nuclear program. In fact, the imposition of the sanctions in the 1970s may have South Africa s determination to build nuclear weapons. 35 Albright came to this conclusion back in the spring of 2001 long before the Obama Administration, the Presidency of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, the current sanctions regime on Iran, and certainly before Iran s nuclear program was worrying the American public. Brazil and Argentina Brazil began researching nuclear power in 1975 with the help of Germany. The U.S. was highly suspicious of the Brazilian program and placed sanctions on Brazil. Argentina, which had started its program before Brazil, installed several nuclear reactors and build a small gas diffusion enrichment plant. 36 Efforts by the U.S. and its allies to restrain the nuclear programs ended up going nowhere. In the 1990s civilian presidents replaced the military leaders in both states, and the nuclear programs were re-examined. Both states realized that special civilian and military interests were served by the nuclear program more so than the state s interests. As a result, a host of bi-lateral and multi-lateral treaties were signed, the nuclear programs were ended, and 34 More information about South Africa s nuclear program can be found at: Sagan, Scott D. "Why Do States Build Nuclear Weapons? Three Models in Search of the Bomb." International Security 21, no. 3 (1996): 54-86. Pages 60-61. 35 Albright, David. Massachusetts Institute of Technology. http://web.mit.edu/ssp/seminars/wed_archives01spring/albright.htm. 36 All information in this paragraph comes from: Goldemberg, José. Arms Control Association. http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2006_04/lookingback. 22

Argentina joined the NPT in 1995 and Brazil joined in 1998. According to Goldemberg, both states monitoring each other s programs worked well. 37 Importantly, foreign countries imposing penalties for pursuing nuclear weapons did not prevent either Argentina or Brazil from halting their nuclear programs. Addressing the underlying factors driving the security calculation was what ultimately changed Argentina and Brazil s assessment of the benefits of nuclear weapons. China In China Mao launched an effort to build a nuclear weapon in response to American nuclear threats at the end of the Korean War. At President Kennedy s request, in 1963 the Joint Chiefs started outlining various military options to deal with China s nuclear program which included sabotage, naval blockades, conventional air attacks, and even using tactical nuclear weapons to destroy targets. 38 The fear was that if China went the whole of Southeast Asia would fall in line with China and become Communist the Domino Theory. In vehement opposition to China s nuclear program the United States actively sought to pressure China into giving up its nuclear program. However, Mao observed that the U.S. was mainly using its nuclear arsenal as a tool to threaten and leverage China, and as a deterrent, and calculated that the U.S. would not strike China; when it came time to test a nuclear device the Chinese announced that their aims were purely defensive and that they would never use nuclear weapons first. 39 In the end, nothing changed in China s analysis of its threat environment, U.S. actions only served to increase China s threat perception, and China joined the club of nuclear powers. 37 Goldemberg, José. Arms Control Association. http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2006_04/lookingback. 38 Goldstein, Lyle J. "When China was a "Rogue State": the Impact of China's Nuclear Weapons Program on US- China Relations During the 1960s." Journal of Contemporary China 12, no. 37 (2003): 739-764. Page 742. 39 Goldstein, Lyle J. "When China was a "Rogue State": the Impact of China's Nuclear Weapons Program on US- China Relations During the 1960s." Page 747. 23

India and Pakistan India was having border disputes with China in the late 1950s, and massive numbers of troops were building up on the border of the two countries. India followed Chinese nuclear weapons development throughout the early 1960s, and an embarrassing military defeat in a border battle spurred on the first demand for Indian nuclear weapons in 1962. 40 India was not surprised when China tested its first nuclear weapon in 1964, and in 1965 India began exploring nuclear weapon options, which left Pakistan gravely concerned. 41 This set the stage for the future nuclear confrontation between India and Pakistan. Despite India s commitment to non-proliferation, and its general belief that nuclear weapons posed incalculable risks and dangers to humanity they successfully developed an arsenal. 42 Ironically, India s security environment prevents the state from giving up nuclear weapons, even though India is firmly committed to the priority of getting rid of all nuclear weapons around the world. 43 A summation of Pakistan s nuclear proliferation is that it was in response to India s proliferation. As India explored nuclear weapons Pakistan became greatly concerned about this development, especially in light of the Kashmir dispute. As Prime Minister, in 1965, Ali Bhutto famously remarked that if India acquire a nuclear weapon then we should have to eat grass and get one, or buy one, of our own. 44 Later, when Bhutto became president, Pakistan s nuclear program began which, later on, resulted in a nuclear arsenal. In short, India developed nuclear weapons because China began looking into them and the two countries had a significant border dispute. Pakistan began researching nuclear weapons 40 Nuclear Weapon Archive. http://nuclearweaponarchive.org/india/indiawdevelop.html. 41 Ibid. 42 Raghavan, VR. "India's Quest for Nuclear Legitimacy." Asia-Pacific Revew 13, no. 1 (2006): 60-67. Page 61. 43 Raghavan, VR. "India's Quest for Nuclear Legitimacy." Page 62. 44 Nuclear Weapon Archive. http://nuclearweaponarchive.org/india/indiawdevelop.html. 24